tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22649737308097172012024-03-13T12:29:03.000-07:00A Different Washington: Archive 2003-2004Posts from 2003 and 2004Gerald G. Dayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18272770512487580818noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264973730809717201.post-14294717429842332882007-12-14T19:42:00.000-08:002009-01-03T16:52:06.342-08:002003<p>[<i>The "P-I"is the Seattle Post-Intelligencer</i>]<br /><p><b>Jan 1</b><br /><p align="justify">Consider: the continuing provocation by North Korea, compared to the progress, however slow and difficult, in obtaining information from and about Iraq; the fact of North Korea's nuclear program contrasted with speculation about Iraq's; the missile capability of the former set against the relative impotence of the latter; our policy of restraint and patience toward one and our preparation to invade the other. They combine to expose the administration's plan for war with Iraq as irrational, not merely misguided or unwise, and the boasting in the National Security Strategy as fatuous.<br /></p><p align="justify">In addition, the President is sinking into inanity. Asked by a reporter about the possible war with Iraq, he replied, "You said we're headed to war in Iraq - I don't know why you say that," an answer which would be credible only from someone not on the planet during the past few months. He then blithered into an answer to his own question: " I'm the person who gets to decide, not you."<br /></p><p align="justify">He has added to the impression that this really is too much for him by imitating his father's rolling rationale for war with Iraq. Bush <i>fils</i> now is concerned that an attack by Iraq or by "a surrogate of Saddam Hussein" would cripple our economy. "This economy cannot afford to stand an attack," he said. The reporters apparently did not ask how Iraq would attack us or who the mysterious surrogates might be.<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Meanwhile the cost of the war has dropped from 100 to 200 billion to a mere 50-60 billion; Mitchell Daniels obviously has no intention of going the way of Lawrence Lindsey.<br />____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. New York Times, Washington Post 12/31/02; Seattle P-I (Assoc. Press) 1/1/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Jan 2</b><br /></p><p align="justify">I learned, by way of op-ed column by Leon Fuerth in yesterday's NY Times, that we have a new policy document, entitled National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. It was issued last month, apparently as an addendum to the National Security Strategy. Professor Fuerth sees two contradictions between our response to the North Korean problem and statements in the new document. The first is the contrast between our policy of caution and the claim that we "will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes...to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." The other is our decision to permit a N. Korean ship to deliver missiles to Yemen, despite the statement, "Effective interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means."<br /></p><p align="justify">The latter, it seems to me, isn't a direct contradiction, as the Interdiction section of the new document concerns movement of WMD to "hostile states and terrorist organizations," which presumably doesn't apply to Yemen. The former quote may be inconsistent with our inaction regarding North Korea's nuclear plans, but the better contrast is between our reaction to that country's threats and the bombast about preemption in the National Security Strategy.<br /></p><p align="justify">Professor Fuerth's most pertinent observation has to do with the risks of tough talk: "When using words as weapons, a leader must be prepared to back up his rhetoric with force. The president's nomination of North Korea as a member of the 'Axis of Evil' in his last State of the Union message now looks like a bluff that is being called."<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Jan 4</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction is an odd document. Although it is an extension of the bellicose National Security Strategy, and restates part of it, the new document generally is restrained in tone. It gives the impression of detail by breaking down each topic into several subsections; however, in terms of substance, it is general and rather vague. It speaks of further studies and of policies to be adopted, but never quite gets around to saying what we're going to do. It is full of jargon and occasionally uses peculiar grammar. This is national defense policy MBA style.<br /></p><p align="justify">The strategy has, we are told, three "pillars": Counterproliferation to Combat WMD Use; Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation; and Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use. Confusingly, these are presented first in summary form, then at somewhat greater length, the two separated by a reference to a different, though related topic. The summary is a copy, with some changes in language, of a section of the National Security Strategy.<br /></p><p align="justify">The first pillar primarily refers to defense. The meaning of the term counterproliferation in this context isn't clear, nor is it in general. It is not defined in this document (nor in the National Security Strategy, where it also appears), but elsewhere I found "Counterproliferation refers to the use of military measures to address WMD threats to the United States and its allies."<sup><small></small> </sup>That seems to fit the use here, but doesn't really make much sense; the actions described in that definition and in most of the first pillar may counter the opponent's weapons, but don't counter their spread or increase, <i>i.e.,</i> proliferation. The one exception is the Interdiction section; the other two sections of this pillar are Deterrence, and Defense and Mitigation.<br /></p><p align="justify">The only reference to preemption occurs in the Defense and Mitigation section: "Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures." This certainly is more restrained than the repeated references to preemption in the National Security Strategy, which outlines steps to be taken to "support preemptive options."<br /></p><p align="justify">The second pillar, as the redundancy in its title makes clear, does concern suppressing the spread of weapons. The opening statement in the summary is "The United States, our friends and allies, and the broader international community must undertake every effort to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD and missiles." This is more at odds with the Yemeni incident than the language quoted by Professor Fuerth. However, this statement says too much; we don't plan to forbid all states from having dangerous weapons.<sup><small>2</small></sup> That consideration probably led to the less-inclusive statement under Interdiction. The sections of this pillar are entitled Active Nonproliferation Diplomacy, Multilateral Regimes, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Cooperation, Controls on Nuclear Materials, U.S. Export Controls, and Nonproliferation Sanctions. Interdiction would seem to belong here also.<br /></p><p align="justify">U.S. Export Controls makes clear where the administration's priorities lie. This section is two paragraphs long, but manages to tell business, not once but three times, not to worry. Export controls must meet national security goals "while recognizing the realities that American businesses face in the increasingly globalized marketplace." New legislation will be sought which will "give full weight to both nonproliferation objectives and commercial interests." The overall goal is to "focus our resources on truly sensitive exports to hostile states or those that engage in onward proliferation, while removing unnecessary barriers in the global marketplace."<br /></p><p align="justify">Consequence Management is the euphemism for dealing with the effects of an attack. The summary tells us that the government "will develop and maintain the capability to reduce to the extent possible the potentially horrific consequences of WMD attacks at home and abroad." The more extended discussion is largely a reference to other sources, including the National Strategy for Homeland Security.<br /></p><p align="justify">In between the summary and the expanded version, we are advised that<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The three pillars of the U.S. national strategy to combat WMD are seamless elements of a comprehensive approach. Serving to integrate the pillars are four cross-cutting enabling functions that need to be pursued on a priority basis: intelligence collection and analysis on WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies; research and development to improve our ability to respond to evolving threats; bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and targeted strategies against hostile states and terrorists. </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The method of seamlessly integrating the three pillars by means of the four cross-cutting enabling functions is taken up later under the heading Integrating the Pillars. In that section those enabling functions and their messages are as follows:<br /></p><p align="justify">- Improved Intelligence Collection and Analysis: "A more accurate and complete understanding of the full range of WMD threats is, and will remain, among the highest U.S. intelligence priorities....." We must improve our "intelligence regarding WMD-related facilities and activities...."<br /></p><p align="justify">- Research and Development: We have a "critical need for cutting-edge technology that can quickly and effectively detect, analyze, facilitate interdiction of, defend against, defeat, and mitigate the consequences of WMD." The new Counterproliferation Technology Coordination Committee "will assist in identifying priorities, gaps, and overlaps in existing programs and in examining options for future investment strategies."<br /></p><p align="justify">- Strengthened International Cooperation: It "is vital that we work closely with like-minded countries on all elements of our comprehensive proliferation strategy."<br /></p><p align="justify">- Targeted Strategies Against Proliferants: "A few states are dedicated proliferators, whose leaders are determined to develop, maintain, and improve their WMD and delivery capabilities...." "Because each of these regimes is different, we will pursue country-specific strategies...." The same effort must be made as to "terrorist groups which seek to acquire WMD."<br /></p><p align="justify">As suggested in the last section, a state or group which receives WMD is a proliferant and also a proliferator. As to "proliferator", this clumsy usage probably originates in the notion that any entity which increases the number of those possessing WMD proliferates WMD, which would make it a proliferator, <i>i.e.,</i> one which proliferates; this could apply either to the supplier or the acquirer. However, a more natural reading of the term would call only the supplier a proliferator. One could call the acquirer a proliferant, but it's awkward; "proliferant" suggests some sort of device, like a propellant.<br /></p><p align="justify">Various web sites discussing WMD follow the same usage, in which a proliferator could be either the supplier or the acquirer; a proliferant is only the latter. In a few instances, "proliferant" is an adjective, as in "proliferant programs" or "proliferant behavior." All of this is too deep for me. The drafters of our new policy did refer once to senders and receivers, but even then in jargon: "supplier and recipient states of WMD proliferation concern."<br /></p><p align="justify">This statement of national policy closes, under the heading End Note, with this: "The requirements to prevent, deter, defend against, and respond to today's WMD threats are complex and challenging. But they are not daunting. We can and will succeed in the tasks laid out in this strategy; we have no other choice." Oh, good; we're going to succeed because we must. At least we don't have to trust to the administration's talents.<br /></p><p align="justify">Does some law mandate the submission of this statement? That might explain creating something which says so little and does it in such silly language.<br /></p><p align="justify">The only other obvious reason would relate to developments in North Korea. The National Security Strategy is embarrassingly assertive, so perhaps a milder statement was desired, to cover the milder policy. The reference to country-specific strategies might be aimed in that direction. Making the revised policy more or less content-free also would be appropriate to that end.<br />________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative) web site.<br />2. The corresponding statement in the National Security Strategy refers to "rogue states."</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Jan 5</b><br /></p><p align="justify">As we move nearer war with Iraq, the reason for doing so becomes more elusive, and the President now is fully into the mode of Bush <i>père,</i> offering a series of rationales for the war.<br /></p><p align="justify">Basing an invasion on the fear of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is difficult to maintain, at least at present, since Iraq is allowing inspections which aren't disclosing anything. In addition, the administration doesn't appear to be very worried about WMD in Korea, where there is much better evidence of their existence.<br /></p><p align="justify">No connection between Iraq and 9-11 has been made and any link to terrorism in general is so tenuous that it cannot serve as the excuse.<br /></p><p align="justify">In October, the theory became the need to deter an attack by Iraq on the U.S. The President - or his advisors - asserted in the war resolution that Iraq might "launch a surprise attack against the United States...." In a speech in New Hampshire, the President warned us that Saddam Hussein "has a horrible history" of striking without warning, and that we "must do everything we can to disarm this man before he hurts one single American." In his speech in Cincinnati, he embellished on hat with a reference to Iraq's "growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical and biological weapons across broad areas." He expressed concern that "Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States."<br /></p><p align="justify">A few days ago, the effect on the economy became the reason to fear such an attack.<br /></p><p align="justify">On Friday he told troops at Fort Hood, "you will be fighting not to conquer anybody, but to liberate people." This imitates the high-moral-principle rationale from 1990, although less persuasively. It was at least possible to believe that driving Iraq out of Kuwait was undertaken to liberate the Kuwaitis; I doubt that anyone thinks that we're about to invade Iraq to liberate the Iraqis.<sup><small>1 </small></sup>At one point, the President used the weakness of the terrorism theory as a bridge to the current one: "America seeks more than the defeat of terror: We seek the advance of human freedom in a world at peace."<br />______________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. 4/6/03: I was mistaken about this. Increasingly, "liberation" has become the official rationale, and it appears to be at least accepted as such, if not wholly believed, by those supporting the war; it allows one to feel that the war is just.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Jan 10</b><br /></p><p align="justify">I've avoided the favorite theory on the left about our designs on Iraq, that it's all about oil. Little as I respect the Bush administration, I have difficulty accepting the notion that it is about to kill a lot of people in order to control Iraqi oil fields. However, the NY Times reported a few days ago that the "national security team is assembling final plans" for the administration of post-surrender Iraq. Included is the quick takeover of the country's oil fields ("to pay for reconstruction"), which makes it a bit harder to avoid cynicism. (The Times offered the story under the head, "U.S. Is Completing Plan to Promote a Democratic Iraq." More liberal bias.)<br /></p><p align="justify">In the same issue, Thomas Friedman offered the opinion that the war "will certainly be - in part -about oil." He thinks that denying that would be "laughable" because "it is impossible to explain the Bush team's behavior otherwise." He offered a variation on the oil theme, thereby melding two of the 1990 rationales: we're going to take over Iraq because Saddam with WMD could dominate the Middle East, threatening our oil supply.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Friedman thinks that war over oil is OK, as long as we're noble about it. To avoid being "immoral," we must encourage domestic energy conservation, share the wealth, and promote democracy: "I have no problem with a war for oil - provided that it is to fuel the first progressive Arab regime, and not just our S.U.V.'s, and provided we behave in a way that makes clear to the world we are protecting everyone's access to oil at reasonable prices - not simply our right to binge on it. "<br /></p><p align="justify">Too many people have no problem with this war. I have a problem with that.<br /></p><p align="justify"><a id="01/17/03"><b>Jan 17</b></a><br /></p><p align="justify">The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has issued its decision in the third appeal in <i>Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.</i> Unimpressed by the presence of more than a hundred professors, lawyers and organizations as <i>amici</i> for Mr. Hamdi, the Court held that his confinement may continue at the discretion of the government.<br /></p><p align="justify">The decision may be limited to the circumstances of the case: an American citizen captured during a military operation and identified with an enemy force. The court referred to Hamdi's capture in "a zone of active combat" six times and, for variety, in an "active combat zone" once. It distinguished the case of Jose Padilla, so perhaps the decision is limited to the battlefield context. However, the Court's general approach and some of its language would make that a risky bet; in the Padilla case, the government already has cited the Hamdi decision in support of a motion aimed at reversing a decision to allow access to counsel.<br /></p><p align="justify">The stated issue in the current Hamdi appeal was "whether a declaration by a Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy setting forth what the government contends were the circumstances of Hamdi's capture was sufficient by itself to justify his detention." In its decision on the second appeal ("Hamdi II"), the Court had held that "if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant' who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government's present detention of him is a lawful one." Therefore the factual question was whether he is an "enemy combatant." The answer to both questions was yes.<br /></p><p align="justify">The reasoning is more than a little muddy. In Hamdi II, the Court had declined to dismiss Hamdi's petition. "In dismissing, we ourselves would be summarily embracing a sweeping proposition - namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government's say-so." However, that is exactly what the Court did.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Court attempted to reconcile the two opinions. The distinction, it said, is that Hamdi is not "any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant." He is an American citizen "captured and detained by American allied forces in a foreign theater of war during active hostilities and determined by the United States military to have been indeed allied with enemy forces." However, in Hamdi II, the Court recited that Hamdi was "captured as an alleged enemy combatant during ongoing military operations in Afghanistan," so the explanation seems merely to mask a change of mind.<br /></p><p align="justify">The government did alter its manner of saying that Hamdi is an enemy combatant. It submitted an declaration by the mysterious but now famous Michael Mobbs, but all this accomplished was to attribute the claim to an unknown individual of unknown qualifications, applying undisclosed criteria.<br /></p><p align="justify">The District Court recognized that Hamdi's status as an "enemy combatant" was the crucial question, found the Mobbs declaration to be insufficient proof and attempted to go behind it. The Court of Appeals, however, would have none of that. At least in this context, the sufficiency and even the existence of the declaration are unimportant: once the government has decided that a prisoner is an enemy combatant, an enemy combatant he is.<br /></p><p align="justify">In various ways, the Court attempted to show that its decision was not quite that bald. As part of its rationale, it made several references to the Constitution and its separation of powers. After reciting war-related powers of the President and Congress, the Court noted, "Article III contains nothing analogous to the specific powers of war so carefully enumerated in Articles I and II." By itself, this establishes nothing; if the courts were limited to deciding cases explicitly described in the Constitution, they would have very short calendars. In Hamdi II, the Court stated that "the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases implicating... military affairs." In the present opinion, that was interpreted as follows: "The judiciary is not at liberty to eviscerate detention interests directly derived from the war powers of Articles I and II."<br /></p><p align="justify">The Court did not directly address the question whether detention interests directly derived from war powers were involved, but it relied upon the provision in the Constitution that the President, as Commander in Chief, has "the power to wage war which Congress has declared," and impliedly held that, in effect, there has been a declaration of war. "Congress authorized the President 'to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks' or 'harbored such organizations or persons.' " Under this authority, the President ordered "United States armed forces to Afghanistan to subdue al Qaida and the governing Taliban regime supporting it." "During this ongoing military operation," as the Court loosely put it, Hamdi was captured.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Court acknowledged that a habeas corpus petition normally would lead to a factual inquiry into the circumstances of the detention. However, that too would cross the boundary which the Court visualizes between the branches. Contemplating a factual inquiry "begs the basic question in this case," which in the course of the opinion became "whether further factual exploration would bring an Article III court into conflict with the warmaking powers of Article[s] I and II."<br /></p><p align="justify">The <i>amicus</i> brief filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights stated that the term "enemy combatant" is found in only three Supreme Court cases, "<i>Quirin,</i> where it refers to unlawful combatants, violators of the laws of war, and in <i>Yamashita.</i> . . and <i>Madsen v. Kinsella.</i> . ., both of which use it in the same manner as <i>Quirin.</i>" I have to take their word for the frequency of its use. (The Court, in a footnote, said that "the term is one that has been used by the Supreme Court many times," but cited the same three cases.) The rest of the statement in the <i>amicus</i> brief is misleading. <i>In re Quirin</i> used the term only once and, although it was in the context of a discussion of unlawful combat, "enemy combatant" was used to mean exactly what it appears to mean, someone fighting for the enemy. <i>In re Yamashita</i> used the term repeatedly, with the same meaning. In <i>Madsen,</i> it appears in a quote from <i>Yamashita</i> which was addressed to another issue; there was no enemy combatant in that case.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, the general point raised, that the term may be misused here, is valid and central. This and related concepts, drawn from earlier military models, are poor guides to the current situation. However, the Court not only was unconcerned about any present mismatch, it was willing to give the administration a blank check: "As the nature of threats to America evolves, along with the means of carrying those threats out, the nature of enemy combatants may change also." Separation of powers doctrine leaves definition of that change to the executive.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Court discussed the need for the military to detain enemy combatants free of interference by the judiciary. In a conventional context, that would be clear enough; the issue is whether it applies here, which brings us back to whether it is proper to label Hamdi an enemy combatant. The Court's decision terminates all inquiry into that question even though, as the District Court commented, "the circumstances of Hamdi's surrender and detention are anything but clear...."<br /></p><p align="justify">Hamdi was not seized by American forces, but by a Northern Alliance unit. It is not specified when he was taken prisoner, although apparently it was after September 11, 2001; the Court's statement is: "While serving with the Taliban in the wake of September 11, he was captured when his Taliban unit surrendered to Northern Alliance forces with which it had been engaged in battle." The District Court noted that the alleged battle isn't described: "a close inspection of the declaration reveals that Mr. Mobbs never claims that Hamdi was fighting for the Taliban...." "It does not say that the unit to which Hamdi was 'affiliated' was ever in any battle while Hamdi was 'affiliated'"<br /></p><p align="justify">We do not know whether Hamdi was aware of the association between the U.S. and the Northern Alliance or even of the September 11 attacks at the time of his capture, so we do not know whether he willingly joined or remained in a force he knew to be in opposition to the U.S. Whether, at the time of the capture, the bands known as the Northern Alliance had become "allies," is not revealed, nor is there any discussion of what being an ally means, requires or implies. What should be the status of one fighting against a tribe which suddenly becomes our ally?<br /></p><p align="justify">At one point, the Court referred to "thousands of alleged enemy combatants, including Hamdi," but the modifier is insignificant, as an allegation is all that is needed: "Thus, it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan during a time of armed hostilities there. It is further undisputed that the executive branch has classified him as an enemy combatant." That is all the decision really is about.<br /></p><p align="justify">Hamdi argued that the "war" has ended, and with it ended the government's right to detain him as a combatant. The Court was prepared to defer to the government's determination of the end of hostilities, but instead accepted its argument that "American troops are still on the ground in Afghanistan, dismantling the terrorist infrastructure in the very country where Hamdi was captured and engaging in reconstruction efforts which may prove dangerous in their own right." Satisfied that, "under the most circumscribed definition of conflict," the war has not ended, the Court rejected Hamdi's claim. The problem is that, under definitions the government will employ, the war may never end, which means Hamdi will remain a prisoner for as long as the government chooses to hold him. That carries with it implications for freedom which even the Fourth Circuit should be able to recognize.<br /></p><p align="justify">There is one more aspect of the decision which is troubling. As with much of the opinion, it is difficult to analyze the relevant passage by way of paraphrase or summary because it makes so little sense, so let us look at it almost in full. Referring to the District Court's critique of the Mobbs declaration, the Court of Appeals said this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...We think this inquiry went far beyond the acceptable scope of review. To be sure, a capable attorney could challenge the hearsay nature of the Mobbs declaration and probe each and every paragraph for incompleteness or inconsistency, as the district court attempted to do. The court's approach, however, had a signal flaw. We are not here dealing with a defendant who has been indicted on criminal charges in the exercise of the executive's law enforcement powers. We are dealing with the executive's assertion of its power to detain under the war powers of Article II. See <i>Eisentrager,</i> 339 U.S. at 793 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is no 'crime' to be a soldier."); cf. <i>In re Winship,</i> 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (explaining that elevated burden of proof applies in criminal cases because of consequences of conviction, including social stigma)....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The Court distinguished enemy combatants from those accused of crimes. As it noted earlier, the former are detained not as punishment but to remove them from the action. However, its point here is that, because no criminal charges have been filed against Hamdi, the District Court's rejection of the absurdly insufficient Mobbs declaration is inappropriate, or, in the Court's language of pompous submissiveness, "To transfer the instinctive skepticism, so laudable in the defense of criminal charges, to the review of executive branch decisions premised on military determinations made in the field carries the inordinate risk of a constitutionally problematic intrusion into the most basic responsibilities of a coordinate branch." In short, it is improper to challenge the declaration because Hamdi is being treated as a soldier, and it is no crime to be one. The protections of the criminal law are available only to those who might suffer adverse consequences.<br /></p><p align="justify"><i>In re Winship</i> is a case involving the application of adult criminal law standards to juveniles; it has nothing to say regarding enemy combatants. As to <i>Johnson v. Eisentrager,</i> and leaving aside the dubious use of a comment in a dissent as authority, Justice Black was not distinguishing between enemy combatants and civilians charged with crimes; he was objecting to the conclusion of a military tribunal that certain German soldiers were war criminals. One decision deals with civilian criminal law, the other with (conventional) war; the Court's conclusion is in no way supported by slapping these unrelated decisions together.<br /></p><p align="justify">The notion that there are no adverse effects "including social stigma" of being designated an enemy combatant is ludicrous. If the Court of Appeals is determined to prevent the District Court from challenging the government's assertions, it needs a more sensible theory than the lack of serious consequences.<br /></p><p align="justify">The most glaringly illogical aspect of this passage is the conclusion that it is better to be an alleged criminal than an alleged enemy soldier. If the former, one has some procedural protection; if the latter, throw away the key. Serial killers, even some terrorists under the baffling system now in place, have more rights.<br /></p><p align="justify">As a further irony, if the dissent in <i>Eisentrager</i> were to be applied here, its message would be that merely being a soldier in an enemy force is not a crime. Thus far, Hamdi has not been charged. However, John Walker Lindh was charged with numerous crimes and bullied into pleading guilty to two of them. His case is not entirely the same as Hamdi's but the basic situation is the same: capture while in the service of the Taliban.<br /></p><p align="justify">This decision seems to me to be misguided in two fundamental ways. The first is that we need a new theory. The concepts and terms being used, derived from conventional warfare, are not entirely appropriate to the present situation. Forcing cases to fit these obsolete molds will not produce just results.<br /></p><p align="justify">The other is that we have lost our objectivity, to say nothing of our dedication to civil liberties. Any decision which begins with a recital of the events of September 11, and transitions to the issues of the case with "in the wake of this atrocity,..." isn't going to keep its focus. We don't do any service to the memories of the victims by telling an administration which has little respect for our traditions that it may do as it pleases.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Jan 25</b><br /></p><p align="justify">After pardoning four men on death row, Governor Ryan of Illinois commuted the sentences of the remaining 167 inmates. The commutation is a stunning move, if only because of the number of cases, and has prompted editorials pro and con. One of each appeared in the Washington Post, approval coming from William Raspberry and dissent from George Will. Scott Turow wrote a column for the New York Times which provides valuable insight, as he was a member of a commission appointed by Governor Ryan to study the Illinois death penalty.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Raspberry is not an "absolutist," as he puts it, on the death penalty, but concluded, as did the Governor, that the system is too badly broken to patch up. "The Republican Ryan was, as they used to say about defecting liberals, mugged by reality." Mr. Will has escaped such an attack.<br /></p><p align="justify">Governor Ryan referred to Justice Stewart's comment that capital punishment is "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." In other words, the death penalty is imposed capriciously, with no more logic or fairness than a natural disaster. Will finds the Governor's response to be equally illogical, "capriciousness cubed," consisting of "undiscriminating commutations, most of them benefiting killers about whose guilt there is not a smidgen of doubt." Will only mentions the question of guilt, and does not address the issue of whether the death penalty had been imposed fairly. Reference to Turow's column would have provided reasons to be skeptical about both: "false confessions that had been coerced or dubiously reported by the police; mistaken eyewitness identifications; murderers who portrayed innocent people as accomplices; jailhouse informants who became witnesses in exchange for the kinds of favors that clearly tempted lies; and a statutory structure that provided an obvious pathway to arbitrariness in deciding who was to die."<br /></p><p align="justify">Turow did not elaborate on the last point, but I would assume that he had in mind the statute which listed twenty "eligibility factors," circumstances which, if found by the jury, authorize the death penalty. The most troublesome factor, one which has produced a controversial decision in Washington, is homicide in the course of a felony; in Illinois, fifteen felonies qualified for the death penalty. The commission unanimously recommended reducing the number of eligibility factors, and by majority vote reduced it to five, excluding felony murder. The majority explained the exclusion: "Since so many first degree murders are potentially death eligible under this factor, it lends itself to disparate application throughout the state. This eligibility factor is the one most likely subject to interpretation and discretionary decision-making."<sup><small>1</small> </sup>In less cautious language, the application tends to be arbitrary.<br /></p><p align="justify">It is fair enough to question whether blanket commutation should have been replaced by case-by-case analysis. I suspect that time constraints were part of the problem. Turow points to more principled factors. As to the clemency decision in general, no one suggested any alternative solution; Governor Ryan "either had to accept the results of a system everyone agreed needed to be fixed or exercise the clemency powers the state constitution imposed on him." Within the context of commutation, distinctions were problematic: "Knowing the details of so many of these cases, I could see how difficult it was to draw the line."<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Will complains that the action was "explicitly, even exuberantly, anti- democratic." By this he means that the governor thwarted the intent of the capital punishment statutes; the "chief executive vowed to not carry out the consensus of the people, as carefully codified by their elected representatives, in conformity with U.S. Supreme Court standards." Leaving aside the degree of care exercised by anyone, it is stretching the matter a bit to call the action undemocratic. Illinois law gives the governor the right of commutation. One might as well call any executive action undemocratic, so that isn't much of an indictment. Democratic or not, the clemency power is part of the same system which Mr. Will wants vindicated. In fact, the members of the Supreme Court who are supportive of capital punishment resort to the existence of that power as an excuse for not overturning death-penalty judgments. In <i>Herrera v. Collins,</i> Chief Justice Rehnquist devoted several pages to praise for the existence of the clemency power. "Executive clemency has provided the 'fail-safe' in our criminal justice system.... It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible."<br /></p><p align="justify">Will tempers his criticism with a similar, if pro-forma, acknowledgement that the system might have flaws, in the form of his ritual recital: conservatives "should remember that capital punishment is a government program, so skepticism is warranted." An interesting variation, one which found an adverse moral, was offered by <i>Die Welt,</i> quoted in the Post: "The death penalty is un-American because it postulates the infallibility of a government institution. America's democracy is based on the mistrust of government, on the ability to revise all decisions." Turow also drew the conclusion Will's formula suggests: "perhaps the best argument against capital punishment may be that it is an issue beyond the limited capacity of government to get things right."<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Will discounts the possibility that anyone innocent has been executed. He concedes that the fact that innocent men have been found on death row "might seem to justify the inference that, nationally, some innocent persons have been executed." It might seem to make the inference inescapable. Will's riposte: "But none of the many groups opposed to capital punishment provides the name of any such person." OK, let's keep on with the executions until one is named; if the first one identified is the guy executed yesterday, well, oops.<br /></p><p align="justify">This debate exists only because we have the death penalty. Why should we? Not quite three years ago, commenting on Governor Ryan's imposition of a moratorium on executions, Will said that there are two arguments for capital punishment, deterrence and proportionality. He was concerned then that deterrence might be "vitiated by sporadic implementation." Apparently he now has given up on it; restrictive rules have reduced "the death penalty's ability to deter, and even the ability of social science to measure its deterrent power." The "remaining realistic case for capital punishment is proportionality...." He also offered that rationale in 2000: executing a murderer "heightens society's valuation of life by expressing proportionate anger at the taking of life." However, this time, victims' rights come into the formula: "It is disrespectful of life, and of the victims' survivors, not to take a life for an especially heinous murder." In support of consideration of the survivors, Will quotes Turow's recent novel: <i>Reversible Errors:</i><br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Turow articulates the way capital punishment serves those whose lives are permanently lacerated by grieving for murder victims: "Their pain was not due to some fateful calamity like a typhoon, or an enemy as fickle and unreasoning as disease, but to a human failure, to the demented will of an assailant and the failure of the regime of reason and rules to contain him." For the grieving, capital punishment meant "an end point, a sense of an awful equilibrium being restored to the world."</p></blockquote><p align="justify">I wonder whether Turow, who supported the clemency order, would approve the use of this quote. Leaving aside the source, the idea conveyed is a bizarre one. The death of the perpetrator is necessary to restore the victims' equilibrium, to provide, in the current jargon, closure. Are we that primitive? Does vengeance really help us to cope? In addition, the execution makes up for the failure of the system to prevent the killing. We can't do it right before the fact, so we'll make up for that afterward; we'll bury our mistake.<br /></p><p align="justify">Will's complaint that the rules restricting imposition of the death penalty "have helped make its administration capricious" has some merit. Certainly the Supreme Court's meandering course leaves one with the sense that its decisions are based more on procedure than on substance and that the outcome is dependent more on the makeup of the Court than on any principle.<br /></p><p align="justify">Will points out the obvious and, for death-penalty opponents, inconvenient fact that the Constitution assumes the existence of capital punishment. That doesn't end the inquiry, but it does force opponents into arguments which are not notable for their cogency. One of those is "evolving standards of decency," the theory that a practice formerly accepted now is in disrepute. That is a tough argument to make here, as 38 states and the federal government have the death penalty. Evolving-standard analysis frequently is illogical, as it tends to be measured by reference to state statutes. This leaves the Court in the anomalous position of judging a state statute by reference to other state statutes: adjudication by referendum.<br /></p><p align="justify">Finally, Will notes that the commutations almost coincided with the anniversary of <i>Roe v. Wade.</i> He thinks that <i>Roe,</i> supported by many of the same people who oppose the death penalty, turned the liberal formula on its head: it "was made by a judicial fiat that overturned the evolving consensus on abortion policy set by 50 state legislatures." I don't know whether such a consensus was emerging; however, the juxtaposition is valid in a sense not mentioned by or applicable to Mr. Will, but one which troubles me profoundly: why is the debate between camps which are selectively pro-life? What accounts for the association of support for abortion with opposition to the death penalty and vice versa? Respect for human life should lead to opposing, or at least seriously questioning, both. The peculiar dichotomy may break down, but if it does, it may be in the form of a relative indifference to life, accepting both.<br />____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, 4/15/02, p. 72.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Jan 28</b><br /></p><p align="justify">When reading history, I used to be puzzled at how national leaders could take their people down paths which were obviously ill-chosen, the most usual being that toward war. After the events of the past sixteen months, I still am unenlightened, but no longer regard other times and places as different from our own. Tonight President Bush led us further down that path, to cheers from the Republicans and more applause from the Democrats than respect for the office required.<br /></p><p align="justify">The State of the Union address was notable for two careful deviations from last year's script. There no longer is an axis of evil: as to Iran, we merely support the aspirations of its people; as to North Korea, we will not be blackmailed, whatever that means, and will consult with other Asian nations. Last year the deficit was promised to be "small and short term;" it now is so obviously persistent, deep and intractable that there were no promises, assurances or forecasts, and it was mentioned only once, in a bromide about economic growth and spending discipline.<br /></p><p align="justify">The President made a good beginning in his denunciation of Iraq. He listed biological and chemical weapon stocks and pointed out that there is no evidence of their destruction. He complained about lack of cooperation and obstruction. He alleged that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium, presumably for nuclear weapons. Assuming his facts to be straight, this was sound, or would be if he were speaking to the UN and arguing that it should enforce its resolutions. As a call to unilateral action, it doesn't come close to making it, but few seem to notice the difference. He went on at much greater length, and here and there tried to show that Iraq is an imminent threat to us, but each new category was weaker than the one before, either because the facts are suspect, the supposed threat is unconvincing, or the issue is an obvious makeweight, such as Saddam's human rights violations.<br /></p><p align="justify">As a whole, the speech seemed to me to be pompous, shallow, demagogic and hypocritical. It will be interesting to see tomorrow's commentary; I probably will be in a smaller minority than usual.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Feb 2</b><br /></p><p align="justify">On Wednesday, the P-I reported the State of the Union address under the screaming headline, "We seek peace." One could hardly find a statement which less accurately described the portion of the President's speech devoted to Iraq. The paper had offered a better commentary, in advance, in the form of a Horsey cartoon showing Bush at rehearsal unable to keep a straight face while reciting, "War is our last resort."<br /></p><p align="justify">Wednesday's subhead was another quote, but modified. The paper had "but President says if war comes, 'we will prevail.' " The actual line was "if war is forced upon us,... we will prevail." Apparently even the P-I isn't gullible enough to repeat that formula.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Feb 3</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The excessive concentration of power in the executive, so well described by Arthur Schlesinger, was reversed for a time, ultimately leading to an opposite extreme in the impeachment of President Clinton. How quickly the pendulum has swung back.<br /></p><p align="justify">With Nixon in mind, but also noting a longer trend, Dr. Schlesinger observed that the imperial presidency had produced the idea that excessive deference was due "run-of-the-mill politicians, brought by fortuity to the White House," an apt description of the present incumbent. Nixon and his defenders sought to deflect attacks by demanding respect for and protection of the office of president. Schlesinger was not impressed: "...I would argue that what the country needs today is a little serious disrespect for the office of the Presidency;..." He didn't intend "serious disrespect" to denote personal animosity or partisan venom, as in the Clinton experience, but rather the withholding of deference in aid of serious criticism, specifically "a refusal to give any more weight to a President's words than the intelligence of the utterance, if spoken by anyone else, would command."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">There would be fewer absurd headlines like the recent one in the P-I if we adopted that standard.<br />______________________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The Imperial Presidency,</i> 411.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Feb 13</b><br /></p><p align="justify"><i>This note refers to one of a series of initiatives to the voters sponsored by a local activist, Tim Eyman. His proposals have had two general themes, tax cuts and public votes on any tax increases. Most of his proposals have been directed, unsuccessfully, to reducing annual auto license tab fees to $30. Two earlier Eyman initiatives were invalidated by the courts because they violated a provision of the state constitution that legislation, whether a bill in the legislature or an initiative, may have only one subject. For background, see Nov. 6 and 8, 2001 and Nov. 2, 2002. Sound Transit is an agency created pursuant to another public vote in 1996, whose mission is to improve regional transit; one of its projects is a light-rail system which has run over budget, has revised its plans numerous times, and has yet to lay a foot of rail. Its funding comes in part from a tax attached to license-tab fees. Eyman, among others, would like to kill the rail project or at least require a new vote on its current plan. For background on Sound Transit, see April 11, 2001.</i><br /></p><p align="justify">Initiative 776 was declared unconstitutional by the King County Superior Court. The result provides a double irony. This is the third time that an Eyman-sponsored initiative has been invalidated based on its violation of the one-subject rule, and this time it happened because Eyman cannot resist larding his measures with political posturing. Contrary to Eyman's post-decision whine that his group is incredibly careful in drafting, they are inept and apparently unteachable. If the initiative had kept to substantive matters, it probably would have survived unscathed.<br /></p><p align="justify">Section 1 of I-776 is the usual Eyman rant about politicians who don't keep their promises, including a claim of what the people want, in this case the following:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...The people want a public vote on any increases in vehicle-related taxes, fees and surcharges to ensure increased accountability. Voters will require more cost-effective use of existing revenues and fundamental reforms before approving higher charges on motor vehicles.... Voters will require more cost-effective use of existing revenues and fundamental reforms before approving higher charges on motor vehicles.... This measure provides a strong directive to all taxing districts to obtain voter approval before imposing taxes, fees and surcharges on motor vehicles.. ..</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The Court found this to be related to the initiative's subject, limiting the fee for auto license tabs to $30. However, as Eyman had made clear in the campaign, one of his targets was Sound Transit. He couldn't stop at cutting off its funds, but had to vent his anger at its failure to deliver the promised system. One of the ellipses above contains this: "Also, dramatic changes to transportation plans and programs previously presented to voters must be resubmitted."<br /></p><p align="justify">In Section 7, Eyman again indulged his dislike for Sound Transit and his fantasy of making public policy.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">If the repeal of taxes in section 6 of this act affects any bonds previously issued for any purpose relating to light rail, the people <i><b>expect</b></i> transit agencies to retire these bonds using reserve funds including accrued interest, sale of property or equipment, new voter approved tax revenues, or any combination of these sources of revenue. Taxing districts <i><b>should</b></i> abstain from further bond sales for any purpose relating to light rail until voters decide this measure. The people <i><b>encourage</b></i> transit agencies to put another tax revenue measure before voters if they want to continue with a light rail system dramatically changed from that previously represented to and approved by voters.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The court added the emphasis, to acknowledge that this section is more advisory than Section 1. However, in its ruling, the two passages were lumped together, the Court holding that they introduce a second subject. The rationale is not free of ambiguity, but stripped to its essentials, it is that<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...when I-776 asks voters to establish a policy regarding public votes on transportation programs, there is no connection to license tabs and fees. As argued by Sound Transit, I-776 seeks to achieve two unrelated purposes: 1) set licenses fees at $30.00 and 2) establish a new state policy encouraging public votes on transportation programs that are not funded by and thus, do not affect the $30.00 fee. This court concurs.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The offending sentence from Section 1 ("must be resubmitted") could be read as mandatory. Section 7 is, as the Court emphasized, precatory only, but that did not affect the result.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Voters should not have to guess whether a section is precatory or mandatory when voting for or against an initiative. Rather, voters should be able to assume that language placed in the body of an initiative serves a legitimate and necessary purpose for effectuating the legislation.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This probably is sound enough, especially where, as with this measure, the precatory portion has been pushed as a reason to vote yes. However, the Court declined to look at matters outside the initiative text, so the issue is posed in rather stark terms.<br /></p><p align="justify">Eyman has a better shot at reversing this decision than he did with the earlier initiatives. The Court found no Supreme Court authority for the proposition that precatory sections are to be taken into account for single-subject purposes, and some of the language of the opinion blurs the distinction between the two subjects. The decision would have been more secure if the Court had ruled separately on the Section 1 and 7 issues. Even within Section 7, there is a gradation, from "expect" to "should" to "encourage." By basing the decision on all of these statements, the Court weakened the effect of the apparent directive in Section 1, "dramatic changes to transportation plans and programs previously presented to voters must be resubmitted," especially by pairing it with the mild parallel statement in Section 7 that the people "encourage transit agencies to put another tax revenue measure before voters if they want to continue with a light rail system dramatically changed from that previously represented to and approved by voters."<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 2</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The level of support for the invasion of Iraq continues to baffle me. It is advocated by presumably sensible columnists as well as by the easily led and is accepted by a majority of the people and much of the opposition party. Why? It is being pushed by an accidental president whose credibility in general is poor and whose credibility on this issue is nil due, among other factors, to his inability to decide why we're about to do it; the latest excuse is that it will help the Palestinian peace process. The principal theme, that Iraq is a unique menace, is ludicrous; it is militarily weaker than the country we defeated easily in 1991, it is powerless even to control all of its territory, its borders are so porous that we can slip in anyone we want, its skies are patrolled, it is bombed regularly and inspectors are running around peeking into its secret corners.<br /></p><p align="justify">At every opportunity, the administration tries to suggest a connection between Iraq and 9-11. Although none of the 9-11 terrorists came from Iraq, polls indicate that about 30% of Americans believe that one or more of them did.<sup><small>1</small></sup> Salem, Oregon recently defeated a resolution opposing the war; the mayor voted against it in part because the 9-11 terrorists came from Iraq. Another reason was that several of her family have been in the military, a variation on the notion that we must "support the troops," which seems to morph into supporting whatever war the troops are thrown into.<br /></p><p align="justify">Suggestions that the draft be reinstated so panicked Secretary Rumsfeld that he dismissed the value of draftees in foolish and offensive terms. His distress is understandable; if there were a draft, attitudes would be different: there would be a risk of harm to someone we know. Also, if we had a fiscally honest administration, one which acknowledged the financial cost and told us how much taxes would have to rise to pay it, enthusiasm would tend to wane. This administration has been honest about very few things, but its pretense that the war will have no cost, human or fiscal, goes beyond mere politics.<br /></p><p align="justify">Three events in the past two days are potentially significant.<br /></p><p align="justify">One of the complaints against Iraq is that some of its missiles can go a few miles farther than is allowed under Resolution 687. This did not seem to be a major violation, but the inspectors took a serious view of the matter and ordered destruction. Iraq began destruction yesterday. Compliance obviously lessens the excuse for war, so the administration dismissed the move as an insignificant contribution to disarmament, merely the tip of the iceberg. That dismissal may not play.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Turkish parliament failed to authorize staging an invasion on Turkish soil. A majority of those voting consented, but that was short of a majority of those present, so the measure failed. The ruling party may try to present the resolution again next week, but it faces overwhelming public opposition.<br /></p><p align="justify">Despite its comments on the destruction of the Iraqi missiles, the administration apparently realized that it is a meaningful step, so yesterday the White House shifted ground again: not only is the destruction of these missiles inadequate progress toward destroying WMD, disarmament never will be enough to forestall the invasion; now there must be regime change also. Although in a sense this position is no surprise, there never before has been the naked rejection of disarmament as a sufficient response. The new position thus far has been articulated only by Ari Fleischer, and reported only by The New York Times, so corrections or denials may issue, but none has so far (at 8:30 p.m. Sunday 3/2). Assuming that the President stands by that declaration, he will have parted company with the U.N.; the article stated Fleischer's position to be that "both would be necessary conditions because disarmament was the United Nations' goal and changing Iraq's government was the president's."<sup><small>2</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Maybe these events will slow the rush to war, but probably not. The message continues to be: we're going to war; we'll figure out why later; in the meantime, support the troops.<br />_________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. 3/22/03: I've seen other estimates of this belief at 40% and Gallup reports that "about half say that [Saddam Hussein] was personally involved in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks."<br />2. President Bush had given an ambiguous version of the new demand a few days before: "Should we be forced to commit our troops because of [Hussein's] failure to disarm, the mission will be complete disarmament, which will mean regime change."</small><br /><br /><b>Mar 3</b> </p><p align="justify">Of the eight announced Democratic Presidential contenders, four voted for the war resolution. Governor Dean, supposedly anti-war, gave his position recently on The News Hour on PBS. When Gwen Ifill pointed out that he had repeatedly used the qualifier "unilateral," he fell back to a position that invasion is OK if sanctioned by the U.N. As Michael Kinsley put it, deferral to the U.N. is "an awfully convenient resting point for bet-hedging politicians." True, there is a significant difference between invasion with and without that sanction: the latter would be a violation of international law and possibly self-destructive. However, the former, on the current record, cannot be justified either. U.N. consent obtained through bullying, threats of unilateral action and bribery is no consent at all, but even absent that pressure, a U.N. directive to wage war has no moral authority if it is not justified by the facts. The U.N. does indeed need to enforce its resolutions, but invasion would seem not to be the option of choice at this point. </p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 5</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The Fleischer formula, disarmament plus regime change, has begun to turn up in sources other than the NY Times. A column in the Boston Globe on March 3, entitled "A war policy in collapse," listed that change of position, the vote in Turkey and the destruction of missiles as evidence that Mr. Bush's plans may be in tatters. The author, James Carroll, was appropriately cautious: "No one of these developments by itself marks the ultimate reversal of fortune for Bush, but taken together, they indicate that the law of 'unintended consequences,' which famously unravels the best-laid plans of warriors, may apply this time before the war formally begins." Mr. Carroll relied on several additional events in reaching that conclusion.<br /></p><p align="justify">Prime Minister Blair recently expressed disapproval of the American position on global warming. Mr. Carroll seemed to think that this "clear effort to get some distance from Washington" only could indicate an impending breach; it is as likely an attempt to save face with the home folks while continuing to march to Mr. Bush's war drums.<br /></p><p align="justify">A speech by George H.W. Bush raised a question:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The president's father chose to give a speech affirming the importance both of multinational cooperation and of realism in dealing with the likes of Saddam Hussein. To say, as the elder Bush did, that getting rid of Hussein in 1991 was not the most important thing is to raise the question of why it has become the absolute now.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This one is at least an embarrassment to the President; faced with his father's comments, he was forced to explain why Hussein's ouster now is an aim, leading to his confusing version of the new formula: "Should we be forced to commit our troops because of his failure to disarm, the mission will be complete disarmament, which will mean regime change."<br /></p><p align="justify">The renewed demand for regime change prompted Hussein to ask why he should bother disarming if his country is to be invaded in any case. In Mr. Carroll's view, this shows that the new demand "undermined the early case for war" and is "fatal to the moral integrity of the prowar position." If the crucial event is a Security Council vote for war, or some other expression of international approval, that may be so. To an administration determined to invade no matter what, it isn't a problem; Hussein's hesitation in destroying missiles (and the slow pace) simply are added to the list of his delaying tactics.<br /></p><p align="justify">Another issue is a possible Russian veto. Experts on the News Hour last night opined that Russia was bluffing, that it would abstain. The morning papers reported a meeting at which Russia and France stated they would cast their vetos, so it's anyone's guess. A veto would be a diplomatic defeat, but, again assuming that Bush is going to war with whatever support he has, is that really a roadblock?<br /></p><p align="justify">The capture in Pakistan of a senior Al Qaeda operative, in Mr. Carroll's view, "highlighted the difference between the pursuit of Sept. 11 culprits and the unrelated war against Iraq. Osama bin Laden, yes. Saddam Hussein, no." That distinction seems to be lost on most people, and isn't likely to cause any soul-searching among the Bush people.<br /></p><p align="justify">The administration's contradictions, evasions and seeming ineptness regarding the length, cost and nature of an American occupation were noted. They have resulted in some criticism in Congress, but I don't see a reversal of the war resolution in sight.<br /></p><p align="justify">There were a few more events on the list. I certainly agree that all of them reveal flaws in the Bush world view, but I doubt that they indicate or will lead to second thoughts about the war. Mr. Carroll ended by saying, "The hope now is that - even before the war has officially begun - its true character is already manifesting itself, which could be enough, at last, to stop it." I hope so too, but I doubt it.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 6</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The President held a news conference tonight. The purpose, I assume, was to convince the public that he knows what he's about. No doubt the true believers are still on board, but he certainly could not have convinced anyone who was at all skeptical. The questions were almost laughably mild and inept, but the President still failed to answer most of them, falling back on speeches about high principle. His repeated themes were the threat to the U.S. and the goal of bringing democracy to Iraq. The obvious questions regarding those claims were not asked, at least not clearly enough to pin him down.<br /></p><p align="justify">The advocates for ordinary citizens are their elected representatives and the press. They can protect us from oral sex in the Oval Office, but war obviously is just too much for them.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 9</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The P-I, for no obvious reason, ran a column on its op-ed page by "a staff writer for the Riverfront Times in St. Louis," protesting the possibility that CBS will drop coverage of the NCAA basketball finals in favor of war reports. The point of view is revealing: "Escapism - especially in times of war - is a staple of any sane mind. And there is no more pleasant diversion than sports, the cream of which occurs in late March." Leaving aside the importance of televised sports and specifically of "March Madness," this reflects an attitude which helps to make possible the war about to be covered. Yes, an occasional retreat from the ugliness of the world can be sanity-preserving, but it becomes pathological if one simply withdraws from reality. Increasingly, Americans live in a sort of twilight zone in which the distinction between reality and fantasy is blurred, in which the model, for war among other things, is a video game. The impending war has public support or tolerance in part because it will have no more reality to most Americans than any other TV show.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b><a id="03/15/03">Mar 15</b></a><br /></p><p align="justify">The P-I has tended to follow the line of most of the media in that its news stories present the administration's Iraq policy as if it made sense. The paper has, however, taken a moderately skeptical position editorially, one elaborately and redundantly qualified: "So far, however, the evidence of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction remains sufficiently absent and Iraq's cooperation with weapons inspectors remains sufficiently high that there is insufficient justification for military force at this time." (February 26) On March 7, reviewing the President's news conference, it declared that "We, like many Americans, remain unconvinced of the direct connection between al-Qaida and Iraq, or that Iraq presents a clear and present danger to us." However, that column had a wistful quality to it: "At a huge moment in American history, the president of the United States left us wanting more. We were eager for clarity and precision -- and it was not to be. President Bush delivered little more than what we've heard over and over; not much new in this 'news' conference." It seems that the P-I, while not convinced, would like to be.<br /></p><p align="justify"><em>The Seattle Times</em> came to this same desire for reassurance from the opposite direction: it is for the war, but isn't sure why. On February 23, referring to the impending invasion as "Saddam Hussein's war," it asserted that the "war - if it comes - will be a just action, taken by a president who has reached the boundaries of diplomacy and moved to prevent further attacks on the world's democracies." "Entering Iraq...has become necessary. The longer democracies wait, the more emboldened are its [<i>sic</i>] enemies." "Indifference causes war to happen when murderous dictators rise - whether in Germany, Cambodia, Yugoslavia or the Middle East."<br /></p><p align="justify">Perhaps aware, while reciting these dubious generalities, that it was in over its head, the Times sought help. After arguing that the President had authorization for war from Congress and the U.N., it said, "Ultimately, we understand Bush's real authority comes from the American people. Before he acts, he must go before us another time and tell us why we can no longer delay." Let's roll - oh, and by the way, why are we doing it?<br /></p><p align="justify">Meanwhile, the administration is being offered an insight into the foolishness of the National Security Strategy, the Iraq policy and its contempt for international law, but doesn't seem to hear the message. The U.S. reportedly is trying to dissuade Turkey from sending troops into Iraq on the heels of an American invasion. "We said to them, 'We oppose unilateral force,'" a senior U.S. official said, very possibly with a straight face. Turkey isn't fooled: "If the safety of America's citizens is so important that its army will come 10,000 miles from home to fight in Iraq, then what about us?" asked a member of the ruling party. "Don't we have a right to defend our own interests in the country next door?"<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Apparently the administration also is worried that Iran might join in. Pandora's box is open.<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Los Angeles Times 3/15/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 19</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Here we are again, on the brink of a George Bush adventure, the purpose of which he can't or won't explain, hoping that it will not be as bad as it looks. This time the potential for harm is far greater.<br /></p><p align="justify">In leading us this way, the administration seems determined to turn itself into a parody of Oceania in <i>1984</i>. The slogans of the Party were War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery and Ignorance is Strength. The administration hasn't matched the second, although its post-9/11 policies tend slightly in that direction, but certainly the other two are in play, the first as its policy, the last as the nature of the public response on which the war policy depends. One important difference is that the government does not have a Ministry of Truth; the facts, contemporary and historical, are available. However, the media largely have parroted the official line, disguising or at least overlooking its illogic and hypocrisy.<br /></p><p align="justify">Listening to various spokesmen for the administration, notably but by no means exclusively the President, evokes this passage from "The Principles of Newspeak," an appendix to <i>1984:</i>. "Ultimately it was hoped to make articulate speech issue from the larynx without involving the higher brain centres at all."<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 22</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Certainly the higher brain centers are in no danger of overuse in Congress. Faced with massive deficits, the Republicans are about to slash taxes again. The Democrats, as usual, can do no more than offer a mild suggestion to be slightly less irresponsible. Just to add to the sense of looming fiscal disaster, the President will ask his minions for $80 billion for phase one of Operation Whatever (I've forgotten, no doubt having repressed, the euphemism). They will promptly appropriate it, not troubling their silly heads over where the money is going to come from. An article in the Washington Post noted that the war funding request had been delayed until both houses had approved the tax cuts. Deception may have been intended, but hardly was necessary.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 26</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Ari Fleischer, who clearly has no trouble believing six impossible things before breakfast, tells us that we need the tax cut "to make sure that the economy can grow" and that the reduction in revenue will enhance our ability to wage war. ("The stronger the economy, the stronger we are as a country. The stronger we are as a country, the stronger our military.") In addition, we need the stronger economy created by those tax cuts so that "when the war is over, our military has jobs to come home to."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">In the distant past, a tax increase during wartime not only was considered financially necessary but also was part of the shared sacrifice; we would "support the troops" by paying for the war. No longer. Now, not only is there no cost to war, it is our patriotic duty to benefit from it. Supporting the troops requires tax cuts; we must, however reluctantly, do our duty and accept them.<br />_________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Washington Post 3/26/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 27</b><br /></p><p align="justify">On March 23, the Los Angeles Times carried a thoughtful column by Arthur Schlesinger in which he offered a position of reasoned, responsible opposition: "Now that we are embarked on this misadventure, let us hope that our intervention will be swift and decisive, and that victory will come with minimal American, British and civilian Iraqi casualties. But let us continue to ask why our government chose to impose this war."<br /></p><p align="justify">He also asked why the Democratic Party had collapsed; why had it "let the opposition movement fall into the hands of infantile leftists?" I assume that he refers to the protest marchers. I have to admit that my reaction to them has been ambivalent, agreeing with their dismay that we have reached this point and glad for a demonstration that not everyone is mindlessly accepting Bush's rationale <i>du jour,</i> but not quite ready to stand alongside them. There is too much resemblance to the WTO rioters and others of the knee-jerk left.<br /></p><p align="justify">Maybe that's too smug a point of view. I can sympathize with the view of a couple, whose son is in the war zone, who organize protests. They see no inconsistency in supporting the troops and opposing the war. "We're actually surprised that people have trouble with this one.... If you saw one of your kids getting into a car with a drunk driver, would you stand by the side of the road and salute? Or would you do everything in your power to stop the car?"<sup><small>1</small></sup><br />__________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Washington Post 3/26/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 28</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Media coverage of the buildup to war, where not actually favorable, was complacent. Some still recite the administration line - NBC introduces its broadcast with an "Operation Iraqi Freedom" logo - but some critical articles and columns have begun to appear.<br /></p><p align="justify">It is surprising that criticism is more evident after the beginning of the war than before, but the greater oddity is not the current questioning but the previous silence.<br /></p><p align="justify">Part of the change is due to the pace of the invasion, which has led to complaints of miscalculation and bad planning. Part is due to a belated realization that war brings casualties. If Baghdad were taken in a few days with minimal deaths, things might return to the status quo ante. However, even as a temporary phenomenon, the change is noteworthy, and is widespread enough that the administration and conservative commentators are complaining about negativism.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Mar 30</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Complaints that the war is not progressing as it should may not be valid or realistic, but they are the main thrust of the new critical attitude of at least some reporters. Secretary Rumsfeld's habitual arrogance has not been diminished by any sense that his campaign is not going well, but he does seem to resent the carping: his condescension now is a little edgy.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Rumsfeld implied that we may attack Syria because of its alleged transshipment of supplies to Iraq. No one has contradicted him, which is ominous. Also ominous is the statement by Iraq's vice president that we have not seen the last suicide bombing and that they may not be confined to Iraq: "We will use any means to kill our enemy in our land and we will follow the enemy into its land."<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Apr 4</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Secretary Rumsfeld dismissed some criticisms of the progress of the war by referring to mood swings among the media. There is some truth in that; reports have moved from emphasizing early success to unexpected Iraqi resistance to the collapse of the Republican guard, the last leading to predictions of the taking of Baghdad.<br /></p><p align="justify">The media may be forgiven their mood swings, as the changes of emphasis in part have merely reflected comments by the military or administration officials. Today, in what seemed to be a major change in strategy, Rumsfeld proposed setting up a provisional government in southern Iraq, not waiting for the fall of Baghdad, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Meyers suggested that Baghdad might be "isolated" rather than invaded.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Apr 7</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Secretary Powell denied that the administration has any intention of invading Syria or Iran. Should we take that as a statement of policy? Is it an example of the State and Defense Departments having conflicting ideas, not yet resolved by the President? That does seem to be the pattern. Now State and Defense are arguing over who will be appointed to the still amorphous reconstruction regime.<br /></p><p align="justify">The day after the announcement of the strategy to avoid invading Baghdad, the invasion began. Resistance has been reported to be light, so this switch isn't likely to attract much criticism; so far no one seems to have noticed the change of plan. Polls indicate that the favorable news has sent approval of the war even higher, 77% overall, according to the Washington Post. It will be interesting to see whether it survives the aftermath.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Apr 9</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The gloating has begun. President Bush smirkingly demonstrated Saddam's fingers being pried from the throats of the Iraqi people. Vice President Cheney described the defeat of a weak opponent, after more difficulty than he predicted, as "one of the most extraordinary military campaigns ever conducted."<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Cheney is of the opinion that, "coming on the heels of the Afghanistan operation last year, it's proof positive of the success of our efforts to transform our military to meet the challenges of the 21st century."<sup><small>1</small></sup> He referred only to the military side of the "Afghanistan operation," but the comparison is instructive in other ways: bin Laden and Omar apparently still are at large, the new regime is powerless to control most of the country, the Red Cross and U.N. are confined to Kabul because of the danger, we're doing nothing to improve the situation and the administration didn't ask for any funds for Afghanistan in its budget proposal. Maybe we'll do better this time, if we aren't too busy invading Syria.<br /></p><p align="justify">The rationale for the invasion of Iraq has been flexible of late: if Iraqis eventually can be portrayed as welcoming the invaders, as the media are trying to show today, then it will have been about freedom and democracy. If any WMD are found, it will have been about them. As to the former, and assuming that something better than the Afghan model emerges, what will the calculus be: how many dead and maimed does it justify?<br /></p><p align="justify">If all else fails, it was about America's standing tall.<br />___________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Washington Post, 4/9/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Apr 10</b><br /></p><p align="justify">On April 7, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. ____ (2003), decided a case involving the conviction of three men for violating, in two unrelated incidents, a Virginia statute prohibiting cross burning. The statute made cross burning a crime only if intended to intimidate, but included a provision making the act <i>prima facie</i> evidence of intent. In the trial of one of the defendants, an instruction permitted the jury to infer intent from the act.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Virginia court held that the statute was unconstitutional:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Under our system of government, people have the right to use symbols to communicate. They may patriotically wave the flag or burn it in protest; they may reverently worship the cross or burn it as an expression of bigotry.... While reasonable prohibitions upon time, place, and manner of speech, and statutes of neutral application may be enforced, government may not regulate speech based on hostility -or favoritism -towards the underlying message expressed.<br /></p><p align="justify">....Additionally, a statute that sweeps within its ambit both protected and unprotected speech is overbroad. Accordingly, we hold that Code § 18.2-423 violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The convictions in each of these appeals will be vacated and the indictments will be dismissed.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the conviction resulting from the jury instruction on intent and remanded the other two. As demonstrated by the remand, its decision is not as strong an affirmation of First Amendment rights as the Virginia ruling; the Supreme Court held that the ban could be constitutional if intent were proved. The decision contains five opinions, producing mixed and in some instances not altogether clear messages. However, seven of the Justices found the statute to be an infringement to one degree or another. The case is significant, especially now: it upholds the right to express unpopular, even despised, ideas absent intimidation.<br /></p><p align="justify">Perhaps I am assigning too much importance to a divided decision which is unwilling to fully endorse a vigorous statement of First Amendment rights. However, I am not confident that the administration, which allegedly has gone to war to bring freedom to Iraq, is as concerned about preserving it in the United States. Therefore even a qualified reaffirmation of free-speech rights, in a tough case, is no small event.<br /></p><p align="justify">Justice Scalia, perhaps the greatest source of concern regarding civil liberties, concurred in part of the lead opinion; that part included the following:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow 'free trade in ideas' -even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.... If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The decision relied upon <i>R.A.V. v. St. Paul,</i> 505 U.S. 377 (1992), which held that "content-based discrimination was unconstitutional because it allowed the city 'to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.' " The majority opinion in that case was authored by Justice Scalia. <i>R.A.V.</i> produced the usual plethora of opinions, including vigorous claims that Scalia's theory contracted or confused First Amendment jurisprudence. Whatever the merit of those objections, Scalia used political dissent as the prime example of protected speech:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">... We have long held...that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses - so that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag is not.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This would be encouraging were it not for a statement made by Justice Scalia in a recent speech. Asked about the Justice Department's pursuit of terrorism suspects and whether their rights are being violated, he said, "The Constitution just sets minimums. Most of the rights that you enjoy go way beyond what the Constitution requires." He did not specify what rights he believed are constitutionally protected, but said that in wartime, one can expect "the protections will be ratcheted right down to the constitutional minimum."<sup><small>1</small></sup> If the President succeeds in convincing Scalia and his fellow conservatives that we are in a permanent state of war, we may learn where the minimum lies.<br />_______________________<br /><br /><small>1. Associated Press, 3/18/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>April 12</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The lead opinion in the cross-burning case was written by Justice O'Connor, concurred in by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Today I received an e-mail link to a column by Nat Hentoff in <i>The Village Voice</i> which mentions the Scalia speech and equally worrisome statements by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Apr 16</b><br /></p><p align="justify">According to Thomas Hobbes, "...during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man...."<sup><small>1</small></sup> That is the state of nature, in Hobbes' view, a state at least briefly restored in Baghdad after its "liberation." Such a picture is too dramatic for modern tastes; to Donald Rumsfeld, the chaos, the looting, killing and suffering, are merely "untidy." That description came in response to annoying questions from the press and was intended to be dismissive and condescending in his usual style. Instead, it was wonderfully prissy, a perfect reflection of how little the effects of war bother its planners.<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>Leviathan,</i> Chapter XIII.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Apr 20</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The Chairman and a member of the President's Advisory Committee on Cultural Property have resigned in protest of the failure of U.S. forces to prevent the looting of Baghdad's antiquities museum, saying that it should never have been allowed to happen. Various reports indicate that specific requests and warnings were given to the administration prior to the invasion.<br /></p><p align="justify">The May-June issue of <i>Archaeology Odyssey</i> arrived yesterday. Despite the issue date, it must have been written before the beginning of the war. It included an article entitled "At Risk! Ancient Sites in Iraq," concerned, as the title indicates, with damage to historic structures and ruins. However, it also contained a warning about looting:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Thousands of archaeological sites in Iraq, birthplace of the world's most ancient cities and earliest writing systems, may soon be threatened by one of the oldest scourges known to man: war. At the invitation of the Pentagon, American archaeologists have supplied military strategists with information about ancient sites to minimize collateral damage. Concern also remains high about postwar looting: Following the Gulf War in 1991, mobs raided nine of Iraq's 13 regional museums..... </p></blockquote><p align="justify">So not only did we have warnings from knowledgeable people, we had the last war as a guide.<br /></p><p align="justify">An Iraqi archaeologist expressed the anger: "A country's identity, its value and civilization resides in its history. If a country's civilization is looted, as ours has been here, its history ends. Please tell this to President Bush. Please remind him that he promised to liberate the Iraqi people, but that this is not a liberation, this is a humiliation."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Perhaps nothing could have been done. That appears to be the official line: as our house philosopher tells us, stuff happens. After all, we have our priorities. A cartoon summed them up: two men are sitting in the ruins of the museum; one says, "If only we'd located this thing in the middle of an oil field...."<sup><small>2</small></sup><br />______________________<br /><br /><small>1. New York Times, 4/18/03.<br />2. Ben Sargent, Austin American-Statesman, 4/18/03, from a link to the Washington Post (Universal Press Syndicate).</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Apr 24</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Being a moderate Republican must be frustrating. Senators Olympia Snowe of Maine and George Voinovich of Ohio loyally voted for the Iraq war resolution, but have been targeted because they think that the size of the proposed tax cut should be limited to the level of irrationality and irresponsibility rather of than madness or wilful destruction, depending on your view of what goes on in the White House.<br /></p><p align="justify">A recent press release by The Club for Growth, in which it described itself as "one of the nations [sic] leading free-market political advocacy organizations," announced that it will run - perhaps by now already is running - television ads in the Senators' home states criticizing their votes to reduce the Bush tax cut. "Senators Voinovich and Snowe have single-handedly thwarted the central piece of President Bush's economic stimulus package,"' said Club president Stephen Moore, apparently ignoring the Democratic votes. The release described the two obstructive Senators as "Franco-Republicans," and included "screenshots," one of each Senator with the legend "Stands in the Way" and one of Jacques Chirac labeled "Stood in the Way." A French flag flutters in each picture.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Club's statement announcing the ads rambled on at length, omitting few tax-cut clichés. The best line was another quote by the club president: "The goal of the terrorists is to disable the U.S. economy. Pro-growth tax cuts are a powerful defense mechanism to foil this strategy." Mr. Moore must have been a classmate of Ari Fleischer's at the Institute of Neo-Voodoo Economics.<br /></p><p align="justify">Today President Bush made the policy of intimidation official by campaigning for his tax cut in Ohio. "Some in Congress say the plan is too big," he said in a speech at a plant in Canton. "Well, it seems like to me they might have some explaining to do."<br /></p><p align="justify">Senator Jeffords has left the Republican Party. The self-destructive tendencies of the Party and its supporters might push others in the same direction.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Apr 30</b><br /></p><p align="justify">In the May issue of <i>Liberty,</i> R.W. Bradford tells us that he became aware of the evils of totalitarianism when he heard, as a child, how Nazis and Communists mistreated people.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">They held their prisoners in secret locations, depriving them of what they were used to and comfortable with: food, sleep, water, knowledge of time, and whether it was day or night. </p><p align="justify">They played on their prisoners’ secret and darkest fears, used physical force against them, made them wear black hoods, held them in stress positions for hours on end, gave them encouragement to talk by pistol whipping them and even, in some cases, by capturing their children to provide them with an incentive to talk.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Then the punch line: "Every phrase I’ve used to describe totalitarian treatment of captives is a direct quotation from a Wall Street Journal article titled, 'How Do U.S. Interrogators Make a Captured Terrorist Talk?' (March 4)."<br /></p><p align="justify">Little of Bradford's description qualifies as a direct quotation, but it follows the account in the Journal, and his point, that we are using or at least contemplating methods which we associate with evil regimes, is valid.<br /></p><p align="justify">The WSJ article referred specifically to the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. It stated that Mohammed's children "were captured," and that the U.S. has "access" to them. Otherwise, its description of interrogation techniques was similar to a that in an article in The Washington Post on December 26, 2002. Both paint an unpleasant picture of what we are or are becoming; the Post described interrogations in Afghanistan:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Those who refuse to cooperate inside this secret CIA interrogation center are sometimes kept standing or kneeling for hours, in black hoods or spray-painted goggles, according to intelligence specialists familiar with CIA interrogation methods. At times they are held in awkward, painful positions and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour bombardment of lights -- subject to what are known as "stress and duress" techniques.<br /></p><center>***</center><br />According to Americans with direct knowledge and others who have witnessed the treatment, captives are often "softened up" by MPs and U.S. Army Special Forces troops who beat them up and confine them in tiny rooms.... <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">The Post report was quoted in The Nation on March 31, 2003, in an article examining and rejecting the arguments for torture.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...As Shibley Telhami, a professor at the University of Maryland and an expert on the Middle East, writes in his new book, The Stakes, "We cannot defend what we stand for by subverting our own values in the process." In the current climate, conservatives may dismiss such talk as soft-minded idealism. In fact, nobody has more adamantly insisted that the war on terrorism is, at root, a conflict about values than George W. Bush. </p></blockquote><p align="justify">One of those expressions of values was in this year's State of the Union address, in which the President described torture methods allegedly administered to prisoners in Iraq, and concluded, "If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning." The practices he listed are more awful than those described above, but the hypocrisy remains. As The Nation put it, "For the same government that denounces such practices to soften the rules when its own interests are at stake sends a disturbing message: that American moralizing is meaningless....."<br /></p><p align="justify">In its December article, The Post reported that, at a September Congressional hearing, the head of the CIA Counterterrorist Center, referring to the treatment of suspected terrorists, said "This is a very highly classified area, but I have to say that all you need to know: There was a before 9/11, and there was an after 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off." That does seem to be all that this administration needs to know: 9-11, the day the world changed.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>May 10</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Governor Dean made a political mistake: he raised an unpleasant possibility, one which we should keep in mind, but which does not flatter American self-regard. He said, in a recent speech, "We have to take a different approach. We won't always have the strongest military." Senator Kerry apparently has decided that, since the Republicans keep winning, he should emulate their "patriotic" mindset. Dean's statement "raises serious questions about his capacity to serve as commander in chief," his camp asserted in a campaign news release. "No serious candidate for the presidency has ever before suggested that he would compromise or tolerate an erosion of America's military supremacy."<sup><small>1</small></sup> Perhaps Kerry felt the need to shift the spotlight from his "regime change" remark; never mind that his attack on Dean more or less missed the point. In rebuttal, Dean pointed out that former President Clinton had said much the same a year ago: "This is a unique moment in U.S. history, a brief moment in history, when the U.S. has preeminent military, economic and political power. It won't last forever. This is just a period; a few decades this will last."<br /></p><p align="justify">Military superiority depends on economic power. The news articles I've seen do not indicate whether Dean went into that, but Clinton did. He declined to take sides in the Dean-Kerry dispute, but, as reported by The Post, elaborated on his earlier statement: " 'In all probability, we won't be the premier political and economic power we are now' in a few decades, he said, pointing to the growth of China's economy and the growing economic strength of the European Union." <sup><small>2</small> </sup><br /></p><p align="justify">In addition to the possibility that other economies may catch up to ours, we have a serious present weakness, our dependance on foreign investment to fund our military spending. We might be able, alone, to fund the levels contemplated by the Bush administration, but clearly it is unwilling to ask the country to do so: as costs explode, taxes are cut. The claims that the deficit will be covered by reductions in other spending, or that tax cuts will produce enough additional revenue to cover the loss, can't be taken seriously. One has to assume that Bush and Co. are content with borrowing, and with the purchase by foreign investors of a significant fraction of the bonds.<br /></p><p align="justify">Our status as a debtor nation has been addressed - and ignored - for a long time. An article by Niall Ferguson in The New York Times on April 20 discussed this in the context of our imperial ambitions. He pointed out that the cost of rebuilding Iraq will be funded in part by foreign investors. "For the fact is that America is not only the world's biggest economy. It is also the world's biggest borrower. Its muscular military power is underwritten by foreign capital." Ferguson thinks that this is problematic for an imperialist: "This could make for a fragile Pax Americana if foreign investors decide to reduce their stakes in the American economy, possibly trading their dollars for the increasingly vigorous euro."<br /></p><p align="justify">Ferguson can't be accused of trying to find reasons to oppose American imperialism. His only complaint appears to be that we aren't sufficiently committed to it.<sup><small>3</small></sup><br />_____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Dean and Kerry comments: Washington Post, 4/29/03.<br />2. Clinton comments: Washington Post, 5/1/03.<br />3. See "The Empire Slinks Back," <i>New York Times Magazine,</i> 4/27/03. </small></p><p align="justify"><b>May 13</b><br /></p><p align="justify">A column by Jeff Kemp in today's P-I argues against proposals to solve the state's fiscal problems by expanding legal gambling. Mr. Kemp's principal argument is that gambling is a social and personal evil, destructive of families. Certainly it is a dubious activity to receive official sanction, encouragement and exploitation.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Kemp notes in passing one effect of gambling on public policy: "Gambling is addictive for individuals and governments alike. Once a person gets hooked on gambling it's difficult to quit. And government is just as hard to wean from gambling once it becomes accustom[ed] to the revenue." He doesn't pursue the latter point, perhaps because it leads directly to the reason for the state's need for gambling: its unwillingness to create enough revenue by more legitimate means, <i>e.g.,</i> taxes.<br /></p><p align="justify">I don't know whether Jeff Kemp shares his father's views on tax policy, but it is relevant to note that the tendency of Washington, other states and the federal government to resort to substitute revenue sources and accounting gimmicks is due in part to the wave of tax cutting with which the elder Kemp is identified. I acknowledge that Jack Kemp's advocacy of lower taxes is grounded in the belief that cutting taxes will, in the long run, bring increased revenue. However, apart from the deficiencies in that theory, cuts in federal taxes have become, for Republicans and many Democrats, an obsession divorced completely, except in cynical rhetoric, from their supposed beneficial effects. At the state level, little effort is made at theory, other than to emulate the Bush pretense that cuts are designed to help ordinary people.<br /></p><p align="justify"><br /></p><p align="justify">Perhaps this is an appropriate time to demonstrate that I don't always disagree with Jack Kemp, although that will require an abrupt change of subject.<br /></p><p align="justify">I rarely refer to TownHall.com, the collection of conservative columnists. A few of them appear regularly and others occasionally in papers I read and I'm not, on the whole, sufficiently impressed by their contributions to civic discourse to look for more. However, having seen a reference somewhere to Jack Kemp's views on the war, I visited that web site about a month ago to look up his columns. I discovered some very insightful comments on Iraq, which, unfortunately, influenced very few of his fellow Republicans and not enough Americans of any category. In addition to their intrinsic merit, they illustrate how good sense can be overpowered, at least temporarily, by loyalty.<br /></p><p align="justify">On October 1, 2002, Mr. Kemp recognized the progress made by inspections in the early 90s: "Far from being a failure due to a lack of enforcement authority, UNSCOM was succeeding in its primary objective -- disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and destroying the capability to produce more of them in the future." He stated the case for inspections clearly: "if the inspectors have immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites, the degree of Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions on nuclear weapons can be verified fairly rapidly and other troubling questions on biological and chemical weapons could be answered within a year." This, of course, required a degree of patience not to be found elsewhere.<br /></p><p align="justify">He added that "Congress must give the president an effective legislative mandate to enforce Iraq's disarmament as called for by a series of U.N. resolutions, which would entail the authority to use military force if necessary." That was an error; such a resolution led to the invasion. Kemp meant it to serve inspection and disarmament and made clear that it should authorize military action only if all else failed, but the administration had other ideas.<br /></p><p align="justify">On October 17, Kemp was clearer about the limited nature of the military force he envisioned: "I do not believe Iraq would resist [inspections], but if they do, by all means...apply the force required, but only that required to successfully effect the search and destroy any weapons discovered." This resembles the position taken by Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in March, 2002.<br /></p><p align="justify">Kemp certainly did not endorse the administration line about deposing Hussein: "There is no need to burn down the house to gain entry, and disarmament is the goal, not a pre-emptory unilateral regime change. Regime change should only be undertaken as the ultimate means, if necessary, to effect disarmament." As Dr. Mathews had put it, "rather than seeking to oust Saddam Hussein from power, the U.S. goal ought to be to thwart his continuing attempt to acquire these weapons [of mass destruction]. The inability to make a clear choice between these two aims was the Clinton administration's costliest foreign policy error. The Bush administration seems prepared to make a choice -- but the wrong one."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Kemp was suspicious of the war hawks but gullible about the President: "To his great credit, Bush has not been snookered by those whose agenda is more one of conquest than disarmament. He clearly does not intend to allow himself to be stampeded into immediately using his newly authorized grant of power from the Congress to invade Iraq, as evidenced by his unambiguous statement last week that military action is neither imminent nor unavoidable."<br /></p><p align="justify">On November 19, Mr. Kemp urged full and proper use of Resolution 1441: "it's time to give inspections a chance to succeed in disarming Iraq." He then went further, suggesting adding a carrot to the stick: "we would enhance our chances for success by announcing that if the inspections are successful and Iraq cooperates in disarming, then we will lift the embargo and remove sanctions. " In perhaps his most pointed comment, Kemp said "it's time to lower the level of bellicosity that has been raised by some in Washington...." He ended this column by reminding his readers that the 9/11 terrorists had not needed WMD and that we should be concentrating on eliminating any repetition of that tragedy, a point lost on most.<br /></p><p align="justify">Kemp criticized the Clinton administration's Iraq policy, which certainly is fair, and it leads to a more general point: our policy toward Iraq has been flawed, to put it mildly, for virtually the entire reign of Saddam Hussein.<br /></p><p align="justify">Much of Kemp's January 7 column was devoted to the contrast between our restraint regarding North Korea and our war plans for Iraq. He acknowledged that identical treatment might not be appropriate, but wondered why diplomacy was not an option regarding Iraq, and expressed concern that "we might actually be stimulating WMD proliferation among small, weak nations if we go to war with Iraq without having in hand concrete and convincing evidence that it has failed to disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction."<br /></p><p align="justify">On January 22, he expressed dismay that we were headed toward war when the inspections were making progress. "To date, U.N. inspectors appear to have the access they demand and to have found nothing suspicious beyond about 16 unused artillery shells..." Instead, "officials" were suggesting other rationales for war: Iraq failed to fully cooperate with inspectors; it imported missile engines and other non-WMD equipment and materials barred under the U.N. arms embargo; it fired on U.S. planes patrolling the no-fly zones. Kemp found the new rationales be "insufficient to justify bombing or invading and occupying Iraq as long as U.N. inspectors continue to have unfettered access to Iraq sites and personnel."<br /></p><p align="justify">He offered the sensible suggestion that we "give U.N. inspectors all of the intelligence information we can to help in their search." However, his mood had changed: "We should open direct communications with Iraq..., but not to negotiate or offer Hussein a carrot of some kind - quite the contrary. Now is the time to...tell them precisely what they must do to avoid war. Give Iraq a detailed checklist of items and actions we demand before we will stand down militarily." Kemp was being overwhelmed by the bellicose attitude which he criticized.<br /></p><p align="justify">On February 18, Kemp told us that the President "has always said war in Iraq is not inevitable, but there appeared to be only two possible alternatives: 1) the threat of war followed by Saddam Hussein's abdication or disarmament; or 2) all-out war followed by prolonged U.S. military occupation." The odd formulation of the first alternative seemed to indicate an abandonment of his hope for inspections. Kemp attributed the second alternative to the war hawks and rejected it because "invading and occupying a Muslim country portends political and social turmoil across the Middle East and escalating terrorism around the world." Further, the hawks' scheme "is the first step in a much larger, ill-considered foreign-policy gambit to try and remake the entire Middle East through U.S.-induced chaos - a strategic nightmare."<br /></p><p align="justify">Kemp was of the opinion that Bush had a third way in mind, that he merely gave the impression of going along with the hawks' plan because their strategy "offered the perfect opening gambit" for what Kemp believed to be Bush's preferred strategy: "peaceful envelopment." The hawks' plan also "provided a fallback position." The probably imaginary third way was a naïve and peaceful variation on the neocons' dream of marching into Iraq amid flowers and cheers:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...The purpose of Operation Peaceful Envelopment is not to conquer and rule over people but to control territory temporarily to ensure order, root out any proscribed weapons and get a provisional government established. Allied military forces would be replaced as quickly as possible by a temporary U.N. force.<br />...The military's objective would be to envelop Iraq as peacefully as possible in a security mantle and escort a caretaker governor into Baghdad. Action would not begin with aerial bombardment or involve lightning attacks on Iraqi military installations or strikes on civilian infrastructure. Overwhelming military presence would be established in Iraq but unleashed selectively only if Iraqi forces resist.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The final column in this series is of March 25. Alternatives to war were history, but decisions needed to be made about the aftermath. The main thrust of his comments was to reject the advice of Charles Krauthammer and Richard Perle to dump the U.N. Kemp believed, sensibly, that this would be a blunder.<br /></p><p align="justify">He went on to make a comment about competing world views which is insightful, and in which his earlier resistance to war returns, but now expressed in general terms. "The common hubris of the left and some of my neoconservative friends alike is their belief that pre-emptive military force may legitimately be used other than in unambiguous self-defense against a present or imminent threat to a nation's or a people's security." The "some" seems to be misplaced, but numeric qualifiers aren't important to the point that he makes, which is a valid one.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The only difference between many on the left and the right today seems to be whether they believe preventive war must be waged through the United Nations, as liberals desire, or by ad hoc coalitions of the willing, as some neocons prefer....<br /><center>***</center><br />Even liberal supporters of the United Nations now seem to agree that the organization may appropriately use force to enforce its own demands, even if those demands are not directly related to repelling a present or imminent threat of attack on a member of their own. <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Kemp had an entirely different view of the function of the U.N.; here he returned to the mood of his earlier columns:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...The promise of the United Nations was not to legitimize war but rather to provide a collective forum to help avoid war and a mechanism of collective security if members were attacked or in imminent danger of being attacked. The terrible irony of this war is that the United Nations is being criticized, not for failing to keep the peace, but for failing to wage war to enforce one of its resolutions.... </p></blockquote><p align="justify">These columns provided sensible views, marred only by Kemp's unwarranted confidence in the President; they were capped by a significant final insight, in its turn diluted by a refusal to recognize that George W. Bush is among those making that charge against the U.N.<br />____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Washington Post, March 4, 2002.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>May 25</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Several members of Congress, including Senators Lugar, Biden and Hagel, are concerned, even outraged, that the pacification and reconstruction of Iraq are progressing so slowly and that Congress and the public are not being kept fully informed as to the administration's plans, expectations and cost estimates. The Senators expressed these views in a recent grilling of Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz.<sup><small>1 </small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">It is amazing that such intelligent and serious people could be so naïve. What did they expect when they voted for a resolution authorizing a secretive, dishonest, obsessed government to invade Iraq? What did they expect the effects of war to be? Did they expect them to be merely, in the famous phrase, untidy?<br /></p><p align="justify">Senator Lugar has discovered that "The planning for peace was much less developed than the planning for war." Was that in doubt? The Senator now is committed to a reconstruction effort stretching over five years and costing billions of dollars. Did he have that in view when he voted "Aye?" What is his explanation to voters that those billions will not go to reducing the deficit or keeping schools open? Polls indicate that the public thinks that we have an obligation to rebuild Iraq, but if they were told candidly what the choices are, instead of the administration's you-can-have-it-all line, Iraq would fall swiftly to the bottom of the table.<br /></p><p align="justify">Senator Biden berated Wolfowitz for not acknowledging the facts: "When is the president going to tell the American people that we're likely to be in the country of Iraq for three, four, five, six, eight, ten years, with thousands of forces and spending billions of dollars? Because it's not been told to them yet...home constituency doesn't understand that." Has the Senator told that to his constituents? Did he do so when he cast his vote for the war?<br /></p><p align="justify">Senator Hagel observed, apparently without irony, that "we may have underestimated or mischaracterized the challenges of establishing security and rebuilding Iraq."<br />___________________________<br /><br /><small>1. New York Times, 5/22/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>June 11</b><br /></p><p align="justify"><i>The New York Times</i> published an extended exposé of Jayson Blair's sins of commission and its of omission. If it thought that a detailed, unforced confession would blunt criticism, it has been disappointed. Apparently anxious to reaffirm the principle that no good deed goes unpunished, the media applied themselves with vigor, indignation and sarcasm to the Blair scandal.<br /></p><p align="justify">If the issue is the quality of journalism at The <i>Times,</i> most of the criticism hasn't made the point which most needs making, that The <i>Times</i> and the media in general have been derelict in reporting the fact that the Bush administration has led us to the edge of a precipice - to the edges of several simultaneously, if you don't mind a fractured metaphor. Let's deal with one chasm into which we've already tumbled, Iraq.<br /></p><p align="justify">I have just read <i>The Day the Presses Stopped,</i><sup><small>1 </small></sup>dealing with the publication of the Pentagon Papers by The Times and later by <i>The Washington Post.</i> The <i>Times,</i> The <i>Post</i> and many of the critics might profit by reading it; as then, we are governed by an administration which has led us into war by devious means. In 1971, The <i>Times</i> and The <i>Post</i> stuck their necks out to publish the Defense Department's study of how we ended up where we did, in the belief that the truth would serve the public interest. The same cannot be said of their performance regarding this war, although The Post's reporting has improved. (One critic which has moved beyond Blair is <i>The Nation,</i> which has made pointed, negative, repeated - almost obsessive - comments on The <i>Times'</i> coverage of the war, especially the reporting of Judith Miller on WMD.)<br /></p><p align="justify">In addition to less-than-skeptical news coverage, enthusiasm for war has been striking on the op-ed pages of both papers; The <i>Post</i> could have been mistaken in the pre-war period for a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bush & Co.<br /></p><p align="justify">Two major columnists for The <i>Times,</i> Thomas Friedman and William Safire, were enthusiastic about invading Iraq, but have taken a position at odds with the administration on various domestic issues. The combination, in my view, doesn't work.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Safire's position is clear, and has been explicitly described by him: he is a foreign-policy hawk and a domestic libertarian. Whether those are compatible positions in general I do not know, but in the present context, they force him to do an abrupt and disorienting about-face at the water's edge.<br /></p><p align="justify">Safire denounced the military tribunals, looser guidelines for FBI activity, the Total Information Awareness program and Patriot Act II. These are principled, and I think correct, positions, but they cannot be reconciled with his unquestioning support for the invasion of Iraq; the same theory of government and the same mindset underlie both.<br /></p><p align="justify">Take two of his arguments as illustrations of the similarity of the positions he accepts and rejects. On November 15, 2001, he said this as to the military tribunals:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Misadvised by a frustrated and panic-stricken attorney general, a president of the United States has just assumed what amounts to dictatorial power to jail or execute aliens. Intimidated by terrorists and inflamed by a passion for rough justice, we are letting George W. Bush get away with the replacement of the American rule of law with military kangaroo courts.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Is Iraq different? Intimidated by terrorists and inflamed by a passion for rough justice, we let the President, misadvised by neocon hawks, get away with replacing international law with military domination.<br /></p><p align="justify">On March 6, 2003, he asked how we should feel about launching a pre-emptive strike, and answered as follows:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">We are launching this attack, already too long delayed, primarily to defend ourselves. This is a response to reasonable fear. We know Saddam is developing terror weapons and is bound on vengeance; we know he has ties to terror organizations eager to use those weapons for more mass murder;... we know Americans are terror's prime targets....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The miliary tribunals were proposed primarily to defend ourselves. They were a response to a fear as reasonable as the prospect of attack by Iraq or the belief it would hand WMD to terrorists.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Safire's defense of civil liberties is admirable - and in the present environment, very important - but he can't have it both ways. A government which arrogantly decides to do whatever it damned well pleases abroad, heedless of contrary opinion, principle, logic and international law will do what it damned well pleases at home, heedless of contrary opinion, principle, logic and the Constitution.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Friedman was so caught up in the post 9-11 fervor that he was less concerned about violations of civil liberties than Safire. He advocated the war, not minding either before or after that the stated reasons were pretextual.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Friedman's inconsistencies are less striking than Mr. Safire's, in part because his views are more ambiguous; he calls them neoliberal. "Neoliberals believe in a muscular foreign policy and a credible defense budget, but also a prudent fiscal policy that balances taxes, deficit reduction and government services." His June 11 column offered that definition and, apparently as an application of it, criticized "George Bush's maniacal tax cuts." (High marks for the description). He noted that the cuts will result in reduced services, jeopardize Social Security and make us even more dependant on foreign capital. However, so will spending billions of dollars invading and rebuilding other countries. The early estimate of the cost of our recent exercise in muscular foreign policy was 100 to 200 billion dollars, and there is no reason to doubt its accuracy. That would pay for a lot of services.<br /></p><p align="justify">Unlike Safire, Friedman didn't buy the administration line as to why we had to invade Iraq. He didn't believe that Saddam was a threat and acknowledged that the war was carried out for reasons of policy or, as he put it, was "a war of choice." I'm not sure how he can retain his liberal credentials, neo or otherwise, spending 100 billion on a discretionary war while jeopardizing Social Security.<br />______________________________<br /><br /><small>1. David Rudenstein, University of California Press 1996.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>June 13</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Leaving my theory of philosophical inconsistencies aside, Mr. Safire's support of the war was, according to all of the evidence to date, based on a faulty factual assumption; Iraq wasn't a threat. Mr. Friedman doubted the threat all along, but he managed to find other rationales which are equally hard to accept.<br /></p><p align="justify">On June 4, Friedman told us that "there were actually four reasons for this war: the real reason, the right reason, the moral reason and the stated reason."<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The "real reason" for this war, which was never stated, was that after 9/11 America needed to hit someone in the Arab-Muslim world. Afghanistan wasn't enough because a terrorism bubble had built up over there - a bubble that posed a real threat to the open societies of the West and needed to be punctured....<br />...Smashing Saudi Arabia or Syria would have been fine. But we hit Saddam for one simple reason: <i>because we could,</i> and because he deserved it and because he was right in the heart of that world....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">His "real reason" leaves out oil; on January 5, he thought that was a significant factor.<br /></p><p align="justify">It does seem that invading Iraq resulted from something akin to the "real reason:" the need felt by President Bush to strike at someone; the years-long obsession with Iraq, the Middle East and American hegemony on the part of some of his advisors; the moral and military vulnerability of Hussein; oil.<br /></p><p align="justify">The "right reason" for the war was "to build a progressive Arab regime."<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">... The real weapons that threaten us are the growing number of angry, humiliated young Arabs and Muslims, who are produced by failed or failing Arab states - young people who hate America more than they love life. Helping to build a decent Iraq as a model for others - and solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - are the necessary steps for defusing the ideas of mass destruction, which are what really threaten us.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This has been Friedman's dubious theme for some time: make us safe from Muslim terrorists by invading a Muslim country and remaking it in our image.<br /></p><p align="justify">The "moral reason" for the war was that Saddam "had killed thousands of his own people, and neighbors, and needed to be stopped." Friedman thinks that Bush could not gain support for the war using the moral reason. I didn't think it would fly either; in fact, it proved to be popular and eventually became an important fallback position for the administration. As Friedman concedes, he adopted it also. On April 27, referring to a picture from a burial ground, reportedly of Hussein's victims, he said,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">As far as I'm concerned, we do not need to find any weapons of mass destruction to justify this war. That skull, and the thousands more that will be unearthed, are enough for me....<br /><center>***</center>Whether you were for or against this war, whether you preferred that the war be done with the U.N.'s approval or without it, you have to feel good that right has triumphed over wrong. America did the right thing here. It toppled one of the most evil regimes on the face of the earth,... <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">That statement reveals more than intended: this is a "feel-good" rationale. Candid reporting about the casualties would make us feel less good.<br /></p><p align="justify">It seems to me that, for the administration, the moral or "liberation" argument was an obvious makeweight. In addition, it had technical problems which made it difficult to put forward as the administration's reason for invading Iraq. As Harold Meyerson has pointed out, freeing Iraq from a dictator "was never a sufficient reason for the United States to go to war, as Bush and his aides clearly understood. Even under the theory of preemption as they propounded it, the preemptee can't simply be a totalitarian thug; he has to pose a threat to us as well."<sup><small>1 </small></sup>He referred, I assume, to the National Security Strategy, which bases preemptive military action on threats to our security:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country;...<br /><center>***</center>...The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.... To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Despite Mr. Meyerson's reminder, the administration now seems content to hide behind the moral reason.<br /></p><p align="justify">This brings us to the reason actually advanced. The "stated reason"' was "that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction that posed an immediate threat to America." It was adopted "because the Bush team never dared to spell out the real reason for the war, and (wrongly) felt that it could never win public or world support for the right reasons and the moral reasons...."<br /></p><p align="justify">What if no WMD are found? In answering that, Friedman distinguished between "his" war and Bush's; the former apparently consists of tagging along behind the real one, claiming collateral benefits. Because his war was right and moral, he isn't very concerned about any misstatements by the administration.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...Finding Iraq's W.M.D.'s is necessary to preserve the credibility of the Bush team, the neocons, Tony Blair and the C.I.A. But rebuilding Iraq is necessary to win the war.... Mr. Bush's credibility rides on finding W.M.D.'s, but America's future, and the future of the Mideast, rides on our building a different Iraq....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Is credibility important only to the present administration? Would America's future not be affected by our being a liar as well as a militarist? Never mind: the important thing is that Iraq must be rebuilt and transformed; if not, Mr. Friedman's war will have been in vain.<br />_____________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Washington Post, 5/13/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>June 15</b> <a name="06/15/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">The invasion of Iraq, we were told, was necessary to rid that country of weapons of mass destruction which were a threat to the United States. Any doubts as to the truth of such claims were reenforced as the war began: no such weapons were used by Iraq in its defense. As has been noted, if they were not used to repel an invader bent on regime change, when would they have been used?<br /></p><p align="justify">This week will mark three months since the invasion of Iraq began and no such weapons have been discovered. The initial search, based on intelligence about specific sites, is winding down.<br /></p><p align="justify">If the administration's pre-war story were sound, those weapons shouldn't have been hard to find. On February 5, Secretary Powell told the Security Council, "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets." He identified "active chemical munitions bunkers." He claimed that, in November, "a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq."<br /></p><p align="justify">The failure to find WMD has led, in Britain, to stinging criticism of the government by the media and by members of Parliament. Reaction has been much more restrained here, which makes one wonder whether we are prepared to accept anything which feels like a response to 9-11. However, without in any degree taking the administration's side, a case can be made for reserving final judgment on the accuracy or truthfulness of the administration's WMD claims. On June 8, Victoria Clarke, spokeswoman for the Pentagon, wrote to the New York Times to complain that critics were inconsistent; having asked for more time for the UN inspections, they should apply the same standard now. The comparison is neither disinterested nor persuasive, but the conclusion is sound enough: let the administration have as long as it reasonably requests before passing judgment on its claims, warnings, rationales and intelligence. There is no urgency and we should make an assessment which will stand up.<br /></p><p align="justify">We can, however, draw some preliminary conclusions about the WMD issue. The most obvious is that the administration is not very confident that any will be found; concessions and fallback positions are appearing almost daily.<br /></p><p align="justify">On May 30, President Bush, referring to the famous two trailers, fudged from weapons to weapon-producing devices:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">You remember when Colin Powell stood up in front of the world, and he said, 'Iraq has got laboratories, mobile labs to build biological weapons.' They're illegal. They're against the United Nations resolutions, and we've so far discovered two. And we'll find more weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong. We found them.<sup><small>1</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">National Security Advisor Rice had this to say on June 8 about Iraq's weapons: "No one ever said that we knew precisely where all of these agents were, where they were stored."<sup><small>2</small></sup> However, on March 30, Secretary Rumsfeld had said "We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat." Perhaps that isn't "precise" by Dr. Rice's standards. In any case, she now hopes that interviews will lead us to something: only "a fraction of the people who were involved" in the weapons programs have been interviewed and "we've always known that the strongest evidence...will come from talking to the people who were involved."<sup><small>3 </small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Also on June 8, Dr. Rice changed the subject from weapons to weapons programs:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The fact is this was a program that was built for concealment. We've always known that. We've always known that it would take some time to put together a full picture of his weapon of mass destruction programs.<sup><small>4</small> </sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">The President echoed this on June 9:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Iraq had a weapons program. Intelligence throughout the decade showed they had a weapons program. I am absolutely convinced with time we'll find out that they did have a weapons program.<sup><small>5</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">That obviously programmed statement tells us that now we're merely seeking to verify the existence, at some unspecified time, of a weapons program which was revealed by intelligence "throughout the decade." That isn't quite the same as "Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today," as the President stated on October 8, 2002, or that Hussein "is assembling the world's most dangerous weapons," as he said in his State of the Union address, or "Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons," as Rumsfeld said on January 20.<br /></p><p align="justify">Perhaps Iraq destroyed all of those weapons just before we invaded, as Mr. Rumsfeld now suggests. But then how did our intelligence, which could produce the detailed information utilized by Secretary Powell, manage to miss such a massive operation? How could Rumsfeld be so certain about the weapons before the war, and - now that he has possession of the country - say, as to the failure to find any, "I don't know the answer"? Is it possible that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz spoke the truth when he said that the WMD threat was merely bureaucratically convenient, <i>i.e.,</i> not necessarily true but saleable? The administration seems to be down to this consoling argument, offered by Viceroy Paul Bremer: "I think we'll find something at some point. It's hard to believe Saddam would have put his people through so much misery and given up millions of dollars if he didn't have something to hide."<sup><small>6 </small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The President ended his tactical retreat on June 9 with this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Asked whether U.S. credibility was at stake in the search for weapons of mass destruction, Bush shifted the focus to the ouster of Saddam. "The credibility of this country is based upon our strong desire to make the world more peaceful and the world is now more peaceful after our decision," he said. "History and time will prove that the United States made the absolute right decision in freeing the people of Iraq from the clutches of Saddam Hussein.<sup><small>7</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The number of dead and permanently injured Iraqis takes some of the glow from "freeing" the rest and it's difficult to see benefits to most of the survivors at this point; hence the appeal to time and history. The world is more peaceful? Iraqis and Americans are dying regularly in Iraq, terrorists have killed about 60 people, including Americans, in Saudi Arabia and Morocco and reciprocal killing continues in Israel and Palestine. WMD may not prove to be the justification for the invasion, but the liberation and pacification theories aren't looking too good either. _________________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>Washington Post,</i> 5/31/03.<br />2, 4. NBC, "Meet the Press" 6/8/03.<br />3. <i>Washington Post,</i> 6/9/03, reporting an interview on ABC's "This Week" 6/8.<br />5. <i>Washington Post,</i> 6/10/03.<br />6. Mirror.co.uk 6/3/03.<br />7. Washingtonpost.com 6/9/03.</small><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>June 20 </b><a name="06/20/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">Federal judges rarely are accused of excessive modesty. To the contrary, one of the arguments for the election of judges is that life tenure goes to the head. However, in the assertiveness department, judges are amateurs compared to the executive branch, or at least to its present incumbents; when told by the Justice Department to get out of the way, the judiciary not only obliges but confesses its unworthiness.<br /></p><p align="justify">The latest manifestation is <i>Center for National Security Studies v. U.S.,</i> decided June 17, in which the District of Columbia Circuit allowed the government to withhold the names of people it detained following 9-11. The Washington Post, in its house editorial on June 18, aptly described the theory underlying the decision: "The government need only whisper the words 'national security,' the court says in effect, and the courts will roll over."<br /></p><p align="justify">"Various 'public interest' groups," as the Court dismissively described them, submitted a request to the Justice Department in October, 2001 asking, under the Freedom of Information Act, for the following information about those detained in the post-9/11 sweep:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">1) name and citizenship status; 2) location of arrest and place of detention; 3) date of detention/arrest, date any charges were filed, and the date of release; 4) nature of charges or basis for detention, and the disposition of such charges or basis; 5) names and addresses of lawyers representing any detainees; 6) identities of any courts which have been requested to enter orders sealing any proceedings in connection with any detainees, copies of any such orders, and the legal authorities relied upon by the government in seeking the sealing orders; 7) all policy directives or guidance issued to officials about making public statements or disclosures about these individuals or about the sealing of judicial or immigration proceedings.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This may be excessive, but items 1, 2 (place of detention) and 4 are matters of fundamental concern in any free society: whom has the government detained and why; where are they? According to the Court, plaintiffs specifically raised questions about mistreatment of the detainees, imprisonment without probable cause and interference with the right to counsel.<br /></p><p align="justify">The detainees at issue were divided by the government and by the Court into three groups: "individuals who were questioned in the course of the investigation and detained by the INS for violation of the immigration laws;" "individuals held on federal criminal charges;" "persons detained after a judge issued a material witness warrant to secure their testimony before a grand jury..." In response to plaintiffs' FOIA request, the government released some information, but, as to INS detainees, withheld the detainees' names, locations of arrest and detention, the dates of release, and the names of lawyers. As to criminal detainees, the government withheld the dates and locations of arrest and detention, the dates of release, and citizenship. It withheld all requested information with respect to material witnesses.<br /></p><p align="justify">Plaintiffs sued to enforce their request. The District Court ordered the government to disclose the names of the detainees and their lawyers, but held that the government was entitled to withhold all other information. Both sides appealed.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Court of Appeals divided 2-1; the majority opinion is, in part, simply an application of the exceptions to disclosure in FOIA, and is an illustration of the fact that public disclosure acts operate as much to prevent as to facilitate disclosure. However, the application of the exemptions in this case is influenced by an attitude of subservience which makes clear that the courts are not to be relied upon to protect anyone's liberties if the government says "terrorism."<br /></p><p align="justify">The Court held that the names of those detained could be withheld under the exemption set out in 5 U.S.C § 552(b)(7), which insulates "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings...." The Justice Department submitted two declarations allegedly supporting its claim that disclosure would so interfere. That was enough. Under 7(A), the government has the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of interference with the investigation. "The government's declarations, viewed in light of the appropriate deference to the executive on issues of national security, satisfy this burden." This is because "in the FOIA context, we have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review." To make sure that the point was not lost, the Court added,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The need for deference in this case is just as strong as in earlier cases. America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore. Exemption 7(A) explicitly requires a predictive judgment of the harm that will result from disclosure.... It is abundantly clear that the government's top counterterrorism officials are well-suited to make this predictive judgment. Conversely, the judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess the executive's judgment in this area of ational security.... </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The Court offered several arguments as to the dangers of disclosure. On the whole, the Court's rationale is not convincing, but the arguments are superfluous; once the Court deferred to the government, the matter was decided.<br /></p><p align="justify">Like <i>Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,</i> this decision gives the government open-ended powers: prosecutors always can allege interference with an investigation, so people can be detained secretly, with or without charges.<br /></p><p align="justify">Rather than simply deferring to the government, the dissenting judge would have allowed it to withhold information, but only on a better showing: "I would therefore remand to allow the government to describe, for each detainee or reasonably defined category of detainees, on what basis it may withhold their names and other information."<br /></p><p align="justify">The dissent agreed that "uniquely compelling governmental interests are at stake: the government's need to respond to the September 11 attacks - unquestionably the worst ever acts of terrorism on American soil - and its ability to defend the nation against future acts of terrorism." Whether 9-11 should give rise to unique prosecutorial rights is debatable; certainly that is an easily abused notion. However, the dissent retained a sense of balance:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...But although this court overlooks it, there is another compelling interest at stake in this case: the public's interest in knowing whether the government, in responding to the attacks, is violating the constitutional rights of the hundreds of persons whom it has detained in connection with its terrorism investigation - by, as the plaintiffs allege, detaining them mainly because of their religion or ethnicity, holding them in custody for extended periods without charge, or preventing them from seeking or communicating with legal counsel. </p></blockquote><p align="justify">As to the issue of deference, the dissenting judge was not so easily persuaded:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...Invoking the "heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security," ... the government refuses to identify the specific categories of information that would actually interfere with its investigation, but rather asks us simply to trust its judgment. This court obeys....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Like the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi, the majority found separation of powers to be an excuse for inaction. The dissent's statement on this point is a little unclear. Assuming that concept to have any significance, the response should be - and the dissent's may well have been - that separation of powers is not honored or enforced by the judiciary's becoming subservient to the executive.<br /></p><p align="justify">A government which operates in secret can abuse its power. This is not an academic concern; the administration's mistreatment of these detainees is documented by the report of the Inspector General of the Justice Department. The response: ''We make no apologies for finding every legal way possible to protect the American public from further terrorist attacks,'' said Barbara Comstock, a spokeswoman for the department."<sup><small>1</small></sup> Perhaps the White House should have considered Ms. Comstock as Ari Fleischer's replacement.<br />_______________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>New York Times</i> 6/2/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>July 3</b> <a name="07/03/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">On July 2, President Bush reacted to continuing attacks on American forces in Iraq in his signature blustering style: "bring 'em on." His use of this foolish phrase has been criticized for encouraging attacks on our forces, which is stretching things a bit. However, his outburst indicates how defensive he is about the situation. Viceroy Bremer announced that the Iraqi opposition is becoming desperate, a reaction which seems to refect a similar anxiety. Whether the attacks show desperation, they are numerous and deadly. Judging from several recent news reports, the attacks, combined with the lack of any prospect for an early return home, are having a serious effect on morale.<br /></p><p align="justify">The number of casualties usually is reported with reference to the date of the President's speech on the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, in which he said that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended." The report always includes that phrase or some variation, and usually nothing else. Describing the speech solely in those terms ignores the celebratory nature of the occasion. Bush was there to swagger, pose for reelection campaign photos and declare victory. In fact, his next sentence was "In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed." That makes the continued combat more difficult for him to accept and to explain.<br /></p><p align="justify">The government announced a reward of $25 million for information leading to the capture of Saddam Hussein or proof that he is dead. This hardly is a surprise. Bush is not riding as high in the polls as before and needs something which will signify success. Capturing or killing Saddam would do that; so would finding weapons of mass destruction.<br /></p><p align="justify">A dead or imprisoned Saddam could actually change the situation, assuming that the guerrilla fighters are taking orders from him or hoping for his return. However, its major benefit to Bush would be symbolic: we said we would take him out; see, we have.<br /></p><p align="justify">Finding WMD would have the same symbolic benefit, as well as validating the excuse given for the war. The definition of WMD by now is flexible, so virtually anything that looks like toxic chemicals or biological agents or plans to produce them will do. If whatever turns up was no threat to us, he'll hope no one notices.<br /></p><p align="justify"><a id="07/12/03"><b>July 12</b> </a><br /></p><p align="justify">The Fourth Circuit preserved its status as the graveyard of civil liberties by denying, 8-4, an <i>en banc</i> rehearing in the latest appeal in <i>Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi III).</i><sup><small>1</small></sup> Mr. Hamdi will remain incarcerated at the government's discretion.<br /></p><p align="justify">There was no opinion of the court, but two of the dissenters (Judges Luttig and Motz) filed opinions, as did two of the majority (Judges Wilkinson and Traxler), who also were members of the panel which decided the appeal. The circumstances of Hamdi's capture form a major issue in this exchange. Mr. Hamdi no doubt has something to say about that; however, he wasn't allowed to participate.<br /></p><p align="justify">The exchange between the four judges is not edifying. It does little to clarify the principles which should govern cases of this sort and the arguments by the members of the panel do nothing to make its opinion more persuasive. The dissenters do not exactly stake out a bold liberal position; Judge Luttig seems to be committed to even more deference to the executive than the panel, and Judge Motz is willing to place the burden of proof on the prisoner. Judge Luttig's opinion is an exercise in syntactical and analytical obscurity; only its hostile tone is clear.<br /></p><p align="justify">The panel decision turned on this formula:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Thus, it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan during a time of armed hostilities there. It is further undisputed that the executive branch has classified him as an enemy combatant.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">At times, the first half of the formula was expressed somewhat more specifically: "Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict...." The first half turns out to be dispositive: capture "in Afghanistan during a time of armed hostilities there" or capture "in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict" eliminates any serious scrutiny of the government's assertion that the prisoner is an enemy combatant. The proof offered on the second point was the infamous Mobbs Declaration, a hearsay statement that Hamdi is an enemy combatant. That was adequate because, once the first requirement is satisfied, a mere allegation establishes the second.<br /></p><p align="justify">As to the first half of the formula, both dissenting opinions questioned whether capture in a combat zone is a meaningful test. As Judge Luttig put it,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The embedded journalist or even the unwitting tourist could be seized and detained in a foreign combat zone. Indeed, the likelihood that such could occur is far from infinitesimal where the theater is global, not circumscribed, and the engagement is an unconventional war against terrorists, not a conventional war against an identifiable nation state.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Judge Motz concurred, using as examples American journalists covering the war in Iraq or a member of a humanitarian organization working in Afghanistan.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Indeed, under the panel's holding, any American citizen seized in a part of the world where American troops are present - e.g., the former Yugoslavia, the Philippines, or Korea - could be imprisoned indefinitely without being charged with a crime or afforded legal counsel, if the Executive asserted that the area was a zone of active combat.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Judge Traxler offered this rebuttal:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Afghanistan is an identifiable nation state and Hamdi was in a conventional war situation. Every resident within Afghanistan (including Hamdi as was explicitly alleged) was in law an enemy, until determined by the Executive to be a friend.... American journalists and American tourists who venture into a country with whom we are at war without the approval of our military, or who fail to return to this country in time of war, necessarily expose themselves to many risks, including this one....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This is somewhat disingenuous. Although <i>Hamdi</i> may be limited to Afghanistan, the panel opinion is full of sweeping generalizations about deference to the administration, and there is no reason to think that the definition of a zone of combat would be exempted. In addition, the point regarding the journalist, tourist or aid worker applies to Afghanistan. According to Judge Traxler, anyone, however innocent of anti-American impulse, could be imprisoned merely because a) he was in Afghanistan in late 2001 and b) some faceless functionary in the DOD asserts that he's an enemy combatant. </p><p align="justify">Despite Judge Luttig's criticism of the panel's definition of a combat zone, it turns out that he really isn't concerned about that. His complaint is that the panel wrongly concluded that capture in such a zone had been conceded by the petitioner; hence the "undisputed" in the formula. Here is where Hamdi's banishment from the proceedings is the most poignant. The panel held that he had conceded the issue, based on statements by the lawyers hired by his father, acting as next friend; neither the father nor his lawyers have had any contact with Hamdi since his capture. Leaving aside whether those statements were clear concessions, what an unfair - not to say stupid - way to decide an issue concerning a man's freedom.<br /></p><p align="justify">As to the second factor, Judge Motz rejected the panel's standard of proof:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">To justify forfeiture of a citizen's constitutional rights, the Executive must establish enemy combatant status with more than hearsay. In holding to the contrary, the panel allows appropriate deference to the Executive's authority in matters of war to eradicate the Judiciary's own Constitutional role: protection of the individual freedoms guaranteed all citizens....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">In other words, something more than the allegations of the Mobbs Declaration is required. Judge Motz argued that the panel's interpretation of Supreme Court decisions was faulty and concluded,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Without any acknowledgment of its break with precedent, the panel embarks on a perilous new course - approving the Executive's designation of enemy combatant status not on the basis of facts stipulated or proven, but solely on the basis of an unknown Executive advisor's declaration, which the panel itself concedes is subject to challenge as "incomplete[ ]" and "inconsisten[t]" hearsay....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This sounds good, but it doesn't lead far. In Judge Motz' view, the fact of capture in a combat zone could justify a rebuttable presumption of enemy combatant status, shifting the burden to the prisoner to prove a negative. This "would seem to be the course dictated by precedent." What that precedent might be is not revealed. This strange procedure is triggered by the mere presence in a combat zone, a test which she earlier ridiculed.<br /></p><p align="justify">Judge Motz offered an alternative suggestion: if the government produced support for the conclusions in the declaration, a court could review it, "ex parte and in camera if necessary." As Judge Wilkinson responded, this "would likely please no one...."<br /></p><p align="justify">None of the opinions examines the concept of "enemy combatant." All are content to let the government do what it wishes with people so labeled. The implication is that this is a well-defined status and that indefinite detention incommunicado is the proper treatment of one so classified. How anyone is able to reach this conclusion is a mystery.<br /></p><p align="justify">There are, it seems to me, three problems with the use of this term: there is disagreement as to what it means; the government isn't applying it legitimately; it is a concept borrowed from another time and culture, which may not fit here, however defined.<br /></p><p align="justify">The American Bar Association Task Force on Enemy Combatants issued a report on August 8, 2002. It noted that the "government maintains that individuals declared to be 'enemy combatants' may be detained indefinitely and have no right under the laws and customs of war or the Constitution to meet with counsel concerning their detention." It adds, with some understatement, "The term 'enemy combatant' is not a term of art which has a long established meaning."<br /></p><p align="justify">"Enemy combatant" comes to us from <i>Ex parte Quirin,</i> which uses it only once, in this passage:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an <u>enemy combatant</u> who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals....<sup><small>2</small> </sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">I read that as stating that "enemy combatant" is a generic category, those who fight for the enemy, of which there are two subcategories, lawful and unlawful combatants. Under that interpretation, the phrase "an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property," refers to one who is an enemy combatant <u>and</u> comes secretly through the lines.... That person also would be an unlawful combatant. The <i>amici</i> in <i>Hamdi III</i> filed a brief before the panel which read that phrase as stating that an enemy combatant <u>is</u> one who comes secretly through the lines.... Under that interpretation, "enemy combatant" and "unlawful combatant" are equivalent. Judge Wilkinson, who authored the panel decision, stated in a footnote to his opinion on rehearing that the "government does not concede that Hamdi is a prisoner of war, but rather asserts that he is an unlawful combatant." (As a variation, the District Court had ordered the government to produce the name and title of the individual who made the determination that Hamdi was "an illegal enemy combatant." I don't know how one reads that).<br /></p><p align="justify">Neither the panel opinion nor the government's brief on that appeal claim or recite that Hamdi is an unlawful combatant, so perhaps Judge Wilkinson is adopting the <i>amici's</i> position that the terms are equivalent and interchangeable. This isn't likely; neither the government nor the Court are that casual about terminology, nor is it a sensible reading of Quirin. The panel opinion stated that<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">It has long been established that if Hamdi is indeed an "enemy combatant" who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government's present detention of him is a lawful one. See, e.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31, 37 (holding that both lawful and unlawful combatants, regardless of citizenship, "are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by pposing ilitary forces");... </p></blockquote><p align="justify">This seems to use "enemy combatant" in the inclusive sense. In rejecting an argument under The Geneva Conventions, the Court said,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Hamdi and the amici make much of the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants, noting correctly that lawful combatants are not subject to punishment for their participation in a conflict. But for the purposes of this case, it is a distinction without a difference, since the option to detain until the cessation of hostilities belongs to the executive in either case. It is true that unlawful combatants are entitled to a proceeding before a military tribunal before they may be punished for the acts which render their belligerency unlawful. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. But they are also subject to mere detention in precisely the same way that lawful prisoners of war are. Id....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Finally, the panel used the fact that Hamdi has not been charged with a crime to support its ruling.<br /></p><p align="justify">None of this is conclusive, but it isn't sensible to assume that dozens of references to "enemy" are to be interpreted "unlawful." We are left to conclude that Judge Wilkinson misspoke in his recent opinion, but that seems more likely than the alternative.<br /></p><p align="justify">Under either definition, there is a distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants and certain rights attach to the former status. According to <i>Quirin,</i> the former are to be treated as prisoners of war; the latter may be tried before military commissions for war crimes. Assuming that the <i>Quirin</i> concepts have any relevance to an unconventional war, they should be applied honestly. Thus far, there is, apart from Judge Wilkenson's footnote, no allegation that Hamdi is an unlawful combatant. Based on the government's allegations, Hamdi would be a lawful combatant, a soldier for the Taliban. The government's brief in <i>Hamdi III</i> stated that the "detainee at issue in this case, Yaser Hamdi, was seized as an enemy combatant and taken into control of the United States military in Afghanistan, after the Taliban unit he was with surrendered." It referred to "the challenged exercise of military authority at issue here - i.e., the capture and detention of the enemy in a time of active war." All of this indicates that, at least at present, Hamdi is considered as a captured member of an enemy force, <i>i.e.,</i> a lawful combatant. However, he is not being treated as a prisoner of war; POWs are not held incommunicado.<br /></p><p align="justify">The final problem with the use of the term and concept "enemy combatant" is that it has been imported from another time and situation, and does not fit here, at least not without analysis and reappraisal, neither of which I have seen.<br /></p><p align="justify">The truth is that the government simply has decided that it will do as it pleases with anyone it captures. Resort to the "enemy combatant" label merely is a matter of juridical convenience, a blanket to throw over its actions when challenged, a blanket under which compliant courts like the Fourth Circuit will not peek.<br /></p><p align="justify">Leaving aside terminology, the government's reliance on <i>Quirin</i> is misplaced. The ABA report criticized its present use:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...<i>Quirin</i> does not stand for the proposition that detainees may be held incommunicado and denied access to counsel, since the defendants in <i>Quirin</i> were able to seek review and they were represented by counsel. Since the Supreme Court has decided that even enemy <i>aliens</i> within the United States are entitled to review, that right could hardly be denied to United States citizens.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Another problem for the government is that detention is lawful only if pursuant to statute: "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress. 18 U.S.C. §4001(a). The ABA report quoted from the legislative history:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The twofold purpose of the amended bill is (1) to restrict the imprisonment or other detention of citizens by the United States to situations in which statutory authority for their incarceration exists and (2) to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950) which...authorizes the establishment of detention camps....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Enactment of 4001(a) and repeal of an act authorizing detention camps would seem to be a strong indication that Congress doesn't approve of indefinite imprisonment without charge. However, the Justice Department argues that the statute doesn't apply here: §4001(a) "Constitutionally could not interfere with the president's power as commander- in-chief."<sup><small>3</small></sup> Hamdi argued that his detention was unlawful under §4001, but the panel disagreed, primarily on the ground that the resolution authorizing the attack on Afghanistan "necessarily includes the capture and detention of any and all hostile forces arrayed against our troops."<br /></p><p align="justify">The ABA report repudiated the administration's position on the issue of access to counsel in cases such as Hamdi's. Referring to citizen prisoners held in the U.S., the report stated,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...[A] United States citizen detainee should not be denied access to the courts and he or she should, at the very least, have the right to contact an attorney in order to seek habeas corpus relief.<br /><center>***</center><br />...Indeed, the right to prompt judicial review may well be hollow unless citizen detainees are afforded meaningful access to counsel and to the effective assistance of counsel in order to appropriately challenge their detention. <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">"Hollow" is a good description of the Fourth Circuit's notion of judicial review.<br />______________________________<br /><br /><small>1. See note of 1/17/03 for my comments on the panel opinion.<br />2. 317 U.S. 1, 30-31; emphasis added, footnotes omitted.<br />3. ABCNews.com 7/20/02.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>July 20</b> <a name="07/20/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">News reports speculate on who is responsible for the infamous 16-word sentence in the State of the Union speech claiming that Iraq had obtained uranium from Africa. They seem to overlook the obvious answer. Michael Kinsley summed up the situation in his <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62122-2003Jul15.html">column</a> in The Washington Post on July 16:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The media are in a frenzy of speculation and leakage. Senators are calling for hearings. All of Washington demands an answer: Who was the arch-fiend who told a lie in President Bush's State of the Union speech? ...<br /></p><p align="justify">Linguists note that the question "Who lied in George Bush's State of the Union speech" bears a certain resemblance to the famous conundrum "Who is buried in Grant's Tomb?" They speculate that the two questions may have parallel answers....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">After all, Mr. Bush is the President, the one who made the speech advocating war, the one who pushed the war button. He's also the one who complained during the 2000 campaign that the "buck stops here" sign had been moved from the oval office to the Lincoln bedroom. One assumes that he intended to adopt Truman's theory that the buck has to stop with the guy in charge. Everyone seems to be saying that it isn't Mr. Bush.<br /></p><p align="justify">In addition to arguing over who decided what the President would say, his aides are at work diminishing his stature in other ways. Mr. Bush, reporters were told by a resolutely anonymous "senior administration official," is not a "fact-checker."<sup> <small>1</small></sup> Presumably this was a clumsy attempt to be snobbish - he's the commander-in-chief , not someone delegated to verify citations - but it conveys the message that he doesn't know or care whether statements he makes are accurate.<br /></p><p align="justify">There are competing versions of the speech story, differing mainly in the role, if any, of the CIA. They agree that the Africa line was not a contribution by the President, but probably was put in by a speechwriter. Its exact form, attributing the uranium claim to the Brits is said to have been a "stylistic" matter.<sup><small>2 </small></sup>Policy, including invading another country, is influenced by rhetorical whim. Here's the speech, George; read it.<br /></p><p align="justify">The White House distributed part of a National Intelligence Estimate; that part, by an amazing coincidence, was eligible for declassification just in time to argue that there was support for the 16 words. However, the "senior official" revealed that neither the president nor National Security Advisor Rice read the entire NIE, thereby missing the State Department warning that the African uranium story was "highly dubious." This is easy to believe about Mr. Bush. It's baffling about Dr. Rice; what is her job, if not to be fully informed about national security matters? National security was, allegedly, the significance of the uranium story and the reason for invading Iraq.<br />____________________________<br /><br /><small>1, 2. Washington Post 7/19/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>July 21</b> <a name="07/21/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">President Bush has designated six of the prisoners at Guantánamo, including two British subjects and one Australian, as "eligible for trial" before military commissions. Under the order creating the commissions, a person may be "eligible" for such treatment if the President determines that there is reason to believe that he<br /><br />- is or was a member of al Qaeda;<br /><br />- "has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States..." or<br /><br />- has "knowingly harbored" someone falling into those categories.<br /><br />The Defense Department claimed that there is evidence that the six "may have attended terrorist training camps and may have been involved in such activities as financing al Qaeda, providing protection for Osama bin Laden, and recruiting future terrorists."<br /></p><p align="justify">Whether they will be tried is said to be up to Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz. According to The Washington Post, "officials" said that Wolfowitz' decision whether to try them will depend in part on "the results of the detainees' interrogations,"<sup><small>1</small></sup> which indicates that the prosecutions may have been threatened to induce cooperation; thus far, this seems to be the principal function of the commissions. The Guardian offered a more dramatic version: the two British eligibles would be given the choice to "plead guilty and accept a 20-year prison sentence, or be executed if found guilty. American legal sources close to the process said that the prisoners' dilemma was intended to encourage maximum 'co-operation'."<sup><small>2</small></sup></p><p align="justify">A few days ago, it was reported that, following an appeal by Prime Minister Blair, proceedings against the Brits would be "suspended" pending discussion with Her Majesty's government. It helps to have an influential advocate. (The same courtesy will be extended to the Australian, although his government seems less concerned.) The PM's intervention could result in elimination of the possibility of the death penalty or transfer to British custody.<br /></p><p align="justify">The other Guantánamo prisoners continue to be detained for as long as the government pleases without charges, American due process or rights afforded under international law.<br /></p><p align="justify">Criticism of the military commissions and of the government's treatment of those at Guantánamo and elsewhere has been muted. Post-9/11, the government is given a pass on matters allegedly connected to national security, by some because they accept the government's arguments, by others out of fear of seeming unpatriotic.<br /></p><p align="justify">Withholding rights from noncitizens is not confined to those captured abroad and detained in Cuba. The government pulled Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri from the federal court system, a month before trial, placing him in a military brig. It threatens to do the same to Zacarias Moussaoui. It refuses to disclose information about aliens detained after 9-11 and holds secret deportation hearings.<br /></p><p align="justify">July 4 traditionally is marked by naturalization ceremonies, at which patriotic themes dominate. This year was no exception; with no apparent sense of irony, the government issued this press release on June 30:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The Department of Homeland Security today launched a weeklong commemoration of the Nation's independence that highlights the importance of legal immigration and citizenship.<br /></p><p align="justify">As part of the commemoration, the Department's Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) will welcome approximately 9,500 new Americans at 50 naturalization ceremonies across the United States. The theme of the ceremonies will be "Celebrating a Nation of Immigrants."<br /></p><p align="justify">"Welcoming new citizens to the United States is one of the most important things that we do as a nation," Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge said. "Immigrants invigorate our national spirit and reinforce the ideals and principles that are the foundation of our great nation."<br /></p><p align="justify">He added, "These ceremonies are more than an opportunity to welcome our newest citizens and celebrate their contributions to our nation. They also remind us that in a troubled world the United States still stands as a beacon of hope and opportunity. We will preserve that legacy by securing our borders and protecting our citizens."</p></blockquote><p align="justify">We won't preserve the tradition of standing as a beacon of hope and opportunity by extending due process to noncitizens; we'll do it by securing our borders, an odd message to the new Americans. Given the present mood, one might consider "the importance of... citizenship" something of an understatement. Candor would require a warning to future immigrants that they have no rights until that magic transformation occurs.<br /></p><p align="justify">Prospective Americans have reason to worry; what about those of us already in the club?<br /></p><p align="justify">Two of the alleged enemy combatants, Hamdi and Padilla, are American citizens; Padilla was arrested in the U.S. Neither has been charged with any crime, but both are under indefinite detention in military prisons. A fundamental tenet of American law is the non-involvement of the military in civilian affairs. Military detention of citizens violates that principle, and opens the door to domestic law enforcement by the military and to the elimination of due process for all of us.<br />_________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Washington Post, 7/3/03.<br />2. The Guardian Unlimited, 7/6/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>July 26</b> <a name="07/26/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">The African uranium story gets better with each revision.<br /></p><p align="justify">Now we are told that the National Security Council received two memos and a phone call from the CIA warning of doubts about the alleged Iraqi shopping trip. Although Dr. Rice has denied having knowledge of such doubts, one of the memos was addressed to her. Both went to Steven Hadley, deputy national security advisor, who also received the phone call.<br /></p><p align="justify">Hadley accepted responsibility for failing to remove the Africa story from the State of the Union speech. He forgot that he had been told that it was unreliable. Rice apparently had more important things to do, or perhaps she also forgot. The President, of course, had no part in all of this. When it suits his purpose, he is the man in charge; when it doesn't, he wraps himself in the mantle of lowered expectations. The irresponsibility ploy worked for Reagan because he obviously was detached and because he was aw-shucks likable. Bush can't play that game; his free pass is entirely a product of 9-11 and the war on terrorism. He can't continue to blame everyone else and plead ignorance without tarnishing his warrior's armor.<br /></p><p align="justify">The President's friends, official and otherwise, have been scrambling to find a way of convincing us that a false - or at the very least, misleading and irresponsible - statement, offered as a basis for invading another country, was unimportant. We have been told that it was literally true: Britain did make such a report. As Michael Kinsley has pointed out, this has problems at the most elementary level: Bush said that Britain had "learned" that Iraq sought to purchase uranium; this implies that the report is true and verifiable. However, we now know that the White House was well aware that the story was at least suspect.<br /></p><p align="justify">Another excuse is that the uranium claim was only one of many justifications for going to war. However, most of the others have unravelled too. For example, immediately following the uranium claim, the President stated, "Our intelligence sources tell us that [Saddam Hussein] has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production." This too has been discredited. Much was made of alleged chemical or biological weapons; none have been found, nor have the large stocks of materials claimed or implied to exist. There is no evidence for the alleged connections to al Qaeda or to "terrorists."<br /></p><p align="justify">All of the talk of weapons of mass destruction and dealings with terrorists was the preamble to the excuse for pre-emptive war: "America will not accept a serious and mounting threat to our country and our friends and our allies." That excuse vanishes if there was no threat. There was no threat if there were no such weapons.<br /></p><p align="justify">What's left? Liberation and the ending of human rights violations. These are noble aims and the charges are well-grounded in fact, but the argument is entirely unbelievable as the reason for the war.<br /></p><p align="justify">A new line has emerged. On July 24, William Kristol clued us in: "Bush's words, though probably a mistake, didn't change anything. The vote to authorize war had taken place months before."<sup><small>1</small></sup> A variation was offered by Thomas Sowell the same day: "Did these words mislead Congress into authorizing military action against Iraq? No - because it authorized military action months before that speech was made."<sup><small>2</small></sup> The new message is that the State of the Union speech was merely a rhetorical exercise, not to be taken seriously.<br /></p><p align="justify">Sowell's argument is fallacious. Congress had authorized military action, but only if necessary; in his speech, the President argued that it might be. He was seeking approval for war from Congress, from the people and from the world. If Kristol is correct, the President was deceitful, pretending not to have made a decision: "we seek peace;" "if war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause;" "if Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm..., we will lead a coalition to disarm him."<br /></p><p align="justify">To use discredited information and misleading arguments in seeking approval for a decision to go to war is reprehensible; if the decision already had been made, it hardly is less so.<br />__________________________<br /><br /><small>1. The Washington Post, 7/24/03.<br />2. See townhall.com.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Aug 1</b> <a name="08/01/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." So said the President in the State of the Union address. When that story blew up, the administration's response was ducking, weaving and finger-pointing. Amid various unconvincing explanations of how the claim came to be made, George Tenet and, later, Steven Hadley were selected to be scapegoats. This only called further attention to the efforts by President Bush and National Security Advisor Rice to distance themselves from the issue. Now they have decided to take responsibility.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, their version of responsibility may not resemble anyone else's. Here is Mr. Bush on the subject at a news conference on July 30:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Q. Mr. President, you often speak about the need for accountability in many areas. I wonder then why is Dr. Condoleezza Rice not being held accountable for the statement that your own White House has acknowledged was a mistake in your State of the Union address regarding Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium. And also, do you take personal responsibility for that inaccuracy?<br /></p><p align="justify">A. I take personal responsibility for everything I say, of course, absolutely. I also take responsibility for making decisions on war and peace. And I analyzed a thorough body of intelligence, good, solid, sound intelligence that led me to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to remove Saddam Hussein from power. We gave the world a chance to do it.<br /></p><p align="justify">Remember, again, I don't want to get repetitive here but it's important to remind everybody that there was 12 resolutions that came out of the United Nations because others recognized the threat of Saddam Hussein. Twelve times the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions in recognition of the threat that he posed. And the difference was is that some were not willing to act on those resolutions. We were, along with a lot of other countries. Because he posed a threat.<br /></p><p align="justify">Dr. Condoleezza Rice is an honest, fabulous person and America is lucky to have her service. Period.<sup><small>1</sup></small></p></blockquote><p align="justify">There! I've said I'm responsible. Now leave me alone. And Condi's really neat, so leave her alone too.<br /></p><p align="justify">Did we expect something more than a pro-forma concession? The President wasn't about to admit that the African-uranium claim was flawed and that he was at fault for making it. One could have hoped that some brave reporter might ask what body of intelligence he "analyzed" and whether that included warnings that the uranium story was suspect. However, that merely would have led to further evasion. To Mr. Bush, the important fact is that he led us into this noble war.<br /></p><p align="justify">Dr. Rice offered her version of responsibility-taking in an interview the same day.<sup><small>2</sup></small> Much of it was an attempt to say that a warning given about one speech can't be expected to carry over to another, in this case from a speech in October to the State of the Union in January.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">GWEN IFILL: ...Did you know, or should you have known, that the information that went into the president's State of the Union speech regarding the purchase, or the efforts to purchase uranium in Niger or from Africa, another country in Africa, did you know that that information was not correct?<br /></p><p align="justify">CONDOLEEZZA RICE: When the line was put into the president's State of the Union address and cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency, when I read the line I thought it was completely credible and that in fact it was backed by the agency.<br /></p><p align="justify">What happened here is that we are really talking about two different processes. The State of the Union was put together, the speech went out for clearance, but the speech that the president had given in Cincinnati in October had also been sent out for clearance.<br /><center>***</center>... And in that speech, a line had been there about the uranium issue and Saddam Hussein seeking uranium in Africa. And Director Tenet had called Steve Hadley and he told him, in no specifics, he told him I don't think you should put that in the president's speech because we don't want to make the president his own fact witness....<br /><p></p><p align="justify">What we learned later, and I did not know at the time, and certainly did not know until just before Steve Hadley went out to say what he said last week, was that the director had also sent over to the White House a set of clearance comments that explained why he wanted this out of the [October] speech.<br /></p><p align="justify">I can tell you, I either didn't see the memo, I don't remember seeing the memo, the fact is it was a set of clearance comments, it was three and a half months before the State of the Union. And we're going to try to have a process now in which we don't have to depend on people's memories to link what was taken out of the speech in Cincinnati with what was put into the speech at the State of the Union.... </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Dr. Rice stated that the uranium claim was "credible," which is a fudge. On the one hand, that is something less than saying that the claim was true and the report was legitimate and reliable. On the other, it does not admit that both the report and the claim were suspect. The statement that the CIA cleared the line is disingenuous; "acquiesced" would better fit the descriptions of the contacts between the agency and the White House.<br /></p><p align="justify">Dr. Rice's response isn't about accuracy; it's all about process, the message being that the line would have been appropriate if the right steps had been followed. Dr. Rice now sees a need for a specific procedure to remind the White House staff that an explosive and controversial claim has been dropped from an earlier speech. This shows how little the facts matter. The CIA director's October comments were for "clearance," not to be studied for content. If he said that the Africa story was nonsense, that would have been taken only as disapproval of the line for the speech then being written. Apparently it would be standard procedure to keep putting the line into subsequent speeches until the Director failed to object. After all, it's only a justification for war.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">GWEN IFILL: Should you have seen the memo?<br /></p><p align="justify">CONDOLEEZZA RICE: Well, the memo came over. It was a clearance memo. It had a set of comments about the speech.... And when Director Tenet says something - takes something out of a speech, we take it out. We don't really even ask for an explanation. If the DCI, the director of Central Intelligence, is not going to stand by something, if he doesn't think that he has confidence in it, we're not going to put that into a presidential speech. We have no desire to have the president use information that is anything but the information in which we have the best confidence, the greatest confidence.<br /></p><p align="justify">And so when Director Tenet said take it out of the speech, I think people simply took it out of the speech and didn't think any more about why we had taken it out of the speech.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">For some reason the reference is to "the memo," but there were two. Dr. Rice didn't admit that she should have seen the memos, even the one which was addressed to her.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">GWEN IFILL: Do you feel any personal failure or responsibility for not having seen this memo and flagged it to anybody else who was working on this speech?<br /></p><p align="justify">CONDOLEEZZA RICE: Well, I certainly feel personal responsibility for this entire episode. The president of the United States has every right to believe that what he is saying in his speeches is of the highest confidence of his staff. That's why we go through a clearance process.<br /></p><p align="justify">That's why the process is so rigorous. In this one case, the process did not work. We did have a clearance from the agency, but frankly, looking back, perhaps we should have remembered that it was taken out of the Cincinnati speech. We simply didn't. And what I've assured the president, and what I want to assure myself, is that our future processes will be ones in which we double-check to make sure that something has not been taken out of a speech, in which perhaps we get an affirmative answer from the principals that they in fact will stand behind an element of a speech as important as the State of the Union.<br /></p><p align="justify">But what I feel, really, most responsible for is that this has detracted from the very strong case that the president has been making....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Again, this has the feel of something said to persuade everyone to forget the issue and move on. Not only is there no genuine acceptance of responsibility, there is a reinforcement of the impression that the National Security Advisor has no independent opinions or knowledge of national security issues. Her role, as here self-described, is to supervise a vetting process. The effect of that is to shift responsibility for what the President says back to the intelligence agencies.<br />_________________________<br /><br /><small>1. New York Times 7/31/03.<br />2. PBS.org 7/30/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>Aug 6</b> <a name="08/06/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">The authors of the house editorials of <i>The Washington Post</i> have struggled with the Moussaoui case for months. They wish to preserve the integrity of the federal criminal justice system but, like the government, find its principles inconvenient in the case of defendants such as Zacarias Moussaoui.<br /></p><p align="justify">On January 27, 2003, they complained that Moussaoui had turned the proceedings into a "circus;" he had "cleverly" demanded to depose an al-Qaeda witness, whom Moussaoui says will exonerate him from participation in 9-11. The editorial writers think that defendants like Moussauoi "effectively blackmail the government by threatening to call key detainees as witnesses." They accept the government's assertion that calling the witness "potentially threatens important interests in the war on terror."<br /></p><p align="justify">It isn't possible, in their view, to reconcile the government's interests with the restrictions of a criminal trial. The solution: remand the defendant to a military commission. "The administration deserves credit for having tried to bring the Moussaoui case under the regular order. But the better part of valor now is to end the experiment." As one commentator put it, "in a jarring reversal of presumptions, the Post portray[s] not the advent of military commissions, but rather the prospect of a fair trial in federal court, as the novel experiment."<sup><small>1 </small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Ending the experiment would cause the Post regret, but not for the defendant: "It's hard to imagine a case for which a military tribunal would be more appropriate than that of a foreign al Qaeda operative accused of conspiring to kill thousands who proudly confesses his affiliation." He's a bad man, and can't expect to be afforded our advanced notions of justice.<br /></p><p align="justify">On June 5, the editorial writers again noted the dilemma regarding Moussaoui's demand to depose the al Qaeda witness. They acknowledged that he has that right and that the government is making up new rules as it goes along, rules which interfere with that right. They almost seemed to have some concern about Moussaoui's fate: "Nobody should be convicted in an U.S. court without the ability to make the best case on his own behalf. Not even Mr. Moussaoui." But no, it's the court which must be protected, not the defendant; the solution still is to take him out of the criminal justice system, so that the denial of his rights will not sully it.<br /></p><p align="justify">On July 6, they recommended that the government come up with rules to determine which al Qaeda prisoners would be tried in court and which by military commission, rather than leaving that to be decided <i>ad hoc.</i><br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Otherwise the law becomes a mere instrument of arbitrary state power, not a predictable system of ordered liberty. Among other dangers, the threat of designation as an "enemy combatant" - and the consequent indefinite detention - can too easily become a club to threaten defendants who will not plead guilty or cooperate.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">However, as to Mr. Moussaoui, no new rules are required: "The dangers - both to national security and to civil liberties - of trying some al Qaeda suspects in federal court are sufficient that some may have to be removed to military custody, as we have urged in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui."<br /></p><p align="justify">The house column returned to the subject on July 17. Again, it seemed to start off with concern for the defendant's rights, only to abandon them:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The Sixth Amendment makes clear that "the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."... Under normal circumstances, there would be no question that the defense could have access to such a witness - nor, constitutionally speaking, should there be such question now. The Constitution's language is absolute, after all, and admits no national security exception. Fair-trial rights in American courts cannot be contingent on other governmental interests, even pressing ones.<br /></p><p align="justify">That said, ....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">That said, send Mr. Moussaoui to the military commission.<br /></p><p align="justify">This time, the focus was on the court system's defects rather than its purity. The great experiment "has shown how easily an al Qaeda defendant can tie the system in knots - and how little ability the system has to untie itself." Actually, the system is functioning normally - the prosecution has been ordered to make the witness available - which the government doesn't like. However, according to the <i>Post,</i> Congress must come up with rules to create "a federal court system that can fully protect fair trial rights in the worst terrorism cases without damaging national security."<br /></p><p align="justify">No details were provided on July 17, but in a column on August 4, two issues were identified, both peculiar to the Moussaoui case: acting as one's attorney, and what to do about "witnesses detained abroad who have potentially exculpatory information in a domestic criminal trial."<br /></p><p align="justify">The first is a problem only if we accept the government's claim that national security would be compromised by letting Moussaoui personally interrogate the al Qaeda witness. The risk is not obvious to me, perhaps only because of my ignorance in these matters. The <i>Post</i> proposed a limitation of the right of self-representation to cure whatever risk that might be.<br /></p><p align="justify">As to the second issue, the <i>Post</i> said that one possible solution would be "to give the jury a declassified summary of the testimony a witness would likely have given - a summary that errs on the side of generosity to the defendant's account of events." It isn't clear whether this is intended to deal with the witness' detention abroad, the government's reluctance to produce the witness in open court, the sensitivity of the information, or all of the above.<br /></p><p align="justify">The suggestions were offered in the context of the editorial writers' conviction that the "experiment" of using normal procedures and forums has failed and that the blame for the failure is on Moussaoui.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">In trying Mr. Moussaoui in federal court, rather than before a military tribunal, the government sought to demonstrate that America's courts were a viable venue for the most complex terrorism cases. Instead, however, the case is demonstrating the opposite: that an al Qaeda defendant can tie the legal system in knots and force the government and the courts to choose between compromising important national-security interests and honoring basic constitutional trial norms....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Leaving aside whether the government had such a noble aim, this is a false analysis. It is not a matter of an al Qaeda defendant deviously distorting the system. Moussaoui has done nothing but insist on a right the <i>Post</i> elsewhere admitted to be his, to call witnesses in his defense. The choice to which the government may be forced is not between "compromising important national-security interests and honoring basic constitutional trial norms." It is the choice between producing the witness or dismissing the prosecution. At least that was the choice before military commissions and "enemy combatant" status were taken out of mothballs.<br /></p><p align="justify">The passage just quoted continued as follows:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">... This is a terrible turn of events, one that will encourage more frequent use of the far less accountable military tribunal system. And that system is, in any event, not available for all possible defendants. Many foreign governments will not extradite people to them, and U.S. citizens, mercifully, are not permitted to be tried before them. For at least some terrorism-related cases, in short, the federal courts must be able to produce fair trials using predictable rules....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Trials are not being forced into military tribunals by any terrible turn of events. To the contrary, as the <i>Post</i> conceded on July 6, the government is holding the threat of trial by military tribunal, or indefinite detention without trial, over the heads of criminal defendants as a means of forcing them to give up rights the courts afford. Fair trials under predictable rules are available now; the government just isn't willing to submit to them.<br /></p><p align="justify">The editorial page staff should read the rest of the paper. On June 16, one of the Post's op-ed writers, William Raspberry, pointed out "the only legally defensible conclusion: that the government must choose between its competing interests in prosecuting Moussaoui and protecting its intelligence...."<br /></p><p align="justify">In addition to its other defects, the editorial writers' position is naïve. They assume that only the rights of non-citizens are at issue; trial by military commission is "mercifully" - and presently - not a risk for citizens. However, that hasn't prevented the government from declaring Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, who are citizens, to be enemy combatants and holding them incommunicado indefinitely. They may not be the last, as reference to the news pages would reveal. The <i>Post</i> reported on July 29 that the defendants in the Lackawanna case, all citizens, were intimidated into guilty pleas and long sentences by the threat of labeling them enemy combatants.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Raspberry offered this evaluation of the current willingness to restrict liberties:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">... Make the danger vivid enough and those who ought to be protecting our liberties - the legislatures, the governmental bureaucracies and, too often, the media - will look the other way. So will too many Americans.<br /><center>***</center>It isn't that Americans are ignorant of the facts. We know about Guantanamo and Moussaoui and the difficulty of locating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. But most of us don't know what to think of all these things until those we trust -- our political leaders, public intellectuals and the press -- help us sort them out.<br /><center>***</center>Someone needs to remind us that what is special about America is not just its power, unprecedented in the world, but also its principles. The one is secure enough, the other in more peril than we're willing to admit. <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Column by Joanne Mariner on FindLaw, 2/3/03.</small><br /><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Aug 9</b> <a name="08/09/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">An op-ed <a href="http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2001435004_">column</a> in <i>The Seattle Times</i> on August 8 coined a phrase for the investigation of the administration's numerous deviations from strict truth regarding Iraq:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Now it is time to launch the War on Error. Errorists have infiltrated the Bush administration.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The author, Jenny Durkan, also had an appropriate response to the argument that the uranium claim was an unimportant detail:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">And what helped launch our troops? Do not underestimate any part of the State of the Union address. Remember the national mood. The term "imminent threat" was defined by our post-9-11 context. The White House spoke of nuclear disaster and "mushroom clouds" on national TV. It ent our collective frayed nerves and fears right over the edge.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">I've been collecting articles, speech texts and other material related to the administration's claims regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. They include the original claims, disclosures of contrary information, waffling, new theories, etc. At this point, they run to 549 pages on Word Perfect with no end in sight. That is not a measure of the validity of the official line, but it does indicate how much difficulty the administration has encountered in justifying its excuse for invasion.<br /></p><p align="justify">The current debate is over how the African-uranium line found its way into the State of the Union address. The White House explanation is that it happened by inadvertence, that the staff forgot that the claim had been disapproved for an earlier speech. Call it the "oops" theory. One of the recent contributions to the debate is an article in <i>The Washington Post</i><sup><small>1</sup></small> which makes that theory difficult to accept.<br /></p><p align="justify">One of the White House dodges is that so much time elapsed between the two speeches - early October to late January - that, of course, they couldn't be expected to remember the warning that the uranium story was unreliable. However, apparently there was discussion of the issue in December. The <i>Post</i> article reveals that the CIA "arranged to have a similar allegation deleted from a speech that John D. Negroponte, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, was to give Dec. 20 before the U.N. Security Council." <sup><small>2</sup></small> Perhaps it's still too much to expect the NSC staff to remember a warning for a month or perhaps they weren't consulted. It was only the U.N.<br /></p><p align="justify">The other half of the White House explanation is that the uranium claim in the State of the Union speech was both an isolated instance and an unimportant part of the rationale for war; neither is true.<br /></p><p align="justify">Thanks to The <i>Post</i>, we know of six instances of essentially the same claim, made immediately before and after the State of the Union; In looking for the source material, I came across a seventh. <ol><li><div align="justify">January 20: A report by the President to Congress referred to the declaration Iraq submitted to the U.N. on December 7, 2002. It stated that the declaration "failed to deal with issues which have arisen since 1998, including: ... attempts to acquire uranium and the means to enrich it." <sup><small>3 </sup></small></div></li><p align="justify"><br /></p><li><div align="justify">January 23: In an op-ed piece, NS Advisor Condoleezza Rice asserted that "Iraq has filed a false declaration to the United Nations that amounts to a 12,200-page lie. For example, the declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to get uranium from abroad, ..."<sup><small>4</sup></small></div></li><p align="justify"><br /></p><li><div align="justify">January 23: A document entitled "What Does Disarmament Look Like?" was issued by the White House. It contained this entry under the heading "Nuclear Weapons": "The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from abroad." <sup><small>5</sup></small> </div></li><p align="justify"><br /></p><li><div align="justify">January 23: Addressing the Council on Foreign Relations, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, referring to the declaration, complained that there "is no mention of Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from abroad." His speech also was entitled "What Does Disarmament Look Like?"<sup><small>6 </sup></small></div></li><p align="justify"><br /></p><li><div align="justify">January 26: Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a speech before the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, asked: "Why is Iraq still trying to procure uranium and the special equipment needed to transform it into material for nuclear weapons?<sup><small>7</sup> </small></div></li><p align="justify"><br /></p><li><div align="justify">January 27: Ambassador John Negroponte addressed the Security Council. Referring to the declaration, he asked, "Where is the evidence to credibly and completely account for recent attempts to procure and enrich uranium?<sup><small>8 </sup></small></div></li><p align="justify"><br /></p><li><div align="justify">(January 28: State of the Union address)</div></li><p align="justify"><br /></p><li><div align="justify">January 29: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in a prepared statement at the commencement of a news conference, said that Saddam Hussein's regime r"ecently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa."<sup><small>9</sup> </small></div></li><p align="justify"><br /></p></ol><p align="justify">The African-uranium claim didn't show up in the President's speech by inadvertence, or because a speechwriter wanted a flashy line or through miscommunication. It was part of a well-orchestrated case for war appearing, in addition to the State of the Union, in seven formal statements in ten days. Whatever the CIA or the State Department intelligence division thought of it, Rice, Powell, Rumsfeld, Negroponte and Bush (or whoever makes his decisions for him) were determined not only to use the story but to lean on it, hard. Whether it was true was of little importance.<br />___________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Walter Pincus, <i>The Washington Post</i> 8/8/03.<br />2. Previously reported by Mr. Pincus in The <i>Post</i> 6/13/03; also reported by <i>USA Today</i> 6/12/03 and CBS News 7/17/03.<br />3. Communication from The President of The United States Transmitting A Report on Matters Relevant to The Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq, Resolution of 2002, Public Law 107-243. See <a href="http://www.gpoaccess.gov/">http://www.gpoaccess.gov/</a><br />4. <i>The New York Times</i> 1/23/03.<br />5. See usinfo.state.gov.<br />6. Transcript on CFR.org.<br />7. Transcript on <a href="http://www.state.gov/">http://www.state.gov/</a> ; reported in <i>The New York Times</i>, 1/27/03.<br />8. This is the one not included by The <i>Post</i>. I found the transcript at www.uspolicy.be, a site for the U.S. Embassy in Brussels. It appears on other embassy web sites as well.<br />9. Transcript. See defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003</small></p><p align="justify"><b>Aug 12</b> </p><p align="justify"><i>The Washington Post</i> ran a <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42059-2003Aug10.html">story</a> about Mount Rainier yesterday, under the caption "A Dream of a Mountain, A Nightmare of a Volcano" As it revealed, skies have been clearer than usual in the Puget Sound basin this summer, which has made it possible to see Rainier "less as an intermittent aesthetic pleasure" and more for what a government agency warns that it really is: "a monumental threat."<br /></p><p align="justify">The article, while interesting and, in its own way, revealing, does not explore the national security implications. Our reporter has uncovered the facts.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Bush administration may be considering preemptive action. "This rogue mountain has a history of attacking its neighbors without warning," a senior official said. A recent, still partly classified, report states that Rainier has a history of unprovoked use of weapons of mass destruction, huge volcanic mudflows known to the intelligence community as "lahars." "Rainier does this every 500 to 1000 years," the official said. He paused dramatically, then added, "the last such attack occurred 500 years ago."<br /></p><p align="justify">Informed of these statements, a liberal spokesman noted that the next attack might not come for another 500 years, even supposing that the administration knew what it was talking about and had reported the facts candidly. "I'd like to see the entire report, including dissenting opinions," the spokesman said. "The real story usually is in the appendix." Another critic of the administration pointed out that Rainier is not the threat it once was. "We've been monitoring it for years now, and there's no sign of sinister activity. An enhanced inspection regime is all that's required."<br /></p><p align="justify">Asked for a response, the senior official summed up the administration's position as follows: "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a lahar."<br /></p><p align="justify">The Defense Department is rumored to be making plans for a surgical strike. A knowledgeable source declared, "We'll take Rainier out before it hurts one single American. The people of Tacoma will welcome us a liberators." Collateral damage is expected to be light.<br />_______________________________<br /><br /><small>Apologies to Blaine Harden.</small><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>Aug 22</b> <a name="08/22/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">Five months have passed since the commencement of war on Iraq. Where are we in the search for weapons of mass destruction?<br /></p><p align="justify">At the beginning of June, it was reported that a task force of more than 1,300 experts had been formed to search for WMD or, perhaps, for WMD programs; only 250 to 300 of those experts would actually look at suspected sites. The assignment for the remainder was not specified, but other reports have spoken of looking at documents or interviewing Iraqis. Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, who will lead the team, described the project as "a deliberate process and a long-term effort."<sup><small> 1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">In Mid-June, former United Nations weapons inspector David Kay was hired as an adviser charged with "refining the overall approach for the search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction," reporting to the CIA. <sup><small>2</small></sup> How this will mesh with the military project is unclear.<br /></p><p align="justify">Kay and Dayton were interviewed on August 1 after testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">"Every week, it is phenomenal what we're finding," Dayton told reporters afterward.<br /></p><p align="justify">Kay told reporters that during the first six weeks of the effort, investigators have uncovered useful documents about Iraq's WMD programs and are getting increased cooperation from Iraqis.<br /></p><p align="justify">He also said the team has "found some physical evidence" related to Iraqi weapons, though he declined to characterize that evidence.<br /></p><p align="justify">The task of finding physical evidence related to Iraq's weapons programs was made more difficult by the destruction during the war and the looting afterward, he said.<br /></p><p align="justify">"I think we are making solid progress," he said. "It is preliminary. We're not at the final stage of understanding fully Iraq's WMD program, nor have we found WMD weapons.<br /></p><p align="justify">"It's going to take time. The Iraqis had over two decades to develop these weapons, and hiding them was an essential part of their program...."<sup><small>3</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Apart from that, about the only WMD news was the disclosure that "engineering experts" from the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that the most likely use for two mysterious trailers found in Iraq was to produce hydrogen for weather balloons rather than to make biological weapons, thus differing from the official position of the DIA and the CIA, but agreeing with British experts.<sup><small>4</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">So, this is where we are: there is no evidence of WMD; evidence of two WMD-producing devices has been further discredited; there are optimistic but hedged predictions of future discoveries.<br /></p><p align="justify">A significant feature of the post-invasion phase of the story is the revelation that the administration had much less information than it claimed. The uranium controversy is an example, but the issue is more general and the deception more pervasive.<br /></p><p align="justify">The administration claimed to have relevant, current and reliable intelligence. Sometimes the claim was implicit, as in the President’s radio address on September 28, 2002:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The danger to our country is grave and it is growing. The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the British government, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist groups, and there are al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq. This regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year.<sup><small>5</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Sometimes the claim was explicit, as when Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made the case for war in his speech on January 23 to the Council on Foreign Relations:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...I think it is very important to make it clear we have a powerful case. It is a case grounded in history. It is a case grounded in current intelligence, current intelligence that comes not only from American intelligence, but many of our allies; intelligence that comes not only from sophisticated overhead satellites and our ability to intercept communications, but from brave people who told us the truth at the risk of their lives. We have that; it is very convincing.... <sup><small>6</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Apart from the reference to history, that statement is now, to borrow a phrase, inoperative. On July 9, Secretary Rumsfeld presented the new paradigm to the Senate Armed Services Committee:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on Sept. 11.<sup><small>7 </small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">That can be interpreted in more than one way. For the present, let's assume the version most favorable to the administration, that Iraq's weapons or ties to terrorism had to be reevaluated in terms of their possible use directly against the U.S. However, that leaves us with the original questions: What weapons? What ties to terrorism?<br /></p><p align="justify">The restatement has been forced by events. We have not found any WMD and indications are that intelligence was limited after the United Nations inspectors left Iraq in 1998.<br /></p><p align="justify">National Security Advisor Rice took the Rumsfeld formula a step further; new evidence would be unimportant:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The question of what is new after 1998 is not an interesting question. There is a body of evidence since 1991. You have to look at that body of evidence and say what does this require the United States to do? Then you are compelled to act.<sup><small>8 </small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Is that an accurate description of the administration’s policy and its level of information? As a policy, that we should go to war based on obsolete information, it is only a little this side of crazy. As a description of the state of intelligence about Iraq, it undoubtedly goes too far - some post-1998 information was available - but it does acknowledge how limited the information was. In doing so, it conflicts with the representations made before the war and exposes the deceit inherent in them.<br /></p><p align="justify">The administration has combined accusations of revisionism with its revisions of the case for war. Referring to "the dictator in Iraq," President Bush said on June 17, "I know there's a lot of revisionist history now going on, but one thing is certain. He is no longer a threat to the free world, and the people of Iraq are free." <sup><small>9</small></sup> But we were taken to war on the premise that Saddam was a threat to us; the substitution of the "free world" suggests that the original claim was shaky. Saddam, according to the President, isn't a threat to that undefined world now, but there's no evidence that he was before, so nothing has been said. The people of Iraq certainly aren't masters of their own fate, which is the only meaningful definition of freedom.<br /></p><p align="justify">On June 21, Mr. Bush offered another change of script:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The intelligence services of many nations concluded that he had illegal weapons and the regime refused to provide evidence they had been destroyed. We are determined to discover the true extent of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs, no matter how long it takes. <sup><small>10</small> </sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">But the administration claimed in the runup to the war that Iraq <i>possessed</i> WMD, not merely that it hadn't proved otherwise. This statement also fudges on the meaning of "had" (how Clintonesque). Had illegal weapons when? The claim before the war was that Iraq possessed such weapons <i>at that moment,</i> but the only solid intelligence refers to much earlier periods and this statement appears to use "had" in that sense. As with many recent statements, the subject at the beginning is weapons, at the end weapon programs.<br /></p><p align="justify">Secretary Rumsfeld's comments also illustrate the shift. Pre-war, he had said, "There's no debate in the world as to whether they have those weapons. There's no debate in the world as to whether they're continuing to develop and acquire them...." <sup><small>11 </small></sup>That was then; this is now: Iraq "had 12 years to conceal its programs," and "uncovering those programs will take time."<sup><small> 12</small></sup> Before there were weapons in plain sight; now there are well-concealed weapon programs.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Rumsfeld also offered a form of an argument which turns up occasionally, that the reason for the war was Iraq's flouting of U.N. resolutions. "The United States did not choose a war - Saddam Hussein did. For 12 years he violated 17 United Nations resolutions without cost or consequence." <sup><small>13</small></sup> Not only did we not start the war - apparently it just sort of happened - we can wrap ourselves in the U.N. flag. This is less revisionism than chutzpah.<br /></p><p align="justify">The most extended recent justification came in a formal statement by the President at the beginning of a press conference on July 30:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">On national security front [sic], it has been 90 days since the end of the major combat operations in Iraq. The nation has been liberated from tyranny and is on the path to self-government and peace. The Iraqi governing council is meeting regularly.... Soon representatives of the people will begin drafting a new constitution and free elections will follow. After decades of oppression, the people of Iraq are reclaiming their country and are reclaiming their future.<br /><center>***</center>The rise of a free and peaceful Iraq is critical to the stability of the Middle East, and a stable Middle East is critical to the security of the American people....<br /><p></p><p align="justify">We know that Saddam Hussein produced and possessed chemical and biological weapons, and has used chemical weapons. We know that. He also spent years hiding his weapons of mass destruction programs from the world. We now have teams of investigators who are hard at work to uncover the truth.<br /></p><p align="justify">The success of a free Iraq will also demonstrate to other countries in that region that national prosperity and dignity are found in representative government and free institutions. They are not found in tyranny, resentment, and for support of terrorism. As freedom advances in the Middle East, those societies will be less likely to produce ideologies of hatred and produce recruits for terror.<br /></p><p align="justify">The United States and our allies will complete our mission in Iraq, and we'll complete our mission in Afghanistan. We'll keep our word to the peoples of those nations. We'll wage the war on terror against every enemy who plots against our forces and our people. I will never assume the restraint and goodwill of dangerous enemies when lives of our American citizens are at risk. <sup><small>14</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The third paragraph uses the ambiguous time frame for possession of weapons, segues to weapon programs and offers the now-standard excuse for not finding them.<br /></p><p align="justify">The statement adds alternative reasons for the invasion: liberation from tyranny, a chance for self-rule, inspiration to other Muslim nations and a victory in the war against terror. However, to date we have substituted one authoritarian rule for another, have set up a puppet council which includes the notorious Ahmed Chalabi, and, so far from inspiring better behavior or combating terror, have inspired jihad.<br /></p><p align="justify">Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz articulated, during a visit to Iraq, one of the final, non-ideological, fallback positions:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">I'm not concerned about weapons of mass destruction. I'm concerned about getting Iraq on its feet. I didn't come on a search for weapons of mass destruction.<sup> <small>15</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">In other words, we must concentrate on repairing the damage we've done. Forget why we did it. At times, the democracy argument has the same flavor: never mind why we came; we're here and we're going to do something noble.<br /></p><p align="justify">The ultimate fallback is simply that we've done it, and everyone should rally around. The alternative would be to admit that it was a mistake, or even a wrong, and we're not about to do that.<br />____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. CNN.com, 6/1/03.<br />2. The Wall Street Journal, 6/20/03.<br />3. CNN.com, 8/1/03; see The Washington Times, 8/1/03.<br />4. The New York Times, 8/8/03.<br />5. Transcript, U.S. Department of State's Office of International Information Programs (usinfo.state.gov).<br />6. Transcript on CFR.org, ½3/03.<br />7. The New York Times, 7/19/03; see Associated Press/WashingtonPost.com, 7/9/03.<br />8. The New York Times, 7/19/03.<br />9. The Washington Post, 6/17/03.<br />10. Mr. Bush’s weekly radio address, 6/21/03: www.whitehouse.gov.<br />11. Transcript, defenselink.mil/news, 9/13/02.<br />12. Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee: Associated Press/ WashingtonPost.com, 7/9/03.<br />13. Ibid.<br />14. Transcript, 7/30/03: <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />15. Associated Press/USAToday.com, 7/22/03</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>September 1, 2003</b> <a name="09/01/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">On December 6, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft defended the government's response to 9-11 in these words:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">We need honest, reasoned debate; not fearmongering. To those who pit Americans against immigrants, and citizens against non-citizens; to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists - for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.<br /></p><p align="justify">Our efforts have been carefully crafted to avoid infringing on constitutional rights....<sup><small>1</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">This is, at least in retrospect, a bizarre statement.<br /></p><p align="justify">Honesty and reason have not been the hallmarks of the Ashcroft Justice Department; fearmongering has.<br /></p><p align="justify">The most notable advocate of pitting "Americans" against immigrants and citizens against non-citizens is John Ashcroft; he was already embarked on that course in December, 2001. It is difficult, even allowing for his characteristic duplicity, to imagine what his comment on that subject was intended to accomplish.<br /></p><p align="justify">Nothing, apart from the invasion of Iraq, has gone so far to erode national unity as the administration's police-state mentality. One application of that, the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo, including the threat of the death penalty, has done more than anything else, again excepting the Iraq war, to give arguments to our enemies and pause to our friends.<br /></p><p align="justify">The claim that the government's actions and policies have been sensitive to constitutional rights is absurd and Ashcroft must have known it to be so; why else the defensive tone?<br /></p><p align="justify">The heart of the statement, the part frequently quoted, is this warning: "to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: your tactics only aid terrorists...." This is at once foolish and threatening, like its author. If lost liberty were only a phantom, there would not be 140 resolutions against the Patriot Act from states, counties and cities; the Republican House would not have voted to deny funding for "sneak and peek" searches.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Ashcroft's Patriot-Act campaign tour and the repeated hints of worse legislation to come prompted me, in search of perspective, to reread several books which describe the post -WWII red scare.<sup><small>2</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">That era was marked by prejudice and politics dressed up as concern for national security, irresponsible accusations, unreasoning fear, hearings at which nothing resembling due process applied, and the ruination of careers. But most striking was the pervasiveness of the repressive mindset. People were harassed not only by HUAC and McCarthy, but by executive-branch loyalty boards. The search for subversives took place not only in and by the federal government but also at the state and local level. Private employment was put under the loyalty microscope. There were groups of self-appointed patriots who monitored colleges and the media, sometimes being hired by them to purge their undesirables and to certify their purity.<br /></p><p align="justify">As bad as some of the current measures are, the total picture does not begin to compare to the Cold-war repression. It does not, that is, with two notable and related exceptions.<br /></p><p align="justify">There was nothing in the cold-war lexicon to compare exactly to "enemy combatant." Even though the U.S. was engaged in mortal, if indirect, conflict with an enemy that actually had nuclear weapons, an enemy later dubbed the "evil empire," even though espionage existed, and even though a shooting war erupted in Korea, no one dusted off "enemy combatant." There were similar, even more paranoid labels: "subversive," "disloyal," "security risk," "fellow-traveler," "pink," "red," and the ultimate, "Communist." These labels were applied indiscriminately and sometimes led to persecution. However, no citizen was thrown into prison, to be held indefinitely at the government's whim, incommunicado, as a result of being so branded.<br /></p><p align="justify">There was a theoretical parallel. The Emergency Detention Act, which was Title II of The Internal Security (McCarran) Act of 1950, authorized the President to apprehend and detain "each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage" in the event of "(1) Invasion of the territory of the United States or its possessions, (2) Declaration of war by Congress, or (3) Insurrection within the United States in aid of a foreign enemy...." However, the Emergency Detention Act provided for some procedural safeguards, including habeas corpus, and although several detention camps were established, they never were used. The Act was repealed in 1971.<br /></p><p align="justify">The second distinguishing feature of the current period is the military commission. Although kangaroo courts were littered across the cold-war landscape, none of them had the power of imprisonment or death. No civilian was tried or threatened with trial before a military tribunal.<br /></p><p align="justify">For the vast majority of us, the present crisis presents, thus far, much less danger than the earlier time. However, the potential threat to civil liberties is serious because of the blurring of the line between civil and military authority, between justice and war.<br />___________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 12/6/01: <a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony">www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony</a></small></p><p align="justify"><small>2. These are the sources which were close at hand:<br />Burns, <i>The Crosswinds of Freedom,</i> vol. 3 of <i>The American Experiment,</i> pp. 230-59.<br />Caughey, "McCarthyism Rampant" and Preston, "Shadows of War and Fear" in Reitman, ed., <i>The Pulse of Freedom.</i><br />Caute, <i>The Great Fear.</i><br />Commager, "Washington Witch Hunt," "Red-Baiting in the Colleges," "What Ideas Are Safe?" and "Is Freedom Really Necessary?" in <i>Freedom and Order.</i><br />Galbraith, "My Forty Years with the FBI" in <i>Annals of an Abiding Liberal</i>.<br />McCullough, <i>Truman</i>, pp. 549-53; passim.<br />Morison, <i>The Oxford History of the American People</i>, pp. 1046-84.<br />Morison, Commager & Leuchtenburg, <i>A Concise History of the American Republic</i>, pp. 684-95.<br />Pells, <i>The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age</i>, pp. 262-345.<br />Phillips, <i>A Partisan View</i>, pp. 161-84.<br />Rovere, "Arthur Miller's Conscience" in Wickenden, ed., <i>The New Republic Reader</i>.<br />Schlesinger, The Oppenheimer Case in <i>The Politics of Hope.</i><br />D. Trilling, "The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony" in Kurzweil, ed., <i>A Partisan Century</i>.<br />Weinstein, <i>Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case</i>, pp. 505-23, 548-65.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>September 6, 2003</b> <a name="09/06/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">Conservatives habitually think that any change is for the worse: "a conservative is a person who does not think that anything should be done for the first time." Conservative old people think that the world is gong to hell. As a old person of at least partly conservative views, I might be expected to subscribe to these thoughts. Until now, I have contented myself with declaring that we live in a post-classical age. Apart from giving my crotchets a more elegant tone, that allows me to think that the world is, more or less, going to hell without admitting that I'm old and conservative.<br /></p><p align="justify">We are told that the prevailing American political philosophy is conservatism, but is that accurate? Is it even a philosophy? Irving Kristol referred to neoconservatism as an impulse, which seems apt for contemporary American "conservatism," in which the neo version seems to be dominant. Neoconservatives insist on being called intellectuals, but there is little intellectual content in the present program. It does indeed seem to be an impulse, a drive to remake the world in a way which will suit a set of personal preferences. This is an urge with which I can sympathize, strongly, but for me that remains a harmless fantasy. As a theory of government, it's a little scary.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Bush administration, the objective manifestation of the prevailing attitude, is "conservative" only in the sense that it isn't liberal. Its program is radical, in that it wants to alter the core assumptions, principles and social compacts which have characterized American politics and international relations for decades and which provide the only basis for long-term stability. This administration may be reactionary, but conservative it is not.<br /></p><p align="justify">(Some time back, I saw a <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/">column</a> by George Will in <i>The Washington Post </i>which questioned, from the standpoint of certain beliefs, whether the Bush administration deserves to be called conservative. I wouldn't use the same tests. I would simply ask whether it stands for the preservation of traditional, accepted, established ways of doing things; clearly it doesn't. Still, it's interesting that a major commentator on the right doesn't think that Bush measures up.)<br /></p><p align="justify">Leaving all of that aside, what is the future of what we must call, for lack of a better term, American political conservatism? The usual image is of a juggernaut; we have the choice of climbing aboard, getting out of the way, or being run over. I wouldn't be at all surprised if the image were to persist through next year. After all, one can't stop a juggernaut with nothing, and the Democrats are pretty close to having nothing. Actually, they have several competing and antagonistic versions of almost-nothing, which is worse yet. Can they, feckless to the end, simply stand aside and watch the dread machine run down? Probably yes, but don't ask for the time frame. American conservatism, it seems to me, is nearing the implosion stage, measured by hubris and desperation.<br /></p><p align="justify">Republicans talk of creating a lasting majority. However, they don't appear to be confident that they can accomplish this by successfully competing in the marketplace of ideas. Instead, they resort to falsification, secret decisions, changes in legislative rules, annual redistricting, bullying lobbyists and sending the police after boycotting Democrats.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush, and more particularly, his guru Mr. Rove, are described as politically astute. However, their technique seems to be to do whatever they want and expect that no one will complain. Few have, but that's not a strategy; that's arrogance combined with luck. Bush & Co. have taken extreme and potentially disastrous positions affecting nearly every aspect of policy, domestic and international. Some of this has been pursued with knowledge that a majority of the people disapprove.<br /></p><p align="justify">Of course, I may be wrong; perhaps conservatism will continue to move from success to success, but I don't think so. Karl Rove's hero is said to be Mark Hanna. This isn't the Gilded Age, as much as American "conservatives" would like it to be.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>September 9, 2003</b> <a name="09/09/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">Many of those who supported the war expected a quick action, one which would produce satisfying results at relatively little cost. At its most shallow, this was an expectation to feel good, shout "USA!" and return to life as before. The continued fighting, including the daily casualties, have not matched that expectation and have led to some decline in support. The financial cost, reaching staggering proportions, also has had an erosive effect, but so far this is mitigated by the fact that the President not only won't raise taxes to cover the cost, but still peddles the opiate of permanent cuts. However, the need to at least partially acknowledge the reality in Iraq has led to a new approach by the administration, one which carries with it the risk of wholesale defections.<br /></p><p align="justify">The President's speech Sunday night was, in effect, an admission that whatever it is that we are doing there will take a long time and cost a great deal; patience and another $87 billion were requested. Apart from that figure, no details were offered, so this might still be shrugged off, but a new and unwelcome concept has entered into the discussion: sacrifice.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Two years ago, I told the Congress and the country that the war on terror would be a lengthy war, a different kind of war, fought on many fronts in many places. Iraq is now the central front. Enemies of freedom are making a desperate stand there, and there they must be defeated. This will take time and require sacrifice.<br /></p><p align="justify">Yet we will do what is necessary, we will spend what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to promote freedom and to make our own nation more secure.<small><sup>1</sup></small> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Mr. Bush compared the task as now described to the rebuilding of our defeated enemies after WWII:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">America has done this kind of work before. Following World War II, we lifted up the defeated nations of Japan and Germany and stood with them as they built representative governments. We committed years and resources to this cause.... America today accepts the challenge of helping Iraq in the same spirit, for their sake and our own.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This theme, that we are reliving the late 40s, has been rehearsed for some time. It surfaced in a vague form on June 26 in a speech in London by Condoleezza Rice, in which she urged Europeans to look to the Middle East "with the same vision, determination and patience that we exhibited in building a united transatlantic community after 1945." <small><sup>2 </sup></small>On July 31, an anonymous "senior official" referred to the rebuilding of West Germany as "a generational commitment" and said that 9/11 gave the United States "the same kind of impulse toward the Middle East." The official claimed that we must "have a transformation of that region if we're not to have terrorists stalking the American people for generations to come," and that there must be "a generational commitment" to that task as well.<small><sup>3</sup></small> On August 7, Dr. Rice wrote in an op-ed piece that "America and our friends and allies must commit ourselves to a long-term transformation in... the Middle East." <small><sup>4 </sup></small><br /></p><p align="justify">The President echoed this in a speech to the American Legion on August 26:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">More progress will come in Iraq, and it will require hard and sustained efforts. As many of you saw firsthand in Germany and Japan after World War II, the transition from dictatorship to democracy is a massive undertaking. It's not an easy task. In the aftermath of World War II, that task took years, not months, to complete.<small><sup>5</sup></small> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Therefore, the president's remarks on Sunday were not a new departure, but part of a sales program evolving over the past two months.<br /></p><p align="justify">I doubt that the voters will be as enthusiastic about sacrifice and long-term dedication as the global thinkers in the White House. If they grasp, even in general terms, what is meant by this "generational commitment," many of them may decide that the war wasn't such a good idea after all.<br />______________________________<br /><br /><small>1, 2 & 5. Transcripts, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />3. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 8/1/03.<br />4. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 8/7/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>September 13, 2003</b> <a name="09/13/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">Most of the reactions to the President's speech on Sunday have been critical in one way or another. Some have demanded a statement of the administration's plan, including its exit strategy, which is a major step forward. However, all assume that we must in some sense "succeed" in Iraq and I have come across only one which asks the fundamental question: Why are we there? A column in The Cleveland Plain Dealer takes the honor: "What the hell are we doing in Iraq? That's the 87-billion- dollar detail."<sup><small>1</small> </sup>We need a meaningful answer. It isn't possible to evaluate the request for funds or any statement of strategy without knowing what it is that we seek to accomplish.<br /></p><p align="justify">In recent statements, apart from ritual references to WMD, which no one takes seriously, the President and his advisors have offered two reasons for "staying the course" in Iraq: victory in the war against terror and democratization.<br /></p><p align="justify">One certainly could quarrel with the President's treating all of the attacks in Iraq as examples of terrorism. Some of them, such as the bombing of the UN, the Jordanian Embassy and the Shia mosque clearly fit the definition. Others are, and at times have been conceded to be, part of guerilla warfare; as such, they could be regarded as an extension of the Iraqi defense against invasion. In testimony on September 9, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz impliedly adopted this interpretation by asserting that the war isn't over. That doesn't square with the President's version of events, and it was an irritated and probably ill-considered response to criticism of "post-war" planning, but it is more accurate than the official line.<br /></p><p align="justify">However we categorize them, these attacks occur in Iraq because we are there, because our invasion and our continuing presence have invited them. Claiming that we are combating terrorism in Iraq is about like saying that we killed nineteen terrorists on September 11th. Attempting to shore up the false terrorism excuse for the invasion by pointing to terrorism that it caused marks a new low in the administration's attempts to justify its actions.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, let's set that aside and inquire why defeating whoever it is that is attacking us and others is crucial to the global war on terrorism and to our security.<br /></p><p align="justify">There are two possible explanations: the fighting in Iraq is important in itself or, regardless of whether it is, we cannot be perceived to have failed. It's difficult to see anything in the former theory. In fact, until our continued presence in Iraq prompted jihadists to enter the country, it was difficult to see any connection between Iraq and worldwide terrorism. The longer we stay the less safe we will be from terrorist retaliation, certainly in Iraq and probably at home.<br /></p><p align="justify">The administration's argument really has to do with perception, not direct effects: we have started something which we must finish in order not to seem weak, vulnerable or irresolute. Secretary Rumsfeld was quoted to that effect a few days ago: <blockquote><p align="justify">"We know for a fact . . . that terrorists studied Somalia and they studied instances where the United States was dealt a blow and tucked in and persuaded themselves they could, in fact, cause us to acquiesce in whatever it is they wanted us to do," he told reporters aboard his plane.<br /></p><p align="justify">"The United States is not going to do that...."<sup><small>2</small> </sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">On Sunday, the President expanded on the theme:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">There is more at work in these attacks than blind rage. The terrorists have a strategic goal. They want us to leave Iraq before our work is done. They want to shake the will of the civilized world. In the past, the terrorists have cited the examples of Beirut and Somalia, claiming that if you inflict harm on Americans, we will run from a challenge. In this, they are mistaken.<sup><small>3</small> </sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">He had said as much to the American Legion on August 26:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Retreat in the face of terror would only invite further and bolder attacks. There will be no retreat.<br /><center>***</center>...The war on terror is a test of our strength. It is a test of our perseverance, our patience, and our will....<sup><small>4</small></sup> <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">If that sounds a bit reminiscent of Vietnam, there's a reason. In that speech, the President also said, "Our military is confronting terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan and in other places so our people will not have to confront terrorist violence in New York, or St. Louis, or Los Angeles." On Sunday, he said, "We are fighting that enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan today so that we do not meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities." We're still playing dominoes.<br /></p><p align="justify">The invasion, the occupation and the prior sanctions have caused immense suffering in Iraq, and we have a moral obligation to contribute to restoration of a decent level of life. The invasion has done harm to our security by providing militant Muslims with another excuse to hate us, and by diverting attention and resources from more useful applications. Both of these must be addressed, but the former does not require long-term American occupation of Iraq and the latter would be exacerbated by it.<br /></p><p align="justify">Although democratization is the subject of stirring phrases, and its invocation is useful in winning support, its importance to the administration is as a tool in the battle against terrorism. Sunday's speech shows this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">... In Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people of that country to build a decent and democratic society at the center of the Middle East... This undertaking is difficult and costly - yet worthy of our country, and critical to our security.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Middle East will either become a place of progress and peace, or it will be an exporter of violence and terror that takes more lives in America and in other free nations. The triumph of democracy and tolerance in Iraq, in Afghanistan and beyond would be a grave setback for international terrorism.... Everywhere that freedom takes hold, terror will retreat.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This leads us into the murky area of nation-building, which Mr. Bush disdained, with some reason, as a candidate. Certainly we should aid in restoring order and institutions of government in Iraq, because we destroyed them. We have an interest in seeing that the successor government is stable and peaceful. However, there may be several paths to that goal, not all of which will resemble "democracy" as the administration defines it. Insisting on a specific form of government may be counterproductive. A recent Zogby poll for the American Enterprise Institute reported that 31.5 per cent of Iraqis said the US and UK should help make sure a fair government is set up in Iraq, but 58.5 per cent thought the Iraqis should work this out themselves; 38.2 per cent said that democracy could work well in Iraq, while 50.2 per cent agreed with the statement that "democracy is a western way of doing things and it will not work here."<sup><small>5 </small></sup>This is hardly definitive, but it tends to confirm that attempting to dictate results may be disastrous.<br /></p><p align="justify">In addition, the rhetoric about democracy, in and out of government, leads too far. Are we committed to overthrowing every undemocratic regime? Have we not survived the existence of many? Do we not count several as allies? Is Iraq a special case? If so, in what way would the absence of democracy in Iraq pose a threat to us? <p align="justify">We don't have 180,000 troops in and around Iraq because we are committed to giving it democracy. Perhaps we have them there to fight the ill-conceived war on terrorism, but there are other possibilities. What are our aims and intentions with regard to Iraq's oil, American military bases and American domination of the Middle East? Does our present and projected force level have something to do with those issues? Our resistance to U.N. supervision may relate to them; democratization and fighting terrorism don't require American control.<br /></p><p align="justify">Finally, Iraq needs to be put into a rational perspective. Does the magnitude of any threat justify distorting our entire policy, domestic and international? Are we ready to rebuild Iraq and let our own infrastructure, physical and cultural, rot? Even if we sacrifice domestic programs, where is the money going to come from?<br /></p><p align="justify">All of these questions may have satisfactory answers, but they won't be answered unless we ask them. If we don't, and simply take the administration's word that we must press on, the word of people who have yet to be honest, we are fools and deserve whatever happens to us. However, the greater burden may be borne by the next generation. If we have no concern for our own well-being, we should demand answers on its behalf.<br />_____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Dick Feagler, 9/10/03.<br />2. Article by Dana Priest in <i>The Washington Post,</i> 9/8/03 .<br />3, . Transcript, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />5. FT.com [Financial Times] 9/10/03. The sampling is small.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>September 17, 2003</b> <a name="09/17/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">In a speech on June 24, Senator Robert Byrd complained of a change of direction in foreign policy:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Mr. President, last fall, the White House released a national security strategy that called for an end to the doctrines of deterrence and containment that have been a hallmark of American foreign policy for more than half a century.<br /></p><p align="justify">This new national security strategy is based upon pre-emptive war against those who might threaten our security. <sup><small>1</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The Senator certainly is correct that the new strategy endorses preemptive war and that it moves away from former policies. However, deterrence still is part of the program, and now is being used as the excuse for staying the course in Iraq.<br /></p><p align="justify">On this topic the National Security Strategy begins by claiming that the old form of deterrence theory is inadequate:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.<sup><small>2</small> </sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">The psychological aspect of this is dubious, and sounds more like a means to an end than sound analysis. In any case, it is a transition to the new form of deterrence:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p align="justify">For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat - most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. <p align="justify">We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">After an extended discussion of the option of preemptive attack, the Strategy returns to a formula including deterrence: <blockquote><p align="justify">It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military's highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, our military must:<br /><br />assure our allies and friends;<br />dissuade future military competition;<br />deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and<br />decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The old policy was to deter attacks by the threat of retaliation. The new strategy adds the fact or threat of preemptive war.<br /></p><p align="justify">At times, as Senator Byrd suggests, the administration has seemed to reject deterrence altogether. In remarks to the National Press Club on September 10, Secretary Rumsfeld came close to that:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">But we have, in fact, entered a new security environment in this 21st century.... We can no longer stake our security on the assumption that terrorist states can be counted on to avoid actions that lead to their own destruction -- the old concept of deterrence. That theory has been overtaken by events. Certainly, such logic did not stop the Taliban regime from harboring al Qaeda as it executed attacks on the United States. They were not deterred, if you will. It did not stop the Iraqi regime from defying the 17th U.N. Security Council resolution, even with thousands of coalition forces massing on its borders. They, too, were not deterred. <sup><small>3</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">However, that says more than Mr. Rumsfeld meant; almost immediately he added this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">As the president said in his address to the country, "For America, there will be no going back to the era before September 11th, 2001, to false comfort in a dangerous world. We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength, they are invited by the perception of weakness."</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Although negatively stated, this is deterrence theory. The same argument underlies the current excuse for remaining in Iraq: if we leave without defeating the terrorists in Iraq, we will invite further attacks. Under that assumption, Iraq presents a situation we might call negative deterrence by misadventure: we've created a mess that we can't walk away from because terrorists would draw the wrong inference.<br />_________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. <a href="http://byrd.senate.gov/">http://byrd.senate.gov/</a><br />2. <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />3. <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts">www.defenselink.mil/transcripts</a></small><br /><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>September 19, 2003</b> <a name="09/19/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">A <i>Washington Post</i> poll last month found that 69 percent of Americans thought it at least likely that Saddam Hussein had a role in the attacks on 9/11. However, on Wednesday President Bush said, "We've had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the September 11th."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The next morning, <i>The Seattle P-I</i> ran a front-page story on the statement, under a banner headline, "No Iraq link to 9/11 found." <i>The New York Times</i>, by contrast, ran a brief report on page 18. Does this reflect a different view of the importance of the event or a desire by The <i>Times</i> to soft-pedal criticism of the administration? Based on the <i>Times'</i> recent performance, it's difficult not to opt for the latter explanation.<br /></p><p align="justify">There could be a third view, that the President's statement is insincere and therefore not worthy of much attention. Candor does not come naturally to this administration, so caution might be in order.<br /></p><p align="justify">Consider the comments by Vice President Cheney last Sunday, during an interview on "Meet the Press." Mr. Cheney followed the established line: deny knowledge of any connection, but imply it. He was not surprised, he said, at the 69% figure; small wonder, given the administration's efforts in planting the idea. Among his attempts to reinforce the misapprehension was the claim that "succeeding" in Iraq will strike "a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11."<sup><small>2</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Secretary Rumsfeld more or less anticipated the President's remarks during a press conference on Tuesday. Asked whether he believed that "Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11 attacks," he responded, "I've not seen any indication that would lead me to believe that I could say that.... Not to my knowledge, I should say."<sup><small>3</small></sup> This is a bit more cautious than Mr. Bush's comment, but it still seems to be adopting a new line.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, when National Security Advisor Rice appeared on "Nightline," also on Tuesday, she was quoted as follows:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">"We have never claimed that Saddam Hussein ... had either direction or control of 9/11," Rice said when asked about the public perception of a link. "What we have said is that this is someone who supported terrorists, helped to train them (and) was a threat in this region that we were not prepared to tolerate." Defending Saddam's ouster, she said he represented a threat in "a region from which the 9/11 threat emerged."<sup><small>4</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">That falls about half way between the Bush and Cheney versions. Dr. Rice only absolved Hussein from direction or control, not from all involvement; she alleged training and support of terrorists, which still allows those so inclined to trace that to 9/11; she echoed Cheney's hint about a region from which 9/11 emerged, a concept as suggestive as it is vague.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Vice President may have been out of the loop or his embarrassing performance may have prompted a decision to come clean. Perhaps Dr. Rice failed to receive another memo, or perhaps her carefully hedged admission will serve as an alternate official position: "What the President meant to say was...."<br /></p><p align="justify">However firm the denials regarding 9/11 turn out to be, the administration still is trying to have it both ways, by reiterating its claim that Saddam Hussein had close ties to al-Qaeda.<br /></p><p align="justify">Therefore The <i>Times</i> had ample reason to be skeptical, but the President's concession still was front-page news, no less so for possibly being insincere.<br />__________________________<br /><br /><small>1. <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />2. <a href="http://www.msnbc.com/news">www.msnbc.com/news</a><br />3. <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/">http://www.defenselink.mil/</a><br />4. Yahoo! News/Reuters 9/16/03</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>October 13, 2003</b> <a name="10/13/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">If one needed the excuse of an anniversary to discuss events in Iraq, there would be only a short wait at any time. October 1 marked five months from the declaration that major operations were over. On October 19, we will be seven months past the start of the invasion. The currently fashionable anniversary is six months from the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein on April 9, which is taken to be symbolic of the end of the old regime. On any such date, the view of the situation by the administration and its critics is markedly different, and becoming more so with each milestone.<br /></p><p align="justify">The testimony of David Kay provides an illustration. Dr. Kay testified before a joint session of several Congressional committees on October 2. The President, in a speech the next day, claimed that Kay's findings vindicated the decision to go to war:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Let me tell you what the report said. It states that Saddam Hussein's regime had a clandestine network of biological laboratories. They had a live strain of deadly agent called botulinum. And he had sophisticated concealment efforts. In other words, he's hiding his programs. He had advanced design work done on prohibited long-range missiles.<br /><center>***</center>Specifically, Dr. Kay's team discovered what the report calls, "Dozens of WMD related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002."...<sup><small>1 </small></sup><p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">I first saw these comments in an article in <i>The International Herald Tribune;</i> it noted, pertinently, that the President "made no specific mention of Kay's statement to Congress on Thursday that no such weapons had been found in the current search." Another article in the same issue summed up the significance of the failure to find any:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The preliminary report delivered by the chief arms inspector in Iraq forces the administration of President George W. Bush to come face to face with this reality: that Saddam Hussein's armory appears to have been stuffed with precursors, potential weapons and bluffs, but that nothing found so far backs up administration claims that Saddam posed an imminent threat to the world.<sup> <small>2</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">The President made reference to the team's report, but his quote is from Kay's testimony to Congress which, as far as I know, is all that is publicly available. The testimony was an interesting mix of the administration line - we've found nasty things and we'll find more - and candor. Kay's statement as to actual weapons illustrates the combination:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis.<sup><small>3</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Of the three categories of WMD, the search appears to have eliminated two from serious consideration. As to chemical weapons, Kay said this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced - if not entirely destroyed - during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections....<br /></p><p align="justify">We...have not yet found evidence to confirm pre-war reporting that Iraqi military units were prepared to use CW against Coalition forces. Our efforts to collect and exploit intelligence on Iraq's chemical weapons program have thus far yielded little reliable information on post-1991 CW stocks and CW agent production, although we continue to receive and follow leads related to such stocks....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">His comments on nuclear weapons were equally negative:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Despite evidence of Saddam's continued ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material. However, Iraq did take steps to preserve some technological capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">That leaves biological weapons. Kay made a weak pass at supporting Bush's excited claim on May 30 regarding trailers, but again candor prevented going very far:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">We have not yet been able to corroborate the existence of a mobile BW production effort. Investigation into the origin of and intended use for the two trailers found in northern Iraq in April has yielded a number of explanations, including hydrogen, missile propellant, and BW production, but technical limitations would prevent any of these processes from being ideally suited to these trailers. That said, nothing we have discovered rules out their potential use in BW production. </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Most of his remarks on biological weapons were inferences from what seemed to him to be suspicious activities or organizational structures:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">With regard to biological warfare activities, which has been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG [Iraq Survey Group] teams are uncovering significant information - including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents.<br /></p><p align="justify">Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the UN and was previously unknown. We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D - all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">"Suitable for preserving...a capability for resuming" is a pretty weak indictment.<br /></p><p align="justify">Dr. Kay's discussion of biological programs and materials has a speculative and conspiratorial tone. The Iraqi Intelligence Service sponsored graduate study abroad in biological science, "the only area of graduate work that the IIS appeared to sponsor." In R&D, nonpathogenic organisms served as "surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents"; certain processes "would have been directly applicable to anthrax"; "one scientist confirmed" that a production line "could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available." Perhaps this demonstrates a plan to develop biological weapons, but it seems thin even for the hedged conclusions by Kay and certainly doesn't justify the President's claim of vindication.<br /></p><p align="justify">The only reference to any biological agent is the following, again emphasizing concealment more than the material:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">A very large body of information has been developed...that confirms that Iraq concealed equipment and materials from UN inspectors when they returned in 2002. One noteworthy example is a collection of reference strains that ought to have been declared to the UN. Among them was a vial of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent can be produced.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This is, to say the least, not a smoking gun. As Maureen Dowd put it, perhaps a trifle flippantly, "we know now that America's first pre-emptive war was launched basically because Iraq had...a vial of Botox?" Or, as she added, more neutrally, "botulinum toxin...can either be turned into a deadly biological weapon or a pricey wrinkle smoother."<sup><small>4</small></sup> (If you want a disinterested source, try the FDA article "Botulinum Toxin: A Poison That Can Heal" at www.fda.gov).<br /></p><p align="justify">Even if it were stronger, the evidence would provide support for the war only by coincidence: Kay makes clear that most of it was discovered only after the invasion; note his comment above that the "clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus...was previously unknown."<br /></p><p align="justify">Dr. Kay also inadvertantly refuted the administration's pre-war overstatement of the threat: "our understanding of the status of Iraq's WMD program was always bounded by large uncertainties and had to be heavily caveated."<br />______________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Transcript of speech, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />2. <i>Herald Tribune,</i> 10/4-5/03; first article by David Stout, second by David E. Sanger.<br />3. All quotes are from the transcript of Dr. Kay's testimony at <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />4. <i>The New York Times,</i> 10/9/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>October 17, 2003</b> <a name="10/17/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">A month ago, President Bush said, "We've had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the September 11th."<sup><small>1</small></sup> It is clear now that this was meant to make a record, not to mark a change of strategy, let alone to reflect a concession. When called to account, the administration can point to that statement and claim righteously that no one was misled. Meanwhile it continues to mislead.<br /></p><p align="justify">The White House has been engaged in what is admitted to be a PR campaign. Part of that campaign has been the recycling of the suggestion that Saddam was involved in 9-11 and of the argument that the invasion of Iraq was connected to those attacks. The claim need not be made directly. When the President begins with a reference to 9-11, segues through a discussion of terrorism in which he says "we're striking our enemies before they can strike us again," <sup><small>2</small> </sup>and moves on to Iraq, the audience gets the hint. They also do when a discussion of terrorism and Iraq follows something like this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">I vowed on September the 11th -- after September the 11th, that I would do everything in my power, with a great country, to hunt down those who killed Americans, plotted against Americans, and bring them to justice. And that's exactly what we are doing.<sup><small>3</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">In a recent speech, the Vice President followed a similar pattern, preceding a lengthy discussion of Iraq with "There is only one way to protect ourselves against catastrophic terrorist violence, and that is to destroy the terrorists before they can launch further attacks against the United States." Perhaps concerned that he was being too subtle, Mr. Cheney also trotted out the al-Qaeda connection:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...Saddam Hussein... cultivated ties to terror -- hosting the Abu Nidal organization, supporting terrorists, making payments to the families of suicide bombers in Israel. He also had an established relationship with al Qaeda, providing training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons, gases, making conventional bombs....<sup><small>4</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Another ploy is to pose a false dilemma by pointing out that the alternative to invasion was to leave Saddam Hussein in power. This takes two forms, both set forth in President Bush's speech in Portsmouth. The first is the argument from threat:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">I acted because I was not about to leave the security of the American people in the hands of a madman. I was not about to stand by and wait and trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein....<sup><small>5</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">In other words, the choice was between action and risking disaster. However, like the pre-war claims, the validity of the formula depends on the dubious proposition that Iraq was a threat to us. Bush (in Milwaukee), Cheney and Condoleezza Rice (in a speech in Chicago),<sup><small>6</small></sup> have attempted to establish that by selective quotes from David Kay's testimony. However, as to chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, a fair reading of his testimony leads to the opposite conclusion. The speeches also refer to findings by the Kay team regarding missiles. That part of Dr. Kay's testimony is the most detailed, but there still is little substance. The findings refer to plans and programs; no prohibited missiles are mentioned. Most of the findings are attributed to statements by unidentified "detainees and cooperative sources." However, taking all of his findings at face value, the most that could be said is that Iraq was working toward missiles with ranges up to 1300 kilometers, about 807 miles, hardly a threat to the U.S.<br /></p><p align="justify">The second form of the argument is the appeal to morality:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Who can possibly think that the world would be better off with Saddam Hussein still in power? Surely not the dissidents who would be in his prisons or end up in mass graves. Surely not the men and women who would fill Saddam's torture chambers, or the women in his rape rooms. Surely not the victims he murdered with poison gas. Surely not anyone who cares about human rights and democracy and stability in the Middle East. There is only one decent and humane reaction to the fall of Saddam Hussein: Good riddance. <sup><small>7</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">No one would argue for the return of Saddam, but that isn't the issue. The question is whether we should have invaded Iraq. Leave aside, for the present purpose, the extreme unlikelihood that we acted for reasons of morality, which would make the President's recital irrelevant. Leave aside whether such a moral impulse would excuse killing and maiming large numbers of Iraqis, sacrificing our troops, plunging ourselves further into debt, incurring the distrust and enmity of large parts of the world and compromising future efforts to deal with real threats. There remains the question of justification. Saying that our unilateral invasion was justified because Saddam was bad is equivalent to my walking up to someone on the street, blowing him away and arguing that, because he was a bad man, I deserve a medal, not prison. Vigilante justice cannot be tolerated among citizens, nor can it between nations. Even the assertive, arrogant National Security Strategy doesn't claim that preemptive war is justified by moral considerations; only a threat to national security will do so, and the administration is no closer to showing that.<br />_________________________<br /><br /><small>1. This slightly garbled statement is taken from the official transcript at www. whitehouse.gov. News accounts changed the ending to "September the 11th."<br />2, 5, 7. Portsmouth, NH, 10/9/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />3. Milwaukee, 10/3/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />4. Washington, D.C., 10/10/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />6. Chicago, 10/8/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a></small><br /><br /></p><p align="justify"><b><a id="11/01/03">November 1, 2003, Saturday</b></a><br /></p><p align="justify">Are we preparing an exit strategy for Iraq? There have been reports over the past few weeks which would suggest that.<br /></p><p align="justify">The reports had two themes: transfer of security responsibility to Iraqis will be accelerated, and plans are in place to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Iraq significantly by next summer. However, transferring more responsibility to Iraqis could have an aim other than withdrawal.<br /></p><p align="justify">In early September, Secretary Rumsfeld referred to increased Iraqi involvement as a means of avoiding an increase in American troop strength:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">There are a number of people calling for additional U.S. forces to go into Iraq. And our commanders, to a person, have told me, from General Sanchez, General Abizaid, General Myers, all have said they believe that they have right number of U.S. forces in the country at the present time.<br /></p><p align="justify">What they want is what we're doing, and that is to increase the Iraqis involved in providing for their own security.<br /></p><p align="justify">Ultimately, every country has to do that. And rather than flooding the zone with more Americans, which means you have to have more force protection, more support, it is, we believe, vastly better to continue to invest in encouraging the Iraqis to provide the kinds of increases and ramping up of their own security capabilities.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">He did make a weak pass at relating the transfer to an exit strategy, but only in response to a question:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">[Q]: What is the U.S. exit strategy in Iraq?<br /></p><p align="justify">Rumsfeld: It's what I just described. It is to see that we work with the Iraqis to pass off to them political responsibility for their country -- they already have a cabinet, they already have a governing council, they already have city councils all across that country, they're working on a constitutional process -- and see that they assume more and more of that responsibility as fast as they're capable of doing it. That's our goal. And the same thing's true with respect to security. That's our exit strategy.<sup><small>1</sup></small></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Other reports have indicated that the point of turning security responsibility over to Iraqis is to allow American troops to concentrate on finding and eradicating the guerrillas and terrorists.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, in early October, reports appeared in <i>The Washington Post</i> indicating that a partial withdrawal was expected. One said that security duties in Mosul would to be turned over to Iraqi "police officers and troops." This was described as "pulling [American] troops out of small camps scattered throughout Mosul and consolidating them at larger bases on the outskirts." Therefore the move hardly is dramatic, but the commanding general was quoted as saying that total forces in the north could be reduced next year. Again, standing alone that could be discounted, as northern Iraq has been the least troubled area. However, the move was said to be in keeping with "plans now being discussed by top U.S. commanders to reduce the U.S. presence in Iraq from about 130,000 troops to less than 100,000 by the middle of next year..." This plan reportedly would "further reduce U.S. forces to about 50,000 by mid-2005."<sup><small>2</sup></small> Another article referred to "well-developed plans to draw down the U.S. troop presence in Iraq to about 90,000 by midsummer, with further cuts planned for the next 12 months."<sup><small>3</sup></small> A third referred to troop levels of 100,000 and 50,000 but stated that these were proposals which had not been approved by Secretary Rumsfeld, and added,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Some of the advocates of the troop drawdown concede that they consider it a "best-case" scenario. The "mid-case," said one defense expert, is that the security situation continues as it is and Iraqi units prove unreliable, requiring more U.S. troops than the drawdown plan would provide, while the worst case is that conditions worsen and Shiite attacks increase, increasing the number of U.S. casualties and possibly requiring U.S. reinforcements.<sup><small>4</sup></small> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The strongest indication of a plan to turn over security to the Iraqis was found in comments by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, who found himself in the middle of the problem when, on a visit to Baghdad, his hotel was hit by rocket fire. David Ignatius reported these comments by Mr. Wolfowitz:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">"This terrorist act will not deter us from completing our mission, which is to help the Iraqi people free themselves from the type of criminals who did this," Wolfowitz said when he met with reporters three hours after the attack. He argued that "the big news" wasn't the rocket attack on his hotel, but "that Iraqis are fighting and killing these people."</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Earlier - not much earlier - there would have been a pledge that we would defeat the terrorists; now the Iraqis will. Ignatius continued,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The rest of Wolfowitz's day was a series of meetings that had been arranged days before to encourage his strategy of stabilizing Iraq by giving Iraqis greater responsibility for security...<br /><center>***</center>At every stop he repeated his pitch that Iraqis must take responsibility for their country. "The fight is going to be won at the end of the day by the Iraqi people," he told reporters....<sup><small>5</sup></small> <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">In a separate report, Ignatius offered more details of Wolfowitz's change of emphasis:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">To achieve that rapid transfer of power, Wolfowitz is pushing to train five security forces: the New Iraqi Army, which should total 40,000 by next summer; a revitalized Iraqi police; a new corps of border guards; a Facilities Protection Service to guard vulnerable oil pipelines and other infrastructure, and a new 22,000-member Iraqi Civil Defense Corps that would operate like the National Guard in America. The only way to field all these security forces quickly, Wolfowitz has concluded, is to recruit elements of the old Iraqi army.... </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The last is a dramatic reversal of the policy enacted by Viceroy Bremer of disbanding the army. The report continued:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Building up Iraqi security forces is Plan A for eventually withdrawing U.S. troops, but it isn't clear that Wolfowitz has a good Plan B. Hopes have faded for a broad multinational force.<sup><small>6</sup></small> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Whether that comment reflects Wolfowitz's views or is only a conclusion by Ignatius isn't clear.<br /></p><p align="justify">A pessimistic view of withdrawal had been offered by the commander in Iraq, General Sanchez, on October 5:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">"I see us being here awhile yet," said Sanchez, a straight-talking tank officer who took command of the coalition forces in June. "The political processes have to take their natural course until we have a representative government in place, and that's going to take some time. And even after that occurs, given the pace at which the Iraqi army (is) standing up, it's going to be awhile after that because the army being formed will not be sufficient for the defense of the country.<br /></p><p align="justify">"So it's going to be a few years before we can draw down as the security situation here stabilizes, as you can build additional coalition capacity to allow the U.S. to draw down some of its forces over time.<sup><small>7</sup></small> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The President had an opportunity on Tuesday to sort this out, but he ducked, a maneuver aided by the form of the inquiry:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Q. ...And the second question, can you promise a year from now that you will have reduced the number of troops in Iraq?<br />THE PRESIDENT: The second question is a trick question, so I won't answer it. <sup><small>8</sup></small></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Leaving aside the demand for a promise, why did he not indicate a plan, however tentative or qualified? Were the reports of force reduction unreliable or premature? Did he simply want to leave his options completely open? Would an affirmative answer, however hedged, be considered politically unwise? Or was he simply caught off guard, inadequately briefed as to the details of his policy? Any of these could have been true.<br /></p><p align="justify">On Thursday the President apparently endorsed the first half of the formula:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The Bush administration has told the Pentagon to revamp and accelerate its plans for putting Iraqi security forces on the streets of Baghdad and other areas where American forces have come under attack, even if their training is significantly shortened, according to military and administration officials.<br /></p><p align="justify">President Bush's desire to speed up - yet again - the rate at which Iraqis are put on the streets to supplement the 130,000 American troops in Iraq was the dominant subject at a meeting of the National Security Council in the White House Situation Room on Wednesday morning.<br /></p><p align="justify">"He made it clear that it's not happening fast enough," said one senior official familiar with the discussion. <sup><small>9</sup></small> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Whether that is or will be linked to withdrawal still is unknown.<br /></p><p align="justify">Rhetoric by President Bush would not lead one to think that any plan of withdrawal is under consideration. He told the nation on September 7 that the U.S. will not be driven into retreat by terrorism: "In the past, the terrorists have cited the examples of Beirut and Somalia, claiming that if you inflict harm on Americans, we will run from a challenge. In this, they are mistaken." On August 26, he said that "Retreat in the face of terror would only invite further and bolder attacks. There will be no retreat." On Tuesday, commenting on the violence of last weekend, he reiterated that seemingly uncompromising position: "It is dangerous in Iraq because there are some who believe that we're soft, that the will of the United States can be shaken by suiciders [sic]..."<sup><small>10</sup></small> Mr. Bush's remarks have, at times, graduated from determination to bluster; the most egregious example is his boast, "Bring 'em on!"<br /></p><p align="justify">Pundits have declared that we cannot "cut and run." William Kristol and Robert Kagen put that more or less in the form of a warning: "We trust the president knows he cannot cut and run in Iraq."<sup><small>11</sup></small> "Cut and run" is not exactly a term of art, but anything that looks like a withdrawal in the face of continuing attacks will be so labeled. Nevertheless, withdrawal may be at least under consideration. <p align="justify">In predicting what position the administration will take, it is relevant to look for other indications of lessening our involvement in Iraq.<br /></p><p align="justify">Secretary Rumsfeld directed a now-famous memo to his assistants on October 16. It described our ongoing wars as follows: "It is pretty clear that the coalition can win in Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another, but it will be a long, hard slog." Despite the White House spin, this is a downbeat assessment. The tone of the memo is, if not one of discouragement, certainly one of disillusionment, and public patience for a long, hard course is wearing thin.<br /></p><p align="justify">The occupation has strained American military capacity to the limit. Our ability to respond to any other crisis is severely impaired, and even maintaining the present troop strength in Iraq will be difficult, as well as increasingly unpopular. Attempts to persuade other countries to contribute troops largely have failed.<br /></p><p align="justify">The much-publicized reorganization of the effort in Iraq, putting coordination in the hands of the NSC, clearly demonstrates Bush's dissatisfaction with the situation. It also may foreshadow a shift away from tight control of Iraq; Rice and the NSC staff don't look decisive, still less like hands-on managers.<br /></p><p align="justify">The decision to allow international oversight of some reconstruction funds is another step away from the virtually unilateral control demanded as recently as the runup to the meeting of the Security Council.<br /></p><p align="justify">After rejecting demands by the French for rapid devolution to the Iraqis, the administration is planning to follow that path. The timetable is much less ambitious than the French proposal, but clearly there is a new emphasis. Secretary Powell has suggested a deadline for a completing a constitution which even the Governing Council thinks too optimistic.<br /></p><p align="justify">All of this is consistent with the idea that the administration is working toward at least partial withdrawal.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, the possibility of withdrawal depends on the security situation next year, and not solely for military reasons. The generals and the Defense Secretaries can make all the plans they want; the plans will be implemented only if they don't interfere with re-election.<br /></p><p align="justify">Bush probably has a bias against withdrawal prior to pacification because his core constituency is hawkish, and because some influential "muscular liberals" also subscribe to the we-can't-afford-to-fail view.<sup><small>12</sup></small> Is that a prudent political stance? It depends on whether Bush should be more afraid of losing supporters of the war than of alienating those who have, at whatever stage and for whatever reason, decided that the casualties aren't justified. Let's consider whether he should worry more about the latter. The issue is whether the war already is a millstone which he needs to shed.<br /></p><p align="justify">Not long ago, the White House thought that the war was a political plus, as demonstrated by the tableau on May 1. No doubt it recognized the truth of this cynical observation by William Greider:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The excitement of an occasional war is, in fact, one of the few remaining opportunities for alienated citizens to feel connected again with their nation’s higher politics. So long as the wars are relatively quick and painless, they provide a rallying point for ordinary citizens, a momentary illusion of shared national purpose. The war making offers a fantasy of power for those who are, in fact, powerless....<sup><small>13</sup></small></p></blockquote><p align="justify">However, the war has not been quick and painless and its political benefits rapidly are being replaced by risks. Attacks on U.S. forces average two dozen per day (33 per day this week). The number killed in action since May 1 now exceeds the total lost in combat during the invasion. A longer conflict and mounting casualties might be tolerated if the people believed them to be justified, but that is becoming a difficult concept to sell.<br /></p><p align="justify">The threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was the principal excuse for the war, but none have been found, nor is there any reason to think that any will be. The administration's attempts to substitute weapon programs as the threat has had limited success; liberation and democratization are losing some of their allure as the costs become known. The only excuse which still seems to resonate is the alleged involvement of Saddam Hussein in 9-11; even that may fade, as the President has admitted that there is no such connection (although he continues to imply it).<br /></p><p align="justify">The war has brought the administration's credibility to a low ebb. Its various claims in justification of the war have been shown to be false or, at the least, irresponsibly exaggerated. The problem has been made worse by implausible excuses and attempts to shift the blame to the CIA, which has led to that agency's knocking the ball back into the White House's court. The leak of Victoria* Plame Wilson's identity has led to an investigation and more embarrassment.<br /></p><p align="justify">The administration has attempted to hide the casualties, literally and figuratively. Its literal hiding of the casualties has been effective; there won't be any pictures of returning caskets because the bases to which they return won't allow photographs. Its attempts to downplay casualties and other bad news have been less successful and now are bordering on the surreal. The attacks over the weekend elicited this response from the President: "There are terrorists in Iraq who are willing to kill anybody in order to stop our progress. The more successful we are on the ground, the more these killers will react."<sup><small>14</sup></small> By that standard, utter disaster would be the best indication that we are winning. At some point, a program which paints Mr. Bush into that corner needs to be reassessed.<br /></p><p align="justify">The military has attempted to prevent criticism by the troops or reports of low morale from reaching the press, without much success. Its attempt at propaganda, through phony letters home, backfired. Low morale and extended tours for reservists have led to agitation by military families. For reasons which elude me, the administration has made all of this worse by cutting military benefits. That has led to the formation of a Veterans' Party in Florida, not exactly where Bush would like to have troubles.<br /></p><p align="justify">The President declared the fund-raising meeting in Madrid a success, but the reality was less encouraging: most of the pledges were in the form of loans or forgiveness of debt, little in the way of grants. This leaves us in the position of funding the reconstruction. Congress approved most of the President's $87 billion demand, but defied him by also making part of it a loan. This turned out to be a temporary gesture, and would have been misguided if carried out, but it illustrates the unpopularity of our assumption of the burden of funding Iraq's recovery. The pre-war assurances that Iraqi oil would pay for it provides another example of false statements coming home to roost.<br /></p><p align="justify">Even though most Iraqis are not reacting with violence, our presence is viewed with increasing suspicion. A poll taken in Iraq recently illustrates this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The results found 67 percent of Iraqis view the US-led coalition as an occupying force, while only 46 percent of the population considered them as such when US troops rolled into Baghdad April 9, said the Iraqi Centre for Research and Strategic Studies.<br /></p><p align="justify">Over the same timeframe, those who viewed the US forces as liberators slumped from 43 percent to 15 percent, the study said.<sup><small>15</sup></small> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The Iraqi Governing Council has been annoyingly assertive, pressing for more control, even to the extent of an op-ed piece in the New York Times. It has claimed that it could provide, at less cost, services now under U.S. control; scandals in contract awards and performance do nothing to detract from this claim nor to enhance Mr. Bush's image.<br /></p><p align="justify">Finally, there is the decline of the President's standing in the polls. The drop is not irreversible, but it has to be worrisome. Entirely eliminating Iraq as an issue probably isn't possible, short of capturing Saddam next October, but Bush needs to defuse it. There is going to be increasing pressure to find a plausible way to declare victory and, if not get out, at least dramatically reduce the losses.<br /></p><p align="justify">Under the core-constituency policy, any doubts as to Iraq's ability to maintain order without us would be resolved in favor of leaving a large force there. The contrary policy, looking to the factors just listed, would have the bias in favor of early withdrawal. Ironically, if the hawks win the argument, the attacks will have had the unintended effect of prolonging American control of Iraq.<br /></p><p align="justify">This morning, in his weekly radio address, the President offered a blend of themes: we can't be intimidated, but we're turning control over to the Iraqis. He began by reciting the standard, flag-waving formula:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">During the last few decades, the terrorists grew to believe that if they hit America hard - as in Lebanon and Somalia - America would retreat and back down. Five years ago, one of the terrorists said that an attack could make America run in less than 24 hours. They have learned the wrong lesson. The United States will complete our work in Iraq. Leaving Iraq prematurely would only embolden the terrorists and increase the danger to America. We are determined to stay, to fight and to win.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Then he described our strategy. First, we are aggressively hunting down the attackers, their funds, and their supplies of weapons.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Second, we are training an ever-increasing number of Iraqis to defend their nation. Today, more than 90,000 Iraqis are serving as police officers, border guards and civil defense personnel. These Iraqi forces are also supplying troops in the field with better intelligence, allowing for greater precision in targeting the enemies of freedom. And we are accelerating our efforts to train and field a new Iraqi army and more Iraqi civil defense forces.<br /></p><p align="justify">Third, we are implementing a specific plan to transfer sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi people....<sup><small>16</sup></small></p></blockquote><p align="justify">How do we read that? Transfer of control probably is being contemplated for all three reasons mentioned: depending on how well the Iraqis perform, and how much pacification is achieved, transfer of control may obviate the necessity of increasing American troop strength, allow American troops to concentrate more on active operations, or even allow partial withdrawal. In addition, I think that we are watching the rehearsal of a fallback scenario - to be available in case that millstone gets any heavier - in which victory will consist primarily in creating that shining new Iraqi state. If fighting continues, well, doesn't every free, democratic nation have a few problems?<br />_______________________________<br />* Correction: Valerie</p><p align="justify"><small>1. National Press Club, 9/10/03; <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts">www.defenselink.mil/transcripts</a><br />2. 10/23/03.<br />3. 10/29/03.<br />4. 10/19/03.<br />5. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 10/27/03.<br />6. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 10/26/03. The Post seemed to be alone in reporting on the proposed troop levels and almost so as to the details of Wolfowitz's comments; there was minor confirmation of the latter in <i>The Los Angeles Times.</i><br />7. <i>The Chicago Tribune,</i> 10/5/03.<br />8. Transcript, News Conference, 10/28/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />9. <i>The New York Times,</i> 10/30/03.<br />10. Transcript, press conference, 10/28/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />11. <i>The Weekly Standard,</i> 9/15/03.<br />12. See Thomas Friedman ("It's No Vietnam") in <i>The New York Times</i> and Richard Cohen ("Vietnam It Isn't") in <i>The Washington Post,</i> both 10/30/03.<br />13. <i>Who Will Tell the People,</i> p. 362.<br />14. Transcript, photo opportunity, 10/27/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />15. Yahoo News/AFP 10/23/03; see Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau 10/23/03.<br />16. Transcript, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a></small><br /><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>November 4, 2003, Tuesday</b> <a name="11/04/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">A few days ago, the President told us that the increasingly deadly attacks in Iraq were a sign that the opposition is desperate, which in turn was a sign that we are prevailing. That was a foolish and, one might say, desperate formula, as was tragically demonstrated Sunday.<br /></p><p align="justify">The loss of sixteen lives when a helicopter was shot down, together with three more killed in other types of attacks, left the President silent. Well, not silent, just unable to talk about the events, even to express sympathy for the families. In a speech in Birmingham, Alabama yesterday, he stuck to his script, telling inane jokes, babbling about entrepreneurship, praising tax cuts, talking about anything but the fact that his policies have led to Sunday's losses. The only even indirect reference was this, near the end:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">We have got a great United States military. (Applause.) And some of the best have fallen in service to our fellow Americans. We mourn every loss. We honor every name. We grieve with every family. And we will always be grateful that liberty has found such brave defenders. (Applause.)<br /></p><p align="justify">We have put the best on the job of securing America and defending the peace. Five-hundred soldiers in the 877th Engineer Battalion, the Alabama National Guard, are deployed. They're fixing roads so life will be better. They're rebuilding orphanages. They're repairing schools. These proud sons and daughters of Alabama were responsible for demolishing the final hideout of the thugs, the sons, of Saddam Hussein. (Applause.)<br /></p><p align="justify">We're grateful for them, and I'm grateful to their families for making the sacrifice. You see, freedom's home is America. We're freedom's defender.... <sup><small>1 </small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">The President reportedly has not attended a memorial service for any of those who have died in Iraq, and his Pentagon forbids pictures of their coffins as they arrive home. His tribute to them is hollow, as false as his rationales for sending them to die.<br /></p><p align="justify">Not satisfied with being insincere, Mr. Bush was deceptive, trotting out the tired, but apparently still effective, implication of a tie between 9-11 and Iraq, weaving the two together over seven aragraphs of his speech, ending with this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...A free Iraq will be a peaceful Iraq. And a free and peaceful Iraq are important for the national security of America. A free and peaceful Iraq will make it more likely that our children and grandchildren will be able to grow up without the horrors of September the 11th....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Apparently afraid that he'd not made clear to his audience that invading Iraq is all that stands between them and certain disaster, he added, "We'll defeat the terrorists there so we don't have to face them on our own streets." Can't you just see the Iraqi air force, which didn't leave the ground in March, dropping parachute troops onto the streets of Birmingham?<br /></p><p align="justify">Perhaps the President isn't able to improvise, or his speechwriters need more than a day to make alterations. Surely the White House web site would note the sad events. Not so. On the home page, the latest entries were the text of his Birmingham speech and a two-paragraph statement regarding the passage of the funding bill. The only possibly relevant passage in the latter is this: "Our country is being tested. Those who seek to kill coalition forces and innocent Iraqis want America and its coalition partners to run so the terrorists can reclaim control." Like the comments in his speech, this could have been written any time in the past several weeks.<br /></p><p align="justify">The featured items on the "Iraq" page of the web site were David Kay's statement to Congress on October 2 and a piece entitled "100 Days of Progress in Iraq." The 100 days begin May 1, so that brings us up to August 8. Under "Latest News," the most recent entry was from October 27. Under "Global Messages," the latest entry was dated November 3, but was a statement by Condoleezza Rice on October 30. The material under "Liberation Update" was dated November 3, but it led off with this, followed by pages of happy talk:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">News accounts are painting vivid pictures of the joy and relief of free Iraqis, who are living without fear of Saddam's brutality and beginning to enjoy freedoms unknown for decades.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">No bad news allowed.<sup><small>2</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">A "Press Gaggle" on the plane en route to Birmingham provided the only indication that President Bush even knows that a helicopter went down:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Q Scott, will the President mention the attack on the Chinook that killed 16?<br /></p><p align="justify">MR. McCLELLAN: Well, the President often talks about the service and sacrifice that our men and women in the military -- and he has often said, and I believe he will continue to say, that we mourn the loss of every fallen soldier. They are serving and sacrificing for an important cause, in Afghanistan, in Iraq and elsewhere. The President has always said we mourn the loss of every life of our troops and our thoughts and prayers are with their loved ones, with their families. And we'll continue to talk about -- I mean, the President has talked about how there are dangers that still exist in parts of Iraq, particularly the Baghdad area, and the area north to Tikrit.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">That suggests that the President's remarks were evasive and inadequate by design, or at least by habit.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Q How was he kept abreast of the event yesterday? </p><p align="justify">MR. McCLELLAN: He was notified in the morning by traveling staff, and then he was updated later in the day, as well. </p><p align="justify">Q By whom? MR. McCLELLAN: By traveling staff. </p><p align="justify">Q Was he in contact with Rumsfeld on the phone, or anything? </p><p align="justify">MR. McCLELLAN: I don't have any updates on that side. I mean, he's always in close contact with administration officials.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">That's reassuring, especially as he doesn't read newspapers.<br />______________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. All quotes are from the White House web site, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />2. Quotes from www.whitehouse.gov were taken at about 11 p.m PST, 11/3/03. As of Tuesday, at 10 a.m. PST, the only change which had been made to that web site was to post a rearranged excerpt from the Birmingham speech as the latest "Global Message." </small><br /><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>November 7, 2003</b> <a name="11/07/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">The President made two speeches yesterday. The occasion for one was the signing of the war funding bill. He again avoided anything resembling a direct acknowledgment of the downing of a helicopter Sunday, in which fifteen - now changed again to sixteen - died. The only reference to loss of life was this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Recent attacks have shown, once again, the cruelty of the enemy. They don't care whose lives they take - men, women, or children. They're cold-blooded. They're heartless. We're engaged in a massive and difficult undertaking, but America has done this kind of hard work before. </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Well, Sunday is recent.<br /></p><p align="justify">The President also managed to slip in the ritual association of Iraq with 9-11:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">On September the 11th, 2001, America grieved for our losses, and we made a commitment. We determined to conduct the war against terror on the offensive. We determined to confront and undermine threats abroad before they arrive in our own cities.<br /></p><p align="justify">We're waging this war in relentless pursuit of the al Qaeda network. We're waging this war in Afghanistan against Taliban remnants and al Qaeda killers.<br /></p><p align="justify">We're waging this war in Iraq against Saddam loyalists and foreign terrorists who seek the return of tyranny and terror. We're pursuing long-term victory in this war by promoting democracy in the Middle East so that the nations of that region no longer breed hatred and terror.<sup><small>1</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The second speech was given on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of National Endowment for Democracy. Again, he stayed away from Sunday's events and offered a completely sanitized picture:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...The former dictator ruled by terror and treachery, and left deeply ingrained habits of fear and distrust. Remnants of his regime, joined by foreign terrorists, continue their battle against order and against civilization. Our coalition is responding to recent attacks with precision raids,... </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Maybe the following was the reference to Sunday, code word "sacrifice:"<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Securing democracy in Iraq is the work of many hands. American and coalition forces are sacrificing for the peace of Iraq and for the security of free nations. Aid workers from many countries are facing danger to help the Iraqi people. The National Endowment for Democracy is promoting women's rights, and training Iraqi journalists, and teaching the skills of political participation. </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Or maybe not.<br /></p><p align="justify">The major theme was the grand plan for remaking the Middle East.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...We've reached another great turning point -- and the resolve we show will shape the next stage of the world democratic movement.<br /><center>***</center>Our commitment to democracy is also tested in the Middle East, which is my focus today, and must be a focus of American policy for decades to come. In many nations of the Middle East - countries of great strategic importance - democracy has not yet taken root. And the questions arise: Are the peoples of the Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions of men and women and children condemned by history or culture to live in despotism? Are they alone never to know freedom, and never even to have a choice in the matter? I, for one, do not believe it. I believe every person has the ability and the right to be free. (Applause.)<br /><center>***</center>Many Middle Eastern governments now understand that military dictatorship and theocratic rule are a straight, smooth highway to nowhere. But some governments still cling to the old habits of central control....<br /><center>***</center>In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council are also working together to build a democracy - and after three decades of tyranny, this work is not easy.... <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Then a pause for a pledge to stay the course: "...The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region...." Stated more realistically, we got ourselves into a mess and don't know how to get out.<br /></p><p align="justify">Finally, a blend of noble rhetoric, Ricean history and neocon imperialism:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace. (Applause.)<br /></p><p align="justify">The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. From the Fourteen Points to the Four Freedoms, to the Speech [by President Reagan] at Westminster [Parliament], America has put our power at the service of principle. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom - the freedom we prize - is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind. (Applause.)<br /></p><p align="justify">Working for the spread of freedom can be hard. Yet, America has accomplished hard tasks before. Our nation is strong; we're strong of heart....<sup><small>2 </small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">We're strong; they bleed. We're resolute; they die. We're principled; they're expendable. That's vision, and leadership.<br />_______________________________<br /><br /><small>1. "President Signs Wartime Supplemental." <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a> 11/6/03.<br />2. "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East." <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a> 11/6/03.</small><br /><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>November 21, 2003, Friday</b><a name="11/21/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">On November 15, <i>The Washington Post</i> ran a story on criticism of the Sharon regime: "Four former chiefs of Israel's powerful domestic security service said in an interview published Friday [November 14] that the government's actions and policies during the three-year-old Palestinian uprising have gravely damaged the country and its people." On Wednesday, November 19, <i>The Seattle Times,</i> in an editorial entitled "Tough Guys Talk Peace," noted that the four "want their country to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Otherwise, they say, Israel is headed toward catastrophe and might not survive as a democracy...." The <i>Times</i> offered several comments:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">A notable pattern repeats itself, with those closest to the conflict urging peace, willing to take risks and deal with the consequences.<br /></p><p align="justify">Their criticism of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is hard on the heels of a complaint by the current Army chief of staff, who said the strict policy of closures on Palestinian cities only increases Palestinian resentment.<br /><center>***</center><p></p><p align="justify">They know all the rhetorical shorthand and shibboleths, and confront them head-on.<br /><center>***</center><p></p><p align="justify">Predictably, the loudest opponents will be those farthest from the conflict, the most adamant for the fight to continue, and the least tolerant of fresh views. </p></blockquote><p align="justify">The parallel is not perfect, but attitudes toward our involvement in Iraq come to mind - to mine that is; The <i>Times</i> didn't note any similarity.<br /></p><p align="justify">On <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=2264973730809717201&postID=1429471742984233288#03/15/03">March 15</a>, I made reference to The <i>Times'</i> bewildered advocacy of the invasion of Iraq. Since then it has offered numerous comments, which are illustrative of the gyrations required to maintain support for the war.<br /></p><p align="justify">The <i>Times</i> began with a more or less conventional view: Saddam Hussein was a threat to our security. On March 18, the day before the war began, it said, "We are fighting to remove Saddam and his sons from Iraq and thereby increase the safety of the United States and our friends." On March 27, it thought that the official theory had been vindicated:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Three-thousand chemical suits found in a central Iraqi hospital, coupled with gas masks and nerve-gas-antidote injectors found at another, may add up to this war's ultimate purpose.<br /></p><p align="justify">A goal of the U.S.-led war is to get rid of Saddam Hussein. But its twin purpose is finding and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Alas for the WMD excuse, those ambiguous finds did not indicate the presence of chemical weapons.<br /></p><p align="justify">On April 9, the rationale began to mutate:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The swift progress of the past few days marks Iraq's transition from war zone to peace. Next comes the task of rebuilding Iraq into a democracy.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The following day, The <i>Times,</i> celebrating, continued the redefinition:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Liberation is a stunning sight.<br /><center>***</center>A Baghdad crowd toppled a 20-foot bronze statue of Saddam Hussein with the kind of good-riddance fervor reminiscent of East Germans bringing down the Berlin Wall....<br /><center>***</center>We've broken the old order. Now we must help the Iraqis build a new, far-better order....<br /><p></p><p align="justify">... One middle-aged Iraqi man beating a huge portrait of Saddam with a shoe summed up aptly the hope felt by his fellow countrymen: "This man has killed two million of us." While many trials lie ahead, this man grasps that death at the hands of a brutal dictatorship will not be his future.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This is the universal fall-back. No WMD? No matter. We have eliminated an evil dictator. The <i>Times</i> also endorsed, on April 13, the positive form of the administration's domino theory: "A democratic Iraq can serve as a model to nations throughout the region."<br /></p><p align="justify">However, doubts began to creep in: had we been led into this war, however noble its collateral benefits, by fraud? This is from June 22:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The Bush administration took the United States into a preemptive war against Iraq based on the imminent threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and his links to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network.<br /></p><p align="justify">In the aftermath of a lightning war, neither of those basic premises, asserted for months by the president and senior officials, has held up.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The <i>Times</i> drew the obvious conclusions:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">In the absence of more information, fully aired in public, Americans are left to wonder about the administration's judgment, honesty and competence.<br /></p><p align="justify">The war was mercifully short, and an unambiguously murderous dictator has been deposed, but the war debate was never narrowly construed to be about the immorality of one man. It was about a military threat to the United States and our friends.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">However, it did not want to dwell on whether the war was justified. What is done is done; it's time to move on:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">At its core, this is about what comes next, rather than regrets about Saddam.<br /></p><p align="justify">President Bush is raising his voice over Iran's nuclear capabilities. Can we have confidence in the intelligence that shapes his comments?<br /><center>***</center>... The American people need to know more about this war before they are asked to approve the next one. <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">The last two comments certainly are sound, as far as they go. The doubts persisted on July 17:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The White House is making heads spin with contradictory explanations of how bogus intelligence survived to appear in the president's State of the Union address.<br /></p><p align="justify">... Rumors that Iraq tried to buy "yellowcake" uranium ore in Africa were discredited or seriously in doubt four months before the accusation appeared in the president's Jan. 28 speech.<br /><center>***</center>Another element of the White House case for war is coming under scrutiny: the links between Saddam and the terrorist group behind the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on New York City and the Pentagon.<br /><p></p><p align="justify">The heart of the pre-emptive strike against Saddam was fear of Iraq's capacity to attack the U.S. and its allies. Evilness was not the primary stated and compelling reason for toppling Saddam.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The <i>Times</i> continued to wonder about the administration's honesty, but apparently couldn't bring itself to hold the President responsible:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Did President Bush lie to Congress and the American people? Such language is too harsh. But it is equally unpleasant to imagine the president surrounded by political hard-liners willing to shade the truth and tailor the facts to build the case they take into the Oval Office.<br /><center>***</center>Senior civilian Bush appointees, especially at the Pentagon, have pressed for war on Iraq since they saw an unsatisfactory end to the first Gulf War.<br /><p></p><p align="justify">If they sold this war with exaggeration and falsehood, the American people should know it, and remember it.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">However, four days later, The <i>Times</i> was back into war mode: "The deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein, if true, are a blessing. Once their father is added to the list, it means that regime change in Iraq is irreversible." It found summary execution to be unacceptable, but imprisonment and trial would be inconvenient. How happy, then, that the boys gave the troops an excuse to take them out:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">It cannot be the business of the United States Army to capture members of a political family and summarily have them shot, like the Communists did in 1918 with the family of Tsar Nicholas II. We are a country of law. And yet, it would have been a security problem to capture the sons of Saddam alive, just as it will be a problem to capture Saddam himself.<br /></p><p align="justify">To put them on trial for crimes against humanity would be seen as political, and would be an incitement to terrorism from the opening gavel to the moment of execution. And it is unimaginable that Saddam, Qusay or Uday would be tried and not executed.<br /></p><p align="justify">We could not leave any of them in Iraq after we left. We could imprison them in America along with Manuel Noriega, but it is surely not wise to begin filling U.S. prisons with a collection of deposed foreign rulers.<br /></p><p align="justify">To end a dynasty requires the death of the ruler and his sons: That was the ancient rule. By fighting to the death, the sons of Saddam mercifully imposed that rule on themselves.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">I would have assumed that we had moved beyond ancient rules. War fever is an amazingly effective engine of regression.<br /></p><p align="justify">On September 8, The <i>Times</i> told us that the cost of the was is so small that we'll never notice:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">President Bush last night asked for an extra $87 billion to wage war and peace in Iraq.<br /></p><p align="justify">That works out to just under $300 per American, which is less than 1 percent of the average wealth produced per American per year. We can afford it; there is no question of that....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The theme continued on October 2:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">American taxpayers are stuck with a huge bill for securing, running and restoring post-war Iraq. Get used to the idea. The financial burden is one the nation took on when it went to war.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">This is wonderful. The <em>Times</em>, when not conjuring up ancient rules of regime change, is the self-appointed representative of those who can't get used to the idea of paying their fair share of taxes: The Times ran editorials calling for elimination of the estate tax and taxes on capital gains; it ran paid advertisements on the former issue; it endorsed Bush in 2000 in part because of the tax issues; publisher Frank Blethen testified before Congress in favor of estate tax repeal; The <i>Times</i> created a pro-repeal website, www.deathtax.com. Whether the cost falls on this generation or on our heirs, the Blethen family, operators and majority owners of the paper, won't be greatly inconvenienced now that their income tax burden has been lightened and the estate tax is on its way out.<br /></p><p align="justify">On October 10, The <i>Times</i> proposed sending in Turkish troops, probably a bad idea and one which has been shelved. On November 4, it proposed sending more American troops. In that column, it put aside all doubts and settled on a rationale for the war:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Here at home, support of the fundamental mission of the war - a free and stable Iraq - is still solid. Confidence in the decision-makers is less steady, and casualty reports stir doubts.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Here at home, where no one is being shot and taxes are only an unpleasant memory, where, in short, the war has no cost, support is solid. If the administration weren't so inept, there wouldn't even be disconcerting bad news.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>November 24, 2003, Monday </b><a name="11/24/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">On Thursday, Maureen Dowd wrote about President Bush's ludicrous visit to London, noting the necessity of shielding him from angry protesters. She concluded her remarks with four potent paragraphs. Referring to the fortieth anniversary of the assassination of President Kennedy, she said,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">There was a dispiriting contrast between G.W.B. shutting out the world and avoiding the British public, and the black-and-white clips this week of J.F.K. reaching out to the world and being adored by Berliners.</p></blockquote><p align="justify"><em>The Oxford Compact Thesaurus </em>offers these words as alternatives to "dispiriting": disheartening, depressing, discouraging, daunting, demoralizing. Yes, the contrast between John Fitzgerald Kennedy and George Walker Bush, the realization that this foolish, ignorant, irresponsible man is President have that effect.<br /></p><p align="justify">In February, 2001, Professor Emeritus Jon Bridgman gave the last of his winter lectures at the University, choosing as his subject the Kennedy presidency and the assassination. As usual, he ended with films, in that case newsreels of the funeral procession and the concluding scene in Camelot. The latter may have seemed a bit much to some, especially to those too young to have lived through those years, but I thought it was valid; as Professor Bridgman said, the world changed that day in November: the hope and idealism that were the best of the Kennedy years faded away. Samuel Eliot Morison, in his <i>Oxford History of the American People,</i> published in 1964, ended the book with this final comment,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">With the death of John Fitzgerald Kennedy something seemed to die in each one of us. Yet the memory of that bright, vivid personality, that great gentleman whose every act of and appearance appealed to our pride and gave us fresh confidence in ourselves and our country, will live in us for a long, long time.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">followed by the closing lines from "Camelot." Romantic, yes; unrealistic, perhaps; but there was a spirit which made such flights of imagination excusable and appropriate, even for the hardheaded. Whatever revisionism, objective or partisan, may do to the Kennedy image, it will not negate the fact that he helped us to believe that good things could be done; that noble words were not merely tools to disguise dubious ends; that we were united in a common cause, not scratching for petty advantage; that charity was not a cover for political gain; that advancing the cause of democracy was a legitimate and truthful aim, not a fallback excuse for imperialism; perhaps above all, that mistakes should be acknowledged and lessons learned.<br /></p><p align="justify">Ms. Dowd continued,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">There was also a dispiriting contrast between the Bush administration, hiding the returning coffins of U.S. soldiers and avoiding their funerals, and the moving pictures of the Italian politicians and people, honoring their dead with public ceremonies and a week of mourning.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">The Italians, drawn into the Iraqi quagmire out of misplaced solidarity, suffered a terrible loss. They reacted naturally, with grief and respect. The American dead and wounded, Jessica Lynch aside, come home in secret, forgotten by the president and the country which sent them into the line of fire. That "support the troops" could be the catch-phrase of the day is one of the bitterest ironies of this adventure.<br /></p><p align="justify">Ms. Dowd concluded,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The bubble in London is just an extension of the bubble the Bush team lives in at home. It superimposes its reality on the evidence for war, the ease of the occupation, the strength of the insurgency and the continuing threat from Saddam and Osama.<br /></p><p align="justify">Isolationism has been a foreign policy before. But for this administration, it seems to be a way of life.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">It is so because the alternative is to engage in actual debate - and not just about Iraq - to submit the administration's world view, if a set of class-based biases and ideological fantasies can be so termed, to the test of the marketplace of ideas, a forum which would give Mr. Bush a serious case of agoraphobia.<br /></p><p align="justify">My view of President Kennedy may be is idealized, influenced by his tragic death and the passage of time. However, in evaluating the present incumbent one needn't rely on the Kennedy image for support; by whatever measure one chooses, George Bush is a disgrace to his office.<br />___________________________<br /><br /><small>The New York Times, 11/20/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>November 26, 2003, Wednesday</b> <a name="11/26/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">Reports regarding a possible exit strategy for Iraq remain conflicting.<sup> <small>1</small></sup> A step has been taken toward transfer of political control, but the future level of American troop strength is as unclear as ever. Several unpredictable factors will influence that decision: the security status; the role of the Iraqi governing body; political pressure in the context of a reelection campaign; and traps into which the administration may blunder through mistakes, operational or rhetorical.<br /></p><p align="justify">Rhetorical traps are no small problem. When the President is on his own, his comments take two forms. Often they consist of preprogrammed lines strung together in whatever order they come to mind. Usually that avoids trouble by avoiding meaning, along with any question which may have been asked, but the possibility of a mistake always is present. The second form is the unrehearsed answer, which tends to be long on bluster. Despite the disaster in Iraq, or perhaps because of it, the President repeatedly has thrown down the gauntlet. This may endear him to the right and perhaps it impresses uninformed patriots, but he makes any eventual withdrawal more difficult. Nevertheless, he goes on framing the issue in terms of success or failure, intimidation or macho response, victory in Iraq or fighting on the streets of America.<br /></p><p align="justify">When making a formal speech, the President has the advantage of a prepared text, but even those scripts have contained more than a few gaffes. Take as an example his speech in London on November 20.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...Whatever has come before, we now have only two options: to keep our word, or to break our word. The failure of democracy in Iraq would throw its people back into misery and turn that country over to terrorists who wish to destroy us. Yet democracy will succeed in Iraq, because our will is firm, our word is good, and the Iraqi people will not surrender their freedom. (Applause.)<br /><center>***</center>We did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq and pay a bitter cost of casualties, and liberate 25 million people, only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins. (Applause.) We will help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful and democratic country in the heart of the Middle East. And by doing so, we will defend our people from danger.<sup><small>2 </small></sup><p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">It's amazing that his advisors would put him in the position of plunging ahead or breaking his word.<br /></p><p align="justify">Parts of the President's speech did not sound much like George W. Bush. As to style, they share that characteristic with the recent, widely praised speech in Washington.<sup><small>3</small></sup> In London, the transformation extended to substance; Mr. Bush emerged as an intellectual, versed in British history and familiar with the great thinkers, no mean accomplishment for someone who doesn't even read newspapers.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...We're sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If that's an error it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith. Americans have, on occasion, been called moralists who often speak in terms of right and wrong. That zeal has been inspired by examples on this island, by the tireless compassion of Lord Shaftesbury, the righteous courage of Wilberforce, and the firm determination of the Royal Navy over the decades to fight and end the trade in slaves.<br /></p><p align="justify">It's rightly said that Americans are a religious people. That's, in part, because the "Good News" was translated by Tyndale, preached by Wesley, lived out in the example of William Booth....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Give us a break.<br /></p><p align="justify">If the President ever read Adam Smith, he might come across uncongenial opinions. Smith took a dim view of national debt, and observed that wars, if they were funded by current taxation rather than borrowing, "would in general be more speedily concluded, and less wantonly undertaken."<sup><small>4</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The apparent need to reject any suggestion of retreat seemed to have led, during the U.K. visit, to a change in policy, or at least in bias, regarding withdrawal of troops. For weeks there had been speculation that troop levels would be lowered by next summer. On November 6, the Pentagon confirmed this; withdrawal would depend on security, but a specific target was set, reduction to 105,000 by May. That may have been put on hold, depending on whether two comments by Mr. Bush should be taken seriously. A joint press conference with Prime Minister Blair on November 20 included this exchange:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Q Could I ask both leaders about the agenda on Iraq? You are both engaged in an unpredictable and dangerous war, as we've seen today. And yet, you say you want to bring the troops home starting from next year. Now, how is that possible when the security situation is still so unresolved? You haven't got Saddam Hussein. Aren't you stuck in Iraq with your enemies holding the exit door?<br /></p><p align="justify">PRESIDENT BUSH: I said that we're going to bring our troops home starting next year? What I said is that we'll match the security needs with the number of troops necessary to secure Iraq. And we're relying upon our commanders on the ground to make those decisions.<br /></p><p align="justify">Q So you'll keep a certain number of troops in Iraq for a longer time?<br /></p><p align="justify">PRESIDENT BUSH: We could have less troops in Iraq, we could have the same number of troops in Iraq, we could have more troops in Iraq, what is ever necessary to secure Iraq.<sup><small>5</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Apparently realizing that his statement was too stark, Mr. Bush broke in clumsily after the PM had responded, and amended his answer. Iraqis are being trained for various military and police functions, he said, and American force level will depend on "how fast the new brigades of Iraqi army are stood up, how effective they are." He didn't, however, retract his statement that more troops might be sent.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush's confusion was so evident and the first answer was so flippant that we might suspect its reliability. However, in an interview the previous day, the President had given roughly the same answer:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Q Mr. President, am I getting this right, you will not have any withdrawal of any troops by the summer?<br /></p><p align="justify">THE PRESIDENT: No. We will have troops on the ground that will match the security needs, is the best way to put that.<br /></p><p align="justify">Q So you're not saying more or less?<br /></p><p align="justify">THE PRESIDENT: I'm saying I'm going to listen to the generals who say, Mr. President, we've got -- we need more, we need less, we've got exactly the right number. They will tell me the number.....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Missing from most of the statements regarding troop levels, including the President's, is any reference to the Iraqis. Although much is being made of the transfer of political control, discussions of troop levels usually assume that this will remain our decision to make. Either the administration is assuming that American forces will be asked to stay, the transfer of power is less substantive than advertised, or the issue hasn't been thought through.<br />_____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. I made an attempt to hit this moving target on <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=2264973730809717201&postID=1429471742984233288#11/01/03">November 1.</a><br />2. Remarks by the President at Royal Banqueting House-Whitehall Palace, London, 11/19/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />3. Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, 11/6/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />4. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book Five, Chapter III, "Of Public Debts."<br />5. President Bush, Prime Minister Hold Joint Press Conference, Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, London; www.whitehouse.gov, 11/20/03.</small><br /><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>November 29, 2003, Saturday</b><a name="11/29/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">President Bush visited the troops - some of them, briefly - on Thanksgiving Day. Under cover so tight that the Secret Service detail at Crawford didn't know his plans, he flew to Iraq, landed in darkness, posed in a military jacket, spent 2½ hours with the contingent at the airbase, said determined things and went home. Certainly there was some danger involved, but a secret trip, a visit only to a secure location and a rapid exit stand in stark contrast to the long tours and mortal risks he leaves the surprised troops to face. This was re-election grandstanding of the most exploitative sort.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>November 30, 2003, Sunday <a id="11/30/03"></a></b></p><p align="justify">For months I have resisted the temptation to rant about the condition of the op-ed page of <i>The New York Times,</i> but the time has come, even though the occasion is offering a partial defense of one of its contributors.<br /></p><p align="justify">When we moved to a more remote suburb in January, 2001, I could no longer receive home delivery of The <i>Times.</i> I tried mail delivery, which was unsatisfactory, so I resorted to buying the paper day by day, usually at Starbucks. I averaged five or six papers per week, which increased my latte intake considerably. Eventually civilization reached the hinterlands, and home delivery resumed. Sometimes I wonder why I tried so hard.<br /></p><p align="justify">One might think that a paper which, no matter what it does, will be reviled by the right as a liberal rag would accept the role and not try to be "fair and balanced." One might think that a paper which in fact has been liberal at times would draw on that history and be so at a time when liberals are needed and hard to find. One also might believe in the tooth fairy.<br /></p><p align="justify">The <i>Times'</i> op-ed page hasn't ceased to be a source of meaningful comment, but it has come close. The decline, in numbers and in quality, began with the retirement of Anthony Lewis, followed by the migration of Gail Collins and Frank Rich to editorial posts. A countermigration put Bill Keller and Nicholas Kristoff on the page; Keller left after a few months, appointed executive editor in the wake of the Jayson Blair scandal.<br /></p><p align="justify">Kristoff is perceptive, but erratic, and at times he seems uncomfortable in the role of pundit. Bob Herbert continues to fight the good fight and Maureen Dowd, who seemed to have lost focus for a time, has served up some appropriately disrespectful comments. Paul Krugman's expertise is economics; when he moves into politics, as he apparently feels compelled to do because of the void left by the three departures, he is usually right on the issues, but often fumbles or exaggerates.<br /></p><p align="justify">Because the ranks thinned, it became common for much of the op-ed page, sometimes all of it, to be made up of guest columns. A Saturday in September was a memorable example. There were four columns, all by guests, including a moderately substantive one on foster care; the other three discussed the overuse of strollers, the overuse of disinfectants and the virtues of a covered tennis stadium. Apparently the world is, contrary to my impression, a safe, dull place.<br /></p><p align="justify">Eventually David Brooks was added, which will lessen the need for guests by two per week and will rebalance the page as to the war in Iraq; apparently it was considered to be dangerously deficient in pro-war voices after Keller's departure. My impression of Brooks based on his appearances on "The News Hour," was of a generally sensible and moderate conservative. In that role, would be an asset to the page; however, he is not sensible or moderate as to the war.<br /></p><p align="justify">A column by Robert Fisk appeared in the P-I on November 27. It criticized the media coverage of the war, and singled out Brooks' column on November 4 for especially harsh comment, suggesting that Brooks advocated atrocities by American troops. Brooks didn't do that. His comments about Iraq, on that occasion and others, deserve criticism but not misrepresentation.<br /></p><p align="justify">Brooks' column was headed "A Burden Too Heavy to Put Down." A more accurate analysis of the situation in Iraq would be "a mess so deep that we can't extricate ourselves without help." Mr. Brooks told us that "Iraq is the Battle of Midway in the war on terror." He said that Saddam's men were evil. That part was standard stuff: nonsense about Iraq being the front line in the war on terrorism and the insupportable notion that we are privileged to invade any country whose ruler we deem to be cruel. However, Brooks apparently is concerned that, were the media to report the reality of the war, support at home might decline, which led to the controversial statements:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">It's not that we can't accept casualties. History shows that Americans are willing to make sacrifices. The real doubts come when we see ourselves inflicting them. What will happen to the national mood when the news programs start broadcasting images of the brutal measures our own troops will have to adopt? Inevitably, there will be atrocities that will cause many good-hearted people to defect from the cause. They will be tempted to have us retreat into the paradise of our own innocence.<br /></p><p align="justify">Somehow, over the next six months, until the Iraqis are capable of their own defense, the Bush administration is going to have to remind us again and again that Iraq is the Battle of Midway in the war on terror, the crucial turning point where either we will crush the terrorists' spirit or they will crush ours.<br /></p><p align="justify">The president will have to remind us that we live in a fallen world, that we have to take morally hazardous action if we are to defeat the killers who confront us. It is our responsibility to not walk away. It is our responsibility to recognize the dark realities of human nature, while still preserving our idealistic faith in a better Middle East.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Fisk asked, "What is one to make of this vile nonsense? Why is The New York Times providing space for the advocacy of war crimes by U.S. soldiers?" Brooks certainly did not advocate war crimes, although his comments do reflect a casual attitude toward them. "Americans are willing to make sacrifices" is true at present only in the sense that some of them are willing for other Americans to suffer and die - if they aren't shown pictures. Mr. Brooks is stronger; he will accept casualties, pictures and "morally hazardous action." After all, we live in a fallen world, which excuses anything. Perhaps it is disgust with that sort attitude which led Fisk into excess.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>December 8, 2003</b> <a name="12/08/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">Perhaps we'll have a test of David Brooks' atrocity theory (see my previous note), set out in his column on November 4. U.S. forces in Afghanistan killed nine children instead of the Taliban agent they were after. This wasn't intentional, so it doesn't quite pose the "moral hazard" he spoke of, but his view still would require us to chalk it up to the fortunes of war and press on.<br /></p><p align="justify">Yesterday I found another comment on Brooks' column, in the current issue of <i>The Progressive.</i> Matthew Rothschild, in an Editor's Note entitled "Saving Lives or Face," excoriated the administration's unwillingness to admit the reality in Iraq. He proposed putting the U.N. in charge. "But this would amount to an embarrassment to Bush, and, like Lyndon Johnson before him, he would rather lose American lives than lose face." I hope that Mr. Bush isn't that callous, or at least that political considerations will force a reassessment. However, he continues to bluster and strike phony-tough poses, which makes Mr. Rothschild's appraisal hard to fault.<br /></p><p align="justify">As to the page on which Brooks now appears, Rothschild said, "I have a habit of reading <i>The New York Times</i> op-ed page every day, and sometimes it’s hazardous to my health. Two recent columns almost made me physically ill." His reference is to the Brooks column and to Thomas Friedman's of October 30, which claimed, "This is the most radical-liberal revolutionary war the U.S. has ever launched - a war of choice to install some democracy in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world." Mr. Rothschild's comment was: "From Wolfowitz's mouth to Friedman's computer." That's not quite fair to Mr. Friedman; he's been clearer and more honest than the Deputy Secretary in saying that this war was optional. In a speech on November 4, Wolfowitz, in a confused attempt to "correct the record" as to his views on Iraq, said that "September 11th...made it a war of necessity, not a war of choice."<sup><small>1 </small></sup>This requires believing that Iraq was a menace to us, which Friedman has had enough sense to avoid.<br /></p><p align="justify">A former administration official has outdone Friedman in candor. Richard N. Haass, director of policy planning for the State Department until June, wrote in an op-ed column entitled "Wars of Choice,"<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Empire is about control - the center over the periphery. Successful empire demands both an ability and a willingness to exert and maintain control. On occasion this requires an ability and a willingness to go to war, not just on behalf of vital national interests but on behalf of imperial concerns, which is another way of saying on behalf of lesser interests and preferences.<br /></p><p align="justify">Iraq was such a war. The debate can and will go on as to whether attacking Iraq was a wise decision, but at its core it was a war of choice. We did not have to go to war against Iraq, certainly not when we did. There were other options: to rely on other policy tools, to delay attacking, or both.<sup><small>2</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">However, this lacks the high-minded rationale which Friedman finds necessary as an excuse.<br /></p><p align="justify">As to Brooks, Rothschild adopts an interpretation not far from Robert Fisk's:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Friedman’s newest companion on the op-ed page, David Brooks, wrote on November 4 that the United States in Iraq faces "scum," "sadist bands," "murderers," "bands of mass murderers," "terrorists," "the face of evil," and "killers."<br /></p><p align="justify">Like every two-bit propagandist, he tries to make those on the other side less than human so they are easier to slaughter. And slaughter we must have, he argues.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Rothschild follows this with the "atrocities" quote, a reference to the "Midway" line and his summation: "I can’t recall reading a more chilling column." It is chilling, but not because Brooks is lacking in decency. The problem with his point of view, and Friedman's, is that they are naïve. Only that could explain Brooks' belief that Iraq is the front line in the war on terrorism and Friedman's that we win Middle Eastern hearts and minds by imposing Western ways at the point of a gun.<br /></p><div align="justify">________________________________</div><p align="justify"><br /></p><p align="justify">The same issue of <i>The Progressive</i> published letters which criticized a book review written by Mr. Rothschild for the October issue. The issue is whether the left should support the Democratic nominee for president. In his evaluation of a book by G. William Domhoff,<sup><small>3</small></sup> Rothschild made the case for a third party, using the 2000 Green Party campaign as the reference. <p align="justify">- His first argument is that a separate party will advance a progressive agenda.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">To my view, the one unassailable point of the Nader campaign was that so long as progressives automatically vote Democratic no matter how far to the right the party moves, we and our issues will continue to be slighted....<br /><center>***</center>In Nader’s defense, he did raise issues that no Democratic candidate for President was coming close to: issues of corporate power, poverty in America, the IMF and the World Bank, empire. <p></p></blockquote><p align="justify">The former comment undoubtedly is correct: the Democratic Party has drifted rightward on numerous issues and, until that changes, progressives indeed will be slighted. The latter is less cogent; Nader could have raised the same points, to larger audiences, as a candidate for the Democratic nomination. Of course, if his main aim was to be nominated, by someone, that wouldn't have been a good strategy.<br /></p><p align="justify">- In addition, a third party campaign gets people involved. Rothschild claims, validly, that Nader "did energize and inspire a couple of million people who longed to work for something more in line with their views" than Gore’s platform. Perhaps a third party is needed as the instigator, but he acknowledges that Nader's "views have largely been taken up by Dennis Kucinich, and some of the Naderite energy has flowed to Howard Dean."<br /></p><p align="justify">- Finally, a third party is a device by which a voter can follow his conscience. Rothschild recognized that the result may be a disaster: "the Nader campaign unfortunately - and, in hindsight, perhaps recklessly - tipped the balance to Bush...." I'm not sure why it requires hindsight to see the narcissistic irresponsibility of the Nader campaign, at least in battleground states. In any case, Rothschild stands on principle:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...I maintain that there is still a noble role to play for leftwingers who vote their conscience, who cast their ballot for the candidate that most represents their views, whether that be a Ralph Nader or a David McReynolds on the old Socialist Party line. As a movement strategy, this may be unwise, but there’s nothing wrong with individuals who proudly want to declare where they stand in the voting bo[o]th.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">There's a lot wrong with that. Voting is the means by which we select those who rule us and is, therefore, too important to be used as a vehicle for self-affirmation. The Bush administration which Mr. Rothschild detests was a gift from, among others, Ralph Nader and those who voted for him in Florida.<br />__________________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Conference on Iraqi Reconstruction, George Mason University, 11/4/03; <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003">www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003</a><br />2. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 11/23/03 .<br />3. <i>Changing the Powers That Be: How the Left Can Stop Losing and Win.</i></small><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>December 18, 2003</b> <a name="12/18/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">The President was admirably restrained in his comments following the capture of Saddam Hussein. His brief address included this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">I also have a message for all Americans: The capture of Saddam Hussein does not mean the end of violence in Iraq. We still face terrorists who would rather go on killing the innocent than accept the rise of liberty in the heart of the Middle East. Such men are a direct threat to the American people, and they will be defeated.<sup><small>1</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Most of this is the usual nonsense about the nature of the resistance and the threat to the U.S., but he avoided gloating or overstating the importance of the capture.<br /></p><p align="justify">Politically, Mr. Bush can afford to take the high road; attacking Howard Dean will be handled, at least for a time, by the other Democratic contenders. Dr. Dean's somewhat flustered reaction to the news included a statement that "the capture of Saddam has not made America safer." Senator Lieberman, who seems poised to join Senator Miller in the I-can't believe-I'm-a-Democrat ranks, obliged by offering comments that could have been drafted by a Bush speech writer:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">"If Howard Dean had his way, Saddam Hussein would still be in power today - not in prison - and the world would be a much more dangerous place," Lieberman said. "The American people would have a lot more to fear."<sup><small>2 </small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">...Lieberman said that if Dean doesn't think Americans are safer with Hussein in custody, "he has climbed into his own spider hole of denial."<br /></p><p align="justify">Lieberman said the former Vermont governor "has made a series of dubious judgments and irresponsible statements in this campaign." Those statements, he said, "signal he would in fact take us back to the days when we Democrats were not trusted to defend America's security."<sup><small>3</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">Lieberman has managed to move from whining over Al Gore's alleged slight to him to pseudo-macho posturing, the two tied together by electoral desperation.<br /></p><p align="justify">Bush has received a ratings boost from the capture, which is hardly surprising; he also went up in the polls after his made-for-TV visit to the troops on Thanksgiving, so it doesn't take much. Whether the benefit of Hussein's capture is limited to the short term depends on several factors. One is whether the violence in Iraq subsides. Mr. Bush sought, by his comments quoted above, to explain away that possible problem. However, if the attacks and casualties continue as before, he will convince a shrinking fraction of the voters that the goal, whatever that now may be, is worth the cost, with of without Saddam.<br /></p><p align="justify">Another problem for the administration is that having Saddam Hussein in captivity is a mixed blessing. Bush no doubt would have preferred to have him brought in dead or, in the alternative, captured next September or October. A trial, about which there has been much talk, most of it aimless, would give him a platform, and some of what he could say would not be pleasant for Mr. Bush to listen to; Hussein can tell too many tales which would embarrass previous Republican administrations and undermine the excuses for this war.<br />_____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a> 12/14/03.<br />2. The International Herald Tribune, 12/15/03.<br />3. CNN.com, 12/ 16/03 .</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>December 20, 2003</b> <a name="12/20/03"></a><br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The historian of the English eighties and nineties will, in his good time, depict the somewhat rapid progression from self-contented and contained provincialism to still more self-contented if less contained imperialism - in other words, the "possessive" instinct of the nation on the move....<sup><small>1 </small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify"><sup><small></small></sup>As with the British nineteenth century, so with the American twentieth and beyond. Self-absorption, ignorance and hubris move from the domestic smugness of the eighties to the imperial assertion of today.<br /></p><p align="justify">The current, fallback, rationale for the invasion of Iraq is our duty to advance freedom and democracy:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East....<br /></p><p align="justify">The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country.... We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history.... <sup><small>2 </small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">However, high-minded excuses for imperialism are less than original. Here is one view from the British nineties:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">To us - to us and not to others, a certain definite duty has been assigned. To carry light and civilization into the dark places of the world; to touch the mind of Asia and of Africa with the ethical ideas of Europe; to give to thronging millions, who would otherwise never know peace or security, these first conditions of human advance....<sup><small>3</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">America is not the first to be called to bring its light to the world.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">... Has not a nation, like an individual ... a certain appointed task which, beyond all other nations, it is fitted to perform? Wilfully to neglect this ordained labour is, so to speak, the one unforgivable sin, because it is to defeat the purpose of the Universe as shown in the aptitudes which have been produced by the previous course of things. To sustain worthily the burden of empire is the task manifestly appointed to Britain, and therefore to fulfil that task is her duty, as it should also be her delight.<sup><small>4</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">It is our duty, our delight, to bring to Iraq, to the world, that "single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise,"<sup><small>5 </small></sup>whether or not they want it, and whether or not we destroy freedom and democracy at home along the way.<br />_____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. John Galsworthy, <em>In Chancery</em>.<br />2. Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, 11/6/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a><br />3, 4. H.F. Wyatt, "The Ethics of Empire" (1897) in Goodwin, ed., Nineteenth Century Opinion<br />5. Introduction, National Security Strategy.</small><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>December 31, 2003</b> <a name="12/31/03"></a><br /></p><p align="justify">Howard Dean said that Saddam Hussein in custody doesn't make us any safer, for which he was denounced by some of his fellow Democratic candidates. I wonder how they explain these events since Saddam's capture on December 13: the official alert level was raised a notch (12/21); six Air France flights between Paris and Los Angeles were cancelled because some passengers were suspected terrorists (12/24); sensors were deployed in California because of fear of a biological attack (12/24); the U.S. ordered foreign airlines to carry marshals (12/29); heavy security is planned for all New Years' celebrations and Rep. Shays cautioned people not to go to Times Square (12/30); private flights were banned over Las Vegas, Hoover Dam and Manhattan (12/30).<br /></p><p align="justify">Iraq has not been made safe for American troops, either. From December 13 to December 26, 12 were killed and 105 wounded.<br /></p><p align="justify">I suspect that the administration will continue to ignore the casualties and claim that capturing Hussein validates the war. In other areas, reality has crept in. John Ashcroft finally recognized his conflict and recused himself - although not his department - from the Plame-Wilson leak investigation. The Department of Agriculture did a 180 and banned use of infirm cattle for food. Halliburton has lost its contract to supply overpriced gasoline to Iraq. However, it may be too much to hope that the President will do the right thing and push Congress to extend unemployment benefits. On December 27, he offered this warm sentiment:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">We think of those among us who spend the holidays in sadness or solitude. We think of those facing illness, or the loss of a loved one, or the hardships of poverty or unemployment. And across our country, caring citizens are reaching out to those in need by volunteering their time. By serving a cause greater than themselves, Americans spread hope in our country, and they make our nation better, one life at a time.<sup><small>1</small></sup> </p></blockquote><p align="justify">Caring citizens no doubt are helping the unemployed, but our government has refused to join them. Someone must explain to me why aid is noble if voluntary, uneven and inadequate, but wrong if collective and systematic; certainly voluntarism is a peculiar model when over two million have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks. By now, we know that compassion really isn't a conservative impulse, but Republicans could tell themselves that additional unemployment benefits would be spent, stimulating the economy. However, maybe they really don't believe in economic stimulus either. Maybe they don't believe in anything other than getting and keeping theirs.<br />____________________________<br /><br /><small>1. Radio address; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/</a></small><br /></p></small></sup></sup></small>Gerald G. Dayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18272770512487580818noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2264973730809717201.post-63404050407627154952007-12-14T13:07:00.000-08:002008-05-04T19:50:53.982-07:002004<b><p align="justify">January 11, 2004, Monday</p><p align="justify"></b></p><div align="justify">The President, in his radio address on December 6,<sup><small>1 </small></sup>boasted of a gain of 328,000 jobs in August through November. Revised figures show that to be 277,000, and preliminary December figures show a gain of only 1,000 jobs, so on January 10,<sup><small>2</small></sup> he referred to "more than a quarter million" gained August through December. He can't be faulted for that; in both cases, he used the numbers presented by the Bureau of Labor statistics. He can be faulted for the rest of the January message. "America's economy is strong and getting stronger," he told us. Well, yes, if you gauge it by the stock market, but not by any measure that means anything to most people. "In December, the unemployment rate fell to 5.7 percent, from a high of 6.3 percent last June." Yes, but the drop in the December percentage was due to a reduction of 309,000 in the work force, primarily because of those ceasing to look for work. Total employment remains down 2.3 million from the level of January 2001. The president's plan for continuing the recovery: make the tax cuts, including the elimination of the estate tax, permanent, encourage more labor from undocumented immigrants, "promote free and fair trade, reform our class action system, and help businesses and their employees address the problem of rising health care costs." There was no mention of extended unemployment benefits, but that's hardly a surprise. This is a plan to help businesses, not to stimulate the economy, still less to help the American worker.<br />_________________________<br /><br /><small>1. www.whitehouse.gov.<br />2. Radio address, www.whitehouse.gov.</small><br /></div><p align="justify"><b><a id="01/16/04">January 16, 2004, Friday</b> </a><br /></p><p align="justify">President Bush announced that he wants to send a mission to Mars. If the President were to go along, it might be considered a return trip, as his programs and attitudes seem to be from another planet. Such a program would cost tens if not hundreds of billions. Proposing that, in the face of massive debt and deficits, and ignoring far more pressing needs such as adequate health care demonstrates serious detachment from the realities of this world. Actually, it may be Mr. Bush's advisors, handlers, mentors and controllers who are the aliens. Increasingly, his role is that of front man and fundraiser. The former role was evident in the space-exploration speech, which again did not sound much like him and which he read with seeming disinterest.<br /></p><p align="justify">Administration officials reportedly are planning a program to promote marriage, in part through training to develop better attitudes and interpersonal skills, something which would be ridiculed if offered by liberals for one of their projects. Big government is good or bad depending on the end to be served, and so too, apparently, is solving social problems through counseling.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, such analysis possibly is beside the point. Both proposals may simply be election-year posturing, the first to distract the public from Iraq, unemployment and other unpleasant truths, the latter to placate the right, which would rather have an anti-gay-marriage amendment. Even so, The New York Times reported them on page 1. It accorded less prominence to a story which is at least as significant, politically and intrinsically.<br /></p><p align="justify">Paul O'Neill claims that President Bush began planning to invade Iraq early in 2001. The Times reported that as follows on January 12:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">''From the very beginning, there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go,'' Mr. O'Neill said in an interview with the CBS program ''60 Minutes.''<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. O'Neill...said Iraq was discussed at the first National Security Council meeting after Mr. Bush's inauguration. The tone at that meeting and others, Mr. O'Neill said, was ''all about finding a way to do it,'' with no real questioning of why Mr. Hussein had to go or why it had to be done then. ''For me, the notion of pre-emption, that the U.S. has the unilateral right to do whatever we decide to do, is a really huge leap,'' Mr. O'Neill said.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Mr. O'Neill's charges are contained in a book just published, The Price of Loyalty, by Ron Suskind. Mr. Suskind's investigation was described by "60 Minutes" as follows:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">He got briefing materials.... "There are memos. One of them marked, secret, says, 'Plan for post-Saddam Iraq,' " adds Suskind, who says that they discussed an occupation of Iraq in January and February of 2001.<br /></p><p align="justify">Based on his interviews with O'Neill and several other officials at the meetings, Suskind writes that the planning envisioned peacekeeping troops, war crimes tribunals, and even divvying up Iraq's oil wealth.<br /></p><p align="justify">He obtained one Pentagon document, dated March 5, 2001, and entitled "Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts," which includes a map of potential areas for exploration.<sup><small>1</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">All of this sounds significant, but to The Times it rated page 11.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">A response by the administration appeared the following day. President Bush acknowledged that, "Like the previous administration, we were for regime change." However, he denied an early plan for an invasion. He said that initially he was considering other options, but added, "And then all of a sudden September the 11th hit." That might suggest that he then decided on war, a decision he professed, into early 2003, not to have made. The Times ran this story on page 22.<br /></p><p align="justify">O'Neill's accusation is important in itself and the regime-change admission, however hedged, lends some credence to it. There is, to put it cautiously, reason to suspect that this administration started a war under false pretenses. Revelations of early discussions and insights into how the decision was made not only are newsworthy - more newsworthy than the Mars and marriage stories - but are vital information to a public which must decide whether to risk four more years.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, the editorial writers of The Washington Post share the view that the story is not important. On January 15, they noted that Rep. Kucinich concluded from the Suskind-O'Neill claims that "the American people, in effect, have been misled," and commented: "The question is: Who is doing the misleading." That is an odd response, or would be if The Post's editorial page were as skeptical of the administration's statements as it is of Mr. O'Neill's or of those of the opposition candidates. Its concluding observation was this: "The wisdom of waging war in Iraq is a legitimate and important topic of political debate. But the Democratic candidates do no favors to their positions when they accept, uncritically, a half-unsurprising and half-dubious account, for no better reason than that it fits their prejudices." I don't know whether The Post entered the war debate with any prejudices but, in swallowing the administration's fully dubious war rationale, it outstripped the Democratic candidates in uncritical acceptance.<br />________________________<br /><br /><small>1. CBSNews.com, 1/11/04.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>January 19, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Justice Scalia did a little duck "hunting" at a private camp recently, in the company of Vice President Cheney. Not long before, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Cheney's appeal regarding the records of his energy task force. Faced with questions about a conflict, the Justice responded, "I do not think my impartiality could reasonably be questioned."<sup><small>1</sup></small><br /></p><p align="justify">It might seem stunning that Justice Scalia could believe himself to be impartial, with or without joint bird-shooting, in a case involving Mr. Cheney, a man he put in office by a decision of dubious legal and ethical validity. However, Mr. Scalia is not bothered by the appearance of conflict, because his heart is pure. It also helps to be arrogant and lacking in self-perception.<br /></p><p align="justify">No one doubts that the judge has the former characteristic; an article I came across recently suggests the latter. The May, 2002 issue of <i>First Things</i> published an article by Justice Scalia, adapted from a speech given at The University of Chicago Divinity School. The article was entitled "God's Justice and Ours" and set out his views on the death penalty. It began as follows:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Before proceeding to discuss the morality of capital punishment, I want to make clear that my views on the subject have nothing to do with how I vote in capital cases that come before the Supreme Court. That statement would not be true if I subscribed to the conventional fallacy that the Constitution is a "living document" - that is, a text that means from age to age whatever the society (or perhaps the Court) thinks it ought to mean.<br /><center>***</center>If I subscribed to the proposition that I am authorized (indeed, I suppose compelled) to intuit and impose our "maturing" society's "evolving standards of decency," this essay would be a preview of my next vote in a death penalty case. As it is, however, the Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living but dead - or, as I prefer to put it, enduring. It means today not what current society (much less the Court) thinks it ought to mean, but what it meant when it was adopted.... <p></p></blockquote><div align="justify">If Justice Scalia were one of those fuzzy-minded liberals who think that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of current standards, his decisions might be influenced by personal beliefs; because he merely applies the text and original intent, he is not subject to any such temptation. Does he really believe that? Can he be so monumentally ignorant of human nature as to think that his decisions never are influenced by his own views? Perhaps he simply is dishonest.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Whichever is true, Justice Scalia does not follow his own formula. Take as an example his opinion in <i>California Democratic Party v. Jones,</i> <sup><small>2</sup></small> in which the Court held that the California blanket primary law violated the First Amendment because, in allowing non-party members to vote in party primaries, it interfered with the right of political parties to refuse to associate with non-members. Does the Amendment mention political parties, or a right of non-association? Does it refer to action by the states? No; it says this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Scalia's opinion reached its conclusion in three stages. Step one, applying the First Amendment to the issue, required several levels of interpretation; there is precedent for this, but that obviously isn't the same as something in the text, and any connection to original intent is tenuous. The second step was to interpret the language of the Amendment to find that it conflicted with a blanket primary, which also involved application of precedent. The third step was to determine whether the benefits of the blanket primary were important enough to justify interference with the supposed protections of the Amendment or, putting it another way, whether the state had a compelling interest which justified overriding those protections. The second step, as I read the opinion, involved a significant element of personal belief, in the form of a preference for party control of elections. The third step, weighing the interests of the parties against those of the state, was almost entirely a value judgment.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">If, prior to the <i>Jones</i> appeal, Justice Scalia had delivered a speech on blanket primaries, he would have, to use his phrase, provided a preview of his next vote. The degree to which personal preference entered into the decision is, I think, unusual for any judge. Whether or not that is true, the process of decision, involving extended interpretation leading to a result not hinted at in the text, renders Scalia's pretensions ludicrous.<br /></p><p align="justify">The conflict between Justice Scalia's principles of decision (and his prior opinions) and the decision in <i>Bush v. Gore,</i> <sup><small>3</sup></small> in which he joined, are discussed by Alan Dershowitz in <i>Supreme Injustice.</i> His critique goes further: not only does Scalia introduce personal views into his decisions - as do all judges; the only issue is admitting it - he and the others in the <i>Bush</i> majority decided that case based on the identity of the parties: they decided for Bush because he was Bush (i.e., the Republican). If that is fair analysis, and I'm inclined to think that it is, Scalia's ethical deficiency goes far past untimely social contact.<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. The Seattle Times, 1/18/04, from The Los Angeles Times.<br />2. 530 U.S. 567 (2000); see my notes of <a href="http://geralddayarchive98.blogspot.com/#04/19/02">4/19</a>and 4/21/02.<br />3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>January 20, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">I had a bad day, so the State of the Union address would have been too much to bear. Between Bush's smirk and the brainless applause at each of his inane punch lines, I knew that I would gag. When I feel stronger, I'll read the transcript.<br /></p><p align="justify">We did watch the Democratic response, but that was worse. Nancy Pelosi managed to combine a manic expression with comments of numbing blandness. By the time Tom Daschle delivered his half, I had lost all interest, but his usual soporific delivery would have accomplished that unaided. If there were any useful ideas in either segment, I was not alert enough to hear them.<br /></p><p align="justify">Howard Dean has his faults as a candidate, but at least he has passion, which no doubt accounted for his early lead. Someone needs to convince people that the emperor has no clothes, but the Congressional leadership only averts its eyes. Dick Gephardt's defeat in Iowa was poignant, but I had difficulty understanding how he thought anyone could take him seriously as an adversary to George Bush after failing to mount any credible opposition to him in Congress.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b><a id="02/01/04">February 1, 2004</b></a><br /></p><p align="justify">The Iraq-invasion rationale continues to evolve. President Bush, in his State of the Union address,<sup><small>1</small></sup> offered the now-familiar pastiche of phantom weapons, invented ties to terrorism, implied connections to 9-11 and liberation. The argument included the newest and dumbest fallback formula: war was justified because we've found "weapons of mass destruction-related program activities." A few more months of not finding anything and it will be "minutes of committee meetings devoted in part to weapons of mass destruction-related program activity proposals." The President attributed the program- activity discoveries to David Kay, just as Dr. Kay was about to make clear that he can't rely on actual WMD.<br /></p><p align="justify">In a press conference on January 27,<sup><small>2</small></sup> Mr. Bush avoided answering questions about his WMD claims. At one point, his evasions left him so confused that he said that, following the adoption of Resolution 1441, Saddam Hussein "did not let us in." That should surprise Hans Blix.<br /></p><p align="justify">While Mr. Bush amused us with his rhetorical retreats, the Vice President offered up golden oldies. In an interview on January 9, he discussed the link between Iraq and 9-11: "On...the 9/11 question, we've never had confirmation one way or another."<sup> <small>3</small></sup> Confirmation of what? His only reference was to the long-discredited report of a meeting between a 9-11 plotter and an Iraqi in Prague. "That was the one that possibly tied the two together to 9/11." An unsupported possibility isn't much of an excuse for war.<br /></p><p align="justify">In the same interview, he discussed the more general question of a link between Iraq and al Qaeda. He referred the reporter to a November article in <i>The Weekly Standard</i>: "That's your best source of information." He claimed that the article was "based on an assessment that was done by the Department of Defense...." That "assessment" was a leaked document. In November, the Defense Department responded to the article and its source as follows:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">News reports that the Defense Department recently confirmed new information with respect to contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq in a letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee are inaccurate.<br /></p><p align="justify">A letter was sent to the Senate Intelligence Committee on Oct. 27, 2003, from Douglas J. Feith, under secretary of defense for policy, in response to follow-up questions from his July 10 testimony. One of the questions posed by the committee asked the department to provide the reports from the intelligence community to which he referred in his testimony before the committee. These reports dealt with the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. <p align="justify">The letter to the committee included a classified annex containing a list and description of the requested reports....<br /></p><p align="justify">The items listed in the classified annex were either raw reports or products of the CIA, the National Security Agency or, in one case, the Defense Intelligence Agency.... The classified annex was not an analysis of the substantive issue of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, and it drew no conclusions.<br /></p><p align="justify">Individuals who leak or purport to leak classified information are doing serious harm to national security; such activity is deplorable and may be illegal.<sup> <small>4</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">It is strange that the Vice President would rely on a magazine article based on a leaked document to prove one of the administration's grounds for war. It is bizarre that he would do so after the Defense Department issued a caution as to the reliability of the information and denounced the leak.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">In an interview on NPR, Cheney hauled out the trailers:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">We know, for example, that prior to our going in that [Saddam Hussein] had spent time and effort acquiring mobile biological weapons labs, and we're quite confident he did, in fact, have such a program. We've found a couple of semi trailers at this point which we believe were, in fact, part of that program.... I would deem that conclusive evidence, if you will, that he did, in fact, have programs for weapons of mass destruction.<sup><small>5</small></sup> </p></blockquote><div align="justify">There was early speculation that the trailers might have some connection to biological weapons, but no support has emerged and the consensus is to the contrary. The Vice President seems to have a relaxed standard for conclusive evidence.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Mr. Cheney has been the usual candidate for power behind the throne, but that is becoming increasingly difficult to accept given his pattern of being about two steps behind the official line as to Iraq.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, we do seem to need a candidate. The contrary assumption, that Bush is in charge, also is becoming more difficult to maintain. His major visible activity has been to attend fund-raisers. Several of his speeches, beginning with a policy address on November 6, have sounded as if they were written not only by, but for, someone else. The recent announcement of the bold new program for space exploration seemed to be something he'd been told to read, not anything in which he had any real interest.<br /></p><p align="justify">Karl Rove is an obvious possibility as the controlling force, but more likely it is a shifting alliance of advisors in which Mr. Rove is prominent. The Suskind-O'Neill book may shed some light.<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1, 2. www.whitehouse.gov.<br />3. Transcript of interview, <i>The Rocky Mountain News,</i> 1/9/04.<br />4. <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003">www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003</a> 11/15/03.<br />5. www.fair.org, 1/23/04, quoting from NPR broadcast.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b><a id="02/04/04">February 4, 2004</b></a><br /></p><p align="justify">The administration's approach to public finance has led to some memorable quotes. Treasury Secretary Snow: "Make no mistake; President Bush is serious about the deficit."<sup><small>1</small></sup> He is so serious that this year will show a record deficit. Budget director Bolten: "With Congress's help in enacting the budget we transmit today, we will be well on the path to cutting the deficit in half within five years."<sup><small>2</small></sup> That is accomplished by increasing spending and making expiring tax cuts permanent. Fantasy, for this administration, is not limited to weapon stockpiles. Nor is misrepresentation: the budget does not include the costs of the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.<br /></p><p align="left">Of all the summaries of the budget, the one which jumped out was a chart showing the sources of revenue. The regressive payroll tax will account for 39% of federal revenue for fiscal 2005.<sup><small>3</small></sup><br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. <a href="http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases">www.ustreas.gov/press/releases</a> 1/26/04.<br />2. The Washington Post, 2/2/04.<br />3. Chart in <i>The Seattle Times</i>; data from <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005">www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>February 7, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The unraveling of the administration's case for war has led to varying responses by its spokesmen and supporters. Vice President Cheney has been in denial and Secretary Powell has been confused, but most have taken the same path as President Bush: if today's rationale springs a leak, try another; there must be one out there that will hold water. A few supporters have admitted to being deceived about WMD, although in some cases clinging to the belief that the war still was justified: Iraq might have developed dangerous weapons sometime; Saddam was bad; democracy in Iraq would be good.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, these rationalizations ignore the fact that the invasion of Iraq not only was unjustified but, strategically, was a bad idea. A study published in December by the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College reaches that conclusion. The study runs to 46 pages plus 10 pages of footnotes, but it is preceded by a summary which is worth quoting in full.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">In the wake of the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. Government declared a global war on terrorism (GWOT). The nature and parameters of that war, however, remain frustratingly unclear. The administration has postulated a multiplicity of enemies, including rogue states; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators; terrorist organizations of global, regional, and national scope; and terrorism itself. It also seems to have conflated them into a monolithic threat, and in so doing has subordinated strategic clarity to the moral clarity it strives for in foreign policy and may have set the United States on a course of open-ended and gratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat to the United States.<br /></p><p align="justify">Of particular concern has been the conflation of al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's Iraq as a single, undifferentiated terrorist threat. This was a strategic error of the first order because it ignored critical differences between the two in character, threat level, and susceptibility to U.S. deterrence and military action. The result has been an unnecessary preventive war of choice against a deterred Iraq that has created a new front in the Middle East for Islamic terrorism and diverted attention and resources away from securing the American homeland against further assault by an undeterrable al-Qaeda. The war against Iraq was not integral to the GWOT, but rather a detour from it.<br /></p><p align="justify">Additionally, most of the GWOT's declared objectives, which include the destruction of al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations, the transformation of Iraq into a prosperous, stable democracy, the democratization of the rest of the autocratic Middle East, the eradication of terrorism as a means of irregular warfare, and the (forcible, if necessary) termination of WMD proliferation to real and potential enemies worldwide, are unrealistic and condemn the United States to a hopeless quest for absolute security. As such, the GWOT's goals are also politically, fiscally, and militarily unsustainable.<br /></p><p align="justify">Accordingly, the GWOT must be recalibrated to conform to concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American power. The specific measures required include deconflation of the threat; substitution of credible deterrence for preventive war as the primary vehicle for dealing with rogue states seeking WMD; refocus of the GWOT first and foremost on al-Qaeda, its allies, and homeland security; preparation to settle in Iraq for stability over democracy (if the choice is forced upon us) and for international rather than U.S. responsibility for Iraq's future; and finally, a reassessment of U.S. military force levels, especially ground force levels.<br /></p><p align="justify">The GWOT as it has so far been defined and conducted is strategically unfocused, promises much more than it can deliver, and threatens to dissipate scarce U.S. military and other means over too many ends. It violates the fundamental strategic principles of discrimination and concentration.<sup> <small>1</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">In short, Bush's conduct of the war on terrorism is misconceived, counterproductive and doomed to failure.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The author is Jeffrey Record, Ph.D., a Visiting Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute and a professor at the Air Force War College. The study is prefaced by a disclaimer that "views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government." The BBC reported that "US officials have played down the report. They say the views are those of the author alone and do not represent any official policy." But it added, "Our correspondent says the suspicion will nevertheless be that the views are shared by some in the US Army."<sup><small>2</small></sup> <p align="justify">Whether or not the last is true, it is too much to expect this administration and its cheerleaders to acknowledge that they have engaged in an "unnecessary preventive war of choice." The President's latest war-rationale fudge was delivered on Thursday in Charleston: "The liberation of Iraq removed a source of violence and instability from the Middle East. And the liberation of Iraq removed an enemy of this country and made America more secure."<sup><small>3</small></sup> Possibly the NBC interview tomorrow will reveal how we have been made more secure. More likely it will provide another variation on the theme.<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. <a href="http://www.carlisle.army.mil.ssi/">http://www.carlisle.army.mil.ssi/</a><br />2. <a href="http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/">http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/</a> 1/13/04.<br />3. www.whitehouse.gov, 2/5/04.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>February 11, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">I read the transcript of President Bush's appearance on "Meet the Press"<sup> <small>1</small></sup> and found his answers to be rambling and nonresponsive. There were numerous distortions: on intelligence, the budget and his cooperation with the 9-11 commission.<sup><small>2</small></sup> Then I read a column by Peggy Noonan<sup><small>3</small></sup> in which she said that one had to see the interview to appreciate just how bad it was, so I ran the tape we had made. She was right; he was also nervous, defensive and confused.<br /></p><p align="justify">Judging from comments to date, this interview fell with about a loud a thud as the State of the Union address. No transcript of the interview has turned up on the White House web site, which has recorded virtually every word said by Mr. Bush to this point. (There is a "Global Message" dated February 10, which is one page of slightly modified and rearranged excerpts). As Ms. Noonan's comment indicates, conservatives were no more impressed than liberals. She suggested that Mr. Bush give up interviews and stick to speeches. David Brooks, agreeing that articulating on his own isn't the President's long suit, offered a text of what he should have said.<br /></p><p align="justify">Tim Russert was criticized for not pinning Mr. Bush down with follow-up questions. There were a few that begged to be asked, but his prepared questions were pointed and he probably wanted to cover a certain amount of ground rather than exhaust any subject.<br /></p><p align="justify">Many of the answers were nothing more than recitals of catch-phrases; on a couple of occasions, Mr. Bush quoted his speeches, as if they were an independent source of information; perhaps they are to him. A few answers were significant, if sometimes incoherent.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush conceded that his statement about Iraq's WMD on the eve of the was wrong:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">RUSSERT: The night you took the country to war, March 17th, you said this: Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. </p><p align="justify">BUSH: Right. </p><p align="justify">RUSSERT: That, apparently, is not the case.<br /></p><p align="justify">BUSH: Correct. </p></blockquote><div align="justify">His explanation of the discrepancy was that he had relied on the best intelligence available. Leave aside whether that is true. Mr. Bush also said that he analyzed the reports in the context of the war against terror. "In other words, we were attacked, and therefore, every threat had to be reanalyzed, every threat had to be looked at, every potential harm to America had to be judged in the context of this war on terror." How does this lead to the conclusion that we must invade Iraq? Usually this argument involves the claim that Iraq would give WMD to terrorists. Mr. Bush more or less made that point:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">It's important for people to understand the context in which I made a decision here in the Oval Office. I'm dealing with a world in which we have gotten struck by terrorists with airplanes, and we get intelligence saying that there is, you know, we want to harm America. And the worst nightmare scenario for any president is to realize that these kind of terrorist networks had the capacity to arm up with some of these deadly weapons and then strike us.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">There is no evidence that Iraq was involved in 9-11, which Bush has conceded, and no evidence of collaboration with or even sympathy toward al-Qaeda, so what is the connection to terrorism?<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">If there were no WMD and a tie cannot be made to terrorism, what justification remains? One of Mr. Bush's favorite fall-back rationales has been Saddam Hussein's brutality. Russert asked a question based on Paul Wolfowitz' interview in Vanity Fair, in which Mr. Wolfowitz identified "three fundamental concerns" about Iraq. The reference is slightly mangled, but presumably the point would have been familiar to anyone who had read the article or had taken part in the administration's internal debate on Iraq.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">RUSSERT: ....[N]ow that we have determined there are probably not these stockpiles of weapons that we had thought, and the primary rationale for the war had been to disarm Saddam Hussein, Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, said that you had settled on weapons of mass destruction as an issue we could agree on.<br /></p><p align="justify">But there were three: One was the weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, and third is Saddam's criminal treatment of his Iraqi people.<br /></p><p align="justify">He said the third one by itself is a reason to help Iraqis, but it's not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk, certainly not on the scale we did.<br /></p><p align="justify">Now looking back, in your mind, is it worth the loss of 530 American lives and 3,000 injuries and woundings simply to remove Saddam Hussein, even though there were no weapons of mass destruction?</p></blockquote><div align="justify">The question was not asked artfully, but the intent is reasonably clear: was invasion justified by Saddam's brutality toward his people? Mr. Bush made no attempt to answer directly but, after some irrelevancies, said<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">...I've got a foreign policy that is one that believes America has a responsibility in this world to lead, a responsibility to lead in the war against terror, a responsibility to speak clearly about the threats that we all face, a responsibility to promote freedom, to free people from the clutches of barbaric people such as Saddam Hussein who tortured, mutilated.<br /></p><p align="justify">There were mass graves that we have found. A responsibility to fight AIDS, the pandemic of AIDS, and to feed the hungry. We have a responsibility. To me, that is history's call to America. I accept the call and will continue to lead in that direction.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Apparently that's a "yes." Contrary to Wolfowitz' opinion, which probably would be repeated in any official position paper, Mr. Bush seems to think that it is appropriate to go to war, and to sacrifice American lives, to rectify internal injustices. (Exactly where AIDS and hunger fit in is anyone's guess; perhaps they were added merely to show his liberal credentials). Someone needs to ask him whether he really intends to "continue to lead in that direction."<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Russert instead asked a more abstract question: "In light of not finding the weapons of mass destruction, do you believe the war in Iraq is a war of choice or a war of necessity?" The President clearly was flummoxed by this, even though the question used a common formulation. He stammered, paused for help from Russert, which did not come, and finally returned to the script:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">BUSH: I think it's -- that's an interesting question. Please elaborate on that a little bit. A war of choice or a war of necessity?<br /></p><p align="justify">I mean, it's a war of necessity. We -- in my judgment, we had no choice when we look at the intelligence I looked at that says the man was a threat. </p></blockquote><div align="justify">On economics, the answers mainly hewed to the line that the recovery has begun, due to his tax cuts. Mr. Bush did add one interesting note; in listing the factors which deepened the recession, he included the war:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">The attacks on our country affected our economy. Corporate scandals affected the confidence of people and therefore affected the economy. My decision on Iraq, this kind of march to war, affected the economy.<sup><small>4 </small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">Russert later asked about that effect: "... If our situation is so precious [precarious?] and delicate because of the war, why do you keep cutting taxes and draining money from the treasury?" The response was a return to the tax-cut mantra: "because I believe that the best way to stimulate economic growth is to let people keep more of their own money." Russert didn't ask him for evidence that the supply-side theory works, but no one ever seems to. Asked whether he shouldn't stop cutting taxes until the budget is balanced, Mr. Bush first dismissed the matter as a "hypothetical question." He then rambled on about tax cuts which favor ordinary folk and Russert failed to ask about those for the rich.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The interview has been described as the beginning of Mr. Bush's reelection campaign. If so, he's off to a slow start with working people. Following one of his references to tax cuts and economic stimulation, Mr. Bush said this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">See, I'm more worried about the fellow looking for the job. That's what I'm worried about. I want people working. I want people to find work. </p></blockquote><div align="justify">He's so worried about people looking for work that his annual report on the economy embraces sending jobs overseas:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">One facet of increased services trade is the increased use of offshore outsourcing in which a company relocates labor-intensive service industry functions to another country.... When a good or service is produced more cheaply abroad, it makes more sense to import it than to make or provide it domestically. <sup><small>5</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">Or, as the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors put it,<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">Outsourcing is just a new way of doing international trade. More things are tradable than were tradable in the past. And that's a good thing.<sup><small>6 </small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">Mr. Bush is so worried about the effect of that on American workers that he won't support extended unemployment benefits.<br />_________________<br /><br /><small>1. washingtonpost.com/FDCH eMediaMillWorks 2/8/04.<br />2. For an analysis, see, e.g., <a href="http://www.americanprogress.org/">http://www.americanprogress.org/</a> "Claim v. Fact."<br />3. www.opinionjournal.com, 2/8/04.<br />4. This appears in more hedged form in the Economic Report of the President, February 2004.<br />5. The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, p. 229, attached to the Economic Report of the President, February 2004.<br />6. The Seattle Times, 2/10/04.</small><br /><br /></div><p align="justify"><b>March 1, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">President Bush is not doing well in polls and his recent appearances and initiatives have been remarkably ineffective.<br /></p><p align="justify">The State of the Union address fell flat. His interview on "Meet the Press" was an embarrassment.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Mars proposal was greeted with some derision, but mostly with yawns. It seems to have been relegated to the punctured-trial-balloon box.<br /></p><p align="justify">The revisions to Medicare, which the administration hoped would steal an issue from the Democrats, are not popular, the "correction" to the cost has offended members of Congress across the political spectrum, and the commercial being run at taxpayer expense has generated still more criticism.<br /></p><p align="justify">The hesitant preliminary stance on marriage, proposing to spend 1.5 billion to improve attitudes and skills, impressed no one, especially social conservatives, leading to the President's recent statement in support of a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage.<sup><small>1</small></sup> The President's remarks left open the possibility of "legal arrangements other than marriage," which could lead to the same position taken by the Democratic candidates, heterosexual-only marriage, with the possibility of "civil unions" for gays. Therefore, Mr. Bush seems to have added nothing of substance to the debate, but has proposed mucking about with the Constitution. That is a bad idea in principle, and the amendment being discussed is hopelessly ambiguous.<br /></p><p align="justify">The fact that the White House felt compelled to take this tack reveals doubts about its core support. The gesture pleased some conservatives - one group ran an ad in <i>The New York Times</i> yesterday thanking Mr. Bush for his "courage" - but the balance of reaction has been negative, and there is a good chance that he lost more votes than he gained. His announcement of support for the amendment set a new standard for unenthusiastic, pro-forma endorsement, and the <i>Times</i> reported today that the issue may not be brought up in future speeches.<br /></p><p align="justify">Added to all of this is the beating Vice President Cheney has been taking, which has led to suggestions that he leave the ticket. His latest gaffe, the Scalia duck shoot, has reminded voters of how he and Bush came to be "elected."<br /></p><p align="justify">The standard explanation for the bad patch is that attention has been concentrated on the Democratic candidates; when that race is over, the spotlight will return to the President and he has unlimited funds with which to burnish his image. It may work out that way, but more exposure of the Bush we have seen lately would not aid the cause. Whatever the outcome, recent events have demonstrated the inherent weakness of George Bush and Dick Cheney as candidates and Karl Rove's limitations as a strategist.<br />________________<br /><br /><small>1. www.whitehouse.gov, 2/24/04.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>March 5, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">In surfing the TV today, I landed on C-SPAN in time to catch Tony Blair's attempt to justify his anti-terrorism policies, including the invasion of Iraq. As to Iraq, it was a thoroughly unconvincing account. One would think that an intelligent man, given a year, could do better.<br /></p><p align="justify">His rationale for the war was a hodge-podge of familiar themes: Saddam's brutality, the irresolution of the U.N., Iraq's failure to faithfully report, the possibility that WMD might get into the hands of al-Qaeda. He had some difficulty with the latter, as his overarching theme was religious terrorism and Iraq wasn't a fundamentalist state. Iraq's weakness also was inconvenient, so he theorized that its porous borders would have allowed terrorists to steal the WMD. Of course, there weren't any WMD, a fact he did not emphasize. Most of it came down to a more literate and elegant version of "I'm not going leave him in power and trust a madman."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">As a final, desperate argument, he declared that once we'd gone through the military buildup and threatened war we had to proceed; "backing down" would have made us look weak and encouraged the terrorists. If, once having threatened the use of force, we must attack, it would seem to follow that we should have solid grounds for war before issuing the threat. However, Mr. Blair certainly has not reached that conclusion.<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1. President Bush, "Meet the Press," 2/8/04, among other occasions.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>March 10, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">In testimony yesterday, CIA Director Tenet provided support for two familiar charges: the administration has distorted the facts in creating Iraq-invasion rationales; the CIA is not exactly on top of things. The support presumably was unintentional as to the second, perhaps less so as to the first.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Tenet said that he has felt compelled to correct exaggerations by the President and Vice President. He gave three examples, including the African-uranium story and Mr. Cheney's insistence that the famous two trailers were "conclusive evidence" of WMD programs. A report of his testimony remarked that, although Mr. Tenet identified only three instances of correction, he "left the impression that there had been more."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The third example illustrates the CIA's shortcomings as a gatherer of information. On January 9, Mr. Cheney said in an interview by the Rocky Mountain News that the best source of information as to an Iraq-al Qaeda connection was an article in <i>The Weekly Standard.</i><sup><small>2</small></sup> Mr. Tenet said yesterday that he intended to correct the Vice President, but he had not yet done so because he only learned about the interview on Monday. The CIA is a massively-funded gatherer of information. Distortions by the White House were a source of embarrassment, to it and to the CIA, so one might expect the agency to keep track of them. The interview was published in a newspaper with a circulation near 400,000. The Rocky Mountain News has an on-line edition. Its archives indicate that the transcript of the interview was posted on January 9. References or links to the transcript appeared in other on-line sources later that month: on americanprogress.org January 22, on washingtonpost.com and misleader.org January 23.<br /></p><p align="justify">Another item which tends to underscore both problems is a reference to a briefing by Douglas Feith to a group including the Vice President's chief of staff and the deputy national security advisor. It reportedly hyped the al Qaeda connection and disparaged the CIA position. The briefing took place in August, 2002; Mr. Tenet learned of that within the past two weeks.<sup><small>3</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">These lapses might lead one to the comforting conclusion that the CIA isn't conducting domestic intelligence operations and isn't spying on other branches of government. Or maybe it's just incompetent.<br />________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The New York Times,</i> 3/10/04.<br />2. See my <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=2264973730809717201&postID=6340405040762715495#02/04/04">note</a> of 2/4/04 for more on this episode.<br />3. <i>The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times,</i> both 3/10/04.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>March 16, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">It will be interesting to see where President Bush's poll numbers go over the next few weeks. A CBS poll released yesterday shows Bush 3 points ahead of Kerry after trailing by one point two weeks ago. However, it reported that 63% thought that Bush "cares about you," so one has to wonder whom they asked.<br /></p><p align="justify">On the plus side for Mr. Bush, the race for the Democratic nomination is over, eliminating a source of free media for the Democrats and presenting a single target. Kerry is not defining himself clearly, allowing Bush to do the defining through attack ads. Kerry has had several episodes of clumsiness. On one of these occasions, a microphone left open accidently (?) caught Kerry calling the opposition a band of crooks and liars. This didn't play well with anyone, but Republican shock was a bit much. Maureen Dowd captured the mood:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">These tough-guy Republicans, who rule the House with an iron fist, were suddenly squealing like schoolgirls at being victimized by big, bad John Kerry. J. Dennis Hastert, the House speaker, said Mr. Kerry would have his "upcomeance coming." Tom DeLay sulked that the public was getting "a glimpse of the real John Kerry." The Hammer was talking like a nail.<br /></p><p align="justify">Marc Racicot, Mr. Bush's campaign chairman, accused Mr. Kerry of "unbecoming" conduct and called on him to apologize.<br /></p><p align="justify">Oh, the poor dears. The very Bush crowd that savaged John McCain in South Carolina, that bullied and antagonized the allies we need in the real war on terror, that is spending a hundred million dollars on ads that will turn Mr. Kerry into something akin to the Boston Strangler; these guys are suddenly such delicate flowers, such big bawling babies, that they can't bear to hear Mr. Kerry speak of them harshly.<sup><small>1</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">On the minus side for Bush, his ads to date have been rather inept and have drawn criticism for trading on 9-11. Two of the ads have a defensive tone; as Ms. Dowd put it, "Mr. Bush's subtext is clear: If it weren't for all these awful things that happened, most of them hangovers from the Clinton era, I definitely could have fulfilled all my promises." Actually, he's tried to have it both ways, also claiming that he's done good things, in some cases things everyone knows he hasn't done, such as creating jobs or reducing the cost of health care.<br /></p><p align="justify">Each of the ads produced by the re-election campaign begins or ends with Mr. Bush reciting that it has his approval. The administration is more flexible. Not content with merely spending public money to promote the Medicare/drug company bill, it now has attempted to disguise the propaganda by presenting it as news and enlisting local stations to aid in the deception.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">In one script, the administration suggests that anchors use this language: "In December, President Bush signed into law the first-ever prescription drug benefit for people with Medicare. Since then, there have been a lot of questions about how the law will help older Americans and people with disabilities. Reporter Karen Ryan helps sort through the details." The "reporter" then explains the benefits of the new law.<sup><small>2</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">She signs off, "In Washington, I'm Karen Ryan reporting." However "Karen Ryan" is an actor. This is pure Karl Rove: we can claim anything we want any way we want because no one will call us on it. He may be wrong this time.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Vice President Cheney has been absent from the ads thus far. We can sympathize; who would want to remind people of that embarrassment? However, he's half of the ticket, and at some point the strategists will have to decide what to do with the mentor/millstone.<br /></p><p align="justify"><i>The Washington Post</i> reported Sunday that "The White House will mark this Friday's first anniversary of the invasion of Iraq with a week-long media blitz arguing that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was essential to combating global terrorism and making the United States safer." However, not all events are cooperating. The terrorist attack in Madrid caused a popular uprising against the Spanish government, which had supported the invasion of Iraq. The possibility that the attack was in retaliation for that stand was enough to turn the election. Bush has lost an ally and has been given a pointed reminder of what the world thinks of his adventure. No amount of spin will change the fact that Spanish voters think that invading Iraq has made then less safe.<br /></p><p align="justify">The beginning of the administration's crass anniversary week performance was marked by the death of six more soldiers last weekend, nine in less than a week, bringing the total to 564, of whom 425 have died since Bush took his victory lap. In addition, six American civilians were killed in Iraq in the past week.<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The New York Times,</i> 3/14/04.<br />2. <i>The New York Times,</i> 3/15/04.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>March 23, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Justice Scalia denied the Sierra Club's motion asking that he recuse himself from the energy-committee records case, <i>Cheney v. U.S. District Court</i>. Rather than leaving it at that, he chose to issue a memorandum attempting to justify his decision. To some degree he succeeded, by clarifying certain facts and thereby showing his actions to be less blatantly inappropriate than they were made to appear in news reports, editorials and cartoons. He offered arguments which may support his decision, if one adopts his version of the facts, including his lack of bias. He did not rehabilitate his reputation, because it is beyond help.<br /></p><p align="justify">A statute sets out the tests for recusal. One section states a general rule: "Any justice... of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."<sup><small>1</small></sup> Scalia's memorandum and his earlier informal responses quote or paraphrase this test. In the memorandum, he offers an argument which relies in part on social contacts by judges in the past to show that the Louisiana trip is not disqualifying. He concedes that, if Cheney were "sued personally," their friendship would require recusal. However, here Cheney is a mere nominal party: the action really is against the federal government.<br /></p><p align="justify">Whether the historical review proves anything is questionable. The nominal-party argument is somewhat disingenuous, as is his claim that Cheney's integrity and reputation could not be affected by this litigation. However, on pragmatic grounds, the personal-official distinction may be defensible; as Scalia says, any other interpretation would result in mass recusals because many judges have social contact with people in the administration, and government officials often are named as parties where only official action is at issue.<br /></p><p align="justify">Another section of the statute lists situations which mandate recusal; the only one which could apply provides that the judge shall "disqualify himself in the following circumstances: "(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,..."<sup><small>2</small></sup> Scalia did not discuss this provision, but it is fair to say that he provided an answer, the first part of which is the status of Cheney as a nominal party with no personal interest. The second part is his statement that he is not biased, or as he puts it, he will rule impartially. That cannot be accepted.<br /></p><p align="justify">The memorandum includes an statement which might suggest bias toward the petitioner, i.e., Cheney. He argues that it would be unfair to recuse because it would make it harder for the petitioner (the appellant, the one seeking reversal) to win:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...Moreover, granting the motion is (insofar as the outcome of the particular case is concerned) effectively the same as casting a vote against the petitioner. The petitioner needs five votes to overturn the judgment below, and it makes no difference whether the needed fifth vote is missing because it has been cast for the other side, or because it has not been cast at all.<sup><small>3 </small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">This is offered as part of a more general discussion rejecting the Sierra Club's argument that he should resolve all doubts in favor of recusal, and it could be read as a generic comment, not referring specifically to the <i>Cheney</i> case. However, the fact that he has chosen to rest his argument in part on the effect on one of the parties seems odd to me. Does this result-oriented analysis indicate bias? Would he evaluate the recusal issue differently if Cheney were the respondent? If we were to interpret his comment as referring to this appeal and this petitioner, it would bear a marked resemblance to his position in <i>Bush v. Gore.</i> In any case, his performance there has determined the question of bias.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">In December, 2000, Bush and Cheney applied to the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of proceedings then pending in Florida. The Court granted the stay, halting the Florida recount. In an opinion explaining his vote in favor of the stay, Scalia offered this rationale (referring to Bush as if he were the sole petitioner):<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The counting of votes that are of questionable legality does in my view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner, and to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election.<sup><small>4</small> </sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">That is, counting the votes might show that Bush and Cheney didn't win, which would cast a cloud on the legitimacy of their claim that they did; freeing them from such a cloud is more important than determining who won; the legitimacy of their election isn't an issue. That formula is as clear a statement of bias in favor of Mr. Cheney as anyone could imagine. Any doubt that this was step one toward handing the election to Bush and Cheney was removed by another passage in the same opinion:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">I will not address the merits of the case, since they will shortly be before us in the petition for certiorari that we have granted. It suffices to say that the issuance of the stay suggests that a majority of the Court, while not deciding the issues presented, believe that the petitioner has a substantial probability of success.<sup><small>5</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">As for the merits, it suffices to say that, although no briefs or argument have been presented, the petitioner is going to win.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Therefore, although Scalia is a bit dense as to the perception of bias, he is right, ironically, in maintaining that his impartiality should not be determined by the recent trip to Louisiana. From the time the stay was issued in <i>Bush v. Gore</i> he had no possible claim to impartiality, and palling around with Cheney or remaining socially remote won't change that.<br /></p><p align="justify">Justice Scalia's bias may lead him to hold for Mr. Cheney in the pending case. He may overcompensate and hold against. He may be capable of truly independent adjudication. The point is that we can't know whether the last is true; he and his colleagues engaged in an act of partisanship in <i>Bush v. Gore</i> which taints everything that follows. Regardless of outcome, no decision by the Court during Bush's tenure will have clear legitimacy.<br />_________________<br /><br /><small>1. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).<br />2. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).<br />3. Memorandum p. 4, <i>Cheney v. District Court,</i> 541 U.S. ___, (3/18/04).<br />4. <i>Bush v. Gore,</i> 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000). The concern about ballots "of questionable legality" was an argumentative device, and it was replaced in the opinion on the merits, 531 U.S. 98, with the more manipulable notion that different interpretive standards from county to county raised an equal protection question, a theory which was so far-reaching that the Court was forced to say that its reasoning applied only to that case.<br />5. 531 U.S. 1046.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>March 26, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">President Bush no doubt had planned to mark the first anniversary of the invasion of Iraq with some sort of celebration. It wouldn't have been as shallow, false and blatantly political as the carrier-deck strut last year, but no doubt he wanted it to be upbeat. We had been told that removing Saddam Hussein from power had made America and the world safer. Then Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, and that further increased our safety. Despite the terrorist alerts which followed, Mr. Bush continued to make that claim in January and February. It's likely that the anniversary theme would have been something along that line.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, at some point, events in the real world force a change of emphasis. Mr. Bush's anniversary party was marred by the terrorist attack in Madrid on March 11. On March 16, Paul Wolfowitz started down the road to restatement by fudging the formula into the future tense: referring to the occupation of Iraq, he said, "It's going to make our country safer, it's going to make the world safer,..."<sup><small>1 </small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">In his anniversary address on March 19,<sup><small>2</small></sup> Mr. Bush abandoned the formula altogether and retreated to the mantras of his baffled response to the resistance in Iraq. "We will never bow to the violence of a few." "Any sign of weakness or retreat simply validates terrorist violence, and invites more violence for all nations." That implicitly recognizes the absence of safety, but it's a long way from admitting that our policies contribute to it.<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. www.defensewlink.mil/transcripts.<br />2. www.whitehouse.gov.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>April 2, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">In his column in Wednesday's <i>P-I,</i> Joel Connelly quoted a prediction by Mary Matalin that the President would be reelected because millions of Americans like him "and sense an authenticity about the man." If authenticity means acting in office as one did on the campaign trail, Bush flunked the test early and often: the humble, moderate uniter became the arrogant, ideological divider. If it refers to matters of appearance and reality in personality and character - he is what he tells you he is - she's no nearer the truth.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush recently appeared at the Houston Livestock Show. In a moment of candor, he admitted to being a "windshield cowboy," meaning that he wanders around his ranch in a pickup, not on a horse. Apparently he doesn't ever ride, so any horses on the place are for decoration. Not only is the cowboy a fake, so is the ranch. It is a made-for-politics backdrop (or "stage set" as Paul Krugman put it), purchased in 1999; the present house was built in 2000.<br /></p><p align="justify">"Windshield cowboy" captures the phoniness not only of his Texas-rancher pose but of much of his public persona. Consider these roles:<br /></p><p align="justify"><u>Ordinary guy</u>. The boots and jeans are part of an act in which Mr. Bush pretends to be just a reg'lar fella, someone you can relate to, not one of the eastern elite like, say, John Kerry. George W. Bush has succeeded in obscuring his Andover-Yale-Harvard background because none of that elite education appears to have rubbed off on him. However, he is no more an ordinary guy than he is a rancher; underneath the pose, he's still an Andover cheer-leader, palling around with the other rich kids.<br /></p><p align="justify"><u>Populist</u>. This is the application of the man-of-the-people act to policy: George Bush cares about ordinary folks and is doing everything he can for them. This theme goes back to the 2000 campaign, during which he told us repeatedly that he trusts the people. For example, he trusts them to invest for their own retirement, so he wants to modify Social Security in a way which will allow that and, by the way, will destroy the system. More recently, his concern for seniors struggling to pay for drugs led to a plan which bars Medicare from negotiating lower prices, but will fatten the profits of drug companies and HMOs, while running up the debt, thereby further threatening Social Security. He is so concerned about single moms and small businesses that he wants to cut their taxes: it's your money and you should keep it; well, you should if you're in a Bush-contributor bracket. He worries about people looking for work and has expressed concern for those suffering the hardships of poverty or unemployment, but supports shipping jobs overseas and refuses to extend unemployment benefits.<br /></p><p align="justify">George W. Bush has validated the (formerly Republican) joke: "I'm from the government and I'm here to help you."<br /></p><p align="justify"><u>Entrepreneur</u>. Mr. Bush is fond of telling us about his business background and his experience as an executive. In fact, his business experience consists of using family connections and insider knowledge to roll one losing venture into another, leading to his sweetheart deal in the Texas Rangers, which made him wealthy. The only plus on his resume is his surname.<br /></p><p align="justify"><u>Warrior</u>. Forget the National Guard issue and look only at George Bush the president as warrior king. The carrier-deck landing to provide a military setting for the announcement of victory in Iraq exemplifies the phoniness. His strut across the deck in a borrowed flight suit was the low point in this charade. A Tom Toles cartoon published at the time Wesley Clark announced his candidacy captured the pose. Under a banner reading "Tonight's Debate: Clark-Bush," the general stands in uniform while Bush struggles into a flight suit taken from a trunk labeled "Dress-up Box."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush continues the play-acting by donning a military jacket whenever he visits the troops, attempting to identify himself with them; he told an Air National Guard Unit, "You not only have a former Guardsman in the White House, you have a friend."<sup><small>2</small></sup> However his only interest in the troops is to use them as extras in the story of his life. We are reminded to support the troops, but the President has given himself an exemption from such duty. He or his administration have proposed cuts or opposed increases in benefits, including pay, tax credits, housing allowances and medical care. They have failed provide the troops in Iraq with sufficient body armor, forcing some of them to buy their own, and have opposed an attempt by troops tortured by Iraq during the first Gulf War to obtain payment of their damages from impounded Iraqi assets. V.A. medical centers were told not to publicize available benefits, hoping that veterans wouldn't learn of them.<br /></p><p align="justify"><u>Protector of national security</u>. More than any other, this role defines the Bush presidency and, for current political purposes, the man. "I will defend America, whatever it takes" is a typical boast. To some degree the falsity here is less intrinsic; Mr. Bush undoubtedly wants to protect the country from attack. In numerous ways, his policies work against those goals, but they do not reflect on his sincerity as to national security. In other ways, however, character is an issue.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush has decided that his response to 9-11 must define him and his presidency. That's fair enough, but appropriating a national tragedy for political purposes carries with it an obligation to be honest about the response and about our state of preparedness. From the beginning, from September 11, 2001, Mr. Bush has offered a false portrayal of his role. His version of what he did that day is at variance with the facts, which leave the impression of disinterest, confusion and indecisiveness. He opposed investigation of the background to the attacks and has obstructed the 9-11 commission at every turn, making concessions only when forced to do so by bad publicity. The reason for the opposition is clear enough: terrorism was not, as Richard Clarke put it, "an urgent issue" for this administration before 9-11. And Mr. Bush's record since then does not match his rhetoric. He opposed a Department of Homeland Security and now claims it as an achievement; he uses pictures of firefighters to burnish his image but, a year after the attacks, tried to hold up funds allocated to providing them with better equipment. Instead of concentrating on al-Qaeda, he diverted resources to Iraq, pretending that, in doing so, he was somehow fighting terrorism, but instead demonstrating that terrorism remained a secondary issue even after 9-11.<br /></p><p align="justify">Iraq was declared to be a menace in order to justify an invasion desired for other reasons. All of the lies and distortions employed to gain Congressional approval and public support are well known. The point here is that Mr. Bush sold himself as our protector not only against terrorism, but against Iraq, based on tales about WMD, fantasies about unmanned planes and hysterical images of mushroom clouds. In this case, he is a protector who has saved us from a nonexistent threat.<br /></p><p align="justify"><u>Model for personal responsibility</u>. Mr. Bush has advocated greater personal responsibility; he claims to stand for "a culture of responsibility" and "a new responsibility society." On numerous occasions, he has urged others to show responsibility; one example was his response two years ago to the corporate scandals, but the standards he demanded were notably different from those he adhered to in his Harken Energy days.<sup><small>4</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">He frequently refers to his "responsibilities;" however, all such references are merely another way of announcing his intentions, for example his responsibility to "defend America" or "to make sure the judicial system runs well." These are easily translated "we're going to do it my way."<br /></p><p align="justify">One aspect of personal responsibility notably absent is admission of error or failure. The vicious attacks on Richard Clarke were prompted in part by Mr. Clarke's willingness to accept some blame for 9-11, creating an unfavorable comparison to the champion of responsibility.<br /></p><p align="justify"><u>President</u>. To no small degree, Mr. Bush is play-acting as president. His principal public role is to attend fund-raisers and to visit military installations. His speeches could be read by someone else, often more persuasively. On the few occasions when he has been allowed to be interviewed or questioned by reporters, he has revealed the extent to which the job is beyond him; he falls back on catch-phases, often mangled or misapplied. His pathetic performance in the Meet the Press interview has resulted in his agreeing to be interviewed by the 9-11 commission only if Uncle Dick is there to coach him. The insider accounts to date verify the impression of one little interested in policy and easily influenced. By his own admission, he is dependent on his staff for information about the outside world.<br /></p><p align="justify">Many people do seem to accept the version of Mr. Bush that Ms. Matalin offers, but the image of a ordinary guy turned decisive, bold, caring leader is pure hokum, something she and her fellow spinners have created. It's difficult to resist the joke about another form of advertising: he isn't a president; he just plays one on television.<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The Washington Post</i>, 9/18/03.<br />2. <i>Army Times,</i> 11/10/03, reproduced on Truthout.com<br />3. An <a href="http://slate.msn.com/?id=2067870">article </a>in <i>Slate</i> sets out the contrast.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>April 9, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">In the course of a column pointing out the administration's distance from reality, TomDispatch.com informed us yesterday that the April 7 "Fact of the Day" on the White House web site was "Iraqis Reject Violence." The detachment continues; yesterday and today the Fact of the Day was "Iraq took an important step this week by establishing three national security agencies." Both are, to put it mildly, ironic since security is exactly what Iraq doesn't have and violence is.<br /></p><p align="justify">It certainly is too much to expect the administration to admit that Iraq is a war zone, that chaos is near, but it was a bit much to bleat about security agencies created by a puppet government while American forces were being killed at the highest rate since the invasion, higher than that during the formal war.<sup> <small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">However, reality is no more evident on the WH site than honesty is in its public statements: the "Renewal in Iraq" page still features a picture of happy children and still has a section entitled "100 Days of Progress in Iraq" which ends on August 8, 2003, 100 days after the flight-suit victory strut.<br />_____________________<br /><br /><small>1. April 1-8, 2004, 5.75 military fatalities per day; March 19-31, 2003, 5.41.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>April 16, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">After his embarrassing performance on "Meet the Press," Peggy Noonan suggested that President Bush stick to formal speeches. He followed that suggestion in part in his "press conference" on Tuesday, by opening with a quarter-hour prepared statement on Iraq which, if one ignored content, was impressive. He was forceful, and read the speech well. Then came the question and answer session, which negatively validated Ms. Noonan's advice. On his own, Mr. Bush is a misprogrammed robot: each question prompts a string of memorized phrases having little relationship to each other or to the question. Often it required close attention to extract or infer an answer. The impression of command which might have been received from the set speech was entirely negated by his bumbling, meandering non-answers, and examination of the content of both parts raises serious questions about his policies.<br /></p><p align="justify">Let's consider what the President said<sup><small>1</small></sup>, first in his formal remarks.<br /></p><p align="justify">According to his generals, we face three opposition groups in Iraq. The one in Fallujah consists of "remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime, along with Islamic militants; in the south, it is a militia assembled by al Sadr. The third is made up of "terrorists from other countries" who have "infiltrated Iraq to incite and organize attacks." The description of the third group appears to say, as have nearly all reports, that foreign terrorists have come in following the occupation, which stands in contrast to Mr. Bush's claim that Iraq was a haven for them under Saddam.<br /></p><p align="justify">These various groups "want to run us out of Iraq and destroy the democratic hopes of the Iraqi people. The violence we have seen is a power grab by these extreme and ruthless elements." By all accounts the majority of the attackers are Iraqis; does their desire to run an occupying force out of Iraq seem odd to him? Was our invasion not a power grab? If there are legitimate arguments for what we're up to, his speechwriters should state them, not rely on platitudes which add to the impression that he's dense. Do the attackers want to forestall democracy? That may be so, but is there any evidence or is that simply a slogan?<br /></p><p align="justify">Iraqis "want strong protections for individual rights; they want their independence; and they want their freedom." Does the occupation not contradict the last two? Perhaps the solution is in our plan to turn over "sovereignty."<br /></p><p align="justify">The President attempted to address the issue of an exit strategy, although disguising it as the accomplishment of our goal, "the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people." He reiterated that there is a deadline of June 30th for that transfer, and indicated that the date will not be changed. "It is important that we meet that deadline. As a proud and independent people, Iraqis do not support an indefinite occupation -- and neither does America." The last two statements are true, and transfer as soon as possible obviously serves those ends. One problem, which became clear in response to a question, is that we don't even know who will be the recipient of the transfer, let alone whether it will be stable, effective or legitimate.<br /></p><p align="justify">In addition, there are two anomalies in the plan. First, although we will be transferring "sovereignty" to some Iraqi body, we have set out a program which will extend beyond the transfer date.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">On June 30th,... the transitional administrative law, including a bill of rights that is unprecedented in the Arab world, will take full effect.... Iraq will hold elections for a national assembly no later than next January. That assembly will draft a new, permanent constitution which will be presented to the Iraqi people in a national referendum held in October of next year. Iraqis will then elect a permanent government by December 15, 2005....</p></blockquote><div align="justify">If we let go on June 30, how can he assure us that these steps will take place? If, as the U.N. envoy has recommended, the Governing Council is replaced by another body, how can Mr. Bush even guess at the outcome? Is the transfer of sovereignty a fraud?<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The other anomaly might lead one to think so. Even though Iraq will commence self-rule on June 30, the President expects to have troops there long afterward.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">As we've made clear all along, our commitment to the success and security of Iraq will not end on June 30th. On July 1st, and beyond,... our military commitment will continue. Having helped Iraqis establish a new government, coalition military forces will help Iraqis to protect their government from external aggression and internal subversion.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">What if the new government doesn't want American troops or troops under American command, or wants fewer? Who decides? If we do, sovereignty is a joke, but there is nothing in any speech or other official discussion that I've found which implies anything but continuing American control of military forces. The President might reverse course yet again and agree to greater involvement by the U.N. or NATO, but forces under those commands still would render "sovereignty" largely meaningless.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The President needs public support for "staying the course" despite sharply escalating losses. The purpose of the exit strategy is to create the appearance of progress, and thereby to provide one prop for that support. For that reason, he can't admit that the transfer is merely symbolic, and that little will change on July 1.<br /></p><p align="justify">The other prop for his policy is the argument that it is necessary to our safety. He addressed this in summary form early in his speech: "Iraq will either be a peaceful, democratic country, or it will again be a source of violence, a haven for terror, and a threat to America and to the world. By helping to secure a free Iraq, Americans serving in that country are protecting their fellow citizens." Public support for our involvement in Iraq depends heavily on believing the last proposition. What is the evidence for it? It isn't something to be taken on faith; the administration also argued that Iraq under Saddam was an urgent threat to us. Later in his speech, Mr. Bush attempted to provide the evidence, but that turned out to be another back-door argument that Iraq is connected to 9-11.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Above all, the defeat of violence and terror in Iraq is vital to the defeat of violence and terror elsewhere; and vital, therefore, to the safety of the American people....<br /></p><p align="justify">The violence we are seeing in Iraq is familiar. The terrorist who takes hostages, or plants a roadside bomb near Baghdad is serving the same ideology of murder that kills innocent people on trains in Madrid, and murders children on buses in Jerusalem, and blows up a nightclub in Bali, and cuts the throat of a young reporter for being a Jew.<br /></p><p align="justify">We've seen the same ideology of murder... in the merciless horror inflicted upon thousands of innocent men and women and children on September the 11th, 2001.<br /></p><p align="justify">...The servants of this ideology seek tyranny in the Middle East and beyond.... They seek to intimidate America into panic and retreat, and to set free nations against each other. And they seek weapons of mass destruction, to blackmail and murder on a massive scale.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">There we have today's version of the formula: the violence in Iraq involves the same ideology of murder (hint: the same organization) which struck us on September 11, 2001; its servants seek WMD (hint: Saddam).<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Even if this were factual, even if the opposition in Iraq were made up entirely of al Qaeda, where would this logic lead? Would we defeat the world-wide terrorist movement by killing off or driving out its Iraqi cell? Of course not. We might weaken it, but I don't expect to hear that modification; "let's fight on and sustain more casualties in order to weaken al Qaeda" wouldn't sound convincing. Therefore Mr. Bush will continue to talk about victory while dropping his hints about connections to 9-11 so that we believe that we are taking revenge as well as preventing another attack.<br /></p><p align="justify">There is an alternative form of the second prop, essentially a fallback rationale, which requires treating the opposition as terrorists but not necessarily as al Qaeda: to withdraw would encourage more terrorism. "Over the last several decades, we've seen that any concession or retreat on our part will only embolden this enemy and invite more bloodshed." There probably are events which support this thesis, but the attack in Madrid could be read as teaching an entirely different lesson. "And the enemy has seen, over the last 31 months, that we will no longer live in denial or seek to appease them." Living in denial is a good description of the administration's attitude toward the quagmire in Iraq.<br /></p><p align="justify">The question period was three-quarters of an hour of evasion, confusion and dissembling which can be appreciated fully only by reading the entire transcript or, better, seeing a video. Let's look at a few of the questions and answers; they are out of order so that related issues can be discussed together.<br /></p><p align="justify">Q. "Mr. President, April is turning into the deadliest month in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad, and some people are comparing Iraq to Vietnam and talking about a quagmire.... [H]ow do you answer the Vietnam comparison?"<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush replied that the analogy is false, which certainly is a legitimate view, but added, "I also happen to think that analogy sends the wrong message to our troops, and sends the wrong message to the enemy." Here is a failed program's last line of defense: criticism is disloyal. The question also referred to polls showing that support for the war is declining. Mr. Bush repeated his disdain for polls: "And as to whether or not I make decisions based upon polls, I don't. I just don't make decisions that way." More on this later.<br /></p><p align="justify">Q. "What's your best prediction on how long U.S. troops will have to be in Iraq? And it sounds like you will have to add some troops; is that a fair assessment?"<br /></p><p align="justify">As to numbers, he said, "Well, I -- first of all, that's up to General Abizaid, and he's clearly indicating that he may want more troops. It's coming up through the chain of command. If that's what he wants, that's what he gets." Since he knows of the request, the conditional nature of the answer is odd. So is the off-hand assurance that we'll supply however many we need, given that our reserves are stretched to the breaking point now. As to duration, we got another slogan: "as long as necessary, and not one day more."<br /></p><p align="justify">The basis for our continued presence remained an assumption: "Once we transfer sovereignty, we'll enter into a security agreement with the government to which we pass sovereignty, the entity to which we pass sovereignty." The vagueness as to that entity came out in another exchange.<br /></p><p align="justify">Q "... Mr. President, who will you be handing the Iraqi government over to on June 30th?"<br /></p><p align="justify">He answered, referring to the U.N. envoy: "We will find that out soon. That's what Mr. Brahimi is doing; he's figuring out the nature of the entity we'll be handing sovereignty over [to]." This is bizarre; he has set a nonnegotiable deadline for transferring an illusory sovereignty to an entity to be named later.<br /></p><p align="justify">The same question asked why he and Cheney insist on appearing together before the 9-11 commission. He ducked that, prompting the reporter to try again, which drew a brushoff. Q. "I was asking why you're appearing together, rather than separately, which was their request." A. "Because it's a good chance for both of us to answer questions that the 9/11 Commission is looking forward to asking us...."<br /></p><p align="justify">There were several questions which asked about possible mistakes.<br /></p><p align="justify">Q. "Mr. President, before the war, you and members of your administration made several claims about Iraq[,] that U.S. troops would be greeted as liberators with sweets and flowers, that Iraqi oil revenue would pay for most of the reconstruction; and that Iraq not only had weapons of mass destruction, but as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, we know where they are. How do you explain to Americans how you got that so wrong? And how do you answer your opponents, who say that you took this nation to war on the basis of what have turned out to be a series a false premises?"<br /></p><p align="justify">There wasn't anything resembling an answer to this. Mr. Bush told us that he had thought Saddam was a threat to us; that (echoing Tony Blair), once we had threatened military action, we had to carry through for the sake of credibility; that the U.N. had to maintain its credibility (so, apparently, we had to wage war in its name); that "we needed to work with people" (?); that Saddam refused to disarm (how one disarms if not armed was not made clear); that the new weapons inspector thinks that Saddam had been devious; that oil revenues are larger than Mr. Bush expected (which is strange, as they are smaller than the administration's published pre-war estimates); and that Saddam was a torturer.<br /></p><p align="justify">Four of those questions asked, in effect, for an apology.<br /></p><p align="justify">Q. "Do you feel a sense of personal responsibility for September 11th? "<br /></p><p align="justify">In the midst of a ramble, he said this, which is as close as he came to an apology or an admission of responsibility: "There are some things I wish we'd have done when I look back. I mean, hindsight is easy."<br /></p><p align="justify">Q "...Two weeks ago,...Richard Clarke, offered an unequivocal apology to the American people for failing them prior to 9/11. Do you believe the American people deserve a similar apology from you, and would you be prepared to give them one?"<br /></p><p align="justify">Well, no. "Here's what I feel about that. The person responsible for the attacks was Osama bin Laden. That's who's responsible for killing Americans."<br /></p><p align="justify">Q "...One of the biggest criticisms of you is that whether it's WMD in Iraq, postwar planning in Iraq, or even the question of whether this administration did enough to ward off 9/11, you never admit a mistake. Is that a fair criticism? And do you believe there were any errors in judgment that you made related to any of those topics I brought up?"<br /></p><p align="justify">The closest Mr. Bush came to even discussing the subject was this excuse: "nobody in our government, at least, and I don't think the prior government, could envision flying airplanes into buildings on such a massive scale." Is the 9-11 evasion now down to the "massive scale?" Certainly Mr. Bush can't claim that no one thought of aircraft as missiles, as a rumor surfaced in June, 2001 of such a plot to attack a conference he attended in Genoa in July; in response, the Italian government closed the airspace above Genoa and installed anti-aircraft batteries. In fact, in answer to another question, which dealt with the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing, Mr. Bush referred to that episode: "I asked for the briefing. And the reason I did is because there had been a lot of threat intelligence from overseas. And so - part of it had to do with Genoa, the G8 conference that I was going to attend."<br /></p><p align="justify">Q "...In the last campaign, you were asked a question about the biggest mistake you'd made in your life, and you used to like to joke that it was trading Sammy Sosa.... After 9/11, what would your biggest mistake be, would you say, and what lessons have you learned from it?"<br /></p><p align="justify">This one really has to be seen; the inanity of the response doesn't fully come through on the page.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">I wish you would have given me this written question ahead of time, so I could plan for it.... I'm sure historians will look back and say, gosh, he could have done it better this way, or that way. You know, I just -- I'm sure something will pop into my head here in the midst of this press conference, with all the pressure of trying to come up with an answer, but it hadn't [sic] yet."</p></blockquote><div align="justify">He then began to babble about weapons and nearly made an important concession, only realizing as he said it how damaging it would be: "Even knowing what I know today about the stockpiles of weapons, I still would have called upon the world to deal with Saddam Hussein. [Oops!] See, I happen to believe that we'll find out the truth on the weapons." Close; maybe no one will notice. After talking about weapons that might be found, he summarized his self-appraisal:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">I hope I -- I don't want to sound like I've made no mistakes. I'm confident I have. I just haven't -- you just put me under the spot here, and maybe I'm not as quick on my feet as I should be in coming up with one.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">There has been speculation as to the origin of Mr. Bush's inability to admit a mistake. Whatever psychological reasons there may be, his strange performance here is a result of tactics combined with his obvious inability to deal with even slight deviations from script. An article in The New York Times yesterday revealed that the White House strategy was: no apologies. "In fact, his advisers said Wednesday that there was near unanimity in the White House, starting with Mr. Bush himself, that the last thing he should do in his first prime time news conference since the Iraq war was to show any sign of remorse." This may proceed less from calm political calculation than from hubris:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">One of his senior advisers broke out laughing Wednesday as he recalled the persistence of reporters pressing Mr. Bush on the subject of remorse, suggesting that contrition would have been a sign of weakness that was both alien to Mr. Bush and more typically found in the corridors of the Democratic Party. "We must return to the days of Jimmy Carter!" the aide said in a sarcastic invocation of a Democratic president that Republicans have long sought to equate with presidential weakness. "We must have malaise! We must have a weak president! We must have a morose Kerrylike apology!"</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Perfect. Go with that strategy! Be sure to mention it if you meet with the families of the 9-11 victims.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Oh, and as to Mr. Bush's refusal to make decisions by poll, "One adviser said the White House had examined polling and focus group studies in determining that it would be a mistake for Mr. Bush to appear to yield."<sup><small>2 </small></sup><br />_________________<br /><br /><small>1. Transcript, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases, 4/14/04.<br />2. Adam Nagourney, "Bush takes strategic no-remorse stance." The article also ran in yesterday's <i>Seattle Post-Iintelligencer</i></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>April 20, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">One of the President's faithful supporters on Iraq has admitted that he misjudged events there. In his column in Saturday's <i>New York Times,</i> David Brooks acknowledged that he had badly underestimated the difficulties we would face. He wasn't duped by the cakewalk scenario, but he didn't expect that, a year after invasion, we would be fighting an urban war.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Most of all, I misunderstood how normal Iraqis would react to our occupation. I knew they'd resent us. But I thought they would see that our interests and their interests are aligned. We both want to establish democracy and get the U.S. out. I did not appreciate how our very presence in Iraq would overshadow democratization.</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Mr. Brooks' pre-war statements indicate that he thought that the threat of WMD necessitated the invasion, but that liberation and democratization also justified it. Apparently he didn't believe that we invaded Iraq to bring democracy to the Iraqis, as he criticized Mr. Bush for not making that case. He seems to be an adjunct member of the group for which Thomas Friedman has been the leading spokesman, those who expect that a positive transformation of Iraqi society will follow an invasion undertaken for different reasons.<br /></p><p align="justify">Or perhaps Mr. Brooks thinks that the administration has changed its goal, and not merely its rhetoric, that the course we are staying really is the effort to bring democracy to Iraq. Whatever the source, the illusion is there: "Despite all that's happened, I was still stirred by yesterday's Bush/Blair statements about democracy in the Middle East." Those statements<sup><small>1</small></sup> were the same pious slogans we've heard many times. President Bush's commitment to democracy in the Middle East, and his effectiveness in bringing peace, can be measured by his abandoning any pretense of neutrality in Palestine and approving Prime Minister Sharon's plan, which Sharon celebrated with another assassination. The most that can be said for the supposed Bush-Blair vision for Iraq is that they recognize that it would be better to leave Iraq with a stable, moderate government; the rest is just filler.<br /></p><p align="justify">A commitment to democracy is not the only characteristic which Mr. Brooks projects onto our leader; "To his enormous credit, the president has been ruthlessly flexible over the past months and absolutely committed to seeing this through." I'm not sure what ruthless flexibility is, but what we've seen is a series of vows not to change followed by changes forced by political pressure. Last year Mr. Brooks had a somewhat less complimentary view of flexibility; then he complained that the Bush administration "has the most infuriating way of changing its mind." It never admits that it makes mistakes, listens to critics or changes course, while doing just that. He found the President's September 7 speech on Iraq to be an example: "The policy ideas Bush sketched out represent such a striking series of policy shifts they amount to a virtual relaunching of the efforts to rebuild Iraq. Yet the president unveiled them as if they were stately extensions of the policies that commenced on Sept. 11, 2001." However the adjustments are described, I fail to see any credit due for a program so flawed that it requires constant retooling and a policy of pretending that no mistakes were made.<br /></p><p align="justify">In a way it isn't fair to pick on Brooks, as he's had the character to admit error, in contrast to the President and his National Security Advisor. However, in other ways, he deserves it. He hasn't gone far enough in his reappraisal; he's only at the level of tactics: "The failure to establish order was the prime mistake, from which all other problems flow." No; the mistake, from which all the rest flows, was invading, but Mr. Brooks is not about to admit that. "We hawks were wrong about many things. But in opening up the possibility for a slow trudge toward democracy, we were still right about the big thing." Mr. Brooks not only was wrong about that, he was, so to speak, wrong at the top of his voice. His arguments for the war were smug, pompous and arrogant. They were, intentionally or not, part of the administration's drive to bully the American people and the Congress into supporting a war without giving the issue the thought it required. Some examples:<br /></p><p align="justify">A Congressional debate on the war was "a terrible idea." In Mr. Brooks' view, we were confronted with a "stark truth," that Saddam Hussein wanted to "get nuclear weapons in order to dominate his region and murder his enemies." That formulation implicitly conceded the lack of evidence of actual WMD, which would seem to suggest a factual issue for debate, to say nothing of questions of principle, international law and collateral effects. Not so: Congressional hearings won't enlighten us; "On the contrary they fog the minds of all who hear them."<sup><small>2</small></sup> This is straight out of the administration playbook: get the war under way before anyone catches on.<br /></p><p align="justify">He relented long enough to say a few good things about the speech by Senator Kennedy. However, it was flawed because it had "the tone of lack of compassion.... A tone of almost meanness, that we are going to sit here in a gated community while the tide of despotism spreads across the Middle East and we are not going to do anything about it."<sup><small>3</small></sup> If you don't agree that we should invade Iraq, then you are an elitist, a "peacenik," and callous about the oppression of its people.<br /></p><p align="justify">But weren't there other issues? The matter wasn't that simple, was it? Apparently so; you see, those in "the peace camp" weren't sincere about their concerns. "Instead of facing the real options, they fill the air with evasions, distractions, and gestures - a miasma of insults and verbiage that distract from the core issue."<sup><small>4</small></sup> He pointed out, accurately enough, that some liberals never moved beyond indecisiveness, but unless one assumes, contrary to fact, that there was an imminent danger (something the administration now claims never even to have mentioned), being hesitant to go to war was not much of a fault. However, Mr. Brooks considered doubt to be a product not of careful thinking but of narcissism. "In certain circles, it is not only important what opinion you hold, but how you hold it. It is important to be seen dancing with complexity, sliding among shades of gray. Any poor rube can come to a simple conclusion--that President Saddam Hussein is a menace who must be disarmed--but the refined ratiocinators want to be seen luxuriating amid the difficulties, donning the jewels of nuance, even to the point of self-paralysis." Real Americans grasp the truth intuitively. The opponents are relativists to whom truth is unimportant; all they care about is style. "And they want to see their leaders paying homage to this style. Accordingly, many Bush critics seem less disturbed by his position than by his inability to adhere to the rules of genteel intellectual manners. They want him to show a little anguish. They want baggy eyes, evidence of sleepless nights, a few photo-ops, Kennedy-style, of the president staring gloomily through the Oval Office windows into the distance."<sup> <small>5</small></sup> Accidentally, in the course of this heavy sarcasm, Mr. Brooks said something significant: thinking people don't trust decisions about war based on the simple conclusions of a poor rube. They would like to believe that someone competent has thought the matter through and, yes, agonized about it.<br /></p><p align="justify">I haven't seen anything by Mr. Brooks about the Vietnam-quagmire parallel, but just before the war he saw Iraq as a way out of the supposed post-Vietnam crisis of confidence: "If the effort to oust Saddam fails, we will be back in the 1970s. We will live in a nation crippled by self-doubt. If we succeed, we will be a nation infused with confidence. We will have done a great thing for the world, and other great things will await."<sup><small>6</small></sup> Feeling down? Launch a war against a weak opponent; results guaranteed.<br /></p><p align="justify">Bush can't be re-elected if the public sees the Iraq fiasco for what it is. To forestall that, he desperately needs to create two illusions: something has been accomplished and we're starting to pull out. Those ideas need to be planted well before the election, ideally before the Democratic convention, so he's adamant about the June 30 date but ready to turn over "sovereignty" to whomever the U.N. picks. Maybe that's what "ruthless flexibility" means: ruthless in achieving the political goal, but flexible as to means and as to theories of why we've done what we've done.<br /></p><p align="justify">Another column in The Times last weekend urged ruthlessness of a different sort. Naill Ferguson returned on Sunday to repeat his advice that the U.S. admit that it's an imperial power and get on with acting like one. He advised us, in looking for precedents, to think about the British in Iraq after World War I, not ourselves in Vietnam. We are experiencing a revolt in Iraq, as did the British. A "revolt against colonial rule is not the same as a war. Vietnam was a war."<br /></p><p align="justify">Most would consider the British experience in Iraq a cautionary tale, but Ferguson would be content to have us learn three lessons from it, two of them dubious. "The first is that this crisis was almost inevitable." Whether or not one accepts Ferguson's somewhat diffuse argument, that conclusion seems a fair one, although not everyone would proceed from there to his second lesson, that revolts must be put down brutally.<br /></p><p align="justify">"Putting this rebellion down will require severity. In 1920, the British eventually ended the rebellion through a combination of aerial bombardment and punitive village-burning expeditions. It was not pretty." He notes that the Brits lost 2,000 men in the action, but apparently that's just part of the deal, along with civilian casualties. "Is the United States willing or able to strike back with comparable ruthlessness?" Probably not, to his dismay.<br /></p><p align="justify">"This could prove a grave error. For the third lesson of 1920 is that only by quelling disorder firmly and immediately will America be able to achieve its objective of an orderly handover of sovereignty." Obviously an orderly transition will be easier if no fighting is going on, but it is absurd to argue that brutal repression is the first step toward handing over sovereignty to a government that we want to be democratic, moderate, and pro-American. Ferguson admits that the sovereignty which the British handed over was illusory and that British troops remained in Iraq until 1955; some model.<br /></p><p align="justify">The administration isn't likely to follow much of Ferguson's advice, including his recommendation that we stop fooling ourselves and admit that "America is in the empire business." However, that is in effect what the neocon vision of Iraq entails and Ferguson may have done a service by pointing out just how bad an idea that is.<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1. See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases, 4/16/04.<br />2. <i>The Weekly Standard,</i> 9/6/02.<br />3. "The News Hour," PBS, 9/27/02.<br />4. <i>The Weekly Standard,</i> 9/30/02.<br />5. <i>The Times</i> (London), 3/7/03.<br />6. <i>The Weekly Standard,</i> 3/17/03.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>April 22, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">On Sunday, <i>The Seattle Times</i> carried a photograph on page 1 showing flag-draped coffins inside a transport plane in Kuwait. That was surprising given the administration's policy against admitting the cost of the war. Today the explanation appeared: the picture was not sanctioned by the government and the photographer, an employee of a contractor, was fired, along with her husband. The Times reported that "Tami Silicio, a Kuwait-based cargo worker...was let go yesterday for violating U.S. government and company regulations."<br /></p><p align="justify">The image of the crusade in Iraq which the administration wants us to absorb is rather different. There are seventy "Photos of Freedom" on the Iraq page of the White House web site. Sixty-eight are upbeat: Iraqis waving, soldiers distributing food or giving candy to children, etc. There are only two that refer even indirectly to the reality of war: each is a picture of a mine, the significance of which is unclear; they were "confiscated somewhere in the North Arabian Sea." Sixty-eight happy scenes, two obscure munitions: war in Bushland.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>April 25, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The administration dropped the other shoe last week and admitted that the "sovereignty" to be transferred to Iraqis on June 30 is something less than that. It has been obvious from the outset that there was a conflict between a transfer of sovereignty and retention of control of the armed forces by the U.S., but the conflict was not often noted. Even now, it seems to be a surprise or an unwelcome admission; Marc Grossman, under secretary of state for political affairs, "referred in testimony on Wednesday to what he said would be 'limited sovereignty,' a phrase he did not repeat on Thursday, apparently because it raised eyebrows among those not expecting the administration to acknowledge that the sovereignty would be less than full-fledged."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">In addition to stating that American forces - and apparently Iraqi forces as well - would remain under American command, Mr. Grossman indicated that the administration does not want the interim government to have the power to enact new laws or change those imposed by the occupation.<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The New York Times,</i> 4/23/04.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b><a id="04/30/04">April 30, 2004</b></a><br /></p><p align="justify">After Representative Jim McDermott, omitted "under God" from the pledge on the House floor - and managed to call attention to the omission by clumsily pausing, as if to ask himself "shall I be provocative and leave it out?" - the "leader" of the House Democrats - does a group in confused flight have a "leader"? - summoned McDermott to her office to deliver a stern lecture on the centrality of the phrase to true Americanism. How pathetic. Congreesman McDermott is repetitively inept and embarrassing, but his version of the pledge conforms to the currently controlling law for schools in his district and may be the version required nationwide if the Supremes affirm the Ninth Circuit. Ms. Pelosi obviously subscribes to the same theory of politics which seems to inform (that's a dumb word, but I need to seem <i>au courant</i>) the Kerry campaign: don't say anything which might be construed as offensive by the most uninformed, hyprersensitive pseudo-patriot.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>May 4, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Among his inventory of reasons for invading Iraq, the President has advanced a righteous argument, removing a despot whose prisoners were subjected to torture and rape. Last May, he boasted that "we are the nation that closed the torture chambers of Iraq." Apparently not.<br /></p><p align="justify">An Army internal investigation by General Antonio Taguba describes the acts of abuse, degradation and torture inflicted on Iraqi prisoners by American guards at Abu Ghraib prison. His report was completed in late February or early March, but no one in authority seemed to be in a hurry to find out what it said until - or even after - "60 Minutes II" broke the story last week. As of Sunday, neither Secretary Rumsfeld nor Chief of Staff General Myers had read it, even though CBS had delayed its broadcast for two weeks at the request of DoD. Now there are reports of other incidents, including homicides.<br /></p><p align="justify">"Civilization is hideously fragile," C.P. Snow wrote; "there’s not much between us and the horrors underneath, just about a coat of varnish." That can't be true of Americans, can it? Aren't we different, exceptional? Mr. Rumsfeld apparently thinks so: he described the acts as "un-American."<br /></p><p align="justify">Sadly, we are capable of inhumane acts, just as other nations are. At the moment, we may be more so. A government which engages in pre-emptive war without justification, which has no regard for civil liberties or international law, which jails and mistreats immigrants simply because they are Arab or Muslim, which holds citizens incommunicado without charge, which designates people as "enemy combatants" more or less by whim, which runs a prison camp in which inmates do not have the rights of prisoners of war, and over which it claims the courts have no jurisdiction, cannot pretend to be shocked by these events. The road from Guantánamo to Abu Ghraib is short and straight.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>May 17, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Whether considered alone or as a metaphor of the entire Iraq adventure, the prisoner-abuse scandal should cause those in charge to reflect, reassess and admit responsibility and error. There has been some of that, but none from the guy at the top.<br /></p><p align="justify">The media's speculation over whether Mr. Bush would apologize was somewhat overdone, but his reaction is telling. Even after others had apologized, and faced with the attention to his failure to do so, the best he could manage was a grudging reference to a private expression of regret to King Hussein, followed by a flag-waving speech:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">I told him I was sorry for the humiliation suffered by the Iraqi prisoners, and the humiliation suffered by their families. I told him I was equally sorry that people who have been seeing those pictures didn't understand the true nature and heart of America.... I also made it clear to His Majesty that the troops we have in Iraq, who are there for security and peace and freedom, are the finest of the fine, fantastic United States citizens, who represent the very best qualities of America: courage, love of freedom, compassion, and decency.<sup><small>1 </small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">The President followed the same line in his radio address two days later:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">In recent days, America and the world have learned of shocking conduct in Iraqi prisons by a small number of American servicemen and women.... Such practices do not reflect our values....<br /></p><div align="justify">***</div><p align="justify">What took place in that Iraqi prison was the wrongdoing of a few....<br /></p><p align="justify">... Our country has sent troops into Iraq to liberate that country, return sovereignty to the Iraqi people, and make America and the world more secure. In this cause, our troops perform a thousand acts of kindness, decency and courage every day....<sup><small>2</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">Leaving aside the filler, the message is that the fault lies entirely with a few low-level troops, an evasion which ought not to be tolerated; the buck should stop at the Oval Office, and not just as a formality.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Mr. Bush claims to stand for "a culture of responsibility." The biographical sketch on the White House web site tells us that, as Governor of Texas, "President Bush... shaped public policy based on the principles of limited government, personal responsibility, strong families, and local control." The Bush approach to the Abu Ghraib scandal is saturated in hypocrisy; the advocate of responsibility does not take any, even though he is the cause of the problem.<br /></p><p align="justify">His administration has instead created a culture of arrogance, extreme measures, indifference to fundamental rights, arbitrariness and contempt for rules. The war is illegitimate, justified neither by international law, the government's own National Security Strategy nor any rational concept of self-defense. It was sold through misrepresentations. If those in charge break rules, if honesty and principle mean nothing to them, how surprising can it be that others act the same way?<br /></p><p align="justify">Among the misrepresentations were the assertion that Iraq was allied with al-Qaeda, and the repeated hint that it was implicated in 9-11. Based on these falsehoods, the administration claims that the occupation is vital to the war on terror. This invites troops to believe that every non-cooperative Iraqi, and certainly every Iraqi prisoner, is a terrorist, and therefore entitled to no mercy. If Senator Inhofe swallows that, guards at Abu Ghraib might.<br /></p><p align="justify">More specifically, there have been numerous signals that there are no restrictions in the treatment of prisoners. The Justice Department detained thousands after 9-11 without charges and without rights, abused some of them and blew off criticism, even from its own inspector general. "Enemy combatants," even if citizens, have been denied access to a lawyer, visitations by family, and communication of any kind with the outside world; there is no independent or public evaluation of conditions or treatment and no limitation on the period of detention. They may be tried before military tribunals, which are not bound by either civilian or military rules of procedure. Suggestions that Geneva conventions apply to the prisoners at Guantánamo, that POW status should be accorded or at least considered, have been dismisses as "international hyperventilation."<br /></p><p align="justify">Whenever the status of prisoners or the designation of "enemy combatants" has come before the courts, the administration has asserted the inherent and unrestricted right of the President to deal with such people free of interference by the judicial branch. This attempt to evade accountability is another signal to those below that there is no oversight, that there are no rules, no restrictions, that anything goes in this crusade.<br /></p><p align="justify">The whole tone of the war on terrorism has been that of vigilante justice. Mr. Bush set it with his faux-cowboy pledge to bring in bin Laden dead or alive. In the 2003 State of the Union address, he told us that many suspected terrorists had been arrested. "And many others have met a different fate. Let's put it this way: They are no longer a problem to the United States and our friends and allies."<sup><small>3 </small></sup>If the President can flippantly refer to assassination and receive applause from Congress, surely a few Iraqis can be pushed around.<br /></p><p align="justify">In addition to the refusal to acknowledge responsibility, the administration's hypocrisy is shown in its pretense that the reports from Abu Ghraib were the first indication of the application of questionable methods. Extreme interrogation practices were reported in <i>The Washington Post</i> on December 26, 2002, <i>The Wall Street Journal</i> on March 4, 2003, <i>The Nation</i> on March 31, 2003 and in the May, 2003 issue of <i>Liberty.</i><sup><small>4</small></sup> The military now acknowledges that "two Iraqi prisoners were killed by U.S. soldiers last year, and 20 other detainee deaths and assaults remain under criminal investigation in Iraq and Afghanistan, part of a total of 35 cases probed since December 2002...."<sup> <small>5</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The use of those methods was no accident. Cofer Black, the head of the CIA Counterterrorist Center, referring to the treatment of suspected terrorists, told a Congressional committee "This is a very highly classified area, but I have to say that all you need to know: There was a before 9/11, and there was an after 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off."<sup><small>6</small></sup> The head of interrogation at Guantánamo, General Miller, was sent to Abu Ghraib in August, 2003; he recommended that detention operations must act as an "enabler for interrogation." <sup><small>7</small></sup> Recent news reports describe instructions for interrogation at Guantánamo which permit interrogators "to use physically and psychologically stressful methods during questioning" and similar guidelines for use on prisoners in Iraq "suspected of terrorism or of having knowledge of insurgency operations."<sup><small>8</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">We have a further insight via another <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040524fa_fact">article</a> on the scandal by Seymour Hersh, to be published in the May 24 issue of <i>The New Yorker,</i> but posted on the internet Saturday. Hersh reports that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was the last in a chain of events. During operations in Afghanistan, suspected al-Qaeda targets were identified, but procedures required approval for strikes from too far up the command structure to react in time. Rumsfeld responded by authorizing<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">the establishment of a highly secret program that was given blanket advance approval to kill or capture and, if possible, interrogate 'high value' targets in the Bush Administration's war on terror. A special-access program, or sap - subject to the Defense Department's most stringent level of security - was set up, with an office in a secure area of the Pentagon.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">As to those captured, the special forces conducted "instant interrogations - using force if necessary...." Hersh summarizes the policy in a quote from one of his unnamed sources: "The rules are 'Grab whom you must. Do what you want.' "<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The war in Iraq was going badly, and the Pentagon thought that the solution lay in improving its intelligence gathering, specifically by getting tough with Iraqi prisoners suspected of ties to the enemy. General Miller's application of Guantánamo methods moved in that direction. According to Hersh's sources, the next step was to bring the methods of the "sap" to Abu Ghraib. A central player was Undersecretary for Intelligence Stephen Cambone.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Cambone then made another crucial decision, the former intelligence official told me: not only would he bring the sap's rules into the prisons; he would bring some of the Army military-intelligence officers working inside the Iraqi prisons under the sap's auspices. "So here are fundamentally good soldiers - military-intelligence guys - being told that no rules apply...."</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Hersh's account already has been denounced by the Pentagon. That agency's credibility at this point is nil, but with or without these details, the picture is the same: the culture has been created from the top down. Hersh makes this point by quoting "a Pentagon consultant":<br />"The White House subcontracted this to the Pentagon, and the Pentagon subcontracted it to Cambone," he said. "This is Cambone's deal, but Rumsfeld and Myers approved the program.... The issue is that, since 9/11, we've changed the rules on how we deal with terrorism, and created conditions where the ends justify the means."<br />_________________<br /><br /><small>1. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases, 5/6/04.<br />2. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases, 5/8/04.<br />3. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases, 1/28/03.<br />4. See my note of <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=2264973730809717201&postID=6340405040762715495#04/30/04">April 30, 2003</a>.<br />5. <i>The Washington Post</i>, 5/5/04.<br />6. September, 2002; reported in <i>The Washington Post,</i> 12/26/02.<br />7. Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (Taguba report).<br />8. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 5/9/04; see op-ed by Kenneth Roth, <i>The Washington Post,</i> 5/13/04.</small><br /></div><p align="justify"><b>May 26, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Last month, in a burst of candor, the Undersecretary of State for political affairs referred to the power to be acquired by the mysterious Iraqi government as "limited sovereignty." Everything said about the transfer confirms that its sovereignty will indeed be limited. However, candor is not regarded as a virtue by the Bush administration, especially on matters pertaining to Iraq. The official line is that full sovereignty will be bestowed upon the new government, a line reiterated by the President in his speech to the Army War College.<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush described five steps "in our plan to help Iraq achieve democracy and freedom," the first of which is that we will "hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government." That gigantic "embassy" which will replace the Coalition Provisional Authority will not assume the CPA's viceregal functions but instead will have "the same purpose as any other American embassy, to assure good relations with a sovereign nation." To make sure that we didn't miss the point, he told us three times that Iraq would have "full sovereignty."<br /></p><p align="justify">This, of course, is nonsense. Mr. Bush managed to emphasize that by referring to sovereignty while describing an aspect of its absence:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">After June 30th, American and other forces will still have important duties. American military forces in Iraq will operate under American command as a part of a multinational force authorized by the United Nations. Iraq's new sovereign government will still face enormous security challenges, and our forces will be there to help.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">More generally, lack of sovereignty is obvious in the extent to which we feel free to dictate the course of events after June 30. Mr. Bush underscored that also: the U.N. (and U.S.) will determine who will run the interim government; it will be advised by a "national council, which will be chosen in July by Iraqis representing their country's diversity;" the interim government will operate until national elections are held, "no later than next January;" that election will create a "transitional national assembly, which will "serve as Iraq's legislature" and "will choose a transitional government with executive powers;" the transitional national assembly also will draft a new constitution, to be submitted to a referendum in the fall of 2005; a permanent government will be elected by the end of 2005. No doubt Mr. Bush thinks that the Iraqis should be grateful that this has been worked out for them, so that they needn't waste any of their sovereignty on such details.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The President's peculiar view of full sovereignty may have to be revised; he wants a U.N. resolution blessing the transfer, but France, Germany, Russia, China and even Britain reportedly think that he'll have to let go of a bit more control, especially of armed forces.<sup><small>2</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The President's speech has been described as the opening event in a campaign to persuade the voters that he knows what he's about. The speechwriters may need to retool; they didn't even convince the boss. He read the speech with little interest and less conviction, and no wonder. His text was in part more of the same tired arguments: "Iraq is now the central front in the war on terror." A "free and self-governing Iraq... will be a decisive blow to terrorism at the heart of its power, and a victory for the security of America and the civilized world." (It is interesting, although perhaps of no great significance, that while the President thinks that we are battling terrorists in Iraq, the State Department does not classify most of the bloodshed there as being the result of terrorism).<sup><small>3</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The bulk of the speech was devoted to an extended discussion of the five steps which we are taking toward the creation of a democratic Iraq; the other four are "help establish security, continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, encourage more international support, and move toward a national election that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people." Although offered as something new, his five steps really were just the same stay-the-course material as before, but presented in the form of a list, as though that gave them more substance. _________________<br /><br /><small>1. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases, 5/24/04.<br />2. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 5/25/04.<br />3. Attacks directed at combatants, i.e."American and coalition forces on duty," are not classified as terrorist. See statement of Cofer Black, 4/29/04; <a href="http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2004/31973.htm">www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2004/31973.htm</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>June 1, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Al Gore's recent speech, in which he denounced the administration and called for the resignations of Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, Cambone, Tenet and Rice, warmed the hearts of critics of the war impatient with Senator Kerry's refusal to do the same. However, some of the reaction to Mr. Gore's speech and one notable review of Mr. Kerry's stance tend to validate the Senator's strategy.<br /></p><p align="justify">The house editorial in Sunday's Washington Post reviewed Mr. Kerry's position on national security which, in the Post's logic and perhaps his, includes Iraq. It commended him for avoiding "the near-hysterical rhetoric of former vice president Al Gore."<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Instead, Mr. Kerry is in the process of setting out what looks like a sober and substantial alternative to Mr. Bush's foreign policy, one that correctly identifies the incumbent's greatest failings while accepting the basic imperatives of the war that was forced on the country on Sept. 11, 2001.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">The Post thinks that Kerry differs little from Bush on principles or basic goals as to national security, although Kerry has indicated that he will take a more realistic view of exporting democracy, essentially returning to the pragmatism that characterized most prior administrations. In any case, the editorial commended Mr. Kerry's advocacy of a less unilateralist strategy and drew a drastic conclusion:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">...Mr. Kerry focused much attention on the president's foremost weakness, his mismanagement of U.S. alliances.... Not only is the truth of that critique glaringly evident in Iraq and elsewhere, but Mr. Kerry is also right to suggest that repairing and reversing the damage probably will require a new president....<br /></p><div align="justify">***</div><p align="justify"><br />The emerging Kerry platform suggests that ultimately he would adopt many of the same goals as Mr. Bush.... There are, in fact, few responsible alternatives to the administration's course. Mr. Kerry's argument is that he has a better chance of making it work. It's not a bold offer to voters -- but it's probably the right one. </p></blockquote><div align="justify">This is not exactly a ringing endorsement, and it's based less on the Post's admiration for Mr. Kerry than its dismay at the performance of Mr. Bush. However, that dismay is, at least for now, considerable. In a by-lined column Monday, the editorial page editor, Fred Hiatt, criticized the President's response to the Abu Ghraib scandal as "a Nixonian strategy of damage containment," and referred to "the president's dishonesty."<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Others of Mr. Bush's supporters are dismayed by the mess in Iraq and have attacked his competence; Thomas Friedman contemplated the same remedy as The <i>Post</i>: "It is time to ask this question: Do we have any chance of succeeding at regime change in Iraq without regime change here at home?"<sup><small>1</small></sup> Polls suggest that many voters may be reaching the same conclusion. This provides an opening to the cautious Kerry strategy.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, that strategy is not without risks. An article in Sunday's Post<sup> <small>2</small></sup> used an interview with Senator Kerry to describe his national-security platform, and concluded that it amounted to "competence over ideology." The reporter did not draw any parallels, but that formula encapsulates the danger in an I'll-manage-it-better approach: it was the slogan of the losing Dukakis campaign in 1988.<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. The New York Times, 5/13/04.<br />2. Glenn Kessler, "Kerry Says Security Comes First; Less Emphasis on Democracy Abroad.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b><a id="06/04/04">June 4, 2004</a></b> <a id="06/04/04"></a></p><p align="justify">On May 26, <i>The New York Times</i> ran an unsigned column admitting errors in reporting about WMD. The self-criticism, while earnest, was less than brutal; its description of the problem - "a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have been" - doesn't quite capture The<i>Times'</i> willingness to peddle the administration line. In addition, the column was carried on page A10, while many of the misleading stories appeared on page 1. Compared to the front-page <i>mea culpa</i> on Jayson Blair, in which the Times searched for things to admit, this was an oddly restrained confession. Daniel Okrent, The <i>Times'</i> ombudsman - or, in its terminology, "public editor" - offered his evaluation on Sunday. It didn't fare any better, appearing on p. 2 of section 4, "Week in Review."<br /></p><p align="justify">(Perhaps we shouldn't make too much of the placement; The<i>Times'</i> concept of frontpage-worthiness is baffling. My<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=2264973730809717201&postID=6340405040762715495#01/16/04"> note</a> of January 16 discussed choices that seemed odd to me, but at least the stories were substantive; on Wednesday a profile of a Las Vegas stripper merited page one treatment.)<br /></p><p align="justify">The editors concluded their review as follows:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">We consider the story of Iraq's weapons, and of the pattern of misinformation, to be unfinished business. And we fully intend to continue aggressive reporting aimed at setting the record straight.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Mr. Okrent said more or less the same thing, with a bit more emphasis:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">The editors' note to readers will have served its apparent function only if it launches a new round of examination and investigation. I don't mean further acts of contrition or garment-rending, but a series of aggressively reported stories detailing the misinformation, disinformation and suspect analysis that led virtually the entire world to believe Hussein had W.M.D. at his disposal. </p></blockquote><div align="justify">Let us hope that The <i>Times</i> is serious about correcting the record. It hardly is the leading culprit in the WMD scam nor are the media as a whole. They were gullible and chauvinistic, and certainly contributed to misleading the public, but the primary offense was the misinformation served up by the administration and its surrogates. Let us hope also that The <i>Times</i> will not limit its reexamination to the claims about WMD; falsehood is the defining characteristic of this administration.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">USA Today offered a critical review of the editors' column, quoting David Paletz, a Duke University political science professor, on the impact of the errant articles:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The Times has a reputation for being skeptical and critical of those in power. Its reports may explain in part Democrats' docility in the run-up to the war. If the Times had been publishing more skeptical stories, some Democrats could have been emboldened to challenge the run-up.<sup><small>1</small> </sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">Two months ago, Tom Engelhardt offered the converse analysis:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">...On most matters, the press tends to go to the edge of where the mainstream of the opposition party is willing to set foot, something that can be seen clearly in the various Clinton-era scandals.....<sup><small>2 </small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">I don't know which leads and which follows, or even whether there is a consistent pattern. Obviously, they will tend to reinforce each other, whether in boldness or in timidity. Certainly both were at fault here, intimidated into abandoning their duty to question the dubious, to distrust the devious.<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. USAToday.com, 5/26/04.<br />2. www.tomdispatch.com, 4/1/04.</small><br /><br /></div><p align="justify"><b>June 11, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">On <a href="http://geralddayarchive98.blogspot.com/#01/07/02">January 7, 2002</a>, I expressed the opinion that a column by William Safire<sup><small>1</small></sup> and an article by Dana Milbank<sup><small>2</small></sup> had gone too far in accusing the Bush administration of attempting to centralize control of government in the executive branch. I thought that some of the actions they described, such as the order authorizing military commissions, proceeded primarily from other impulses. I was mistaken. I still might stop short of Mr. Safire's claim that the commission order amounted to a "seizure of dictatorial power," but there is no doubt that the Bush administration intends to claim for the President something akin to royal prerogative.<br /></p><p align="justify">We have seen this tendency in the arguments made in cases involving "enemy combatants." In its brief to the Supreme Court in <i>Padilla,</i> the government argued that "The Commander in Chief... has authority to seize and detain enemy combatants wherever found, including within the borders of the United States." <sup><small>3</small></sup> This means that the President can, by applying a label, detain any citizen, for as long as he wants, under such conditions as he chooses, without answering to anyone. When it was pointed out in the <i>Hamdi</i> petition to the Supreme Court that such powers are not constitutional, the government dismissed the argument as "Petitioners' purely legal challenges to Hamdi's wartime detention."<sup><small>4</small></sup> Prerogative trumps law.<br /></p><p align="justify">A window into the implications of prerogative writ was opened by the disclosure of the memo written by White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President Bush in January, 2002. It argued that the Geneva conventions should not be applied to the Taliban or al-Qaeda. One reason was that the interrogation techniques contemplated might otherwise land administration officials in the dock, facing charges of war crimes. How convenient to be able to declare one's self and one's aides immune from prosecution.<br /></p><p align="justify">Now we have reports of an August, 2002 memo from the Justice Department and a March, 2003 study by Defense which argue that the President has the authority to approve torture. According to <i>The Washington Post,</i> which obtained the Justice Department memo, it stated that "torturing al Qaeda terrorists in captivity abroad 'may be justified' "<sup><small>5</small></sup> and that "laws outlawing torture do not bind Bush because of his constitutional authority to conduct a military campaign."<sup><small>6</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify"><i>The Wall Street Journal,</i> which obtained a draft of the Defense Department report, summarized its underlying theory: "The president, despite domestic and international laws constraining the use of torture, has the authority as commander in chief to approve almost any physical or psychological actions during interrogation, up to and including torture, the report argued." As in prior cases, lawyers in uniform were more cautious than their politicized civilian counterparts. "A military lawyer who helped prepare the report said that political appointees heading the working group sought to assign to the president virtually unlimited authority on matters of torture - to assert 'presidential power at its absolute apex,' the lawyer said."<sup><small>7</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The documents redefine torture to permit methods otherwise prohibited and suggest defenses to charges of torture, including "necessity," i.e., we're at war, and following orders. The convenient definitions and the contemplation of brutal means exude a whiff of totalitarianism, and the Nürnberg defense has an eerie ring. (As an excellent <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29858-2004Jun9.html">column</a> by Richard Cohen puts is, "parsing what is and what is not torture brings to mind regimes that, well, I would rather not bring to mind.") The excuse that national security justifies arrogation of power probably has parallels throughout history, but its most familiar antecedent is the Nixon administration. We learned then that "national security" was an argument not to be believed and an excuse not to be accepted, but memories are short.<br /></p><p align="justify">The torture memos demonstrate several things, first that the Bush administration is stupid; as Senator Biden pointed out, one reason to reject torture is that, if we use it, we must expect the enemy to follow suit. We had learned earlier that the administration holds international law in contempt; the memos reveal that the laws of the United States fare no better. Worst, the Bush gang are not satisfied to use "national security" as an excuse for breaking the law; instead they have invented a theory under which that elastic concept places the President above and outside the law.<br /></p><p align="justify">How many steps is it from there to ruling by decree? Maybe "seizure of dictatorial power" isn't too strong, after all.<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The New York Times,</i> 1/7/02.<br />2. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 11/20/01.<br />3. <a href="http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/april04.html#hamdi">http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/april04.html#hamdi</a><br />4. <a href="http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/april04.html#rumsfeld">http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/april04.html#rumsfeld</a><br />5. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 6/8/04.<br />6. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 6/9/04.<br />7. <i>The Wall Street Journal,</i> 6/7/04.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>June 19, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">President Bush visited the other Washington this week, to stump for George Nethercutt in Spokane and to rally the troops at Fort Lewis. Mr. Bush's appearances became part of the exchange with the 9-11 commission over ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda.<br /></p><p align="justify">Although the President has admitted that Iraq had no part in 9-11, he and Vice President Cheney have continued to imply that it did, with success; according to one poll, the percentage of the public believing that Iraq was directly involved was the same in March, 2004 as in February, 2003.<sup><small>1</small></sup> An alternative claim, justifying both invasion and continued fighting, is the claim that there were close ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda; the poll shows that this belief has held up too.<sup><small>2</small></sup> The alleged ties form the basis for an argument that Iraq was part of an amorphous entity, "terrorism," which attacked us.<br /></p><p align="justify">The debate began on June 14 with a speech by the Vice President. It included a formula used, with variations, on several occasions, which runs together references to various terrorist groups: Saddam Hussein "was a patron of terrorism - paying $25,000 to the families of suicide bombers in Israel, and providing safe-haven and support for such terrorist groups as Abu Nidal and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. He had long established ties with al Qaeda."<sup><small>3</small></sup> During a press conference the following day, the President adopted Mr. Cheney's formula and tried to provide support for the al Qaeda connection:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Q The Vice President... said yesterday that Saddam Hussein has long-established ties to al Qaeda. As you know, this is disputed within the U.S. intelligence community. Mr. President, would you add any qualifiers to that flat statement? And what do you think is the best evidence of it?<br /><br />PRESIDENT BUSH: Zarqawi. Zarqawi is the best evidence of connection to al Qaeda affiliates and al Qaeda....<br /><br />Saddam Hussein also had ties to terrorist organizations, as well. In other words, he was affiliated with terrorism -- Abu Nidal, the paying of families of suiciders to go kill innocent people.<sup><small>4</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">He seems to say that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi forms a tie between Saddam and al-Qaeda, but then, like Cheney, throws in lesser indications of Saddam's support for terrorism which are irrelevant to the al-Qaeda question.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">On June 16, the commission staff reported that it found contacts but no collaboration:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Bin Ladin also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime. Bin Ladin had in fact at one time sponsored anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan.... A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting Bin Ladin in 1994. Bin Ladin is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded. There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after Bin Ladin had returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship.... We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States....<sup> <small>5</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">This is consistent with other accounts. David Kay was quoted to the same effect: ''At various times Al Qaeda people came through Baghdad and in some cases resided there. But we simply did not find any evidence of extensive links with Al Qaeda, or for that matter any real links at all." He added that ''Cheney's speech is evidence- free."<sup><small>6</small> </sup><br /><br /></div><p align="justify">In Spokane on the 17th, the President told the faithful, "I made a tough decision to defend the country, and we went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq." As to the latter, defend it against what? Leaving aside a litany of irrelevancies, here's his answer: "I saw a threat in Iraq.... And there's a reason why we saw threats. Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator who... harbored terrorists, who provided safe haven for people like Zarqawi..."<sup><small>7 </small></sup>In the search for a connection between Saddam and Osama, Zarqawi is Mr. Bush's smoking gun. This requires showing a tie between al-Qaeda and Zarqawi and one between him and Saddam.<br /></p><p align="justify">The consensus seems to be that, before the invasion, Zarqawi was a terrorist who had some vague relationship to al-Qaeda, but operated independently.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">This February, in a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director George J. Tenet described Zarqawi's network among other groups having "links"' to al Qaeda but with its own "autonomous leadership . . . own targets [and] they plan their own attacks." Although Zarqawi may have cooperated with al Qaeda in the past, U.S. officials say it is increasingly clear he had been operating independently of Osama bin Laden's organization."<sup> <small>8</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">The President has not been satisfied with anything so qualified. In the press conference on the 15th, Mr. Bush said, "Zarqawi is the best evidence of connection to al Qaeda. Remember the e-mail exchange between al Qaeda leadership and he, himself, about how to disrupt the progress toward freedom?"<sup><small>9 </small></sup>This refers to a letter on a compact disc in the possession of a man arrested in January, 2004. The letter is said to be from Zarqawi and addressed to bin Laden. According to the text supplied by the Coalition Provisional Authority, it concludes:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">This is our vision, and we have explained it. This is our path, and we have made it clear. If you agree with us on it, if you adopt it as a program and road, and if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, we will be your readied soldiers, working under your banner, complying with your orders, and indeed swearing fealty to you publicly and in the news media, vexing the infidels and gladdening those who preach the oneness of God.... If things appear otherwise to you, we are brothers, and the disagreement will not spoil [our] friendship. [This is] a cause [in which] we are cooperating for the good and supporting jihad.<sup><small>10</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">That sounds like a business proposal, not a report from a subordinate.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The other half of the equation, Zarqawi's alleged tie to Saddam Hussein, initially was premised on his possible presence before the war in an Ansar al-Islam camp in Iraq; however, that wouldn't establish a connection to Saddam, as the camp was in the Kurdish area, beyond Saddam's control. The other argument for a pre-war relationship was Zarqawi's having been treated in a Baghdad hospital in 2002. The two are run together in Mr. Bush's current rationale: "he was the fellow who was in Baghdad at times prior to our arrival. He was operating out of Iraq.... See, he was there before we came; he's there after we came." <sup><small>11</small></sup> That falls a bit short of making him an agent or ally of Saddam.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Vice President now has taken exception to what he considered to be media distortion of the commission report. His response was partly a hint that he knows something they don't and partly his familiar assertion that if something can't be proved false, it must be true.<sup><small>12</small></sup> The mindset was captured perfectly in a cartoon showing a figure saying, "I'm Rod Serling. Welcome to the Bush administration."<sup><small>13</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Apparently we can look forward to repeated visits to The Twilight Zone between now and November. An "outside adviser to the White House" said the administration will continue to push the alleged Iraq - al-Qaeda connection.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">"They feel it's important to their long-term credibility on the issue of the decision to go to war," the adviser said. "It's important because it's part of the overall view that Iraq is part of the war on terror. If you discount the relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda, then you discount the proposition that it's part of the war on terror. If it's not part of the war on terror, then what is it - some cockeyed adventure on the part of George W. Bush?"<sup><small>14</small></sup> </p></blockquote><div align="left">The possibility had occurred to us.<br />__________________________<br /><br /><small>1. "Iraq was directly involved in carrying out the September 11th attacks:" 20% on each date. The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, <a href="http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqReport4_22_04.pdf">http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqReport4_22_04.pdf</a></small><br /><small>2. "Iraq gave substantial support to al Qaeda, but was not involved in the September 11th attacks:" 36%/37%. <i>Ibid.</i><br />3. Remarks by the Vice President at a Reception for the James Madison Institute, 6/14/04; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040614-20.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040614-20.html</a><br />4. Remarks by President Bush and President Karzai of Afghanistan in a Press Availability, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040615-4.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040615-4.html</a> 6/15/04.<br />5. <a href="http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/staff_statement_15.pdf">www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/staff_statement_15.pdf</a><br />6. <i>The Boston Globe,</i> 6/16/04.<br />7. Remarks by the President at Nethercutt for Senate Reception, 6/17/04; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040617-11.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040617-11.html</a><br />8. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 6/16/04.<br />9. See fn. 4.<br />11. Remarks by the President to the Military Personnel, Fort Lewis, Washington 6/1/04; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040618-1.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040618-1.html</a><br />12. CNN.com, 6/18/04; National Public Radio, "All Things Considered," 6/18/04, including a clip from an interview of Mr. Cheney on CNBC.<br />13. Mike Luckovich, <i>Atlanta Journal Constitution,</i> on washingtonpost.com, 6/19/04.<br />14. <i>The New York Times,</i> 6/19/04.</small><br /></div><p align="justify"><b>June 25, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">I had just finished reading the Justice Department's August 1, 2002 memo, its tortured rationale for torture, when the news came that it was inoperative, or whatever the equivalent Bushism is. This exercise in tardily locking the barn door presumably will not fool anyone, or at least anyone not politically committed to being fooled.<br /></p><p align="justify">The August 1 opinion generated a torrent of criticism. In response, the administration assured us that it never condoned or contemplated torture, which was a bit much to accept in the face of this 50-page apology for it, addressed to Alberto Gonzales, the President's counsel. Ashcroft refused to surrender the memo to Congress, which only made the leaked copy more damning. Now Justice has disavowed the memo, which will be replaced. Anonymous department officials described it as containing "overbroad and irrelevant advice" and said that "no one asked for much of the advice that was included in the memo."<sup><small>1 </small></sup>Its author, Jay Bybee, was a rogue lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel, so out of control that he was fired - oh, wait, no - appointed to the Ninth Circuit.<br /></p><p align="justify">One of the expressions of disapproval came from Mr. Gonzales, who assured us that the suggestion that torture might be acceptable is "contrary to the values of this president and this administration."<sup><small>2</small></sup> I love the use of "this president," which suggests that, although other presidents may have approved of torture, we can count on George W. Bush to uphold high principle.<br /></p><p align="justify">Now the administration has distributed a stack of additional documents, including some formerly stamped "secret," which it apparently thinks will show that its motives were pure. This latest burst of self-justifying release makes a mockery of the Administration's use of classification and its claims to confidentiality.<br /></p><p align="justify">Of the new material, a memo of February 7, 2002 is most relevant to Mr. Bush's efforts to distance himself from the torture issue. Its subject is "Humane treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees." It is signed by the President and addressed, among others, to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the CIA Director, the AG and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It declares that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to al-Qaeda and therefore "al-Qaeda detainees" do not qualify as prisoners of war. It accepts the Justice Department's conclusion that the President may declare that Geneva doesn't apply to Afghanistan (because it was a "failed state"), but declines to invoke that power at present. Nevertheless, it decides that "Taliban detainess" are not POWs because they are "unlawful combatants." Although, in these cases, the Geneva conventions do not apply, the memo declares our strong support for them. It states that U.S. armed forces shall treat detainees humanely and, "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."<br /></p><p align="justify">Although the August, 2002 memo has been repudiated, the President's February directive is based on a Justice Department memo of January 22, 2002 by - surprise - Jay Bybee which, although it does not discuss torture, has some of the same characteristics as his later effort. It focuses on avoiding criminal liability, here under the War Crimes Act, finds ways around the Geneva Conventions and leaves the treatment of prisoners to presidential discretion.<br /></p><p align="justify">Despite its title, the February 7 memo certainly did not prevent either discussion or employment of inhumane methods. It is doubtful that it was intended to. Its substantive provisions deny prisoners the benefits of POW status. The pious sentiments about Geneva and humane treatment have a wink-and-nod quality, something not to be taken seriously. The memo was written at least in part for PR purposes; the last paragraph directs the Secretary of State to "communicate my determinations ... to our allies, and other countries and international organizations cooperating in the war against terrorism...."<br /></p><p align="justify">It will be interesting to see the revised version of the torture memo.<br />_____________________<br /><br /><small>1. The Associated Press on washingtonpost.com, 6/22/04.<br />2. <i>Ibid.</i></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>June 26, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Last Tuesday, the August, 2002 memo on torture was repudiated, disavowed and treated with shocked distaste by the White House and the Justice Department. Somehow it just sort of happened, all fifty pages of it. Well, no. The memo was addressed to Alberto Gonzales, the White House counsel who, it develops, was not exactly a surprised recipient. Today we learned that the memo was circulated, discussed and massaged by a host of players, including lawyers in Mr. Gonzales ' office, the National Security Council, Vice President Cheney's office, the Justice Department's criminal division and "the office of Attorney General John D. Ashcroft." David S. Addington, Vice President Cheney's counsel, asked that the memo include a clear statement of the president's authority.<sup><small>1</small></sup> That section, which essentially states that the president can do whatever he damned well pleases, seems to embarrass them now, but it encapsulates their theory of government.<br /></p><p align="justify">On Tuesday, no one seemed to know why the memo had been written. Now we are told that it was for the CIA, partly by way of after-the fact cover.<sup><small>2 </small></sup>Reliance on it will be suspended pending a rewrite. In the meantime, presumably all actions will be guided by the high principles of the administration which vowed to bring honor back to Washington.<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1. Dana Priest, <i>The Washington Post,</i> 6/27/04.<br />2. David Johnston and James Risen, <i>The New York Times,</i> 6/27/04.</small> </p><p><b>July 3, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The <i>New York Times</i> saw the Supreme Court decisions in the detainees' cases as a "stinging rebuke" to the government,<sup><small>1</small></sup> not without reason. <i>Rasul v. Bush,</i> finding jurisdiction to consider complaints by Guantánamo prisoners, is all of that. <i>Hamdi v. Rumsfeld</i> qualifies to the extent that eight of the Justices rejected the government's claim that the courts have little or no role in deciding the fate of enemy combatants. Its holding and its plurality opinion fall more appropriately into the category of moderate reproof. Still, they slow the administration's march toward rule by executive fiat and uphold a vital aspect of civil liberties, no small matter.<sup><small>2</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">In <i>Hamdi,</i> there was no consensus on the government's right to detain Yaser Hamdi - and, by extension, Jose Padilla - the eight Justices splitting three ways. The plurality opinion, by Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy and Breyer, holds that the government can imprison "enemy combatants" for the duration of the conflict, but that a citizen has a right to contest his designation as an enemy combatant and that some minimally fair proceeding for that purpose is necessary. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, argued that the government has only two choices, to charge Hamdi criminally or to release him. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, reached essentially the same conclusion via a different route. Justice Thomas supported the government.<br /></p><p align="justify">The split raised the possibility of no decision, which would have left the ruling of the Fourth Circuit in force, a result no one but Thomas wanted. For that reason, Souter and Ginsberg joined in the result of the plurality opinion, a remand for further proceedings. It is not clear what those proceedings will be.<br /></p><p align="justify">The plurality opinion, written by the Court's self-appointed centrist, Justice O'Connor, may have been intended as a moderate position around which a majority could coalesce; certainly it is a compromise between the claims of the parties. That its defense of civil liberties will be limited is signalled by its opening phrase, "At this difficult time in our Nation's history...." It is a ponderous statement which struggles to find support for the unexeptionable principle that no citizen may be detained as an enemy combatant without having an opportunity to contest that label. Otherwise, it has little comfort either for Mr. Hamdi or for those who worry that our freedoms are at risk.<br /></p><p align="justify">The first question addressed is "whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as 'enemy combatants.' " Justice O'Connor notes that there is "some debate as to the proper scope of this term," and that the government has not offered a definition. A bolder judge might have ruled for the prisoner at that point; if the government can't even define the category of people it proposes to imprison, it should be sent on its way. However, instead Justice O'Connor finds that the government has alleged that Hamdi was "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan and that he "engaged in an armed conflict against the United States."<sup><small>3</small></sup> Therefore the Court will decide only "whether the detention of citizens falling within that definition is authorized."<br /></p><p align="justify">The government made two arguments as to its authority, that "the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution," and alternatively that Congress has authorized detention. The opinion passes the first argument and finds statutory authority, in the form of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) adopted after 9-11, empowering the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force" against "nations, organizations, or persons" that he determines "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" in the terrorist attacks. The plurality accept the government's argument that detention of enemy combatants is implied in those war powers. Under <i>Ex parte Quirin,</i> Hamdi's American citizenship does not exempt him.<br /></p><p align="justify">One of the most fundamental objections to the government's position is the possibility of indefinite detention. The discussion of that issue begins by stating it well:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Hamdi objects... that Congress has not authorized the indefinite detention to which he is now subject. The Government responds that "the detention of enemy combatants during World War II was just as 'indefinite' while that war was being fought." ... We take Hamdi's objection to be not to the lack of certainty regarding the date on which the conflict will end, but to the substantial prospect of perpetual detention.... As the Government concedes, "given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal cease-fire agreement." ... If the Government does not consider this unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has taken throughout the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi's detention could last for the rest of his life.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">The plurality reject indefinite detention for purposes of interrogation. They accept the principle that detention to prevent return to the battlefield can extend only to the end of the war. However, the war in Afghanistan is still under way: "Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan." Therefore, if Hamdi is an enemy combatant, he has no grounds at present to contest the duration of his imprisonment. The possibility of lifetime detention may require rethinking the rules, but that can wait for another day. The plurality have recognized the problem; that is enough for now.<br /><br />Having decided that indefinite detention of enemy combatants is proper, the plurality turn to the question of determining that status. They easily reject the absurd argument that Hamdi's enemy-combatant status is undisputed. However, they are troubled by the government's claim that separation of powers forecloses any judicial review of the Executive's determination of that status or alternatively that the review must be minimal and deferential. They decide that they must balance such claims against Hamdi's due process rights.<br /></div><p align="justify">The opinion first considers Hamdi's interests and concludes by reaffirming "the fundamental nature of a citizen's right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law..." The reaffirmance is encouraging; the fact that it required a review of authorities, that it was not simply declared as an obvious and immutable principle, is not.<br /></p><p align="justify">The opinion then turns to an appraisal of "the other side of the scale," the "core strategic matters of warmaking," which include "the weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States." These matters must be left to the Executive.<br /></p><p align="justify">This bit of dialectical reasoning leads us to the synthesis, or more accurately, the compromise - a compromise between fundamental due process and untrammeled executive power. As in current politics, the constitutional center has moved well to the right.<br /></p><p align="justify">The statement of the solution sounds good: "We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." However, it's all downhill from there. The plurality worry about the burdens which due process will impose on the government, and conclude that proceedings may have to be "tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict." This seems to be directed toward the difficulty of proving enemy combatant status through the circumstances of capture. The government claims that Hamdi has admitted facts establishing his status, but if that turns out not to be true, proving that he was part of a hostile force and engaged in armed conflict might be a challenge. According to the government's brief, Hamdi surrendered to Northern Alliance forces, who might be difficult to identify and locate at this point.<br /></p><p align="justify">Not to worry; the plurality hold that hearsay "may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding." In fact, the plurality seems to have in mind a very low level of proof, as they cite the Mobbs declaration as the sort of evidence which could be accepted. Not only is that declaration hearsay, it does not identify its sources and it offers no basis for finding its conclusions to be reliable. It does not even state the criteria to be used in determining enemy combatant status.<br /></p><p align="justify">In addition, the plurality hold that a presumption in favor of the government's position would be compatible with due process, even though shifting the burden to the prisoner would saddle him with war-related evidentiary disadvantages at least as daunting as those which they find so onerous to the government.<br /></p><p align="justify">In requiring a neutral decision maker, the plurality reject the government's claim that separation of powers means the courts must defer to the executive. Here is where the opinion reaches its rhetorical high point:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">...Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens....</p></blockquote><div align="justify">However, the assertion that the courts are not to be frozen out of the process doesn't mean that they must have the last word; the neutral decision maker could be a military tribunal. Here the plurality go beyond the administration which, at least officially, does not propose to subject citizens to military tribunals. Pending that development, the courts will continue to look out for the prisoner's rights, although the plurality "anticipate that a District Court would proceed with the caution that we have indicated is necessary in this setting, engaging in a fact finding process that is both prudent and incremental." In other words, remember that this is a "time of ongoing military conflict."<br /></div><p align="justify">I wonder whether Justices Scalia and Stevens have stood alone together before. They do so here, in an opinion by Justice Scalia which is in his usual dogmatic style but is, for him, rather restrained in tone. He argues that, unless habeas corpus has been suspended, the government must charge Hamdi with a crime or release him. However, he recognizes that the government does not allege an ordinary crime; it believes that Hamdi waged war against the United States. "The relevant question, then, is whether there is a different, special procedure for imprisonment of a citizen accused of wrongdoing by aiding the enemy in wartime." Scalia's answer is no. Citizens accused of collaboration with the enemy traditionally have been charged with treason; the government's third way, based on the enemy-combatant label, cannot be accepted. Denying the President the power he seeks would be in keeping with the Founders' beliefs:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The proposition that the Executive lacks indefinite wartime detention authority over citizens is consistent with the Founders' general mistrust of military power permanently at the Executive's disposal. In the Founders' view, the "blessings of liberty" were threatened by "those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain." The Federalist No. 45, p. 238 (J. Madison).</p></blockquote><div align="justify">He notes the attention devoted by The Federalist to fear of oppression by a standing army, and points to Constitutional provisions which he thinks reflect those concerns. He quotes Hamilton on the limitations on the military power of the president, and concludes, "A view of the Constitution that gives the Executive authority to use military force rather than the force of law against citizens on American soil flies in the face of the mistrust that engendered these provisions."<br /></div><p align="justify">However, <i>Ex parte Quirin,</i> relied on by the government and the plurality, is a problem for Justice Scalia. He doesn't suggest overruling it, although that would seem to be the logical outcome of his views. He describes it as "not this Court's finest hour," and suggests that it misinterprets <i>Ex parte Milligan.</i> However, he also tries to distinguish <i>Quirin</i> from the present case, and doesn't succeed. As long as <i>Quirin</i> stands, Justice Scalia's alternatives, indictment or release, aren't the only choices; the government can, as the plurality holds, treat a citizen as an enemy combatant.<br /></p><p align="justify">Whether Justice Scalia's opinion holds together or not, it is a welcome statement in favor of civil liberties by one not often accused of oversolicitude toward them, and a repudiation of the position of an administration to which he is suspiciously close. Given his statement not long ago that rights might be ratcheted down to their constitutional minimums in wartime, the final paragraph of his opinion is remarkable:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Many think it not only inevitable but entirely proper that liberty give way to security in times of national crisis--that, at the extremes of military exigency, <i>inter arma silent leges.</i> Whatever the general merits of the view that war silences law or modulates its voice, that view has no place in the interpretation and application of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in a manner that accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it. Because the Court has proceeded to meet the current emergency in a manner the Constitution does not envision, I respectfully dissent.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Justice Thomas, dissenting, accepts the government's case: His opinion begins, "The Executive Branch, acting pursuant to the powers vested in the President by the Constitution and with explicit congressional approval [AUMF], has determined that Yaser Hamdi is an enemy combatant and should be detained." That's all we need to know. The discussion continues for some pages, but adds nothing to that statement.<br /></div><p align="justify">Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, dissents in part, and ends up, in principle, about where Scalia does, but by a much shorter route. Souter would hold that the Non-Detention Act, 18 U. S. C. §4001(a), applies here. It provides that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress," and he concludes that if "the Government raises nothing further than the record now shows, the Non-Detention Act entitles Hamdi to be released."<br /></p><p align="justify">In contending that the Non-Detention Act should be given a broad application, Justice Souter points out that the act is, in historical context, a Congressional repudiation of "arbitrary executive action." The principal aim of the legislation was to repeal an statute which, in effect, authorized concentration camps. However, rather than opting for mere repeal, Congress enacted the Non-Detention Act, specifying that imprisonment can only be pursuant to statute, not at the administration's discretion. Souter also makes a philosophical argument:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory.... A reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a different branch.... Hence the need for an assessment by Congress before citizens are subject to lockup, and likewise the need for a clearly expressed congressional resolution of the competing claims.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">He proceeds to reject the government's argument that the Non-Detention Act applies only to criminal, and not to military detention, again relying in part on legislative history.<br /></div><p align="justify">Next, he rejects the government's argument and the plurality's holding that AUMF (he calls it the Force Resolution) provides the statutory authorization required by the Non-Detention Act. His reasoning is straightforward: AUMF nowhere mentions detention. To the plurality, it is obvious that it is implied: detention of enemy combatants "is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the President to use." Justice Souter rejects this in part because there is no reason to think Congress saw any need to add to the existing inventory of crimes with which a disloyal citizen might be charged.<br /></p><p align="justify">Justice Souter's position is easier to defend than Justice Scalia's. The Non-Detention Act is a strong statement of policy against imprisonment without Congressional sanction. Reading into AUMF the power to detain citizens, while not irrational, is contrary to the strong policy of the Non-Detention Act, as well as to the constitutional principles which both judges cite.<br /></p><p align="justify">Justice Souter considers the alternative argument that, once AUMF authorized war, the laws of war became applicable, and they include the detention of enemy combatants. He points out that the government's refusal to treat captured Taliban as prisoners of war calls into question "whether the United States is acting in accordance with the laws of war it claims as authority." Therefore its argument that it can rely on the laws of war must be rejected. This is a nice bit of irony. It also illustrates the problem which <i>Quirin</i> poses for the government and for the plurality. Under <i>Quirin,</i> enemy combatants are divided into lawful combatants, who must be treated as prisoners of war, and unlawful combatants, who may be tried for war crimes. The government refuses to make the choice; it wants to hold people like Hamdi indefinitely without charge, but refuses to treat them as POWs. Four members of the Supreme Court would not permit that; the other five, although they do not specifically address the issue, apparently would. Mr. Hamdi had better hope he can convince that neutral decision maker that he is not an enemy combatant.<br /></p><p align="justify">As noted, Justices Souter and Ginsberg joined in the result of the plurality opinion, thus producing a remand. This opinion makes clear that they do not subscribe to the plurality's notions of a presumption in favor of the government or the use of a military tribunal. It remains to be seen what the lower courts will do.<br />____________________<br /><br /><small>1. House editorial, 6/29/04.<br />2. My comments on the Cour of Appeals panel decision and its denial of rehearing <i>en banc</i> are at <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=2264973730809717201&postID=6340405040762715495#01/17/03">1/17/03</a> and<br /><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=2264973730809717201&postID=6340405040762715495#07/12/03">7/12/03</a>.<br />3. The definition is taken from the government's brief, which in turn takes it from a DoD document, "Fact Sheet: Guantanamo Detainees," <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040220det.pdf">www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040220det.pdf</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>July 5, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">In his column today in <i>The New York Times,</i> William Safire reminds us that he was right, on November 15, 2001, about the assault on civil liberties represented by the Bush military-commission order. (He is coy, and quotes someone he calls a "soft-on-terror professional hysteric," among other colorful names, only revealing in the last paragraph that he is talking about himself.) He chides liberals for being too frightened or intimidated to join him at the time. He's entitled: he was right when it counted, when most liberals were silent, or worse.<br /></p><p align="justify">In that last paragraph he admits that it's "uncool to say I told you so, but I have not had many chances to say it lately." Alas, that is a self-created problem: Mr. Safire was as wrong about the administration's policies regarding Iraq as he was right about military commissions. Oddly, he is less right about the latter now than in late 2001. Noting the administration-friendly parts of the O'Connor opinion in <i>Hamdi,</i> he says, "With military tribunals now tilted toward the prosecution, we should stop delaying and start prosecuting." Why he would he accept a suggestion - from a four-judge plurality - for a pro-prosecution tilt which is contrary to the principles he supposedly wishes to defend? He should read Justice Scalia's view on that: "an unheard-of system in which the citizen rather than the Government bears the burden of proof, testimony is by hearsay rather than live witnesses, and the presiding officer may well be a 'neutral' military officer rather than judge and jury."<br /></p><p align="justify">So: on civil liberties, entirely right when it was unpopular, partially right when it's fashionable; on war, wrong front and back.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>July 8, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify"><i>Rasul v. Bush</i> provides a more emphatic message to the administration than <i>Hamdi v. Rumsfeld</i>: although three Justices supported the government's position in <i>Rasul,</i> a majority were able to agree on a rationale for rejecting it. That was all the more striking given that the rationale is something short of persuasive and was picked apart by the dissent. (Justice Kennedy couldn't subscribe to the majority opinion, but found another way to its result.) Moreover, this case, unlike <i>Hamdi,</i> does not involve American citizens and is therefore is less compelling, politically or constitutionally. Six members of the Court apparently think that the administration is too arrogant.<br /></p><p align="justify">As in <i>Hamdi,</i> much remains to be filled in by the lower courts, and further Supreme Court review is likely. However, this decision establishes that the Guantánamo detainees will have access to the federal courts. That is, alone, a major development.<br /></p><p align="justify">The questions debated by the majority and the dissenters have the flavor of scholastic philosophy: Were prior cases decided under the habeas corpus statute or under the Constitution? Did Decision B overrule, reinterpret or modify Decision A or confine it to its facts? Does avoiding an answer to a question establish that a court must eventually give one? How does the maxim, "the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect" apply here? Is "jurisdiction" really jurisdiction or is it venue? Does the United States have "plenary and exclusive jurisdiction" over the base at Guantánamo? Is that legally equivalent to "sovereignty?" What was the status of The Cinque Ports? Did an English court at any time in history grant a writ of habeas corpus to a non-subject? The parties might be forgiven for wondering whether it is their case which is under discussion.<br /></p><p align="justify">The division ostensibly is over the interpretation of <i>Johnson v. Eisentrager </i><sup><small>1</small></sup> and an earlier case, <i>Ahrens v. Clark, </i><sup><small>2</small></sup> on which, according to the majority, <i>Eisentrager</i> depends. <i>Ahrens</i> held that a District Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus where the prisoner is located outside its district; presence of the custodian in the district is not enough. <i>Eisentrager</i> involved the fate of several German soldiers (or possibly, as they claimed, civilians) who were in China in the waning days of World War II, after Germany had surrendered but before Japan did. They were convicted by an American military commission of "violating laws of war, by. . . collecting and furnishing intelligence concerning American forces and their movements to the Japanese armed forces." The Supreme Court held that they were not entitled to challenge their detention through a writ of habeas corpus; "the nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy," has no right of access to our courts.<sup> <small>3</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify"><i>Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky</i> held, contrary to <i>Ahrens,</i> that the "writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody"<sup><small>4</small></sup> and declared that, because of statutory changes and subsequent decisions, <i>Ahrens</i> henceforth refers to venue, not jurisdiction. The majority in <i>Rasul</i> interpret this to undercut the holding in <i>Eisentrager</i>, even though that decision does not appear to rely on <i>Ahrens</i>. They do not identify the custodian in this case, but merely tell us that a court will have jurisdiction if it can subject the custodian to service of process. This too comes from <i>Braden</i>.<br /></p><p align="justify">In any case, the conclusion is that, although the habeas corpus statute, 18 U.S.C. §2241-2243, does not cover a prisoner outside a federal judicial district, decisions after <i>Eisentrager</i> have "filled the statutory gap." And, since "the statute draws no distinction between Americans and aliens held in federal custody, there is little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical coverage of the statute to vary depending on the detainee's citizenship." Therefore, foreign nationals held prisoner at Guantánamo "are entitled to invoke the federal courts' authority under §2241."<br /></p><p align="justify">Although the Court's opinion in places seems to have unlimited geographic reach, the intent probably is to limit it to Guantánamo, or at least to a locale with the same status, as shown by its statement of the issue in the case: "whether the habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of Executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty.' "<br /></p><p align="justify">It is fair to say that Justice Scalia is not impressed by the majority's reasoning; he is joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas. Justice Scalia begins with the statute, which seems to contemplate territorial restrictions: "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions;" a petition "addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge . . . shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held." Guantánamo Bay is not located within the territorial limits of any federal court district. "One would think that is the end of this case."<br /></p><p align="justify">The majority hold that "within their respective jurisdictions" has been interpreted away, but Justice Scalia maintains that such a result requires that <i>Braden</i> have modified <i>Eisentrager</i>, which he denies. Therefore he concludes that the Court, if it wishes to reach its result, must overrule <i>Eisentrager</i>, which it has not done.<br /></p><p align="justify">However, Justice Scalia acknowledges that <i>Ahrens</i> "explicitly reserved 'the question of what process, if any, a person confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court may employ to assert federal rights.' " In his view, <i>Eisentrager</i> definitively decided the question as to alien petitioners, but he admits that it reserved the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction over citizens: "With the citizen, we are now little concerned, except to set his case apart as untouched by this decision and to take measure of the difference between his status and that of all categories of aliens."<sup><small>5</small></sup> Faced with this, Justice Scalia acknowledges that, by expansive construction of the statute, or by reference to the constitutional status of habeas corpus, the Court could reach the conclusion that a citizen located outside a federal district has a right to petition. He notes that the government, in the present case, does not challenge the extension of the habeas corpus statute to citizens abroad. However, in his view, "the possibility of one atextual exception thought to be required by the Constitution is no justification for abandoning the clear application of the text to a situation in which it raises no constitutional doubt." In other words, extraterritorial habeas corpus protection for non-citizens should not be read into the statute because its denial raises no constitutional issue.<br /></p><p align="justify">Part of the debate has to do with the status of Guantánamo, which leads us far back into the history of habeas corpus. Is the relationship of the base at Guantánamo to the United States comparable to that between The Cinque Ports and the English crown? How about The County Palatinate of Durham? Justice Scalia finds all of the examples given by the majority inapposite. Further, he maintains, in all of the cases mentioned by the majority, the writ was extended only to subjects of the crown.<br /></p><p align="justify">There isn't much doubt that extending habeas corpus to aliens wherever found would be a leap; the status of Guantánamo isn't entirely clear, so maybe even an extension only to that base would be a stretch. However, the authorities are sufficiently muddled that either result could be justified. Perhaps for that reason, Justice Scalia adds three pragmatic arguments against extension of the jurisdiction.<br /></p><p align="justify">The first has to do with a supposed trap for the government: it had relied on Guantánamo's being outside the reach of the courts, and it is unfair to suddenly decide that there is jurisdiction. However, in the next paragraph, Scalia claims that the effect of the court's holding is to extend "the scope of the habeas statute to the four corners of the earth." If that is so, it doesn't matter whether the government had chosen Cuba or Kazakhstan for the location of its prison.<br /></p><p align="justify">The second is that the decision creates "a monstrous scheme in time of war." To the extent that this assumes that the Court's holding will allow any prisoner of war to petition for habeas corpus, it raises a genuine issue. The ambiguity of the majority opinion leaves open such an interpretation, but Justice Scalia probably interprets the result too broadly.<br /></p><p align="justify">The final argument is that the decision "confers upon wartime prisoners greater habeas rights than domestic detainees. The latter must challenge their present physical confinement in the district of their confinement, see <i>Rumsfeld v. Padilla</i>, ante, whereas under today's strange holding Guantanamo Bay detainees can petition in any of the 94 federal judicial districts." It's a trifle disingenuous to cite <i>Padilla,</i> a decision issued the same day which applies the territorial-jurisdiction rule with pointless severity.<br /></p><p align="justify">Because the majority took such a beating, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion which takes a different approach to <i>Eisentrager.</i> Rather than finding it modified by later decisions, he seems to read it as limited to its facts. He concludes that, in this case, federal court jurisdiction is "permitted." He reaches this result not by finding any prior authority for his conclusion nor by pointing to anything in the Constitution or the habeas corpus statue, but, so far as I can tell, by assuming that the result is proper unless there is something to be said against it. The "something" is the doctrine of separation of powers, which he finds to be the basis for the decision in <i>Eisentrager</i>.<br /></p><p align="justify">In that case, Justice Kennedy concludes, the "petition was not within the proper realm of the judicial power. It concerned matters within the exclusive province of the Executive, or the Executive and Congress, to determine." He apparently thinks that <i>Eisentrager</i> contemplated a wider reach for habeas corpus in situations where no separation-of-powers issue arose: "A necessary corollary of <i>Eisentrager</i> is that there are circumstances in which the courts maintain the power and the responsibility to protect persons from unlawful detention even where military affairs are implicated." Exactly how he draws this conclusion is not clear to me.<br /></p><p align="justify">In deciding whether separation of powers requires a denial here, he identifies two significant differences between the cases: first, Guantánamo "is in every practical respect a United States territory..." and second, the prisoners at Guantánamo "are being held indefinitely, and without benefit of any legal proceeding to determine their status." These factors distinguish <i>Rasul</i> from <i>Eisentrager</i>: there the prisoners were at a base less fully under American control; and they had been convicted of war crimes, whereas the Guantánamo detainees are simply held at the government's discretion, in legal limbo. At one point he refers to their imprisonment as "pretrial detention." I'm not sure that is their status, but it illustrates his view that the detainees are not ordinary prisoners of war, that the government simply has decided that it will keep them as long as it wishes, with no reference to any accepted international standard. That, I think, is why the administration lost this case.<br />______________________<br /><br /><small>1. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).<br />2. 335 U.S. 188 (1948).<br />3. <i>Eisentrager,</i> 339 U.S. at 776.<br />4. 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973).<br />5. 339 U. S. at 769.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>July 10, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The government managed to win one of the enemy-combatant cases, <i>Rumsfeld v. Padilla,</i> although only on a procedural issue, by five to four, with a loss on the merits presumably to follow. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.<br /></p><p align="justify">In May, 2002, a grand jury was convened in New York to investigate 9-11. A court in New York issued a material-witness warrant for Jose Padilla. On May 8, he was arrested in Chicago and taken to New York, where he was detained. His appointed counsel filed a motion to quash the warrant; a hearing was scheduled for June 11. On Sunday, June 9, the President declared Padilla an enemy combatant. In an <i>ex parte</i> hearing that day, the government withdrew its witness subpoena and disclosed the enemy-combatant order. The court vacated the witness warrant. Padilla was handed over to the Defense Department and transferred to a brig in South Carolina. Padilla's counsel had no notice of the hearing. The transfer was publicly announced on Monday June 10. On June 11, Padilla's counsel petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court denied the request on the merits, although it held that it had jurisdiction. The Second Circuit agreed as to jurisdiction, and reversed on the merits, directing the District Court to issue the writ. The Supreme Court reversed in turn, holding that the petition was filed in the wrong district.<br /></p><p align="justify">The majority's rationale is this: a writ of habeas corpus may be issued by a U.S. District Court only if it has jurisdiction over the custodian, which requires that the custodian be within the district. The custodian is the person having physical custody; in the case of formal detention by the government, that is the warden or other administrative head of the prison. Padilla is imprisoned in a naval brig in South Carolina. Ergo, the petition must be filed in South Carolina.<br /></p><p align="justify">The majority opinion covers 22 pages, not because the holding is any more complicated than my summary, but because it takes that long to explain why none of the exceptions to those rules applies. The opinion projects some of the same sense of detachment from reality found in <i>Rasul;</i> however, here the tone is not so much one of abstraction as of artificiality.<br /></p><p align="justify">Padilla contended that the Secretary of Defense is his custodian, not an illogical point of view given that the commandant of the brig isn't likely to decide whether Padilla arrives, stays or leaves. In addition, Padilla ended up in South Carolina because the President issued an order headed "To The Secretary of Defense" which said the following: "... you are directed to receive Mr. Padilla from the Department of Justice and to detain him as an enemy combatant."<sup><small>1</small></sup> That sounds like it makes Mr. Rumsfeld the custodian. Granted, the Secretary isn't going to keep Padilla in his basement, so another, more direct, custodian will become involved. Does that eliminate Mr. Rumsfeld? Apparently so; the majority hold that only the "immediate custodian" may be served with the writ. They purport to find that in the statute:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained....<br /></p><p align="justify">The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">They conclude that the statute's "consistent use of the definite article indicates that there is generally only one proper respondent, and the custodian is 'the person' with the ability to produce the prisoner's body before the habeas court...." This is, shall we say, not compelling textual analysis. The majority cite <i>Wales v. Whitney</i> <sup><small>2</small></sup> for the proposition that the statute contemplates proceeding against the person "who has the immediate custody," which translates into the warden:<br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">In accord with the statutory language and Wales' immediate custodian rule, longstanding practice confirms that in habeas challenges to present physical confinement--"core challenges"--the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Reference to a default rule indicates that there are other possible results. The majority acknowledge this, but hold that none apply here.<br /></div><p align="justify">Padilla's brief cited <i>Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky</i> <sup><small>3</small></sup> and <i>Strait v. Laird</i><sup><small>4 </small></sup>on the jurisdictional issue. In Braden, an inmate of an Alabama prison filed a petition in Kentucky. The petition concerned his potential confinement in that state pursuant to an order issued there. The <i>Braden</i> Court held that he was, in effect, "in custody" in Kentucky; the rule was satisfied because a custodian with prospective or virtual custody was in the district. In <i>Strait,</i> the petitioner was a reservist living in California who asked to be relieved of his active-duty commitment because he had become a conscientious objector. His records and his "nominal commanding officer" were in Indiana. The <i>Strait</i> Court found that the district court in California had jurisdiction to issue a writ: the commanding officer was "present" in California "through the officers in the hierarchy of the command who processed this serviceman's application for discharge." The majority distinguish both cases because "there was no immediate physical custodian with respect to the 'custody' being challenged."<br /></p><p align="justify">Padilla also relied on <i>Ex parte Endo,</i><sup><small>5</small></sup> in which a Japanese-American interned in California during WW II filed a petition there. The District Court denied her petition. While an appeal was pending, the government moved her to Utah; therefore her new custodian was not in the court's district. The Supreme Court held that the District Court had acquired jurisdiction; the removal of the detainee did not cause it to lose jurisdiction because "a person in whose custody she is remains within the district." In other words, a government official other than the immediate custodian could respond to the writ. The majority in <i>Padilla</i> restate the holding slightly: "the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner's release." Either formulation seems to violate the immediate-custodian rule and support Padilla's argument. There is, however, a distinction: "Padilla was moved from New York to South Carolina before his lawyer filed a habeas petition on his behalf. Unlike the District Court in Endo, therefore, the Southern District never acquired jurisdiction over Padilla's petition." Therefore the critical fact in this case is that Padilla's lawyer filed the habeas petition after he was transferred.<br /></p><p align="justify">The rule of the case is this: if the government, which through a witness warrant has declared a district to be a convenient forum, secretly and pursuant to an order of dubious constitutionality transfers the witness to another district, thereby simultaneously creating the need for habeas corpus and the jurisdictional issue, it may disregard a writ issued by a court in the original district.<br /></p><p align="justify">What is the point of this decision? Do the majority hope that, by the time the petition wends its way through the Fourth Circuit, <i>Hamdi</i> will have been overruled? That would make no sense as to Justices Scalia, O'Connor and Kennedy, who are in the majority here but held against the government in <i>Hamdi.</i> Perhaps the result here is seen as necessary to support the dissent in <i>Rasul.</i> Again, that would not make sense as to O'Connor and Kennedy, who were not among the dissenters. Maybe the majority really believe that the territorial-jurisdiction rule is important enough to reaffirm it in a case in which its only apparent practical effect is to irrationally delay a decision on the merits.<br /></p><p align="justify">Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote a concurring opinion, which makes two points. First, it accepts the Government's reclassification and removal of Padilla as merely a tough break for him:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Both Padilla's change in location and his change of custodian reflected a change in the Government's rationale for detaining him. He ceased to be held under the authority of the criminal justice system. . . and began to be held under that of the military detention system. Rather than being designed to play games with forums, the Government's removal of Padilla reflected the change in the theory on which it was holding him. Whether that theory is a permissible one, of course, is a question the Court does not reach today.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">"Whether that theory is a permissible one" is less important than the technicalities of jurisdiction. Of course, the human cost is not an issue.<br /></div><p align="justify">In addition, the principle being served may not even be as important as the majority opinion indicates; Justice Kennedy's second point is that the Court needs to reconsider the nature of the immediate-custodian and territorial-jurisdiction rules. "These rules . . . are not jurisdictional in the sense of a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction. . . . That much is clear from the many cases in which petitions have been heard on the merits despite their non-compliance with either one or both of the rules." Justice Kennedy offers an alternative interpretation: "In my view, the question of the proper location for a habeas petition is best understood as a question of personal jurisdiction or venue." He thinks that this is a better reading of <i>Braden,</i> and cites a recent Court of Appeals opinion<sup><small>6 </small></sup>as "suggesting that the territorial-jurisdiction rule is a venue rule, and the immediate- custodian rule is a personal jurisdiction rule." However, consideration of this can wait: "I would not decide today whether these habeas rules function more like rules of personal jurisdiction or rules of venue." This case doesn't present any novel problems and may be disposed of by the default rules, however classified:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">For the purposes of this case, it is enough to note that, even under the most permissive interpretation of the habeas statute as a venue provision, the Southern District of New York was not the proper place for this petition. As the Court concludes, in the ordinary case of a single physical custody within the borders of the United States, where the objection has not been waived by the Government, the immediate-custodian and territorial-jurisdiction rules must apply.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Therefore, Justice Kennedy's discussion proves to be academic; the alternative theory, as he applies it, leads to the same result. However, the theory - recasting the custodian rules in terms of personal jurisdiction and venue - has merit. The former is not a major factor; where the Court has allowed exceptions, jurisdiction over the appropriate person has been found. The place of hearing is the issue. If there is physical custody, venue normally would be limited to the district in which the custodian is located. However, because venue is essentially a matter of convenience and appropriateness, another district should be considered in unusual cases.<br /></div><p align="justify">Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, wrote a dissenting opinion. He argues that the government should not be allowed to gain a procedural advantage by its secret maneuvers, and therefore the petition for the writ should be treated as if filed two days earlier, in effect making this an <i>Endo</i> case. More persuasively, Justice Stevens argues that Secretary Rumsfeld realistically is the custodian, that he is amenable to process, and that Justice Kennedy's venue theory is correct.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">When this case is analyzed under . . . traditional venue principles, it is evident that the Southern District of New York, not South Carolina, is the more appropriate place to litigate respondent's petition. The Government sought a material witness warrant for respondent's detention in the Southern District, indicating that it would be convenient for its attorneys to litigate in that forum. As a result of the Government's initial forum selection, the District Judge and counsel in the Southern District were familiar with the legal and factual issues surrounding respondent's detention both before and after he was transferred to the Defense Department's custody. . . .</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Leaving aside whether New York is the better forum, any objection to hearing the case there is difficult to take seriously. The commandant of the brig isn't going to appear and argue the case for the government. The inconvenience of producing Padilla for the hearing is trivial, and in any event it was the government's decision to move him. Even if we were to conclude that there is an element of forum-shopping, on the assumption that Padilla's lawyer had a choice as to where to file and made a calculated decision to file in New York rather than in South Carolina, it is a choice about which the government cannot legitimately complain, having selected New York in the first place.<br /></div><p align="justify">Here's my suggestion for a venue rule which I hope never will be needed again: in this sort of case, where the prisoner is being detained without a whiff of due process, venue will lie in the prisoner's home district, the district in which he was seized and the district of his detention: his choice. Justice demands no less.<br />____________________<br /><br /><small>1. Appendix A to Court of Appeals opinion, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).<br />2. 114 U.S. 564 (1885).<br />3. 410 U.S. 484 (1973)<br />4. 406 U.S. 341 (1972).<br />5. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).<br />6. <i>Moore v. Olson,</i> 368 F. 3d 757, 759-60 (7th Cir. 2004).</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>July 20, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Anthony Lewis wrote an article for July 15 issue of <i>The New York Review of Books</i> entitled "Making Torture Legal." One of his themes is the role of government lawyers in bringing this about.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Lewis first discusses the various prisoner-treatment memoranda: "The torture and death of prisoners, the end result of cool legal abstractions, have a powerful claim on our national conscience. . . . But equally disturbing, in its way, is the administration's constitutional argument that presidential power is unconstrained by law." Those memos, by John Yoo, Jay Bybee, Alberto Gonzales and the lawyers who advised Secretary Rumsfeld, all contributed to the rejection of restraints on the treatment of prisoners by way of an expansive theory of presidential power:<br /><br />Any attempt by Congress to restrict "the President's plenary power over military operations (including the treatment of prisoners)" would be a "constitutionally dubious step."<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /><br />The "new paradigm" of the war on terrorism "renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners . . . .<sup><small>2</small></sup><br /><br />A statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A) which makes torture a crime doesn't prohibit acts which are merely "cruel, inhuman, or degrading." "Torture" only includes the infliction of pain at a "level that would ordinarily be associated with . . . death, organ failure or serious impairment of bodily functions. . . ."<sup><small>3</small></sup><br /><br />"Even if an interrogation method were to violate Section 2340A, the statute would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached on the President's power to conduct a military campaign. . . . Any effort to apply Section 2340A in a manner that interferes with the President's direction of such core war matters as the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants . . . would be unconstitutional"<sup><small>4</small></sup><br /><br />"In order to respect the President's inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority." "Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President."<sup><small>5</small></sup></p><p align="justify">These memos are, as Mr. Lewis says, shocking: </p><blockquote><p align="justify">Reading through the memoranda written by Bush administration lawyers on how prisoners of the "war on terror" can be treated is a strange experience. The memos read like the advice of a mob lawyer to a mafia don on how to skirt the law and stay out of prison. Avoiding prosecution is literally a theme of the memoranda.... </p></blockquote><div align="justify">The authors might argue that they should be exempt from criticism because they were providing confidential advice to clients, not advancing the government's position before the public. However, the substance of the advice given leads to a different conclusion. The principal task of the lawyer as counselor is to advise his client of the implications of a future course of action. Most of us have tended to see that role primarily as warning the client of the potential downside of any proposed move. Some of us have emphasized this to the point of being accused by clients of negativism, obstructionism, and lack of imagination. The memos in question certainly do not have that character; quite the contrary, they are licenses bend the law, if not to break it outright. At the very least, these lawyers did a disservice to their clients by not emphasizing the hazards.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">However, more importantly, they gave advice no ethical lawyer can give to a public official: to evade, ignore or break the law, to adopt policies and practices universally condemned, and to justify all this by the arrogation of power and authority inimical to the continued existence of democracy and the rule of law. The mob lawyer looks like a paragon in comparison.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Lewis' next target is an op-ed piece written by Mr. Gonzales in defense of the military-tribunal order. In a way, it was no different than the arguments made in print or by interview by other administration spokespeople, notably Condoleezza Rice: offering the official and, at least by implication, informed and correct version of events. However, Mr. Gonzales, as a lawyer, was applying the imprimatur of his supposed expertise not only to a policy but to the exposition of a document which had sweeping legal implications. This imposed upon him an obligation to be sound in his analysis and to describe the issues fairly and accurately. He did not meet that standard, as Mr. Lewis pointed out at the time.<sup><small>6</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Lewis criticizes an argument made by Solicitor General Olson in the Padilla case: because DoD had allowed a single, unsatisfactory meeting between Padilla and his lawyers, the issue of access to counsel was moot. I agree that such an argument should be rejected out of hand, but the Solicitor General made worse arguments. In <i>Padilla,</i> he argued for an expansive view of presidential power; in <i>Hamdi,</i> that became a matter of placing the President above the law. This amounts to public advocacy of the general theory, though not of the extreme applications, found in the memos. However, as a matter of professional ethics, his situation is different than the others'. He was assigned to argue the government's position in pending cases and did so mostly in a respectable fashion, in contrast to Mr. Gonzales' deliberate misstatements to the general public. Mr. Olson's arguments, however misguided or even illegitimate, were made in a judicial forum where they could be opposed, unlike those of the memo-writers, who were creating an imperium behind closed doors.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Lewis also referred to an instance of improper conduct which occurred after the <i>Padilla</i> case had been argued, but before the decision was announced:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">. . . The deputy attorney general, James B. Comey Jr., released a lengthy document stating what the government said Padilla had done to help al-Qaeda. . . .<br /></p><p align="justify">Comey's intervention was so crude that one wonders what he hoped to achieve by it. Could he conceivably have hoped to move members of the Supreme Court toward the government's position, in favor of the endless confinement of Padilla without trial? Whatever his reason, Comey's action was of a kind that used to be considered beyond the pale for government lawyers.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Trying cases in the press indeed used to be bad form, and should be still, but Mr. Comey's announcement not only is an instance of a too-common practice, but follows the example of his boss, who puffed and preened when Padilla was declared an enemy combatant and, like Comey, declared Padilla's guilt.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">I wholeheartedly subscribe to Mr. Lewis' reaction to all of this:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">For me, the twisting of the law by lawyers is especially troubling. I have spent my life believing that the safety of this difficult, diverse country lies to a significant extent in the good faith of lawyers - in their commitment to respect the rules. But the Bush lawyers have been brazen in their readiness to twist, dissemble, and invent in the cause of power.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">He suggests that the lawyers in question might be subject to professional discipline. At the least, there should be some soul-searching. It's embarrassing to be compelled to admit the fairness of Mr. Lewis' summary remark: "There is a French phrase for betrayal of standards by intellectuals: la trahison des clercs. I think this is a lawyer's version: la trahison des avocats."<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1. John Yoo, Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, January 9, 2002, p.11.<br />2. Alberto R. Gonzales, Memorandum for the President, January 25, 2002, p. 2.<br />3. Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, August 1, 2002, pp. 1, 6.<br />4. Ibid, p. 31.<br />5. [Draft] Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations, 6 March 2003, pp. 21, 24.<br />6. Column, <i>The New York Times,</i> 12/4/01.</small><br /><br /></div><p align="justify"><b>July 25, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">News reports indicate that the Democratic Convention will minimize attacks on President Bush and emphasize Senator Kerry's positive attributes. It's tempting to think that this passes up a great opportunity, as there is so much of Bush to criticize. However, for two reasons, the proposed strategy is the right one. First, Kerry still is something of an unknown, and the time should be spent on giving people a reason to vote for him. The situation may not be as bad as "Boondocks" had it today: an undecided voter gives his opinion of Bush, starting with "he seems to like to lie a lot" and ending with "basically, life stinks and it's all Bush's fault," only to add, "I hear that Kerry might be a little wishy-washy on some issues, so right now I could go either way."<sup><small>1</small></sup> However, the truth isn't far from that: the task is to sell Kerry.<br /></p><p align="justify">In addition, accentuating the positive will be a welcome contrast. Bush has so little to say on his own behalf that his current ad tells us that leadership is important, but instead of demonstrating how Bush fulfills that requirement, attacks Kerry. The negative tone of his ads will pall eventually, and the fact that he couldn't find any examples of his leadership to talk about is obvious enough without Kerry's making an issue of it. It wouldn't hurt to point out that his ads usually misrepresent the facts, but a contrast in style needs to be maintained. Let George be the one without presidential character.<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. Aaron McGruder; Universal Press Syndicate via washingtonpost.com. </small></p><p align="justify"><b>August 2, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The P-I reported Saturday that the President had returned to the campaign trail the day before; his theme is that he has delivered "results" on education, health care, the economy and national security. The headline used the quotation marks, which is appropriate. Consider the economy.<br /></p><p align="justify">In his radio address on Saturday,<sup><small>1</small></sup> Mr. Bush said that "since last summer our economy has grown at a rate as fast as any in nearly twenty years." He chose "last summer" because the rate for the third quarter of 2003 was very high. Because of that, the average GDP increase for the three quarters ending March 31 was an impressive 5.37%. He has to stop there in order to make his twenty-year claim, because the trend is down; preliminary figures for the second quarter show a gain of only 3%.<sup><small>2</small></sup> The stock market doesn't reflect much optimism, with the Dow off 2.8% in July, 3.01% for the year.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush also said, "Since last August, Americans have started work at more than 1.5 million new jobs..." His number is accurate, but again the beginning date is carefully chosen, as last September was the point at which jobs first showed steady gains. The net change from January 2001 through June, 2004 is minus 1,087,000,<sup><small>3 </small></sup>but never mind. Even within his chosen period, it is difficult to see an encouraging trend. The improvement peaked in April, with a gain of 353,000 jobs; June saw an increase of only 112,000.<sup><small>4</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Any meaningful evaluation of the job numbers must take account of the fact that the work force is expanding. Estimates of the rate of growth have varied, but generally have indicted that something in the neighborhood of 130,000 to 140,000 new jobs must be created each month in order to keep up. Since last August we have added 151,200 jobs per month, running slightly ahead of demand based on those estimates. However, work force growth may be accelerating; one report shows an increase of 233,000 in May.<sup><small>5</small></sup> Not surprisingly, the unemployment rate hasn't moved much; it was 6.1% in September, 5.6% in January, and 5.6% in June.<sup><small>6</small></sup> Long-term unemployment continues to be the pattern. In June, 2003, 21.8% of the unemployed had been out of work for more than 26 weeks; last month it was 21.6%. The mean and median duration of unemployment were 19.6 and 11.7 weeks in June 2003; a year later they were 19.9 and 10.8.<sup><small>7 </small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The President claimed that, of the new jobs, "many [are] in high-growth, high-paying industries." Perhaps proportion, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder; others see most new jobs paying less than those lost. In a speech on July 2, Mr. Bush said that real after-tax incomes were up 11 percent since December of 2000.<sup><small>8 </small></sup>I don't know what source he used, but I suspect that his number is an average which is skewed by the rising incomes of those at the top, who also got the big tax cuts. He more or less gave that away by adding a lame joke: "Real after-tax incomes -- that means that the amount of money in somebody's wallet is increasing. That's what we want to hear, isn't it; particularly is [sic] you're somebody who has got a wallet." Working people haven't shared in that gain. Real wages have fallen for six of the last seven months and are below the level of November 2001, the designated end of the recession.<sup><small>9</small> </sup><br /></p><p align="justify">On Saturday, the President said that economic growth is causing estimates of deficits to shrink. The estimates indeed have been reduced. A report by the Office of Management and Budget now projects a deficit of $445 billion for fiscal 2004, down 76 billion from an estimate in February.<sup><small>10</small></sup> However, the February number, $521 billion, was discounted at the time as an intentional exaggeration designed to allow the argument just made. Mr. Bush went on to claim that, "because of my policy of strengthening the economy while enforcing spending discipline in Washington, we remain on pace to reduce the deficit by half in the next five years." Where he finds evidence of spending discipline is a mystery; the OMB report notes that its estimate of spending has increased since February.<br /></p><p align="justify">I've lost track of which deficit Mr. Bush plans to cut. He claimed in the State of the Union last January that his budget could "the deficit" in half over five years. At that point the only firm figure was the 2003 deficit of 375 billion. Did he plan to reduce the deficit to 187.5 billion? Or did he have in mind the fiscal 2004 deficit, which was estimated at 475 billion in the OMB report in July, 2003? Or was it the revised 2004 estimate of 521 billion issued in February? Or, on Saturday, was he "on pace" to cut the new 2004 forecast of 445 billion in half? Or does he mean that the deficit, as a percentage of GDP, will be halved? A chart in the OMB report suggests that.<br /></p><p align="left">It probably doesn't matter. None of the numbers has much credibility given the administration's lack of skill in forecasting, combined with its lack of candor. As an example, perhaps of the former, certainly of the latter, the deficit forecast by OMB for 2005 doesn't reflect the full cost of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; the report notes that they "are expected to require additional funding." Estimating those amounts will be deferred until next year, by coincidence after the election.<br />______________________<br /><br /><small>1. <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040731.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040731.html</a><br />2. Department of Commerce; <a href="http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/gdpchg.xls">www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/gdpchg.xls</a><br />3. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); <a href="http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?ce">http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?ce</a><br />4. BLS; <a href="http://data.bls.gov/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=CES0000000001&output_view=net_1mth">http://data.bls.gov/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=CES0000000001&output_view=net_1mth</a> </small><small><strong>8/22/04</strong>: Correction: March showed a gain of 353,000, April 324,000.<br />5. Economic Policy Institute (EPI), 6/4/04; <a href="http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_econindicators_jobspict_20040604">www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_econindicators_jobspict_20040604</a><br />6. BLS; <a href="http://data.bls.gov/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS14000000">http://data.bls.gov/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS14000000</a><br />7. BLS; <a href="ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.cpseea12.txt">ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.cpseea12.txt</a><br />8. <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040702-3.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040702-3.html</a><br />9. EPI, 7/16/04; www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_ snapshots_07162004<br />10. OMB, Fiscal Year 2005, Mid-Session Review, 7/30/04; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/05msr.pdf">www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/05msr.pdf</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>August 24, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Returning from a vacation during which we were more isolated from the news than usual, we find the world little improved:<br /></p><p align="justify">Only about 32,000 jobs were created in July, far below forecasts. This continued a downward trend from the peaks of March and April. June, originally reported at 112,000, has been revised to 78,000. The trade deficit reached a record $55.8 billion in June, which may result in a downward revision of the already-low estimate of 3% growth in GDP for the second quarter.<br /></p><p align="justify">With recovery fragile and no obvious signs of inflation, the Fed's interest-rate increase seems ill-timed, but the speculation is that it will raise the rate again.<br /></p><div align="justify">______<br /></div><p align="justify">The attacks on Kerry's war record are ludicrous coming from people who support George Bush. Their success demonstrates that many Americans, especially many veterans, place rhetoric above deeds. The attacks, to all appearances, are unfair, but Kerry brought this on himself by running as a war hero, and as an unrepentant supporter of the invasion of Iraq.<br /></p><p align="justify">One of the ironies of the controversy is that the Vietnam war, by earlier consensus a mistake, has been transformed into a noble enterprise by 9-11. This pseudo-patriotic fantasy drives the "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth," who are more upset by Kerry's criticism of the war than his medals. The greater irony is that Vietnam has been so transformed by support for the even less justifiable Iraq war.<br /></p><div align="justify">______</div><div align="justify"><br /></div><p align="justify">The turnover of "sovereignty" to an Iraqi government did not change much. Fighting and general chaos continue; more American military personnel have been killed per day since June 28, the date of the turnover, than before.<sup><small>1 </small></sup><br />________________<br /><br /><small>1. 1.96 per day since 6/28; 1.82 to that date; <a href="http://icasualties.org/oif/">http://icasualties.org/oif/</a></small><br /></p><p align="justify"><b>August 31, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The Seattle papers reported last week that many voters have called or e-mailed the Secretary of State's office to complain about the new primary election ballot. Some of the complaints may relate to the ballot form, but most seem to reflect a belated realization that the system has changed. The blanket primary is no more; now each of us is limited, in the primary, to voting for the candidates of one party. In practice, this means selecting a Democratic, Republican or Libertarian ballot (or, in some counties, limiting oneself to the appropriate section of a combined ballot form). To many people across the country, this may not seem like news, but to Washingtonians it is a revolution. Not only have we had the blanket primary for as long as nearly anyone can remember,<sup><small>1</small></sup> it has become synonymous in our minds with democracy, with the right to vote as we see fit.<br /></p><p align="justify">A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, its members no doubt having been raised in less enlightened jurisdictions, think otherwise, and in <i>California Democratic Party v. Jones</i> they struck down the blanket primary in that state. As the California statute was modeled on Washington's, the demise of our version was foreordained. The Ds, Rs and Ls combined here, as they had in California, to challenge the Washington system. They failed in District Court, but the Ninth Circuit bestowed upon them the blessings of <i>Jones</i> jurisprudence, and the Supremes, having no reason to disagree, denied cert.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Legislature duly passed a bill establishing a non-blanket system, but rather than adopt the party-controlled system known as the Montana ballot, it opted for the Louisiana procedure of sending to the final election the two candidates receiving the most votes, regardless of party. However, concerned that the courts might find fault with that scheme, it included in the bill a provision that, if the Louisiana ballot were struck down, the Montana ballot would be used. Governor Locke vetoed the portion of the bill referring to Louisiana, leaving (presto!) Montana.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Governor, who was annoyed at the parties for challenging the blanket primary, claimed to be fearful that the Louisiana ballot would not survive a court challenge. More likely, he was concerned that the lawsuit threatened by the parties would leave this year's election in chaos. The parties have graduated from changing the system by litigation to changing it by the mere threat.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Washington State Grange, which had led the campaign for the blanket primary in the early thirties, sued to have the Governor's creative use of the veto set aside. Alas, the State Supreme Court ruled that completely changing the intent of a bill isn't a misuse of the partial-veto power accorded our governor. (We don't know why it so ruled, as no opinions have been filed, even though the decision was handed down on June 10.) The Secretary of State, a Republican whose preferences are, in order, the blanket primary and the Louisiana system, dutifully created a Montana ballot. He has been rewarded with the outraged e-mails.<br /></p><p align="justify">There are two ironies here. We now have a ballot which probably is the third choice of most of the people, and the first choice only of the parties. In addition, the "parties," at least in the case of the Democrats and Republicans, are such ephemeral entities that it is ludicrous to refer to their rights. Defining the parties in California was difficult; here, where we do not register by party, it is impossible; they are, shall we say, without form and void. The opinions expressed in the litigation are those of the state chairmen and perhaps a few other officials. Certainly they do not reflect the views of the people; a 2001 poll reported that 79% of Washington voters favored the blanket primary.<br /></p><p align="justify">I have difficulty understanding why the interests of a few functionaries rise to such constitutional heights that the people cannot decide how they will elect their representatives. Justice Scalia had a chance to explain that in his opinion in <i>Jones.</i> He didn't explain it to me, which means that one of us doesn't understand the Constitution and democratic theory. My natural modesty would assign the fault to me were it not for <i>Bush v. Gore.</i><br />_______________<br /><br /><small>1. It became law in 1935, three years after my mother, who is 93, became eligible to vote.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>September 2, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">I can't get any sense of where the presidential election is headed. Even before the convention, polls showed Bush gaining, but they indicated that his strength is his role in the war on terror, which is so illogical that it's difficult to credit.<br /></p><p align="justify">Anecdotal evidence suggests a migration toward Kerry. A recent and moderately significant example is the decision of <i>The Seattle Times</i> to endorse Kerry: "Four years ago, this page endorsed George W. Bush for president. We cannot do so again - because of an ill-conceived war and its aftermath, undisciplined spending, a shrinkage of constitutional rights and an intrusive social agenda." Numerous ads feature people who voted for Bush four years ago but now support Kerry, including a former Air Force Chief of Staff. Much of the left seems to have come into the real world, ready to vote for, if not to admire, Kerry.<br /></p><p align="justify">The GOP is drawing criticism from present or former stalwarts: <i>The New York Times</i> in the past few days has carried ads by moderates (a group including former governor and senator Dan Evans) and a conservative (Pat Buchanan), both accusing the party of losing its way and betraying former principles.<br /></p><p align="justify">All of this may add up to nothing. We shall see.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>September 10, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The Congressional Budget Office now projects a record deficit of $422 billion for the fiscal year ending September 30, $46 billion more than the previous high, set last year. The CBO described its findings as follows: "The nation's fiscal outlook has not changed substantially since March.... The deficits estimated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 have shrunk somewhat, but the deficits projected for later years have grown."<sup><small>1</small></sup> Ever eager to spin, the Bush campaign declared that the new estimate is "a sign of the economic growth that is a result of President Bush's leadership on tax relief." In other words, because this year's deficit is a little less awful than previously expected, we're galloping down the road to prosperity.<br /></p><p align="justify">This is stretching things a bit. After tax cuts which presumably had some stimulative effect, the recovery is anemic. GDP growth now is estimated to have been only 2.8% in the second quarter, the stock market is in the doldrums and job growth still is barely enough to cover additions to the work force. Recent Census figures show that the number of Americans in poverty rose again last year, those without health insurance reached a record number last year, and real median income is flat. <sup><small>2</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The tax cuts and the cost of our military adventures are major contributors to the deficit and the burgeoning debt. The CBO estimates that the ten-year deficit will total 2.3 trillion if we continue to spend at the current rate in Iraq and Afghanistan, 0.9 trillion if that ends this year. If the tax cuts expire, as now provided, in 2010, the total deficit through 2014 (assuming the wars go on) will be 2.3 trillion, but if the cuts are made permanent, it will be 4.5 trillion. (The President, in his radio address last Saturday again called for "making tax relief permanent.")<sup><small>3 </small></sup>So, over ten years, those two Bush policies would add 3.6 trillion to the debt, creating a massive burden for future generations, a serious threat to Social Security, a budget in thrall to huge interest payments, distortion of financial markets and weakening of national security.<br /></p><p align="justify">Why has the Bush administration run huge deficits and advocated policies which will make them permanent? One theory, a retread from the Reagan days, is that the deficits are intentional, that the plan is to starve the government to death. However, even if we assume that nuts like Grover Norquist want to kill the entire beast, our imperialists obviously need part of it to be active and powerful, and that takes money; an empire cannot survive without a secure financial base for his empire, which current policies certainly will not provide.<br /></p><p align="justify">A more imaginative theory is that Bush is an apocalyptic Christian who expects the second coming at any moment, so planning for an ordinary human future is irrelevant. It could explain his environmental policies: who needs forests or clean air if all is to be transformed? However, that seems a little much. This is not the first time that a nation has followed a self-destructive path, so we probably need not resort to eschatology for an explanation.<br /></p><p align="justify">No doubt many forces are at work in fashioning the Bush policies. It seems to me that, along with greed and hubris, one of the more significant is simple stupidity. Many dismiss Mr. Bush as intellectually challenged, accurately I think. Usually that leads to speculation about the power behind the throne, which generally leads to Dick Cheney. However, Mr. Cheney seems to be every bit as dumb as the President. A recent article<sup><small>4</small></sup> chronicles the Vice President's career in a way that suggests that his singular mismatch of talent and attitude have made him a millstone to every organization he has joined. However, like Mr. Bush, he has ever failed upward and, if current polls are to believed, both will once again succeed by failure.<br />_________________<br /><br /><small>1. The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update (issued 9/04); <a href="http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1944&sequence=0">www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1944&sequence=0</a>.<br />2. Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in The United States, 2003 (issued 8/04); <a href="http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf">www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf</a><br />3. <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040904.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040904.html</a><br />4. T.D. Allman, "The Curse of Dick Cheney" (posted Aug 25, 2004); <a href="http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story?id=6450422">www.rollingstone.com/politics/story?id=6450422</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>September 12, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">On Friday, Bill Moyers' NOW presented a review of the investigation by the 9-11 commission. In its quiet way, the program was a more devastating indictment of the Bush administration than <i>Fahrenheit 9-11.</i> The most effective segments were the excerpts from the testimony of Condoleezza Rice, in which she lamely attempted to excuse her failure, and the President's, to take terrorism warnings seriously. If a Democratic administration had so performed, there would have been calls for impeachment.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Republican Convention presented President Bush to the people as a strong and decisive leader, ready and able to protect us from terrorists. I don't know whether he could have prevented 9-11, but his failure even to take the threat seriously and his attempts to thwart any investigation make his claim to be our protector both ludicrous and shameful.<br /></p><p align="justify">Little has been done to improve domestic security since 9-11. Ports remain virtually unprotected. Baggage and cargo on airplanes still are inadequately screened. Railroads, chemical plants and nuclear power plants all remain vulnerable. The administration in effect admits this by trotting out a terrorism warning whenever public attention needs to be diverted from even more unwelcome news. Nuclear nonproliferation has been a low priority, ironically increasing the possibility of that mushroom cloud Rice warned about.<br /></p><p align="justify">Although no connection between Saddam Hussein and 9-11 existed, our principal response to 9-11 was to invade Iraq, the results of which have been over one thousand American and countless Iraqi deaths, chaos, mounting debt, the alienation of allies and the inspiration of enemies.<br /></p><p align="justify">Dick Cheney warns that a vote for the wrong person might put us at risk. Indeed; look at the record.<br /></p><p align="justify"><b>September 14, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">In a speech on Sunday, John Edwards challenged the Bush forces to stop claiming there was a connection between Saddam, al Qaeda and 9-11. Referring to a "Meet the Press" interview of Colin Powell, he said, "Today, Secretary of State Powell made clear that there is no connection between Saddam Hussein and the attacks on September the 11th. From this day forward, this administration should never suggest that there is." <sup><small>1 </small></sup>A Bush campaign spokesman dismissed the charge. No doubt we will be reminded that the President once made a pro forma denial of a connection. ("We've had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the September 11th.")<sup><small>2 </small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Senator Edwards' point is that the connection has been implied repeatedly, and recently. At a campaign appearance in Cincinnati,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Cheney recounted the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, in which the United States punished the Taliban for harboring al-Qaida, which is blamed for the Sept. 11 attacks. Then he said, "In Iraq, we had a similar situation."<br /></p><p align="justify">Saddam, he said, "provided safe harbor and sanctuary for terrorists for years," including al-Qaida.<sup><small>3</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">Even Secretary Powell's denial was hedged:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">I have no indication that there was a direct connection between the terrorists who perpetrated these crimes against us on the 11th of September, 2001, and the Iraqi regime. We know that there had been connections and there had been exchanges between al-Qaeda and the Saddam Hussein regime and those have been pursued and looked at, but I have seen nothing that makes a direct connection between Saddam Hussein and that awful regime and what happened on 9/11.<sup><small>4</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">Edwards' critique is not a matter of sniping on a minor issue; it is critical in terms of principle and politics. The deliberately misleading statements by the administration about an Iraq-al Qaeda connection and about WMD were important in gaining support for war and the misperceptions thus planted are a major source of Bush's support. Continuing the pattern, Secretary Powell, in answer to a question about WMD on Sunday, stretched the truth, referring to Iraq's "intention and capability" to produce such weapons.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The problem is revealed by polls conducted by The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and Knowledge Networks. In March the poll <sup><small>5 </small></sup>disclosed that the administration's hints about Iraq had been swallowed, as intended. It found that 57% believed that there was a close connection between Iraq and al Qaeda and 60% believed that Iraq had WMD or "a major program for developing them." The exact numbers were as follows:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify"><u>Iraq's relationship to al Qaeda</u><br /></p><p align="justify">11% There was no connection at all.<br /><br />29% A few al Qaeda individuals visited Iraq or had contact with Iraqi officials.<br /><br />37% Iraq gave substantial support to al Qaeda, but was not involved in the September 11th attacks.<br /><br />20% Iraq was directly involved in carrying out the September 11th attacks. </p><p align="justify"><u>Iraq and WMD</u><br /></p><p align="justify">38% Had actual weapons of mass destruction.<br /><br />22% Had no weapons of mass destruction but had a major program for developing them.<br /><br />31% Had some limited activities that could be used to help develop weapons of mass destruction, but not an active program.<br /><br />8% Did not have any activities related to weapons of mass destruction. </p></blockquote><div align="justify">The report noted that the numbers had changed very little over time and commented on the disconnect between the majority beliefs and the evidence:<br /><br /></div><blockquote><p align="justify">Given that neither of these beliefs has been borne out by long and costly investigations into the activities of the fallen regime, and given the assessments challenging these views by high-profile figures like David Kay..., Hans Blix..., or Richard Clarke..., it would seem that this might be a moment when these beliefs would begin to change.<br /></p><p align="justify">To the extent that they have not changed, this raises the question of "why?" </p></blockquote><div align="justify">At the time, two commentators suggested that Bush supporters simply believed anything which would validate their support. Juan Cole offered this explanation for the difference between the perceptions reported by PIPA and reality: "...I would suggest that the two-party system in the US has produced a two-party epistemology .... For his partisans, it is absolutely crucial that the president retain his credibility. Therefore, rather than face reality, they re-jigger it to create a fantasy world."<sup><small>6</small></sup> Todd Gitlin restated Professor Cole's conclusion as follows: "More than half of America is bending its second-hand ideas of reality in order to make them conform to their allegiance to George W. Bush. (Meanwhile, the lesser half, schooled in the Enlightenment, fumbles along with a funky old pre-postmodern concern for facts.)"<sup><small>7</small></sup> Both suggest that loyalty to President Bush precedes and determines opinion on Iraq. I have no doubt that this is true of many people. However, the poll report indicates that the causal connection also might run the other way, that belief on these issues could influence voting preference.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The report showed a strong correlation between belief as to the al Qaeda connection and support for presidential candidates. Those who believed Iraq supported al Qaeda favored Bush 57%-39%. Conversely, those who did not so believe went for Kerry 68-28. As to WMD, Bush led only among those falling into the first category (actual WMD), 74-21; those falling into the remaining categories went for Kerry, in order, 56-39, 71-23 and 92-5. As to causal connection, the report, based on "multivariate regression analysis," concluded that "beliefs had at least some impact on voting intentions." (Out of curiosity, I looked at my college textbook on statistics to see what regression analysis might be. I was not enlightened. I can't believe that I passed that course; the book might as well have been in Chinese.)<br /></p><p align="justify">The report commented that "a change in beliefs about prewar Iraq, or perceptions of what experts are saying, could have an impact on voting intentions." That brings us to the update to the study, published last month.<sup><small>8</small></sup> I wish that I could say that it reveals that the scales have dropped from the public's eyes. Instead, it shows only minor shifts in belief.<br /></p><p align="justify">Utilizing the same categories as above, the new results are as follows (March results in parentheses):<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify"><u>Iraq's relationship to al Qaeda</u><br /></p><p align="justify">10% (11) There was no connection at all.<br /><br />32% (29) A few al Qaeda individuals visited Iraq or had contact with Iraqi officials<br /><br />35% (37) Iraq gave substantial support to al Qaeda, but was not involved<br />in the September 11th attacks.<br /><br />15% (20) Iraq was directly involved in carrying out the September 11th attacks.<br /></p><p align="justify"><u>Iraq and WMD</u><br /></p><p align="justify">35% (38) Had actual weapons of mass destruction.<br /><br />19% (22) Had no weapons of mass destruction but had a major program for developing them.<br /><br />34% (31) Had some limited activities that could be used to help develop weapons of mass destruction, but not an active program.<br /><br />10 (8) Did not have any activities related to weapons of mass destruction.<br /></p></blockquote><div align="justify"><br />So true believers on al Qaeda are down from 57% to 50%, and on WMD, down from 60% to 54%.<br /></div><p align="justify">A small shift away from Bush might be predicted. PIPA did not assess voter preference in the August study, but other polls do not indicate any such movement. The August report did include questions about attitudes toward Mr. Bush, which seem to indicate some erosion of approval:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">When Americans are asked how they think "the way that President Bush has dealt with the situation in Iraq" will affect their vote in the upcoming election, a plurality of 44% say it will decrease the likelihood they will vote for President Bush (up from 41% in March), while 34% say it will increase the likelihood and 19% say it will have no effect on their vote...<br /></p><p align="justify">... When asked whether they "think President Bush gave the country the most accurate information he had before going to war with Iraq, or "deliberately misled people to make the case for war," Americans are divided, with 48% saying he gave accurate information and 49% saying he deliberately misled the public....<br /></p><p align="justify">... While 69% said the President went to war with Iraq based on incorrect assumptions, only 30% thought the president knew these assumptions were incorrect. However 59% believed "some key people in US intelligence agencies" knew this - up from 48% in November 2003.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">The last obviously is affected by the pass given the President by the Senate investigation, but the 30% result seems inconsistent with the finding in the prior paragraph.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Asked about the "assumptions about Iraq" on which the President relied in going to war, 27% now say they were correct, 69% incorrect; in November, 2003, the split was 40-55. A plurality (49-46) now think that going to war in Iraq was the wrong decision; previously a small majority had held the opposite opinion. The August poll added a question about use of resources in combatting terrorism. Fifty-two percent think that resources would have been better used in "pursuing al-Qaeda and stabilizing Afghanistan," 39% thought invading Iraq and overthrowing Saddam the better use.<br /></p><p align="left">One of the puzzles is the number of people who are unaware that various experts have rejected the al Qaeda and WMD connections. That has changed only slightly: "The newest findings indicate that awareness has grown that that [sic] most experts agree that Iraq did not have WMD before the war and that Iraq was not providing substantial support to al Qaeda; however, these are still not majority perceptions." If the experts' rejection of the Bush line could be brought home in some dramatic way, it might have a significant effect on the vote.<br />_____________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The Seattle Post-Intelligencer,</i> from Associated Press.<br />2. 9/17/03; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030917-7.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030917-7.html</a><br />3. <i>The Cincinnati Enquirer,</i> 9/10/04; <a href="http://www.wcpo.com/news/2004/local/09/09/cheney_ap.html">www.wcpo.com/news/2004/local/09/09/cheney_ap.html</a> Also included in the P-I article, note 1.<br />4. <a href="http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5981265/">www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5981265/</a><br />5. U.S. Public Beliefs on Iraq and the Presidential Election, <a href="http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqReport4_22_04.pdf">www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqReport4_22_04.pdf</a><br />6. "Informed Comment," 4/25/04; <a href="http://www.juancole.com/2004_04_01_juancole_archive.html">www.juancole.com/2004_04_01_juancole_archive.html</a><br />7. "The Faith-Based Superpower," <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/columns/view-15.jsp">www.opendemocracy.net/columns/view-15.jsp</a><br />8. U.S. Public Beliefs and Attitudes about Iraq, <a href="http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Report08_20_04.pdf">www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Report08_20_04.pdf</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>September 17, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">I am not a fan of conspiracy theories. They tend to misinterpret events or exaggerate their importance and to find connections which may not exist, all in the service of fitting those events into a pattern. In a sense, this is a risk in every theory, a temptation inherent in the desire to bring analytic order out of observed chaos. However, conspiracy theorists often have somewhat too much imagination and too little logical rigor.<br /></p><p align="justify">An example of this phenomenon is a book by David Ray Griffin, <i>The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11.</i> My attention was directed to the book primarily by a review by Robert Baer in the September 27 issue of <i>The Nation,</i> although I had read an interview<sup> <small>1</small></sup> of Dr. Griffin in April, shortly after the book was published. His plunge into conspiracy theory is the result of his rejection of the official accounts of 9-11. It leads him to present, sympathetically, accusations of official complicity in 9-11, ranging from false accounts after the fact (<i>e.g.,</i> to cover up negligence) to White House involvement in planning the attacks.<br /></p><p align="justify">Although <i>The New Pearl Harbor</i><sup><small>2</small></sup> is too eager to find the dark side, it reflects a skepticism about the accounts of 9-11 which is understandable, partly because the official explanations of some events are unsatisfactory, but more because it is difficult to imagine that the government could be so inept, and easy to believe that this administration is lying. Baer summarizes the attitude as follows:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Griffin is a thoughtful, well-informed theologian who before September 11 probably would not have gone anywhere near a conspiracy theory. But the catastrophic failures of that awful day are so implausible and the lies about Iraq so blatant, he feels he has no choice but to recycle some of the wilder conspiracy theories....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Dr. Griffin's account is in the form of a series of questions and a summary of theories advanced by others to answer those questions. He does not present those conspiracy theories as true, but only because he cannot verify all of the facts alleged: "It is for this reason that I claim only that these revisionists have presented a strong prima facie case for official complicity...." However, it is clear that he finds the conspiracy arguments persuasive: "If a significant portion of the evidence summarized here holds up, the conclusion that the attacks of 9/11 succeeded because of official complicity would become virtually inescapable."<br /></p><p align="justify">The discrepancies which Griffin and others see fall into four principal categories. The first consists of physical anomalies: How could the steel-framed World Trade Center towers be brought down by airplanes crashing into them? What caused the collapse of WTC Building 7, which was not struck? If an airplane flew into the Pentagon, why do photographs show virtually no debris of the plane? The second deals with behavioral anomalies, primarily those of President Bush: for example, why did he tarry over "My Pet Goat" while the country was under attack? Thirdly, why was the government so unprepared for the attacks and so inept in its response as they developed? Finally, why did the administration oppose and obstruct investigations? These are fair and important question. However, concluding, as some of Griffin's sources do - and as he seems inclined to do - that 9-11 was a U.S. government plot is quite a leap. As Baer puts it, Griffin's "most shocking" accusation is that<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">the Bush Administration knew the attack was coming and either let it happen or abetted the plotters as a way of jolting the nation into accepting its policy of pre-emptive warfare and transforming the Middle East.<br /></p><p align="justify">It's a monstrous proposition, which makes this a monstrous but in some ways important book. Someone, after all, should be asking in print why our foreign policy seems to have fallen into the hands of some malevolent band of Marx Brothers....</p></blockquote><p align="justify">Although Dr. Griffin is prepared to believe an extreme theory, he maintains a sense of balance. After describing all of the problems with the official accounts, he candidly lays out the problems concerning the conspiracy theories. One of those problems is that, if there was a conspiracy, it was ineptly carried out, i.e., it left too many of the suspicious circumstances that lead him to speculate that it exists. He states the alternatives as he sees them:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">... When all these rhetorical questions are taken together, it seems that we are faced not simply with a choice between an incompetence theory and a complicity theory. Rather, the choice seems to be between a theory involving subordinates who momentarily became incredibly incompetent, on the one hand, and a theory involving high-level officials who manifested incredible incompetence in creating a conspiracy, on the other.... </p></blockquote><div align="justify">That would seem to indicate that we should accept the official account, which requires believing only in incompetence, not incompetence plus a conspiracy. However, his answer is that such a conclusion in turn requires believing in an unlikely set of coincidences; only a conspiracy can explain them. He presents a list of 38 events or circumstances as proof of the impossibility of coincidence. Some seem factually shaky, some are pure speculation (did Flight 77 crash in Ohio or Kentucky rather than striking the Pentagon?<sup><small>3</small></sup>) and some are plausible examples of incompetence or unpreparedness for this sort of attack.<br /><br /></div><p align="left">However, no one, other than Bush & Co., can quarrel with his conclusion, which is that a more complete investigation is required. His book was published after the 9-11 commission was created but prior to its report, which addresses some of his concerns. However, that report, although a genuine contribution, is insufficient, for reasons inherent in the composition of the commission and the limitations imposed upon it.<br />_______________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The Santa Barbara Independent,</i>4/1/04, <a href="http://independent.com/news/news906.htm">http://independent.com/news/news906.htm</a><br />2. The book has been posted on vancouver.indymedia.com. I am assuming that the version on the web is authentic, although it is full of typos, possibly the result of unedited scanning.<br />3. Elsewhere, he speculates that it could have landed at Reagan Airport, unnoticed, after which its passengers somehow disappeared.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>September 28, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The November ballot will contain one referendum and four initiatives. One of the latter is the latest from Tim Eyman, who is falling into the useful-idiot category. This time he is fronting for gambling interests by pushing an initiative, I-892, which would lower property taxes by substituting state revenue from licensing "electronic scratch-ticket" terminals.<br /></p><p align="justify">The voters' pamphlet hasn't been published yet, but its contents are available on the Secretary of State's web site. The statement in support of the initiative is consistent with Eyman's record for clarity and veracity; it claims that Washington is the "seventh highest taxed state in the nation," citing The Tax Foundation.<sup> <small>1</small></sup> That organization ranks us #7 in total tax burden because we pay more than average in federal taxes. The same source shows that Washington is 21st in state and local taxes, which is what the initiative is about. Eyman also states that property taxes were $1 billion in 1980 and $6.25 billion in 2003, and that the increase is "obscene." However, the increase is partly due to inflation (113.6% in that period) and to population growth (48.4%). In addition, his fiscal claims are exaggerated. He promises that his scheme will produce $400 million in annual revenue, but the Office of Financial Management estimates $252 million when the system is fully installed.<sup><small>2</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Opponents of the initiative include Indian tribes whose gambling operations would face new competition and various people and organizations opposed to gambling, or at least to its extension, on principle. Eyman responds to the latter by claiming that the new terminals will not create new gamblers, but merely allow additional access to a finite market. Ironically, this supports another argument against the proposal. The Lottery Commission predicts a loss of revenue, from reduced sales of its products, of 15 to $30 million per year and the Gambling Commission forecasts a loss of up to $8.4 million per year to local governments from reduced play in the types of gambling they are allowed to tax.<sup><small>3 </small></sup>The amounts are speculative, but they further reduce the claimed $400 million benefit to the state from the scheme.<br /></p><p align="justify">The referendum, R-55, a measure which passed the legislature by modest majorities, asks the voters to authorize charter schools. One of the initiatives, I-884, would increase the sales tax and earmark the additional revenue for education. The former poses a serious and structurally basic issue of educational policy. The latter primarily is a revenue measure and appears to raise no major policy issues. The statement against is simply a claim that we're already overtaxed. (Either it was written anonymously by Eyman or someone is copying his style; it refers to tax increases by "politicians" and repeats that "Washington is the 7th highest taxed state in the nation.") Both of the school-related measures reflect the decline of the public school system, which neither will reverse nor even materially affect.<br /></p><p align="justify">Initiative I-297, originally presented to but not acted upon by the legislature, would, indirectly, ban further transfer of nuclear waste to Hanford until the existing mess is cleaned up. It addresses a real problem, but even the explanatory statement prepared by the AG's office is bafflingly complicated, and the measure, if passed, might be unenforceable.<br /></p><p align="justify">The remaining initiative, I-872, would substitute a Louisiana ballot for the partisan primary used for the first time this month. The new primary is so unpopular that the initiative may well pass, but not on its merit. The dominant themes seem to be punishment of the parties for destroying the blanket primary and the notion that the Louisiana system resembles it.<br /></p><p align="justify">The arguments for and against the initiative are mostly vague, but there is one from the opposition that could prove persuasive. Under the Louisiana system, no party is guaranteed a place on the final election ballot; the opposition obviously thinks that is bad. It tries to show just how awful it would be by arguing that, had the proposed system been in place in 1980, "the voters' ultimate choice, John Spellman, would never have appeared on the November ballot." This is a non sequitur. It is true that, because there was a spirited primary on the Democratic side between the conservative incumbent Dixy Lee Ray and the liberal challenger Jim McDermott, more people voted for each of them than for Spellman. McDermott won the Democratic primary but Spellman won the final. However, there is no reason to assume that the votes would have been distributed the same way had the Louisiana system been in place. In the existing system, the major parties are guaranteed a representative on the final ballot; if that changes, people may vote differently.<br /></p><p align="justify">The opposition statement does not raise constitutional issues, but it is a virtual certainty that they will appear in a legal challenge to the initiative should it pass. The outcome is anyone's guess. There is a somewhat anomalous passage in <i>California v. Jones</i> which may indicate that the Louisiana primary would survive. After rejecting all of the state's arguments in support of the California blanket primary, the Court added another reason for holding against it: even if the state's interests were "compelling," its version of a blanket primary was not "a narrowly tailored means" of advancing them. Instead it could have opted for what the Court confusingly calls "a nonpartisan blanket primary," described as follows:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">... Generally speaking, under such a system, the State determines what qualifications it requires for a candidate to have a place on the primary ballot--which may include nomination by established parties and voter-petition requirements for independent candidates. Each voter, regardless of party affiliation, may then vote for any candidate, and the top two vote getters (or however many the State prescribes) then move on to the general election.... </p></blockquote><div align="justify">That sounds like the Louisiana system. The Court apparently believed that such an arrangement would avoid the impact on parties which it held to violate the First Amendment. However, I'm not sure how much reliance one could place on these remarks. They are <i>dicta</i> and the Court may disown its ramblings if an actual case arises. It would not be difficult to argue that, at least in its I-872 form, the Louisiana primary still raises an associational issue.<br /><br /></div><p align="left">The structure of Washington's ballot may be unsettled for some time.<br />_____________________<br /><br /><small>1. <a href="http://www.taxfoundation.org/">http://www.taxfoundation.org/</a><br />2. Potential Fiscal Impacts of I-892, pp. 3-4; <a href="http://www.ofm.wa.gov/initiatives/2004/892/">www.ofm.wa.gov/initiatives/2004/892/</a><br />3. Potential Fiscal Impacts of I-892, pp. 3-4.</small> </p><p align="justify"><strong>October 4, 2004</strong></p><p align="justify">Why do people support George Bush? That has baffled me since he appeared on the scene, and the debate Thursday did nothing to enlighten me. An additional level of mystery is added by a new poll by The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), which reports,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Majorities of Bush supporters incorrectly assumed that Bush favors including labor and environmental standards in trade agreements (84%), and the US being part of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (69%), the International Criminal Court (66%), the treaty banning land mines (72%), and the Kyoto Treaty on global warming (51%). They were divided between those who knew that Bush favors building a new missile defense system now (44%) and those who incorrectly believe he wishes to do more research until its capabilities are proven (41%). </p></blockquote><p align="justify">A majority of Bush supporters did get two of his positions right: "Bush favors increased defense spending (57%) and wants the US, not the UN, to take the stronger role in developing Iraq's new government (70%)." <p align="justify">Uncommitted voters also were wrong as to most of Bush's positions, but by smaller margins. Here's a composite table, showing perceptions of Bush's positions by his supporters and the uncommitted:<br /><u>Pro-Bush.....Uncommitted</u><br /><u>Think Bush is for (he's against):</u><br />84% .............69% labor & environmental standards in trade agreements<br />69% .............51% Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty<br />66% .............47%* International Criminal Court<br />72% .............50% treaty banning land mines<br />51% .............45%* Kyoto treaty on global warming </p><p align="justify"><u>Think Bush is for (he is):</u><br />44%* ............35% building a new missile defense system now<br />57% ..............41% increased defense spending<br />70% ..............46%* US, rather than UN, to lead re Iraq's new government<br />* pluralities</p><p align="justify">Bush supporters were asked their own views on these issues, producing a stunning result: his supporters disagree with his position on every issue in this survey. As to five, they appear to have projected their preferences: they favor, and mistakenly believe he favors, labor and environmental standards, the test ban treaty, the ICC, the land mine treaty and Kyoto. However, at least a plurality understand that Bush disagrees with them on the remaining three: missile defense system now, increased defense spending, and US v. UN lead in Iraq. Here's a comparison of Bush supporters' views and their perceptions of his:</p><p align="justify"><u>Supporters favor....Think Bush favors<br /></u>93% .............................84% labor & environmental standards in trade agreements<br />68% .............................69% Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty<br />75% .............................66% International Criminal Court<br />66% .............................72% treaty banning land mines<br />54% .............................51% Kyoto treaty on global warming<br />33% .............................44%* building a new missile defense system now<br />40% .............................57% increased defense spending<br />44% .............................70% US, rather than UN, to lead re Iraq's new government </p><p align="justify">The five issues as to which Bush's positions are misperceived have had less publicity than the three where Bush's views are correctly understood, so as to them we may be seeing the result of wishful thinking unchallenged by information. Its tempting to suppose that the media are at fault in not making facts clear. However, reference to the results for Kerry may lead to a different conclusion. Tables corresponding to the previous two show this:</p><p align="justify"><u>Pro-Kerry........Uncommitted<br />Think Kerry is for (he is):</u><br />90% ....................75% labor & environmental standards in trade agreements<br />77% .....................60% Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty<br />59% ....................49%* International Criminal Court<br />79% .....................57% treaty banning land mines<br />74% .....................54% Kyoto treaty on global warming<br />68% .....................46%* further research on missile system, no present deployment<br />43%* ...................39%* defense spending at present level<br />80% .....................71% UN, rather than US, to lead re Iraq's new government<br />* pluralities</p><p align="justify">Kerry supporters also were asked their own views on these issues:</p><p align="justify"><u>Supporters favor.....Think Kerry favors</u><br />94% .............................90% labor & environmental standards in trade agreements<br />88% .............................77% Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty<br />74% .............................59% International Criminal Court<br />81% .............................79% treaty banning land mines<br />79% .............................74% Kyoto treaty on global warming<br />68% .............................68% further research on missile system, no present deployment<br />52% .............................43% defense spending at present level<br />85% .............................80% UN, rather than US, to lead re Iraq's new government </p><p align="justify">So, in contrast to the Bush survey, at least a plurality of Kerry's supporters and the uncommitted correctly understand his positions, and his supporters agree with all of them. Unless we assume wishful thinking which just happens to be correct as to Kerry, this indicates that the problem with the Bush results isn't the unavailability of correct information. </p><p align="justify">In responding to an earlier PIPA poll on different issues, Juan Cole and Todd Gitlin suggested that Bush supporters believe what they need to believe to validate their support. Perhaps uncommitted voters similarly need to think well of their president. That would fit part of the results. It doesn't explain why people who are way off on several of Bush's positions are right on others. </p><p align="left">In any case, if this poll is reliable, support for Mr. Bush doesn't flow from sympathy for his positions on these issues.<br />____________________<br /><br /><small>1. Public Perceptions of the Foreign Policy Positions of the Presidential Candidates, 9/29/04; <a href="http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Pres_Election_04/Report09_29_04.pdf">www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Pres_Election_04/Report09_29_04.pdf</a><br />2. The tables in this note are my presentation of the text of the report. The report includes a table, in a different form, corresponding to the first and third here.</small></p><p align="justify"><b>October 13, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">In Monday's column, Bob Herbert described the administration's reaction to bad news about employment and Iraq: "Reality. . . was shoved aside."<sup><small>1 </small></sup>How true; take the job situation first.<br /></p><p align="justify">Ninety-six thousand jobs were added in September. That isn't good news, but the administration touts it as proof of the effectiveness of its economic policy, i.e., its mania for tax cuts. The spin for some time has emphasized the job growth since August, 2003, when the number ceased to be negative; President Bush and Secretary of Commerce Evans claimed in the past few days that over 1.9 million jobs have been created over that period.<sup><small>2</small></sup> Assuming that they referred to seasonally adjusted nonfarm employment, which seems to be the usual measure, the gain is 1,778,000, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Using its number, that's an average of 136,769 per month; using theirs, it's 146,154. Even assuming the latter, we barely kept up with population growth. Over the past four months, results have been worse: a total gain of 405,000, a monthly average of 101,250. The net change from January, 2001 is a loss of 821,000 jobs.<sup><small> 3</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The denial of reality is greater as to Iraq. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG), under Charles Duelfer, has confirmed that there were no weapons of mass destruction and neither present capacity nor active programs to create them. The report<sup> <small>4</small></sup> does say that Saddam had a desire to have WMD; the President seized on that as his newly revised, latest-in-a-series rationale for war. However, apparently aware that mere desire hardly amounts to a threat, he fantasized facts contrary to the report: Saddam Hussein had "the materials" and "the means" to produce WMD.<sup><small>5</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">In addition to its general findings that Iraq had no WMD capability, the report destroys two of the claims made by Secretary Powell before the Security Council in a performance which convinced many of the need for war. The first concerned chemical weapons. Referring to photos of a site in Iraq, taken in May, 2002, he said, <blockquote><p align="justify">I'm going to show you a small part of a chemical complex called "Al Musayyib", a site that Iraq has used for at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field. . . .<br /></p><p align="justify">Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. . . .<sup><small>6</small></sup> </p></blockquote><div align="justify">The ISG report states that it investigated the question of movement and storage of chemical weapons (CW); it found "alternate, plausible explanations" for activities thought, prior to the war, to relate to chemical weapons. Specifically, ISG investigated pre-war activities "at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depot - the storage site that was judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike previously assessed."<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The second claim related to biological weapons (BW). Secretary Powell told the Security Council that Iraq had "mobile production facilities," including trailers, "used to make biological agents." On May 20, 2003, President Bush pointed to them as proof of the existence of WMD; on February 1, 2004, even though serious doubts had been expressed, Vice President Cheney asserted that the trailers were conclusive evidence of WMD programs. The ISG report first disposes of the general question of a mobile BW program: "In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons." As to the famous trailers,<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">ISG thoroughly examined two trailers captured in 2003, suspected of being mobile BW agent production units, and investigated the associated evidence. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers almost certainly designed and built the equipment exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. It is impractical to use the equipment for the production and weaponization of BW agent. ISG judges that it cannot therefore be part of any BW program.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">Another example of the administration's reaction to the intrusion of reality has to do with one of the major pre-war claims, that Iraq was reviving its nuclear program. This was based in large part on the argument that aluminum tubes acquired by Iraq were intended for use in centrifuges which would refine uranium. A principal player in this drama was National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. On September 8, 2002, she asserted, "We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do know that there have been shipments going into . . . Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to - high-quality aluminum tools that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs." Then she gave the punch line: "we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."<sup><small>7</small></sup> President Bush used the aluminum-tube claim and the mushroom-cloud line in his speech in Cincinnati in October, 2002. A week ago, <i>The New York Times</i> reported that the administration knew early on that the aluminum-tube argument was at least suspect: "almost a year before [her 9/8/02 statement], Ms. Rice's staff had been told that the government's foremost nuclear experts seriously doubted that the tubes were for nuclear weapons. . . ."<sup> <small>8</small></sup> Her current, typically lame, story is she knew there was a dispute, but "actually didn't really know the nature of the dispute."<sup><small> 9</small></sup><br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The unhappy fact is that misstatement simply is an administration policy. During confirmation hearings, Porter Goss, nominated to become Director of Central Intelligence, "said he agreed that statements by Vice President Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice that linked Iraq to the Sept. 11 attacks; to Al Qaeda; and to an active nuclear weapons program appeared to have gone beyond what was spelled out in intelligence reports at the time."<sup><small>10</small></sup> The exaggerations included the Rice theory of aluminum-tube usage, her statement that Iraq provided training to Al Qaeda in chemical weapons development and one of Mr. Cheney's favorites, that Mohammed Atta had met with an Iraqi official in Prague.<br /></p><p align="justify">The misstatements show that the administration was committed to war regardless of justification. Its detachment from realty is shown by the fact that it rushed ahead heedless of consequences. <i>The New York Times</i> reported recently that two pre-war intelligence estimates "predicted that an American-led invasion of Iraq would increase support for political Islam and would result in a deeply divided Iraqi society prone to violent internal conflict." These were presented to the President in January, 2003.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">One of the reports also warned of a possible insurgency against the new Iraqi government or American-led forces, saying that rogue elements from Saddam Hussein's government could work with existing terrorist groups or act independently to wage guerrilla warfare, the officials said. The assessments also said a war would increase sympathy across the Islamic world for some terrorist objectives, at least in the short run, the officials said.<sup><small>11</small> </sup></p></blockquote><div align="left">The same intelligence group recently painted a picture of present conditions and future prospects in Iraq less rosy than the White House version. The President dismissed their report as a guess. Scott McClellan characterized the authors as "pessimists and naysayers." The flight from reality continues.<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The New York Times,</i> 10/11/04.<br />2. Bush, 10/9/04; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041009.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041009.html</a><br />Evans, 10/8/04; <a href="http://www.commerce.gov/">www.commerce.gov/</a><br />3. All numbers except Bush's and Evans': Bureau of Labor Statistics; <a href="http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?ce">http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?ce</a><br />4. <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/wmd/100604_iraq_survey_group_Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf">www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/wmd/100604_iraq_survey_group_Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf</a> I am relying on the report summary, which covers sixteen pages. I have read only small portions of the 918-page full report.<br />5. "President Bush Discusses Iraq Report," 10/7/04; <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041007-6.html">www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041007-6.html</a><br />6. 2/5/03; <a href="http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm">www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm</a><br />7. Interview by Wolf Blitzer, CNN Late Edition, 9/8/02.<br />8. The <i>Times,</i> 10/3/04.<br />9. Associated Press, 10/3/04, reporting an interview on ABC's "This Week;" <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=134387">http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=134387</a><br />10. <i>The New York Times,</i> 9/21/04.<br />11. The <i>Times,</i> 9/28/04.</small><br /><br /></div><p align="justify"><b>October 17, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">In August we learned that the government had decided to release Yaser Hamdi, bringing the story of his imprisonment to an anticlimactic end, leaving unresolved many of the issues raised by the application of the enemy-combatant label to citizens.<br /></p><p align="justify">Hamdi's release was described as "tremendously embarrassing to the government," which it is: despite the administration's attempt to spin the event, it is a retreat. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's decision, which presumably led to the change of position, was called "an important legal victory for the government because the Supreme Court ruled that the government still has the authority to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, even if they can challenge the detentions."<sup><small>1</small></sup> That also is true. The meeting point of those opposing views is the potential hearing on the challenge; the government apparently could not prove that Hamdi was an enemy combatant, even though the Court accepted its definition of that term and hardly was demanding as to the burden of proof.<br /></p><p align="justify">Hamdi was expected to be released promptly and returned to his home in Saudi Arabia. However, the government attached list of conditions to the release, one of which was that he was not to leave that country for five years. The Saudi government balked and pointed out that it was being asked to enforce an agreement to which it is not a party and the premise of which is elusive. A Saudi representative asked, reasonably, "If he has not committed a crime ... why are the conditions in place?"<sup><small>2</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">Hamdi finally was sent home on October 11. Upon arriving at Riyadh, he complied with one of the conditions by renouncing his American citizenship. Presumably he has satisfied another, agreeing not to sue the U.S. for his illegal imprisonment. The State Department claimed that the release finally had taken place because Saudi Arabia had accepted the other conditions, and that the key to ending the delay was "making the Saudis feel comfortable with the terms of the deal, making them understand the arrangements and know what we were requiring of him." More likely Hamdi was sent home because the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, to which his case had been remanded, ordered that Hamdi be produced in court on October 12 unless he had been released and had arrived in Saudi Arabia by October 11.<sup><small>3</small> </sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The Saudis may or may not impose the travel restrictions which made up most of the remaining conditions. They appeared to be primarily face-saving boilerplate to begin with.<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1. Both quotes from <i>The Washington Post,</i> 9/23/04.<br />2. CNN.com, 9/29/04; also MSNBC.com (Associated Press), 9/30/04.<br />3. Order entered October 11; <a href="http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/2:02-cv-00439/docs/70250/0.pdf">http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/2:02-cv-00439/docs/70250/0.pdf</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>October 20, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">I have reached the point in my life when I should be reading great novels, listening to classical music, traveling, and reminiscing with old friends. Instead I spend my waking hours worrying about the future of the republic, specifically whether the voters will, in a burst of thoughtlessness, deliver its future into the hands of a gang who are ideologically driven, frequently incompetent and routinely dishonest.<br /></p><p align="justify">In a lecture two weeks ago, Brewster Denny, former Dean of the UW Graduate School of Public Affairs, referred to an observation of Jefferson's which is apt and ominous: "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be." Jefferson expanded on the risk, and proposed a solution:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The functionaries of every government have propensities to command at will the liberty and property of their constituents. There is no safe deposit for these but with the people themselves; nor can they be safe with them without information. Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe.<sup><small>1</small> </sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">Sadly, the formula in the last sentence assumes too much: the media may be free, but they have failed in their role as educators, and the people are more interested in being entertained than in being enlightened.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The media, which have been enablers of Bush's agenda, also have aided in burnishing his personal image. Currently they do this by reporting his campaign rallies as if they were real-world events. Mr. Bush is described and shown surrounded by admiring, enthusiastic people who cheer his every word. If these were honest public appearances, attended by ordinary people, that would be appropriate, but they are staged events before carefully screened audiences, and ought to be ignored. Instead the media reinforce the image that Mr. Bush is a man of the people, who adore him.<br /></p><p align="justify">Such images are important; apart from them, the President's campaign material is limited. His supporters have had little to say about his record at any time during the campaign. Indeed his record is the last thing they want anyone to consider, so the strategy, apart from making carefully nonspecific claims that Bush will keep us safe, has been to attack Kerry.<br /></p><p align="justify">An example of that approach was found on the op-ed page of Monday's <i>New York Times</i>. William Safire repeated the already tired accusation that the Senator did something rude in mentioning Mary Cheney's sexual orientation. For good measure, Mr. Safire attacked Senator Edwards for having done so during the vice-presidential debate. This feigned outrage is simply the latest diversion.<br /></p><p align="justify">By contrast, Bob Herbert's column on the same page described the situation in Iraq, which raises actual issues: Should we have invaded? What, truthfully, is the present situation? What should be done to improve that situation and to work toward withdrawal of our troops? However, those are so tiresomely substantive; throwing mud is more fun.<br /></p><p align="justify">Republican campaign ads in local races reflect that choice. Some of the worst have been directed at Dave Ross, the Democratic candidate for Congress from the 8th District. I had supposed that "socialized medicine" had become too laughable to be useful as an slur, but no; we received a flyer last week accusing Mr. Ross of advocating that awful system. To be sure we didn't miss the point, that this is unamerican, it included a picture of a Soviet officer. This week a TV ad accused Ross of waving a white flag in the war on terrorism; he wants - can you believe it? - to cut $100 billion from defense funding in the midst of that "war." Never mind that the spending he wants to cut, over time, is for the missile defense system which, even if it worked, would have nothing to do with defeating terrorism.<br /></p><p align="justify">We might suppose that the possibility of losing the 8th for the first time has made the GOP come unhinged. However, the Senate race follows the same pattern: an attack ad implies that Senator Murray also is soft on terrorism. This obviously is the new soft-on-communism; Republicans really have only a very few ideas.<br /></p><p align="justify">Actually, finding ideas among these accusations is being too generous. Despite their pretensions to the contrary, Republicans often still validate Lionel Trilling's appraisal in 1950: "the conservative impulse & the reactionary impulse do not, with some isolated & some ecclesiastical exceptions, express themselves in ideas but only in action or in irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas."<sup><small>2</small></sup><br />____________________<br /><br /><small>1. Entire quote from a letter to Colonel Charles Yancey, January 6, 1816; <a href="http://www.bartleby.com/73/492.html">www.bartleby.com/73/492.html</a><br />2. <i>The Liberal Imagination,</i> p. ix.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>October 23, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The connection between religious belief and the Bush presidency has been the subject of much speculation. There are numerous anecdotal accounts of the effect of religious belief on President Bush's decisions, some of which, assuming that he actually is deciding anything, are scary.<br /></p><p align="justify">The influence of religious belief on his popular support is equally intriguing. My impression is that his more outspoken religious followers have more political beliefs than religious ones and that neither bears much resemblance to Christian principles.<sup><small>1</small></sup> They use a strangely truncated Bible, consisting of Pentateuch, selected warnings from the prophets and Revelation.<br /></p><p align="justify">A recent article by Ron Suskind indicates that religion is indeed a factor both in Bush's decision-making process and in his political support. As to the former, Suskind quotes Bruce Bartlett: Bush "truly believes he's on a mission from God." Leaving aside whether that is an exaggeration or even a misreading, Bartlett's conclusion about its effect rings true: "Absolute faith like that overwhelms a need for analysis. The whole thing about faith is to believe things for which there is no empirical evidence. . . ." Disdain for empirical evidence does seem to lie at the heart of the administration's actions and its supporters' beliefs. <p align="justify">Suskind quotes an unidentified White House source who puts this view in imperial rather than religious terms:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The aide said that guys like me were ''in what we call the reality- based community,'' which he defined as people who ''believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality. . . . That's not the way the world really works anymore,'' he continued. ''We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality . . . we'll act again, creating other new realities . . . "<sup><small>2</small></sup></p></blockquote><div align="justify">Have they created a new reality? It looks like it. The most recent report<sup> <small>3</small></sup> by The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) shows, as its earlier polls have, that Bush supporters are unconnected to the world of empirical fact and that they are accepting the emperor's substitute reality.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">I had been reluctant, and I thought that PIPA's analysts had been reluctant, to conclude that Bush supporters simply lived in another world from the rest of us. However, the title of the current study is "The Separate Realities of Bush and Kerry Supporters," which says it all: Kerry supporters' views correspond to known facts, Bush supporters' views are at sharp variance form them.<br /></p><p align="justify">As in the previous study, three results stand out: Bush supporters are mistaken about significant facts, such as WMD in Iraq or its connection with al Qaeda; they are mistaken as to what experts, such as David Kay and Charles Duelfer, and the 9-11 Commission have found; they attribute to Mr. Bush views which match their own but which he does not hold, such as support for Kyoto. By contrast, Kerry supporters have those facts straight.<br /></p><p align="justify">These worlds intersect at two points. Majorities of both groups think that Bush is now claiming that Iraq had WMD just before the invasion, that he claimed before the war that there was a close connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, and that he is claiming now that there is clear evidence of that connection. Bush supporters agree with Kerry supporters that, if Iraq did not have WMD and was not providing support to al Qaeda, we should not have invaded. However, continuing the projection of their views, Bush supporters believe that he would not have gone to war under those facts; Kerry supporters know better.<br /></p><p align="left">There are ample signs that religious belief in some way inclines many people to opt for Bush's separate reality. However, we also are witnessing the successful efforts of a Ministry of Truth on a population which is frightened, patriotic, nationalistic and uninformed.<br />____________________<br /><br /><small>1. I omit here those who will vote for Bush because of abortion; that issue seems to me to be a special case.<br />2. <i>The New York Times Magazine,</i> 10/17/04.<br />3. October 21, 2004; <a href="http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/Pres_Election_04/Report10_21_04.pdf">http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/Pres_Election_04/Report10_21_04.pdf</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>October 29, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">One aspect of the separate-reality phenomenon is that there appear to be two George W. Bushes. The one I see bears no resemblance to the one described by many people.<br /></p><p align="justify">One theory is that two Bushes have existed serially. Richard Cohen, in a recent column, spoke of the vanishing president. He found the one at the debates to be "wooden, ill at ease and downright spooky" and contrasted that Bush with "the funny, good-natured regular guy I once saw on the campaign trail - a man of surprisingly quick wit and just plain likability."<sup><small>1</small></sup> If Mr. Bush has those characteristics in private or in some more informal setting, something happens when the camera is turned on to make him alternately baffled and smug, inane and shifty. However, the contrast Mr. Cohen sees is not primarily between the private and public man, but between the earlier and later. The Bush I've seen never has had the positive characteristics Mr. Cohen and others talk about, but certainly his televised appearances have been worse this year than before. He was weak, to say nothing of strange, in the debates, but he's been pretty bad even in his campaign appearances in front of carefully selected audiences of Stepford Republicans.<br /></p><p align="justify">It's easy to see why his managers want newspaper photos or TV news reports to show him surrounded by the faithful. (<i>The New York Times</i> cooperated again on Wednesday with a page-one picture of Bush, in the midst of a crowd, holding a supporter's child.) If a TV clip shows Mr. Bush delivering his speech, it's not an inspiring sight. When he comes to a punch line, he leans forward on the lectern, turns a little to the right, smirks, and says something dumb, false or both.<br /></p><p align="justify">The mannerisms are his, but the punch lines aren't. Each time Mr. Bush has been shown speaking since the debates, he's used a script. His inability to deliver a pep talk to a handpicked audience without having it written out for him gives credence to the story that he wore a receiver at the first debate. Now there are web sites featuring pictures supposedly showing suspicious bulges at all of the debates and on other occasions. As far-fetched as the story seems, his implausible explanation, that it's a badly tailored shirt, only encourages the speculation. However, his performance at the debates hardly indicates helpful off-stage prompting; as someone said, if he was wearing a wire, the guy on the other end must have been a Democrat.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush is getting half of the votes in the polls. Obviously a lot of people see a different man than I do.<br />_____________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 10/15/04.</small> </p><p align="justify"><b>October 31, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">One of the ironies of the presidential campaign is that, in several ways, Mr. Bush's failures have given him an advantage.<br /></p><p align="justify">The first is that he has created problems which are insoluble in the short term, thereby making it next to impossible to propose a sensible alternative. Iraq obviously is the prime instance. Simply starting a war would lock in any successor to some degree, but bungling the war, creating a morass from which there is no short or easy way out, essentially commits the opponent to agreeing to stay the course. The same is true of the budget. By running massive deficits, the President has made it impossible for Mr. Kerry to propose any sensible program. He ends up copying Mr. Bush's implausible formula: a promise to cut the deficit in half in five years while adding benefits. The greater the failure, the more the incumbent co-opts the challenger.<br /></p><p align="justify">Another instance also involves Iraq. Greg Thielmann was interviewed on NOW on Friday. After discussing the many distortions of intelligence involved in taking the country to war, he described one of the reasons that people, even now, accept obvious untruths, such as Iraq's involvement in 9-11: they have a desire to believe their president; the notion that he would knowingly or even negligently mislead us about the reasons for sending Americans to risk their lives is too awful to contemplate, so many accept the administration's distorted portrayal, back the war and think George Bush is a strong leader because the alternative is too shocking.<br /></p><p align="justify">Then we have the October surprise. The former version of this scenario was that Osama bin Laden would be produced about now, perhaps having been caught earlier but saved for the final run to election day. Instead, bin Laden gave us the surprise unaided, in the form of a tape which rubs Mr. Bush's nose in 9-11:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">It never occurred to us that the commander in chief of the American forces would leave 50,000 citizens in the two towers to face those horrors alone at a time when they most needed him because he thought listening to a child discussing her goat and its ramming was more important than the planes and their ramming of the skyscrapers. This gave us three times the time needed to carry out the operations, thanks be to God.<sup><small>1</small></sup></p></blockquote><p align="justify">The October surprise may yet help the President, if people rally around because of a reminder of the threat or punish bin Laden by voting for his target. It should, instead, be the end of Mr. Bush's claim to be our bulwark against terrorism, a reminder that 9-11 happened on his watch. Whether he can be faulted for that is beside the point: he has run as our protector and has no credential other than the supremely ironic one of having failed.<br />_____________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The Washington Post,</i> 10/30/04, translation by Reuters; <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10079-2004Oct29.html">www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10079-2004Oct29.html</a> A slightly different translation appeared in <i>The Seattle P-I,</i> from Associated Press.</small> </p><p align="justify"><a id="11/12/04"><b>November 12, 2004</b></a><br /></p><p align="justify">On November 8, a judge of the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled, in a case involving a Guantánamo detainee, that the military commissions created by President Bush three years ago can be used to try charges of war crimes only if it has been determined, by a competent tribunal, that the accused is not a prisoner of war. If he is entitled to POW status, or if that determination has not been made, he must be tried by court martial. In addition, any trial before a military commission, as now constituted, would be void because the rules allow the government to exclude the accused from sessions in which classified evidence is presented.<sup><small>1</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">The decision depends on the application of the Geneva Conventions, which establish the significance of POW status and the procedure necessary for determining it. It also involves interpretation of <i>Quirin.</i><sup><small>2</small></sup> Whether the District Court's analysis of these issues will persuade an appellate court is anyone's guess. <p align="justify">In addition to arguing against the application of the Geneva Conventions, the government attempted to finesse the POW issue. The first step was to establish that Hamdan was part of al Qaeda; for this the government pointed to the decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) that Hamdan was "either a member of or affiliated with Al Qaeda." From there, the argument proceeded to the President's blanket declaration that al Qaeda members aren't entitled to POW status. The Court rejected this, holding that the CSRT, a sham tribunal formed after the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Rasul,</i> was not established to address detainees' status under the Geneva Conventions, but rather to decide whether the prisoner is an "enemy combatant" and therefore subject to indefinite detention.<br /></p><p align="justify">The interpretation of <i>Quirin</i> and the application of the Geneva Conventions may be subject to legitimate debate, but the basic ruling should surprise no one. Although the Department of Defense adopted rules which in many ways brought the President's original military-commission concept closer to legitimacy, exclusion from trial, in aid of using secret evidence, is too blatantly unfair to ignore.<br /></p><p align="justify">Technically, the issue is raised by 10 U.S.C. § 836, part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). That section authorizes the President to prescribe regulations for the conduct of military commissions, subject to two limitations. The first is that such regulations shall, "so far as [the President] considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts...." President Bush, in the order creating the commissions, declared, with no explanation, that those rules were "not practicable." The Court did not rest its decision on that part of the order.<br /></p><p align="justify">The second limitation set out in § 836 is that the rules established by the President "may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter," <i>i.e.,</i> with the UCMJ. The District Court found that exclusion from trial conflicted with the UCMJ, which gives the accused the right to be present at all times, and in effect held that this was so fundamental a right, implicating the ability to provide an adequate defense, that the commission procedures were "contrary to and inconsistent with" the UCMJ.<br /></p><p align="justify">Hamdan had been held in isolation from December, 2003 until just before the hearing. Apart from the harshness of the treatment, this also affected his ability to assist his lawyer. The issue was partially resolved by the government's releasing Hamdan from solitary but transferring him to a "pre-Commission detention wing" of the prison. The Court ordered that he be returned to the general prison population.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Court also should have found the commission's rules for appeal invalid. They provide for an advisory panel of civilians, but leave final decision to the President or his designee, a poor substitute for judicial review, as required for courts martial. The Court listed but did not discuss numerous other differences. In the aggregate, they also seem inconsistent with the UCMJ, but it is not clear whether they were put in issue.<br /></p><p align="justify">In a nice coincidence, Alberto Gonzales was nominated on November 10 to be the new Attorney General. Mr. Gonzales, who argued deceitfully in support of the military commission order in its original, far more unjust form,<sup><small>3</small></sup> also was a major contributor to the concept of unlimited inherent presidential power, which led to the justification of torture. In addition to being in the midst of the discussions of bending the rules, Mr. Gonzales authored a memo of January 25, 2002<sup><small>4</small></sup> which advised the President that one of the advantages of declaring that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to al Qaeda and the Taliban is that it [s]ubstantially reduces the threat of . . . prosecution under the War Crimes Act . . . ."<br /></p><p align="justify">The decision in <i>Hamdan</i> is a repudiation of Gonzales' legal philosophy, if sycophantic manipulation of the law can be so described, and of his prediction that the President could foreclose any reconsideration of the POW issue.<br /></p><p align="left">The Senate should refuse to consent to his nomination. That presumably is impossible given the Republican majority, but a vigorous opposition should be mounted. What better opportunity to demonstrate to the nation the sort of people who are running its government? Instead, early reaction, including comments by Senators Leahy and Biden, indicate that confirmation will follow with little difficulty. The Democrats apparently are anxious to demonstrate that Ralph Nader was right.<br />___________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,</i> DCDC case 04-1519; <a href="http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/04-1519.pdf">http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/04-1519.pdf</a><br />2. <i>Ex Parte Quirin,</i> 317 U.S. 1 (1942).<br />3. See my note of <a href="http://geralddayarchive98.blogspot.com/#12/04/01">December 4, 2001</a><br />4. <a href="http://wid.ap.org/documents/doj/gonzales.pdf">http://wid.ap.org/documents/doj/gonzales.pdf</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>November 17, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">The Combatant Status Review Tribunal referred to in <i>Hamdan v. Rumsfeld</i> <sup><small>1</small></sup> has an interesting history. On June 28, <i>Rasul v. Bush</i> held that prisoners at Guantánamo are entitled to challenge their detention. <i>Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,</i> decided the same day, held that a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to a hearing to determine whether he is properly so classified, but that the hearing may be conducted by a military tribunal. The government has combined the two.<br /></p><p align="justify">In <i>Hamdi,</i> the Court's concept of due process for an accused enemy combatant is forgiving in the extreme. The government may hold a person so labeled indefinitely. It need not define "enemy combatant" in any meaningful way. It must allow a prisoner to challenge his enemy-combatant status, but that may be before a military tribunal; the Court even hinted that the government might want to look at a certain Army regulation as a model. The tribunal may presume the government's contentions to be correct, and may rely on hearsay, including conclusory hearsay like the Mobbs declaration. <p align="justify">Even the Department of Defense was able to interpret this intelligence. If a military tribunal operating under government-friendly rules is acceptable for a citizen, it certainly must be adequate for aliens. On July 7, Paul Wolfowitz signed an order creating a Combatant Status Review Tribunal to determine whether prisoners at Guantánamo are enemy combatants. A "fact sheet" issued at the same time<sup><small>2</small> </sup>blends the two Court decisions and the regulation referred to in <i>Hamdi,</i> Army Regulation 190-8,<sup><small>3</small></sup> into a rationale for the tribunals. Of course, <i>Rasul</i> contemplated habeas corpus review. The government satisfies the formalities by notifying each prisoners that "the United States Courts have jurisdiction to consider petitions brought by enemy combatants held at this facility that challenge the legality of their detention." The notice adds the warning that "the Combatant Status Review Tribunal will still review your status as an enemy combatant." Legal representation is not provided. No doubt the detainess all clearly understand their rights.<br /></p><p align="justify">Rules for the Guantánamo tribunals were issued on July 29 which generally follow Regulation 190-8 as to procedure. However, 190-8 was designed for a different purpose. It makes no mention of "enemy combatants." It is based upon the Geneva Conventions, which the government refuses to apply. It is designed to determine whether detainess fall into certain categories, including prisoners of war, a classification the government refuses to recognize.<br /></p><p align="justify">Guantánamo tribunals may receive classified evidence, which the prisoner may not see or hear. The prisoner is assigned a military "representative," but no lawyer.<sup> <small>4</small></sup> Regulation 190-8 is similar on these points. It provides that proof shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.<sup><small>5</small></sup> The Guantánamo rules give lip service to that concept but, taking the Court's suggestion, specify that the government's evidence shall be presumptively "genuine and accurate."<sup><small>6</small></sup><br /></p><p align="justify">This process is a sham. The government already has determined that each of the respondents is an enemy combatant;<sup><small>7</small></sup> the commission's task is to rubber-stamp that, which it has done; of 104 decisions, 103 have found the prisoner to be an enemy combatant.<sup><small>8</small></sup><br /></p><p align="left">That term, if used as defined in <i>Quirin,</i> would encompass legal combatants, who are required to be treated as prisoners of war, and illegal combatants, who would be subject to prosecution for war crimes. Reports to date indicate that few will be prosecuted, but, in denying POW status, the government implies that all of the detainees are war criminals. However, that may be nothing more than a PR exercise. There is speculation that the government needs to find the detainees to be enemy combatants in order to justify their detention. Many then would be released, but the government can pretend that it is being merciful. "One official said that approach would allow the military to assert that most of the detainees were not wrongfully imprisoned, but it would also provide a solution for the administration's desire not to hold such a large number for years."<sup><small>9</small></sup> If so, the present hearings are a farce as well as a sham. The Supreme Court must be proud of its work.<br />______________________<br /><br /><small>1. See note of <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=2264973730809717201&postID=6340405040762715495#11/12/04">November 12.</a><br />2. "Combatant Status Review Tribunals"; <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707factsheet.pdf">www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707factsheet.pdf</a><br />3. "Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees"; <a href="http://www.cdi.org/news/law/190-8.pdf">www.cdi.org/news/law/190-8.pdf</a><br />4. "Combatant Status Review Tribunal Process" § F. (3), (8); C(3).(7/29/04); <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf">www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf</a><br />5. <i>Ibid,</i> § 1-6e.(9), p. 3.<br />6. <i>Ibid,</i> § G. (11). See "Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal" § g.(12), <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf">www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf</a><br />7. Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, § a; Combatant Status Review Process, § B.<br />8. <i>The Los Angeles Times,</i> 11/7/04; <i>The New York Times,</i> 11/8/04.<br />9. <i>The New York Times,</i> 11/8/04.</small> <b></p></b><b><p align="justify">November 30, 2004</b></p><p align="justify">During his testimony to the Senate Banking Committee on February 12, Alan Greenspan said that Social Security benefits might have to be cut to bring the deficit under control. That seemed to be news. <i>The Seattle Times</i> treated it as such, in a front-page story the following day under a headline pointing to the Social Security issue. In <i>The New York Times,</i> the story rated page C3, and the only reference to Social Security was a passing mention in paragraph 11. There was no report on the main page of the online edition of <i>The Washington Post;</i> a search turned up an article referring to Social Security in paragraphs 15 and 16.<br /></p><p align="justify">Apparently repetition is necessary to attract the attention of our national guardians. After Mr. Greenspan offered the same advice to the House Budget Committee on February 25, The NY <i>Times</i> and The <i>Post</i> managed to get the point and ran front-page stories.<br /></p><p align="justify">President Bush has pretended that he will "protect" or "save" Social Security while asking for repeated, massive tax cuts. Greenspan, who is more honest if no more enlightened, said that making the tax cuts permanent is good policy, but we'll have to reduce Social Security benefits to pay for them. It seemed possible that the national media's awareness of the issue combined with Greenspan's candor might wake people up to what's afoot. In a column in The <i>Post</i> the day after the second hearing, E.J. Dionne speculated that "Greenspan did something no Democrat could do: He made Social Security an issue in the 2004 election." Mr. Dionne hoped that we would have a debate over our priorities: tax cuts for the rich or preservation of promised retirement benefits. Unfortunately, that did not happen and Bush continues to prattle about protecting Social Security while planning its demise.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Bush's plan is to allow individuals to invest part of their payroll taxes in private accounts. Because allowing the diversion of some of the payroll tax would reduce the cash flow into the system, and because the tax revenue is needed to pay benefits, preserving those benefits would cost a ton of money. Bush has refused to address that problem and generally has pretended that it doesn't exist. Now that he has his supposed mandate, he wants to move forward with privatization, so the problem must be faced - or maybe not. Because the budget already is in massive deficit, the government must borrow the money necessary to pay the cost of privatization, but the current speculation is that the cost will be relegated to an off-budget account so that it won't affect the official deficit.<sup><small>1 </small></sup>This is a nice bit of sleight of hand: the Social Security surplus lowers the deficit but these costs won't be allowed to increase it.<br /></p><p align="justify">Where will that money come from? We already are running out of sources; will lenders, especially the foreign lenders on whom we are now so dependant, choose to fund our further descent toward national bankruptcy? Possibly recognizing that problem, some Republicans in Congress are hesitantly acknowledging that it won't be possible to borrow all of the cost, so benefits will be cut and/or taxes raised. No one has specified the tax to be increased, but the logical choice is the payroll tax. If that turns out to be the case, workers will have diverted part of their payroll tax to private investment, only to have the tax increased, possibly leaving them paying as much for less in future Social Security benefits. They will have added a private investment program, but they could have done that without our messing up Social Security.<br /></p><p align="justify">It is a mystery to me why Alan Greenspan is treated with such deference and respect. His record in managing the monetary system is good but hardly perfect. His public pronouncements are described as Delphic, which is a kind way of saying that they are either evasive or muddled; neither is a recommendation for following his advice. He occupies a powerful, independent and unaccountable position, which imposes on him a duty of nonpartisan objectivity, but instead he has become an apologist for the Bush administration's obsession with cutting taxes. He even has followed the leader in altering his rationale to suit the circumstances.<br /></p><p align="justify">But the principal reason that no one should again pay any attention to Mr. Greenspan is his complicity in what Paul Krugman has aptly termed The Greenspan/Bush Social Security Scam. Following the recommendations of a commission chaired by Mr. Greenspan, the regressive payroll tax was increased in the mid-eighties. Workers were told that the additional revenue would cover the increased cost of pensions when the baby boomers retired. As a result of the increase, the Social Security trust fund has built up a large surplus, which has masked the condition of the general fund and has made tax cuts easier to sell.<br /></p><p align="justify">The surplus is "invested" in government bonds, which means that the Social Security reserve against those boomer pensions is only as meaningful as the willingness and ability of the government to repay its borrowings from the fund. The administration already has jeopardized that repayment by running up the deficit and debt through tax cuts; now it wants to set up private accounts, which will add to the debt and, gimmicks or not, to the deficit. For good measure, the administration wants additional tax cuts, which will add still more red ink.<br /></p><p align="justify">Every addition to deficit and debt increases the likelihood that the government will default on its obligation to repay the Social Security trust fund, and that the benefit cuts being discussed are only the opening wedge. Those additional payroll taxes will not have secured future pensions; instead, they merely will have shifted the tax burden downward.<br /></p><p align="justify">If the government were honest, its first priority would be ensuring enough revenue to repay its borrowings from the trust fund; then it could consider what adjustments might be needed to deal with any remaining shortfall. Instead it is overstating the future Social Security deficit (to frighten people into accepting its "cure"), ignoring the general-fund deficit, pretending that taking money from the fund adds to it and exempting the wealthy from their fair share of taxation.<br /></p><p align="justify">George Bush is, ironically, telling the truth when he says that Social Security is in trouble. What he doesn't say is that he is the menace.<br />______________________<br /><br /><small>1. Richard W. Stevenson, "Bush's Plan Is Said to Require Vast Borrowing," <i>The New York Times,</i> 11/28/04.</small> </p><p align="justify"><a id="12/08/04"><b>December 8, 2004</b></a><br /></p><p align="justify">In the course of analyzing their inability to win presidential elections, Democrats are re-examining both their message and their ability to communicate it successfully. It turns out that the administration has engaged in a similar exercise as to its failure to win hearts and minds in the Muslim world.<br /></p><p align="justify">The results of that inquiry are contained in a document dated September, 2004 and entitled Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication. <sup><small>1</small></sup> The Report discusses the necessity of effectively communicating U.S. policy and principles, finds that the government has failed to do so, and offers suggestions, including detailed and ambitious organizational changes, to remedy that deficiency.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Report is a difficult document to characterize or even summarize. It concludes that the image of America in the Muslim world is negative, and that we lack credibility. "Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible . . . ; messages should seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards." "To be effective, strategic communicators must understand attitudes and cultures . . . To be persuasive, they must be credible." However, the Report can't quite make up its mind whether our policies are wrong or whether the problem is one of attitude, organization and method.<br /></p><p align="justify">One criticism which might fall into either category is that certain ways of thinking became entrenched during the cold war and did not change after it ended. Indeed, the Report claims, a result of victory in that contest was that "the Cold War template was almost mythically anointed." Following 9/11, the government "reflexively inclined toward Cold War-style responses to the new threat, without a thought or a care as to whether these were the best responses to a very different strategic situation." The Report lists passage of The Patriot Act and creation of The Department of Homeland Security as instances of that reaction. The fixation on national enemies, leading to the invasion of Iraq, would be a better example, and elsewhere the Report does note that mindset: "We must think in terms of global networks, both government and non-government. If we continue to concentrate primarily on states ('getting it right' in Iraq, managing the next state conflict better), we will fail."<br /></p><p align="justify">The cold-war paradigm also has led to misjudging the condition and aspirations of Muslim peoples: "There is no yearning-to-be-liberated-by-the-U.S. groundswell among Muslim societies - <i>except to be liberated perhaps from what they see as apostate tyrannies that the U.S. so determinedly promotes and defends."</i> [Italics in original] The last sentence emphasizes a point made elsewhere in the Report, that our support for repressive Muslim regimes is a strategic mistake. And there are others: "U.S. policies on Israeli-Palestinian issues and Iraq in 2003-2004 have damaged America's credibility and power to persuade."<br /></p><p align="justify">These errors are summed up in statement which also clears away some of the rhetorical underbrush:<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">Muslims do not "hate our freedom," but rather, they hate our policies. The overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support in favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the longstanding, even increasing support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Gulf states.<br /></p><p align="justify">Thus when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy. . . . </p></blockquote><div align="justify">The first sentence dismisses one of President Bush's favorite myths, and the last disposes of the current rationale for the occupation of Iraq.<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">Viewing our present situation in terms of a war on terrorism also is an echo of the cold war. The discussion here falls into jargon, as does much of the document.<br /></p><blockquote><p align="justify">The Global War on Terrorism replaced the Cold War as a national security meta narrative. Governments, media, and publics use the terrorism frame for cognitive, evaluative, and communication purposes. . . .<br /></p><p align="justify">. . . But like the Cold War frame, the terrorism frame marginalizes other significant issues and problems. . . . The focus is more on capturing and killing terrorists than attitudinal, political, and economic forces that are the underlying source of threats and opportunities in national security.</p></blockquote><div align="justify">This certainly is true, and we'd be better able to develop rational policies if the notion of a Global War on Terrorism were scrapped. However, the authors of the Report apparently still need a "meta-narrative," so they offer a substitute: the war of ideas. For strategic communication to succeed, "we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas. . . ."<br /><br /></div><p align="justify">The Report's attempt to expand on that theory is not a model of clarity. The global war of ideas is reduced to a struggle primarily within Islam, into which we must intervene. "Islam's crisis must be understood as a contest of ideas and engaged accordingly." "[T]he larger goals of U.S. strategy depend on separating the vast majority of non-violent Muslims from the radical-militant Islamist-Jihadists." It may be that we are to effect this separation by encouraging modernization; the Report states that "the United States today is seeking to convert a broad movement within Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity - an agenda hidden within the official rubric of a 'War on Terrorism.' " That doesn't sound approving, but buried in a long section on methodology are comments which indicate that we should, in fact, be encouraging adoption - or at least reinforcing any tendency to favor - Western values. Those are defined at one point as "personal control, choice and change, personal mobility, meritocracy, individual rights (and, particularly, women's rights)" but at another more hesitantly as "moderation" and "tolerance" [quotation marks in the original].<br /></p><p align="justify">Although in one place the Report disavows any intention to impose "the American way of life," in another it proposes recruiting people from the private sector to "articulate American values." The Report refers to "the enemy," but it's not clear who that is; in one passage, al Qaeda is identified, but elsewhere it may be "radical Islam."<br /></p><p align="justify">These inconsistencies, and differences in style, suggest authorship by committee. So does an ambivalent attitude toward current administration policy. Many of the comments are critical, but others follow the administration line. For example, the embedding of reporters is described as an exercise in "transparency" and it is claimed that embedding helped prevent Iraqi "disinformation" about civilian casualties that could have undermined support for the war.<br /></p><p align="justify">The Report is a confused statement, the confusion perhaps traceable to differing agendas among the authors but also to the decision to state the issue in terms of a war of ideas. That was not an original formulation - the Report refers to the use of the phrase by Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice - nor is it a productive one. The difficulty the authors have in defining the ideas we are fighting for is one problem, but whether the ideas are fuzzy or clear, an ideological foreign policy is dangerous and, ironically, is another carryover from the cold war.<br />______________<br /><br /><small>1. <a href="http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf">www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>December 13, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Apparently the official rationale for the invasion of Iraq still is more or less what it was in early 2003: Iraq's WMD, which might be passed to terrorists. The latest statement I could find on the White House web site is the President's brief response on October 7 to the Duelfer report. Mr. Bush acknowledged that "Iraq did not have the weapons that our intelligence believed were there." However, in his imaginative interpretation of the report, Saddam Hussein "retained the knowledge, the materials, the means, and the intent to produce weapons of mass destruction. And he could have passed that knowledge on to our terrorist enemies."<br /></p><p align="justify">If the President ever is forced to drop the weapons rationale, and is stumped for an alternative excuse, he might be tempted to turn to Thomas Friedman for suggestions. Mr. Friedman was an early advocate of the liberation-and-beacon-of-democracy scenario, which Mr. Bush falls back on from time to time. However, death, destruction and chaos are making that a little tough to recite with a straight face, so Mr. Friedman has a new one.<br /></p><p align="justify">His column of December 9 started off with a skeptical observation about the new intelligence structure. As he noted, another layer of bureaucracy isn't likely to lead to better work. He wants more people "on the ground" who speak the relevant languages, which probably is a good idea. Of course, given the President's ability to find in intelligence reports whatever he wishes to find, better information is irrelevant. However, that doesn’t matter; facts are equally unimportant to Mr. Friedman’s new theory.<br /></p><p align="justify">He thinks that if, years ago, we had deployed those Arabic-speaking agents, they would have discovered "people of mass destruction" in Iraq. This clever formulation refers to the present-day violent insurgents who were, he tells us, created as such by the U.N. sanctions, operating on a society already damaged by the repressive Hussein regime, the war with Iran and the first Gulf War. Thus his conclusion: we should have invaded ten years ago, to prevent their becoming terrorists. The President should like this; call it the better-late-than-never theory.<br /></p><p align="justify">According to Mr. Friedman, an earlier invasion would have prevented youngsters from growing up with bad attitudes, inclined to do - what? Participate in 9-11? Well, no. Their supposed turn to the dark side led them to attacking us when we finally did get around to invading. Here's a thought: maybe it's our presence in Iraq that's the problem, not the psychological effect of sanctions. It may not be only the damaged present generation that would resent a pack of Westerners blowing up their cities, killing their neighbors, maiming their children and, as a bonus, declaring that they must adopt our form of government; an invasion at an earlier time might have prompted a similar response. The methods of some of the insurgents - kidnaping, execution of innocent prisoners, suicide bombings which kill civilians - are barbaric, and the motivation of the insurgency may go beyond merely throwing the occupiers out, but the fact remains that all of this has come to pass in the wake of our invasion.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Friedman's cure looks a lot like a disease, but that would fit right in.<br /></p><p align="justify"><a id="12/16/04"><b>December 16, 2004</b></a><br /></p><p align="justify">One of the ambiguities of the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication <sup><small>1</small></sup> is its attitude toward disinformation. It notes that the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Influence was closed amid allegations that it intended to place lies and disinformation in foreign media organizations but does not express any disapproval of its aims. The Report recommends that public diplomacy be coordinated with psychological operations (PSYOP) and open military information operations. Exactly what open means here is not clear to me, but the Report tells us that information operations is a term used by the Defense Department to include Computer Network Operations (Computer Network Attack and Defense), Electronic Warfare, Operational Security, Military Deception, and PSYOP. Coordinating them with public diplomacy, which the Report elsewhere declares must be credible, suggests that the credibility is to be apparent but not necessarily real, that information is to be just another weapon. An article in <i>The New York Times</i> on December 13 states that this is in fact the plan.<br /></p><p align="justify">The <i>Times </i>article <sup><small>1</small></sup> describes a study conducted by the National Defense University which proposes creating an Orwellian director of central information. The director would have authority over messages "across all the government operations that deal with national security and foreign policy. Lip service is paid to separating military disinformation from accurate public information, but the potential for merging the two and managing the news is obvious, and is underscored by a comment by Lawrence DiRita, spokesman for the Pentagon, that military officers are the face of the United States abroad.<br /></p><p align="justify">Of course, we don’t get accurate and honest information about national security now, so how much difference can it make?<br />__________________<br /><br /><small>1. See note of December 8.<br />2. Shanker & Schmitt, Hearts and Minds, 12/13/04. </small></p><p align="justify"><b>December 18, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">"The White House seems to have slipped the bonds of simple denial and escaped into the disturbing realm of utter delusion." This pertinent observation was the opening of a recent column by Bob Herbert,<sup><small>1</small></sup> prompted by the farce performed last Tuesday: presentation of The Presidential Medal of Freedom to three of the architects of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, an adventure which has little to do with freedom and is a disaster by any measure.<br /></p><p align="justify">Mr. Herbert also illustrated the "disconnect between the White House's fantasyland and the world of war in Iraq" by juxtaposing two headlines from the front page of the December 10 <i>New York Times</i>: "It's Inauguration Time Again, and Access Still Has Its Price - $250,000 Buys Lunch With President and More" and "Armor Scarce for Heavy Trucks Transporting U.S. Cargo in Iraq."<br /></p><p align="justify">He mentioned other indications of the administration's descent into fantasy, such as the nominations of Bernard Kerick and Alberto Gonzales. In the former, the New York - 9/11 image was so dazzling that common sense and careful vetting were forgotten. The latter is, of course, primarily an indication of the administration's lack of principle and contempt for the law and the Constitution. However, nominating someone so ethically unqualified while presenting itself as the protector of moral values does suggest detachment from reality.<br /></p><p align="justify">Meanwhile, the news pages provided another instance of the <i>Times'</i> determination not to be accused of an unseemly degree of liberalism. In an article noting the retirement of Bill Moyers from PBS, David Carr led with this snide observation: " Bill Moyers, a preacher turned journalist . . . has veered back to the pulpit in announcing his retirement from 'Now With Bill Moyers' . . . ." <sup><small>2</small></sup> The "jeremiad" which so annoyed Mr. Carr was an advance copy of a report broadcast Friday during Mr. Moyers' last program; the subject was the capture of much of the media by the corporate-political right. "The gospel of Mr. Moyers - an unreconstructed progressive - warns against the danger of media consolidation, the growing links between conservative government and conservative media and the threat of information control by government." Yes, happily for the future of the Republic, it does. Apparently that is a point of view as surprising to Mr. Carr as it is unwelcome.<br /></p><p align="justify">Carr offers quotes in praise and criticism of Moyers. Perhaps because of what he considers to be Moyers' "tendentiousness in choice of targets," he turns for negative comment to sources who fairly might be described in similar terms. One is conservative columnist, liberal-media scourge and family-values monitor L. Brent Bozell III, who is quoted as saying, "I think that if Bill Moyers is trying to go out as the Michael Moore of television, he ought to be congratulated, because he has succeeded. I think he has gone off the deep end." The other source is a column by Lowell Ponte, from which Carr extracts a description of Moyers as "sweater-wearing pundit who delivered socialist and neo-Marxist propaganda with a soft Texas accent."<sup><small>3</small></sup> The rest of Ponte's column (which also quotes Bozell) is a mixture of personal attacks and complaints that Moyers, by interjecting his opinions, doesn't play by the rules of journalism. Considering the practices of the right-wing media, the latter is sufficiently ironic standing alone, and made more so by a comment on Moyers' final broadcast. One of his guests, Richard Viguerie, defended the conservative media's practice of offering opinion, not facts; in his view they shouldn't be bound by "liberal" rules of objectivity.<br /></p><p align="left">Perhaps with the departure of Bill Moyers, we will hear the last complaint about the liberal media; he was one of the few liberal voices remaining. Not likely, though; slogans are more important than facts.<br />_________________<br /><br /><small>1. <i>The New York Times,</i> 12/17/04.<br />2. "Moyers Leaves a Public Affairs Pulpit With Sermons to Spare," 12/17/04.<br />3. "Adieu to Bill Moyers," <a href="http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=16309">www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=16309</a></small> </p><p align="justify"><b>December 31, 2004</b><br /></p><p align="justify">Three items from the news sum up this interesting year. The administration, having been labeled insensitive and stingy in its reaction to the disaster in Southeast Asia, finally has pledged a larger sum in relief than will be spent on the inaugural festivities. The Republicans in the House propose to deal with Tom DeLay's ethical violations by changing the rules to remove any sting from such violations and replacing the chairman of the ethics committee. ABC News, as part of a report on the ethically problematic gifts received by Justice Thomas, sought comment from John Yoo, whose most notable contribution to the theory of government lies in the area of avoidance of moral standards and personal responsibility.</p>Gerald G. Dayhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18272770512487580818noreply@blogger.com